tools-only Phase 4: Security Design Review
Type: Evaluative Executor: LLM Knowledge: Control Sets, OWASP References
⚠️ MANDATORY: 4-Phase Gating Protocol (BLOCKING)
CRITICAL: 必须按顺序完成以下四个阶段，并输出每个阶段的结果。跳过任何阶段将导致分析质量下降！
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
🧠 THINKING - Phase 4 Entry Gate
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Purpose: 深度理解后再行动，防止基于不完整理解的仓促行动。
⚠️ 你必须输出以下格式的 THINKING 结果：
🧠 THINKING - P4 Entry Gate
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
📌 CORE PROBLEM
评估项目在16个安全域的设计成熟度，识别安全控制缺口
📊 UPSTREAM DATA (从 P1-P3 YAML 读取)
| 指标 | 值 | 来源 |
|------|-----|------|
| P1模块总数 | {实际值} | P1_project_context.yaml → module_inventory.summary.total_modules |
| P2数据流总数 | {实际值} | P2_dfd_elements.yaml → data_flow_traces.summary.total_flows |
| P2数据存储数 | {实际值} | P2_dfd_elements.yaml → data_store_inventory.summary.total_data_stores |
| P3边界数量 | {实际值} | P3_boundary_context.yaml → boundary_context.boundaries 长度 |
| Tech stack | {实际值} | P1_project_context.yaml → project_context.tech_stack |
❓ UNKNOWNS
- 需要通过代码审查确认的安全控制
- 需要KB查询确认的最佳实践
⚠️ RISKS
- 域评估不完整 (16个域未全部覆盖)
- Gap与Module/Flow的追溯链缺失
- 扩展域触发检测遗漏
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
⛔ STOP CHECK
- P1 YAML 已读取? [YES/NO]
- P2 YAML 已读取? [YES/NO]
- P3 YAML 已读取? [YES/NO]
- 上游数据完整? [YES/NO]
- 可以继续PLANNING? [YES/NO]
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
⛔ STOP条件: 如果任何 STOP CHECK = NO → 先读取上游数据再继续
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
📋 PLANNING - Sub-task Decomposition
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Step 1: 读取上游数据 (BLOCKING - 必须执行)
# 读取P1-P3 YAML数据 (选择其一)
python scripts/phase_data.py --aggregate --phases 1,2,3 --format summary --root .
# 或直接读取
cat .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P1_project_context.yaml
cat .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P2_dfd_elements.yaml
cat .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P3_boundary_context.yaml
⛔ 如果任何文件不存在或无效 → STOP并返回完成上游Phase
Step 2: 输出子任务表格 (MANDATORY)
⚠️ 你必须输出以下格式的 PLANNING 结果：
📋 PLANNING - P4 Sub-tasks
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
| # | 子任务 | 预期输出 |
|---|--------|----------|
| T1 | 读取P1-P3数据，提取模块/流/边界清单 | 数据结构 |
| T2 | 评估10个核心安全域 (AUTHN→DATA) | 域评估矩阵 |
| T3 | 检测扩展域触发条件 (ext-11→ext-16) | 触发检测 |
| T4 | 评估已触发的扩展域 | 扩展域评估 |
| T5 | 生成Gap清单 (GAP-xxx) | Gap清单 |
| T6 | 写入P4_security_gaps.yaml | PRIMARY输出 |
| T7 | 写入P4-SECURITY-REVIEW.md | SECONDARY输出 |
⛔ PLANNING CHECK
- 子任务已分解? [YES/NO]
- 准备创建 TaskCreate? [YES/NO]
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Step 3: TaskCreate for ALL sub-tasks (MANDATORY)
⚠️ 在开始任何实施前，必须执行 TaskCreate 创建所有子任务！
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
⚡ EXECUTION LOOP
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
For each sub-task:
TaskUpdate(status: "in_progress")- 实施子任务
- 验证: 输出是否符合预期？
- If 验证通过:
TaskUpdate(status: "completed")→ 下一个 - If 验证失败: 诊断 → 修复 → 重试 (max 3x) → 如仍失败: CHECKPOINT请求用户决策
输出顺序 (CRITICAL):
- 先写YAML:
.phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P4_security_gaps.yaml - 后写MD:
.phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/reports/P4-SECURITY-REVIEW.md
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
🔍 REFLECTION - Completion Verification
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
⚠️ 完成 EXECUTION 后，你必须输出以下格式的 REFLECTION 结果：
🔍 REFLECTION - P4 Completion Check
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
| 检查项 | 状态 |
|--------|------|
| 所有子任务已完成? (TaskList check) | [✅/❌] |
| P4_security_gaps.yaml 存在且有效? | [✅/❌] |
| design_matrix 包含全部16个域? | [✅/❌] |
| 每个Gap有唯一ID (GAP-xxx)? | [✅/❌] |
| coverage_verification 显示100%覆盖? | [✅/❌] |
| input_ref 字段指向 P3_boundary_context.yaml? | [✅/❌] |
| Hook验证通过 (exit 0)? | [✅/❌] |
⛔ COMPLETION GATE
- 所有检查通过? [YES/NO]
- 可以进入P5? [YES/NO]
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
⛔ 任何检查失败 → 修复并重新验证，直到全部通过
⚠️ MANDATORY OUTPUT RULES
CRITICAL: Phase 4 requires TWO outputs - a YAML data file AND a Markdown report.
