tools-only Phase 3: Trust Boundary Evaluation
Type: Evaluative Executor: LLM Knowledge: Security Principles (ZT, SOD, LP), security-design.yaml
⚠️ MANDATORY: 4-Phase Gating Protocol (BLOCKING)
CRITICAL: You MUST complete the following four stages in sequence and output the result of each stage. Skipping any stage will degrade analysis quality!
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🧠 THINKING - Phase 3 Entry Gate
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Purpose: Identify trust boundaries based on P2 DFD, evaluate cross-boundary security posture.
⚠️ You MUST output THINKING results in the following format:
🧠 THINKING - P3 Entry Gate
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📌 CORE PROBLEM
Identify all trust boundaries, evaluate security controls for cross-boundary flows
📊 UPSTREAM DATA (Read from P2 YAML)
| Metric | Value | Source |
|--------|-------|--------|
| P2 External Interactor Count | {actual_value} | P2_dfd_elements.yaml → dfd_elements.external_interactors length |
| P2 Process Count | {actual_value} | P2_dfd_elements.yaml → dfd_elements.processes length |
| P2 Data Store Count | {actual_value} | P2_dfd_elements.yaml → dfd_elements.data_stores length |
| P2 Data Flow Count | {actual_value} | P2_dfd_elements.yaml → dfd_elements.data_flows length |
| L1 Coverage Score | {actual_value} | P2_dfd_elements.yaml → l1_coverage.overall.overall_score |
❓ UNKNOWNS
- Trust boundary type distribution (Network/Process/User/Data/Service/Model/Agent)
- Security controls for cross-boundary flows
- Sensitive data node locations
⚠️ RISKS
- DFD elements not fully mapped to boundary zones
- Cross-boundary flows missing security control records
- Boundary diagram missing critical crossing points
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⛔ STOP CHECK
- P2 YAML read? [YES/NO]
- Upstream data complete (all DFD element counts have values)? [YES/NO]
- Ready to continue PLANNING? [YES/NO]
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⛔ STOP CONDITION: If any STOP CHECK = NO → Read P2 data first before continuing
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📋 PLANNING - Sub-task Decomposition
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Step 1: Read Upstream Data (BLOCKING - MUST execute)
# Read P2 YAML data
python scripts/phase_data.py --query --phase 2 --summary --root .
python scripts/phase_data.py --query --phase 2 --type dfd --root .
# Or read directly
cat .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P2_dfd_elements.yaml
⛔ If P2 YAML does not exist or is invalid → STOP and return to complete P2
Step 2: Output Sub-task Table (MANDATORY)
⚠️ You MUST output PLANNING results in the following format:
📋 PLANNING - P3 Sub-tasks
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| # | Sub-task | Expected Output |
|---|----------|-----------------|
| T1 | Read P2 DFD data, extract element inventory | Data structure |
| T2 | Identify trust boundaries (TB-xxx), determine types | Boundary inventory |
| T3 | Analyze cross-boundary data flows | Cross-boundary flow mapping |
| T4 | Evaluate interface security (authn/authz/encryption) | Security control assessment |
| T5 | Map sensitive data nodes | Sensitive data markers |
| T6 | Generate boundary diagram (ASCII + Mermaid) | Visual diagrams |
| T7 | Write final output | P3_boundary_context.yaml + MD |
⛔ PLANNING CHECK
- Sub-tasks decomposed? [YES/NO]
- Ready to execute TaskCreate? [YES/NO]
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Step 3: TaskCreate for ALL sub-tasks (MANDATORY)
⚠️ Before starting any implementation, you MUST execute TaskCreate to create all sub-tasks!
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⚡ EXECUTION LOOP
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For each sub-task:
TaskUpdate(status: "in_progress")- Implement sub-task
- Verify: Does output match expectations?
