272 Security Scorecard Fed9e50e

OSSF Scorecard Compliance Notes

This document explains our compliance status with OSSF Scorecard checks and documents any accepted risks or false positives.

Current Score: 8/10 for Pinned-Dependencies

Summary:

• ✅ 196/196 GitHub Actions pinned by SHA
• ✅ 4/4 Container images pinned by digest
• ✅ 3/3 Security tools use official SHA-pinned actions (checkov, pip-audit, zizmor)
• ⚠️ 0/17 pip commands pinned by hash (version-pinned only - accepted risk, checkov and pip-audit now use official actions)
• ⚠️ 21/24 npm commands pinned (3 are operational commands)
• ⚠️ 1 false positive for downloadThenRun
• ⚠️ APT packages intentionally unpinned (base image controls versions)

Pinned-Dependencies

GitHub Actions: COMPLIANT ✅

All GitHub Actions use commit SHA pinning (40-character hex):

# Examples from our workflows:
actions/checkout@1af3b93b6815bc44a9784bd300feb67ff0d1eeb3  # v6.0.0
actions/setup-python@83679a892e2d95755f2dac6acb0bfd1e9ac5d548  # v6
step-security/harden-runner@df199fb7be9f65074067a9eb93f12bb4c5547cf2  # v2.13.3

Docker Images: COMPLIANT ✅

All Docker images use SHA256 digest pinning:

# Examples from our workflows and docker-compose:
python:3.13.9-slim@sha256:326df678c20c78d465db501563f3492d17c42a4afe33a1f2bf5406a1d56b0e86
redis:alpine@sha256:8360960f5fb56a282d78686203dd875862cd4b52a4184c17ac753690252d6d31
node:20-alpine@sha256:bcd88137d802e2482c9df3cdec71e0431857ebbbdba6973776b5593214056d86

Official GitHub Actions: COMPLIANT ✅

Several security tools now use official GitHub Actions with SHA-pinning, which provides equivalent security to hash-pinned pip installs:

These official actions run their tools in containers with internal integrity verification, which OSSF Scorecard accepts as equivalent to hash pinning.

pip install: VERSION-PINNED (Accepted Risk) ⚠️

Scorecard flags pip install package==version because it prefers hash pinning. The remaining pip commands use exact version pinning.

Flagged commands and their status:

Why we don't use hash pinning:

1. Platform-specific hashes: pip package hashes vary by Python version, OS, and architecture. A single hash won't work across different CI runners.

2. Maintenance burden: Every version update requires regenerating hashes for all platforms.

3. Marginal security benefit: These are dev/CI tools running in hardened CI environments (step-security/harden-runner) with egress auditing. Supply chain attacks on PyPI packages are mitigated by version pinning and short execution windows.

4. Industry practice: Version pinning (==) is the standard for CI tool installation. Hash pinning is typically reserved for production dependencies.

5. Local packages: pip install -e . installs the local source code and cannot be hash-pinned.

npm Commands: MOSTLY COMPLIANT (21/24) ⚠️

The 3 "unpinned" npm commands are operational commands, not package installations:

These commands don't install packages directly - they either generate lockfiles or intentionally update packages. They cannot and should not be "pinned".

downloadThenRun: FALSE POSITIVE ⚠️

Flagged: examples/elasticsearch/test_elasticsearch.sh:60

curl -s http://localhost:9200 | python3 -m json.tool | head -10

Why it's a false positive:

• This fetches JSON from localhost:9200 (local Elasticsearch)
• Pipes to python3 -m json.tool (stdlib JSON formatter)
• Shows first 10 lines of pretty-printed output

This is NOT downloading and running a remote script. It's formatting local JSON output. The scorecard pattern-matches curl | python as potentially dangerous, but this is a safe operation on localhost data.

OSSF Scorecard Alert: #4411

APT Packages: INTENTIONALLY UNPINNED ⚠️

Files affected: publish.yml, e2e-research-test.yml, responsive-ui-tests-enhanced.yml, Dockerfile

Rationale for NOT pinning APT packages:

1. Version availability: Old APT package versions are removed from Ubuntu archives after 6-12 months. Pinning to package=1.2.3-1ubuntu1 causes builds to fail when that version is removed.

2. Base image controls versions: Docker base images are SHA-pinned, which deterministically controls which APT package versions are available. The combination of python:3.13.9-slim@sha256:326df678... and apt-get install curl produces the same result every time that base image is used.

3. Runner stability: GitHub workflow runners use pinned Ubuntu versions (e.g., ubuntu-22.04) which provide consistent package versions throughout the runner's lifecycle.

4. Version variation: APT package version strings vary between Ubuntu releases and architectures, making cross-platform pinning impractical.

5. Industry consensus: Security experts recommend pinning the base image/runner rather than individual packages. Base image pinning provides stronger guarantees with lower maintenance burden.

Mitigations in place:

• ✅ Docker base images pinned to SHA256 digests (see Docker Images section above)
• ✅ GitHub runner versions pinned where practical (ubuntu-22.04)
• ✅ Dependabot configured to monitor for security updates
• ✅ Step-security/harden-runner audits all egress traffic
• ✅ Minimal package sets installed (only what's needed)

Enforcement

We have automated verification for our pinning strategy:

• .github/workflows/validate-image-pinning.yml - Validates Docker image digests
• Pre-commit hooks verify action SHA pinning
• All pip install commands use explicit version specifiers

Review Cadence

These decisions are reviewed quarterly to ensure they remain appropriate:

• Next review: Q2 2025
• Owner: Security team

References

• OSSF Scorecard Pinned-Dependencies Check
• StepSecurity Harden Runner
• pip Hash Checking Mode