Dual Output Requirement
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ PHASE 4 MUST PRODUCE TWO FILES: │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ 1. DATA FILE (PRIMARY - Write First!) │
│ Path: .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P4_security_gaps.yaml │
│ Purpose: Structured gap data for P5/P6/P7 to read │
│ Format: Valid YAML with schema_version: "3.0.0 (20260201a)" │
│ │
│ 2. REPORT FILE (SECONDARY - Write After Data!) │
│ Path: .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/reports/P4-SECURITY-REVIEW.md │
│ Purpose: Human-readable security design assessment │
│ Format: Markdown with assessment matrix and gap analysis │
│ │
│ ❌ FORBIDDEN: Writing only .md without .yaml │
│ ❌ FORBIDDEN: Embedding YAML blocks inside .md as data source │
│ ✅ REQUIRED: .yaml file is the authoritative data source │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Required Data Sections in YAML
| Section | Validation |
|---|---|
security_gaps.gaps[] |
BLOCKING - all identified gaps with GAP-xxx IDs |
security_gaps.design_matrix |
BLOCKING - all 16 domains assessed |
security_gaps.summary |
BLOCKING - counts and statistics |
extended_domains_triggered[] |
CONDITIONAL - list triggered ext domains |
Validation Gate
Phase 4 CANNOT complete until:
.phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P4_security_gaps.yamlexists and is valid YAMLdesign_matrixcontains all 16 domains (10 core + 6 extended)- Every gap has unique ID (GAP-xxx format) and risk_level assigned
- Every domain has
assessed: trueorassessed: false(N/A) .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/reports/P4-SECURITY-REVIEW.mdexists
Coverage Verification (CRITICAL)
P4 MUST verify complete coverage of P1/P2 inputs:
# In P4_security_gaps.yaml - REQUIRED section
coverage_verification:
# P1 Module Coverage
p1_modules:
total_modules: 15 # From P1.module_inventory.summary.total_modules
modules_assessed: 15 # Modules referenced in gaps or confirmed secure
coverage_percentage: 100 # MUST be 100%
unassessed_modules: [] # MUST be empty
# P2 Data Flow Coverage
p2_flows:
total_data_flows: 45 # From P2.dfd_elements.data_flows count
flows_assessed: 45 # Flows analyzed for security controls
coverage_percentage: 100 # MUST be 100%
unassessed_flows: [] # MUST be empty
# P2 Data Store Coverage
p2_stores:
total_data_stores: 8 # From P2.dfd_elements.data_stores count
stores_assessed: 8 # Stores with DATA domain assessment
coverage_percentage: 100 # MUST be 100%
unassessed_stores: [] # MUST be empty
Validation Rules:
- P1 Module Coverage: Every M-xxx from P1 must be referenced in at least one gap's
affected_elementsOR confirmed as secure - P2 Flow Coverage: Every DF-xxx from P2 must be assessed for INPUT/OUTPUT/CRYPTO controls
- P2 Store Coverage: Every DS-xxx from P2 must be assessed for DATA domain compliance
BLOCKING: coverage_percentage < 100% for any category
Domain Coverage Verification (GAP-5 FIX)
CRITICAL: P4 MUST verify all 16 security domains are assessed with proper completeness criteria.