- If verification passes:
TaskUpdate(status: "completed")→ Next sub-task - If verification fails: Diagnose → Fix → Retry (max 3x) → If still failing: CHECKPOINT to request user decision
Output Order (CRITICAL):
- Write YAML first:
.phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P3_boundary_context.yaml - Write MD second:
.phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/reports/P3-TRUST-BOUNDARY.md
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🔍 REFLECTION - Completion Verification
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⚠️ After completing EXECUTION, you MUST output REFLECTION results in the following format:
🔍 REFLECTION - P3 Completion Check
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| Check Item | Status |
|------------|--------|
| P2 YAML data read and understood? | [✅/❌] |
| P3_boundary_context.yaml exists and valid? | [✅/❌] |
| All TB-xxx boundaries identified and classified? | [✅/❌] |
| All DFD elements mapped to boundary zones? | [✅/❌] |
| All cross-boundary flows have security control records? | [✅/❌] |
| Boundary diagram (ASCII) included? | [✅/❌] |
| boundary_findings exists (even if empty)? | [✅/❌] |
| Hook validation passed (exit 0)? | [✅/❌] |
⛔ COMPLETION GATE
- All checks passed? [YES/NO]
- Ready to enter P4? [YES/NO]
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⛔ If any check fails → Fix and re-verify until all pass
⚠️ MANDATORY OUTPUT RULES
CRITICAL: Phase 3 requires TWO outputs - a YAML data file AND a Markdown report.
Dual Output Requirement
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ PHASE 3 MUST PRODUCE TWO FILES: │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ 1. DATA FILE (PRIMARY - Write First!) │
│ Path: .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P3_boundary_context.yaml │
│ Purpose: Structured data for P4 to read │
│ Format: Valid YAML with schema_version: "3.0.2 (20260204a)" │
│ │
│ 2. REPORT FILE (SECONDARY - Write After Data!) │
│ Path: .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/reports/P3-TRUST-BOUNDARY.md │
│ Purpose: Human-readable trust boundary analysis │
│ Format: Markdown with diagrams and matrices │
│ │
│ INPUT REQUIREMENT: │
│ Read: .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P2_dfd_elements.yaml │
│ ❌ DO NOT read P2's .md report for data extraction │
│ ✅ REQUIRED: Parse P2's YAML for dfd_elements │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Required Data Sections in YAML
| Section | Validation |
|---|---|
boundary_context.boundaries[] |
BLOCKING - all trust boundaries with TB-xxx IDs |
boundary_context.interfaces[] |
BLOCKING - cross-boundary interfaces |
boundary_context.data_nodes[] |
BLOCKING - sensitive data locations |
boundary_context.cross_boundary_flows[] |
BLOCKING - all boundary crossings |
boundary_findings |
WARNING - security observations from boundary analysis |
Validation Gate
Phase 3 CANNOT complete until:
.phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P3_boundary_context.yamlexists and is valid YAML- Every DFD element mapped to a trust boundary zone
- All cross-boundary flows have security controls documented
.phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/reports/P3-TRUST-BOUNDARY.mdexists
Input Context
← P2: dfd_elements from .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P2_dfd_elements.yaml
⚠️ MANDATORY: Query P2 Data Before Analysis
Before starting P3 analysis, LLM MUST execute these queries to obtain P2 data:
# Step 1: Get P2 summary for DFD overview
python scripts/phase_data.py --query --phase 2 --summary --root .
# Step 2: Get detailed DFD elements (REQUIRED for boundary mapping)
python scripts/phase_data.py --query --phase 2 --type dfd --root .
# Step 3: Get data flows (REQUIRED for cross-boundary analysis)
python scripts/phase_data.py --query --phase 2 --type flows --root .
Or read YAML directly:
# PRIMARY source - REQUIRED
cat .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P2_dfd_elements.yaml
CRITICAL: Do NOT generate P3 trust boundaries from memory. MUST read P2 DFD data first!
Output Context
→ P4: boundary_context {boundaries[], interfaces[], data_nodes[], cross_boundary_flows[]}
Core Analysis Goal
Based on DFD, identify trust boundaries, key interfaces, and data nodes; evaluate security posture at boundary crossings.
