Go Security

Go Security Audit

Audit Go applications across stdlib net/http, Gin, Echo, Chi, Fiber.

When this skill applies

• Reviewing Go HTTP handlers and middleware
• Auditing database queries (database/sql, sqlx, GORM)
• Reviewing template usage (html/template vs text/template)
• Checking goroutine safety and context propagation
• Reviewing file path handling

Workflow

Follow ../_shared/audit-workflow.md.

Phase 1: Stack detection

grep -E '^module|require' go.mod | head
# Detect framework
grep -E 'github.com/(gin-gonic/gin|labstack/echo|go-chi/chi|gofiber/fiber|valyala/fasthttp)' go.mod

Phase 2: Inventory

# Handlers and routes
grep -rn 'http\.HandleFunc\|r\.GET\|r\.POST\|router\.\|app\.' --include='*.go' . | head -50

# SQL queries
grep -rn 'db\.Query\|db\.QueryRow\|db\.Exec\|Prepare' --include='*.go' .

# Templates
grep -rn 'text/template\|html/template' --include='*.go' .

# File paths
grep -rn 'os\.Open\|filepath\.Join\|filepath\.Clean' --include='*.go' .

# Cryptography
grep -rn 'crypto/md5\|crypto/sha1\|crypto/des' --include='*.go' .

Phase 3: Detection — the checks

Template injection

• GOL-TPL-1 html/template used for HTML output (auto-escapes); never text/template for HTML (no escaping).

  // BAD — text/template doesn't escape HTML
  import "text/template"
  tmpl, _ := text.Parse("<p>{{.Name}}</p>")
  
  // GOOD — html/template context-aware
  import "html/template"
  tmpl, _ := html.Parse("<p>{{.Name}}</p>")
  

• GOL-TPL-2 No template.HTML(userInput), template.JS(userInput), template.URL(userInput) — these mark strings as safe and bypass escaping.
• GOL-TPL-3 No template.Parse(userInput) — SSTI vulnerability.

SQL injection

• GOL-SQL-1 database/sql uses ? (MySQL) or $1 (Postgres) placeholders:

  // BAD
  rows, err := db.Query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " + userID)
  
  // GOOD
  rows, err := db.Query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID)
  

• GOL-SQL-2 fmt.Sprintf constructing queries → injection.
• GOL-SQL-3 GORM Raw(sql, args) parameterizes args; string concatenation does not.
• GOL-SQL-4 Dynamic ORDER BY / table names → allowlist.

Path traversal

• GOL-PATH-1 filepath.Join(root, userInput) does NOT prevent .. traversal. After Join, verify result stays under root:

  safeRoot, _ := filepath.Abs("/var/data/userfiles")
  target := filepath.Join(safeRoot, filepath.Clean(userInput))
  resolved, err := filepath.Abs(target)
  if err != nil || !strings.HasPrefix(resolved, safeRoot+string(filepath.Separator)) {
      return errForbidden
  }
  

• GOL-PATH-2 Archive extraction (zip-slip): check each entry's resolved path stays inside the destination.

CORS

• GOL-COR-1 CORS middleware configured with specific origins. In Gin: cors.Default() is *; use cors.New(cors.Config{AllowOrigins: [...]}).
• GOL-COR-2 AllowCredentials: true combined with AllowOrigins: ["*"] is rejected by spec but check anyway.

Authentication

• GOL-AUTH-1 JWT validation: parse with explicit signing method; reject none.

  token, err := jwt.Parse(tokenString, func(t *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
      if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
          return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method")
      }
      return []byte(jwtSecret), nil
  })
  

• GOL-AUTH-2 Password hashing: golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt or argon2id. Not MD5/SHA1/SHA256.
• GOL-AUTH-3 Constant-time comparisons: subtle.ConstantTimeCompare for tokens, MACs.

Authorization

• GOL-AZ-1 Per-handler middleware checks role/permission. Don't rely on URL routing for auth.
• GOL-AZ-2 Ownership check uses values from validated session, not request body.

Middleware order (Gin/Chi/Echo)

• GOL-MW-1 Recovery middleware registered first.
• GOL-MW-2 Security headers (e.g., secure.New()) before routes.
• GOL-MW-3 CORS before auth (CORS preflight must succeed without auth).
• GOL-MW-4 Rate limiter before expensive parsing/handlers.

File uploads

• GOL-UP-1 r.ParseMultipartForm(maxMemory) with bounded maxMemory.
• GOL-UP-2 File size limited via http.MaxBytesReader.
• GOL-UP-3 Content-type validated by sniffing (http.DetectContentType on bytes), not just header.Header.Get("Content-Type").

TLS

• GOL-TLS-1 Production servers use http.Server with TLS or terminate TLS at the reverse proxy with Strict-Transport-Security set.
• GOL-TLS-2 tls.Config.MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12 (or 13).
• GOL-TLS-3 Custom certificate verification disabled? tls.Config.InsecureSkipVerify: true is never OK in production.

Cryptography

• GOL-CRYPTO-1 No crypto/md5 or crypto/sha1 for security purposes (passwords, MACs).
• GOL-CRYPTO-2 Random number generation uses crypto/rand, NOT math/rand for security tokens.
• GOL-CRYPTO-3 crypto/des, crypto/rc4 not used.

SSRF

• GOL-SSRF-1 http.Get(userURL) without URL validation → SSRF. See saas-security-pack/saas-code-security-review/references/ssrf-patterns.md.
• GOL-SSRF-2 Custom http.Client with Transport that blocks internal IPs.

Goroutine and context

• GOL-CTX-1 Handlers respect r.Context(); don't spawn goroutines without context for background work tied to request.
• GOL-CTX-2 Long-running goroutines started from handlers don't leak (no shutdown signal).
• GOL-CTX-3 Shared maps protected by sync.Mutex or use sync.Map; concurrent map access without sync is data race + panic.

Error handling

• GOL-ERR-1 Errors not echoed verbatim to clients (fmt.Fprintln(w, err) leaks internals).
• GOL-ERR-2 panic recovered at handler boundary (gin.Recovery(), chi.Recoverer, custom).
• GOL-ERR-3 Stack traces logged server-side only.

Logging

• GOL-LOG-1 No log.Printf("token=%s", token) — secrets not logged.
• GOL-LOG-2 Structured logging (zap, zerolog, slog) with redaction for sensitive fields.

Static analysis

• GOL-SAST-1 gosec run periodically. Common findings: hardcoded credentials, weak crypto, SQL injection patterns.
• GOL-SAST-2 staticcheck and go vet clean in CI.

Dependencies

• GOL-DEP-1 go.mod versions current; go mod tidy clean.
• GOL-DEP-2 govulncheck clean — official Go vulnerability scanner.

Phase 4: Triage

Critical: SQL via fmt.Sprintf; tls.InsecureSkipVerify in prod; SSRF reaching internal services; race condition on shared map.

Phase 5: Report

Use ../_shared/findings-schema.md. Prefix IDs with GOL-.

Source: hlsitechio/claude-skills-security — distributed by TomeVault.