Florianbuetow Claude Code Integrity

Software and Data Integrity Failures

Analyze source code, CI/CD configurations, and dependency manifests for integrity violations. Detect insecure deserialization, unverified auto-updates, missing subresource integrity, CI/CD pipeline injection, and untrusted dependency sources. Produce actionable findings with severity ratings, code locations, and concrete remediation steps.

Supported Flags

All flags from ../../shared/schemas/flags.md are supported:

Framework Context

OWASP Top 10 2021 - A08: Software and Data Integrity Failures

Code and infrastructure that does not protect against integrity violations. This category covers a broad set of concerns around trusting the provenance and authenticity of software, data, and infrastructure:

• Relying on plugins, libraries, or modules from untrusted sources, repositories, or CDNs
• Insecure CI/CD pipelines that allow unauthorized code or configuration changes
• Auto-update functionality that downloads and applies updates without integrity verification
• Insecure deserialization where untrusted data is deserialized into objects, enabling remote code execution, replay attacks, injection, or privilege escalation

STRIDE Mapping: Tampering, Elevation of Privilege

CWE References: CWE-502 (Deserialization of Untrusted Data), CWE-829 (Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere), CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check), CWE-915 (Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes), CWE-353 (Missing Support for Integrity Check)

Detection Patterns

Read references/detection-patterns.md before performing analysis. It contains detailed Grep heuristics, language-specific code examples, scanner coverage, and false positive guidance for each vulnerability pattern.

Workflow

1. Determine Scope

Parse --scope flag and resolve to a concrete file list:

1. Apply scope resolution per ../../shared/schemas/flags.md.
2. Filter to files relevant to integrity:
   • Serialization/deserialization code (data processing, API handlers)
   • CI/CD configuration files (.github/workflows/*.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci/config.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml)
   • Dependency manifests and lockfiles (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, Pipfile.lock, go.sum, Cargo.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle)
   • HTML files with CDN script/link tags
   • Update/installer scripts and auto-update mechanisms
   • Pre/post-install hooks in package configurations
   • Dockerfile and container build configurations
3. Include infrastructure-as-code files that reference external resources or images.

2. Check for Scanners

Detect available scanners in order of preference:

If no scanner is available, proceed with Claude analysis using Grep patterns from references/detection-patterns.md. Note in output: "No scanner available -- findings based on code pattern analysis only."

3. Run Scanners

For each available scanner:

1. Execute against the scoped file list.
2. Parse JSON output.
3. Filter to integrity-related rules only.
4. Normalize findings to the schema in ../../shared/schemas/findings.md.
5. Set scanner.confirmed: true for scanner-detected findings.

4. Claude Analysis

Regardless of scanner availability, perform manual code analysis:

1. Read references/detection-patterns.md for the full pattern catalog.
2. Use Grep with the regex patterns to locate suspicious constructs.
3. Read surrounding code context (30-50 lines) to assess each match.
4. Trace data flows from untrusted sources to deserialization sinks.
5. At --depth deep or higher: follow imports, trace dependency chains, analyze CI/CD workflow trigger conditions and secret exposure, map update mechanisms end-to-end.
6. Deduplicate against scanner findings (same file + line = same finding).
7. Set confidence: medium for Claude-only findings, confidence: high when confirmed by a scanner.

5. Report Findings

Format output per --format flag. Each finding uses the schema from ../../shared/schemas/findings.md with these specifics:

• ID prefix: INTEG (e.g., INTEG-001, INTEG-002)
• references.owasp: A08:2021
• references.stride: T (Tampering) or E (Elevation of Privilege)
• metadata.tool: integrity
• metadata.framework: owasp
• metadata.category: A08

Summary block (appended after all findings):

## Summary

| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| CRITICAL | N     |
| HIGH     | N     |
| MEDIUM   | N     |
| LOW      | N     |

**Scanners used**: [list or "none"]
**Scanners missing**: [list of recommended but unavailable]
**Top priorities**: [top 3 findings to fix first and why]

What to Look For

These are the primary vulnerability patterns. See references/detection-patterns.md for detailed regex patterns and code examples.

1. Insecure deserialization -- Using pickle.loads, yaml.load (without SafeLoader), Java ObjectInputStream, or JSON.parse on untrusted input to reconstruct objects that can execute arbitrary code.
2. CI/CD pipeline injection -- GitHub Actions or other CI workflows that interpolate untrusted input (PR titles, branch names, issue bodies) into run: blocks, enabling command injection in the build environment.
3. CDN resources without SRI -- Loading JavaScript or CSS from third-party CDNs without integrity attributes, allowing a compromised CDN to inject malicious code.
4. Auto-update without verification -- Download-and-execute update mechanisms that do not verify digital signatures or checksums before applying updates.
5. Malicious pre/post-install scripts -- Package configurations with install hooks that execute arbitrary code during npm install, pip install, or similar commands.
6. Missing lockfile integrity -- Dependency lockfiles absent from version control or containing no integrity hashes, allowing silent dependency substitution.
7. Untrusted base images -- Dockerfiles using unverified or untagged base images (e.g., FROM node instead of FROM node:20-alpine@sha256:...).
8. Missing code signing -- Release artifacts, packages, or binaries distributed without digital signatures.

Scanner Integration

Refer to ../../shared/schemas/scanners.md for full scanner details.

Primary: trivy (dependency vulnerabilities, misconfigurations), osv-scanner (cross-ecosystem CVEs) Secondary: semgrep (deserialization patterns), bandit (Python pickle/YAML), checkov (CI/CD configs) Fallback: Grep-based pattern matching from references/detection-patterns.md plus Claude analysis of CI/CD configs and dependency manifests

When running as a subagent of the OWASP dispatcher, receive scope and flags from the parent agent prompt. Do not re-parse user input.

Output Format

All findings conform to the schema defined in ../../shared/schemas/findings.md.

ID prefix: INTEG (registered in the ID Prefix Registry as OWASP A08)

Example finding:

{
  "id": "INTEG-001",
  "title": "Unsafe pickle deserialization of user-uploaded data",
  "severity": "critical",
  "confidence": "high",
  "location": {
    "file": "src/api/import_handler.py",
    "line": 72,
    "function": "import_data",
    "snippet": "data = pickle.loads(request.files['upload'].read())"
  },
  "description": "User-uploaded file content is deserialized with pickle.loads, which can execute arbitrary Python code embedded in the pickle stream.",
  "impact": "An attacker can upload a crafted pickle file to achieve remote code execution on the server, potentially compromising the entire application and underlying infrastructure.",
  "fix": {
    "summary": "Replace pickle with a safe serialization format like JSON",
    "diff": "- data = pickle.loads(request.files['upload'].read())\n+ data = json.loads(request.files['upload'].read())"
  },
  "references": {
    "cwe": "CWE-502",
    "owasp": "A08:2021",
    "stride": "T",
    "mitre_attck": "T1059"
  },
  "scanner": {
    "name": "bandit",
    "rule": "B301",
    "confirmed": true
  },
  "metadata": {
    "tool": "integrity",
    "framework": "owasp",
    "category": "A08"
  }
}

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