Knowledge Reference
Security Principles:
- Zero Trust (ZT): Never trust, always verify
- Separation of Duties (SOD): Critical ops require multiple parties
- Least Privilege (LP): Minimum permissions required
- Least Agency (LA): Limit AI agent autonomy
Security Domains: AUTHN, AUTHZ, API from security-design.yaml
Error Handling
| Error | Cause | Recovery Action |
|---|---|---|
| P2 YAML not found | P2 not completed | Return to P2, complete DFD analysis |
| DFD elements incomplete | Missing flows or stores | Return to P2 for supplemental analysis |
| Boundary mapping failure | Complex architecture | Break into smaller zones, consult architect |
| Cross-boundary flow gaps | Incomplete P2 data | Document gaps, flag for manual review |
Fallback Strategy: If boundary analysis cannot complete due to data gaps, document known boundaries and mark incomplete zones with status: partial and gaps: ["description"].
Trust Boundary Types
| Type | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Network | Network segment boundaries | Internet/DMZ, DMZ/Internal |
| Process | Process isolation boundaries | Container, VM, Sandbox |
| User | User privilege boundaries | Anonymous/Authenticated, User/Admin |
| Data | Data sensitivity boundaries | Public/Internal/Confidential |
| Service | Service trust boundaries | Internal/External services |
| Model | AI/LLM model boundaries | User/Model, Model/Tool, Model/Data |
| Agent | AI agent autonomy boundaries | Human/Agent, Agent/External API |
Analysis Tasks
1. Identify Trust Boundaries
For each boundary:
- Assign ID: TB-xxx
- Determine type (Network/Process/User/Data/Service)
- Define scope (which elements are inside)
- Identify crossing points
2. Analyze Cross-Boundary Flows
For each data flow crossing a boundary:
- Source boundary zone
- Destination boundary zone
- Security controls at crossing
- Risk assessment
3. Evaluate Interface Security
For each cross-boundary interface:
- Authentication mechanism
- Authorization checks
- Data validation
- Encryption status
4. Map Sensitive Data Nodes
Identify where sensitive data resides relative to boundaries:
- Which boundary zone
- Access controls
- Encryption status
Output Structure
boundary_context:
boundaries:
- id: TB-001
name: "Internet Boundary"
type: Network
description: "Boundary between internet and DMZ"
inside: [P-001] # Elements inside
outside: [EI-001, EI-002] # Elements outside
crossing_points:
- flow_id: DF-001
direction: inbound
controls: [TLS, WAF, Rate-Limit]
interfaces:
- id: IF-001
boundary: TB-001
entry_side: "Internet"
exit_side: "DMZ"
protocol: HTTPS
authentication: "None (public endpoint)"
authorization: "N/A"
validation: "Input sanitization"
encryption: "TLS 1.3"
risk_level: HIGH
data_nodes:
- id: DN-001
data_store: DS-001
data_types: ["User PII", "Credentials"]
sensitivity: CRITICAL
boundary_zone: "Internal Network"
access_controls: ["Role-based", "MFA required"]
encryption:
at_rest: true
in_transit: true
cross_boundary_flows:
- flow_id: DF-001
source_zone: "Internet"
dest_zone: "DMZ"
boundaries_crossed: [TB-001]
data_sensitivity: MEDIUM
security_controls:
authentication: "Session token"
encryption: "TLS 1.3"
validation: "Input sanitization"
risk_assessment:
level: MEDIUM
concerns: ["Public exposure", "Credential handling"]
Boundary Diagram Template
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Trust Boundary Diagram │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ ╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗ │
│ ║ TB-001: Internet Boundary ║ │
│ ╠══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣ │
│ ║ ║ │
│ ║ ┌─────────┐ ║ │
│ ║ │ EI-001 │ ║ │
│ ║ │Web User │──────────┐ ║ │
│ ║ └─────────┘ │ DF-001 ║ │
│ ║ │ [TLS, WAF] ║ │
│ ╚═══════════════════════╪══════════════════════════════════╝ │
│ │ │
│ ╔═══════════════════════╪══════════════════════════════════╗ │
│ ║ TB-002: DMZ ▼ ║ │
│ ╠══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣ │
│ ║ ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐ ║ │
│ ║ │ P-001 │───────▶│ P-002 │ ║ │
│ ║ │API Gate │ DF-002 │Auth Svc │ ║ │
│ ║ └─────────┘ └────┬────┘ ║ │
│ ╚═══════════════════════════╪══════════════════════════════╝ │
│ │ │
│ ╔═══════════════════════════╪══════════════════════════════╗ │
│ ║ TB-003: Internal Network │ DF-003 ║ │
│ ╠═══════════════════════════╪══════════════════════════════╣ │
│ ║ ▼ ║ │
│ ║ ┌─────────┐ ║ │
│ ║ │ DS-001 │ ║ │
│ ║ │User DB │ ║ │
│ ║ └─────────┘ ║ │
│ ╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝ │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Security Assessment Matrix
| Boundary | Crossing Flows | Auth | Encryption | Validation | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TB-001 | DF-001, DF-010 | Token | TLS 1.3 | Input sanitization | Medium |
| TB-002 | DF-002, DF-003 | mTLS | TLS 1.3 | Schema validation | Low |
| TB-003 | DF-003 | DB Auth | TLS 1.3 | Parameterized queries | Low |
Boundary Issues to Identify
- Missing Controls: Boundaries without adequate authentication
- Weak Encryption: Unencrypted or weak encryption at crossings
- Excessive Permissions: Cross-boundary access with excessive privileges
- Missing Validation: Input not validated at boundary crossings
- Sensitive Data Exposure: Sensitive data crossing to lower-trust zones
Report Template
# P3: Trust Boundary Evaluation
## Boundary Summary
| Boundary | Type | Elements Inside | Crossing Flows |
|----------|------|-----------------|----------------|
| TB-001 | Network | P-001 | DF-001 |
| TB-002 | Network | P-001, P-002 | DF-002, DF-003 |
## Trust Boundary Diagram
[ASCII diagram]
## Cross-Boundary Flow Analysis
### DF-001: User Request (Internet → DMZ)
- **Source Zone**: Internet
- **Dest Zone**: DMZ
- **Security Controls**: TLS 1.3, WAF, Rate Limiting
- **Risk Level**: Medium
- **Concerns**: Public exposure
## Interface Security Assessment
[Assessment matrix]
## Sensitive Data Mapping
| Data Node | Location | Sensitivity | Protection |
|-----------|----------|-------------|------------|
| DN-001 | Internal | CRITICAL | Encrypted, RBAC |
## Boundary Findings
[yaml:boundary_findings block - see below]
```yaml:boundary_findings
findings:
- id: F-P3-001
type: boundary
title: "Finding title"
description: "Detailed description"
severity: HIGH # CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|LOW|INFO
category: missing_control|weak_encryption|excessive_permission|unprotected_crossing
location:
boundary_id: TB-xxx
interface_id: IF-xxx
flow_id: DF-xxx
affected_elements:
- type: trust_boundary
id: TB-xxx
- type: cross_boundary_flow
id: DF-xxx
security_relevance: "Why this matters for security"
crossing_risk: HIGH # Risk level of boundary crossing
recommended_action: "What to investigate in later phases"
summary:
total: 0
by_severity:
critical: 0
high: 0
medium: 0
low: 0
info: 0
by_category:
missing_control: 0
weak_encryption: 0
excessive_permission: 0
unprotected_crossing: 0
Finding Categories:
missing_control: Boundary crossing without security controlweak_encryption: Inadequate encryption at boundaryexcessive_permission: Cross-boundary access with excessive privilegesunprotected_crossing: Input not validated at boundary
Recommendations
- ...
- ...
---
## Completion Checklist
Before marking Phase 3 complete:
- [ ] All trust boundaries identified (TB-xxx)
- [ ] All cross-boundary flows analyzed
- [ ] Interface security assessed
- [ ] Sensitive data nodes mapped
- [ ] Trust boundary diagram included
- [ ] yaml:boundary_findings present (even if empty)
- [ ] Boundary issues documented
- [ ] Validation passed
---
**End of Phase 3 Instructions** (~200 lines, ~1.5K tokens)