Domain Assessment Completeness Matrix
# In P4_security_gaps.yaml - MANDATORY section (GAP-5)
domain_coverage_verification:
# ============================================================
# Core Domains (01-10) - MANDATORY Assessment
# ============================================================
core_domains:
assessment_requirement: MANDATORY
domains_total: 10
domains_assessed: 10 # MUST equal domains_total
coverage_percentage: 100 # MUST be 100%
# Per-domain assessment status
domain_status:
AUTHN:
assessed: true
assessment_result: Partial # Yes | Partial | No | N/A
checks_performed: 6 # From checklist
checks_passed: 4
gaps_identified: [GAP-001, GAP-002]
coverage_detail:
module_refs: [M-001, M-003] # Modules assessed for this domain
flow_refs: [DF-001, DF-005] # Flows relevant to this domain
kb_ref: "control-set-01"
AUTHZ:
assessed: true
assessment_result: Yes
checks_performed: 4
checks_passed: 4
gaps_identified: [] # No gaps = fully compliant
coverage_detail:
module_refs: [M-001, M-002, M-004]
flow_refs: [DF-002, DF-003]
kb_ref: "control-set-02"
INPUT:
assessed: true
assessment_result: Partial
checks_performed: 5
checks_passed: 3
gaps_identified: [GAP-003]
coverage_detail:
module_refs: [M-005, M-006]
flow_refs: [DF-010, DF-011, DF-015]
kb_ref: "control-set-03"
OUTPUT:
assessed: true
assessment_result: No
checks_performed: 4
checks_passed: 1
gaps_identified: [GAP-004, GAP-005]
coverage_detail:
module_refs: [M-007]
flow_refs: [DF-020, DF-021]
kb_ref: "control-set-04"
# ... (CLIENT, CRYPTO, LOG, ERROR, API, DATA)
# ============================================================
# Extended Domains (ext-11 to ext-16) - CONDITIONAL Assessment
# ============================================================
# AUTHORITY: P1 is the AUTHORITATIVE source for extended domain detection.
# P4 READS P1.project_context.tech_stack and APPLIES trigger patterns.
# P4 does NOT redefine detection - it uses P1's detection results.
# The trigger_patterns below are REFERENCE patterns used to validate
# P1's detection, not independent detection logic.
# ============================================================
extended_domains:
assessment_requirement: CONDITIONAL
trigger_detection_source: "P1.project_context.tech_stack"
# Complete trigger pattern library for all extended domains
domain_triggers:
INFRA: # ext-11: Infrastructure as Code
trigger_patterns:
- "Dockerfile"
- "docker-compose.yml"
- "docker-compose.yaml"
- "kubernetes/*.yaml"
- "k8s/*.yaml"
- "helm/"
- ".github/workflows/*.yml"
- "Vagrantfile"
- "ansible/"
- "chef/"
- "puppet/"
triggered: true # Detected in P1
assessed: true
assessment_result: Partial
gaps_identified: [GAP-010]
trigger_evidence:
files_found: ["Dockerfile", "kubernetes/deployment.yaml"]
detection_method: "File pattern match"
SUPPLY: # ext-12: Supply Chain
trigger_patterns:
- "package.json"
- "package-lock.json"
- "yarn.lock"
- "pnpm-lock.yaml"
- "requirements.txt"
- "Pipfile"
- "Pipfile.lock"
- "poetry.lock"
- "go.mod"
- "go.sum"
- "Cargo.toml"
- "Cargo.lock"
- "pom.xml"
- "build.gradle"
- "Gemfile"
- "composer.json"
triggered: true
assessed: true
assessment_result: No
gaps_identified: [GAP-011, GAP-012]
trigger_evidence:
files_found: ["package.json", "requirements.txt"]
detection_method: "Dependency manifest detection"
AI: # ext-13: AI/LLM Applications
trigger_patterns:
- "**/llm/**"
- "**/model/**"
- "**/ai/**"
- "**/ml/**"
- "langchain"
- "openai"
- "anthropic"
- "huggingface"
- "transformers"
- "ollama"
- "llama"
- "gpt"
- "claude"
- "embedding"
- "vector"
- "rag"
triggered: false # Not detected
assessed: false
assessment_result: N/A
gaps_identified: []
trigger_evidence:
files_found: []
detection_method: "No LLM/AI patterns detected"
MOBILE: # ext-14: Mobile Applications
trigger_patterns:
- "*.apk"
- "*.ipa"
- "*.aab"
- "AndroidManifest.xml"
- "Info.plist"
- "build.gradle"
- "Podfile"
- "*.xcodeproj"
- "*.xcworkspace"
- "react-native"
- "flutter"
- "ionic"
- "cordova"
triggered: false
assessed: false
assessment_result: N/A
gaps_identified: []
trigger_evidence:
files_found: []
detection_method: "No mobile artifacts detected"
CLOUD: # ext-15: Cloud Native
trigger_patterns:
- "terraform/"
- "*.tf"
- "*.tfvars"
- "pulumi/"
- "cloudformation/"
- "*.cdk.ts"
- "serverless.yml"
- "sam.yaml"
- "aws-cdk/"
- "bicep/"
- "*.bicep"
- "gcp/"
- "azure/"
triggered: true
assessed: true
assessment_result: Partial
gaps_identified: [GAP-015]
trigger_evidence:
files_found: ["terraform/main.tf", "terraform/aws.tf"]
detection_method: "IaC pattern detection"
AGENT: # ext-16: Agentic AI
trigger_patterns:
- "**/agent/**"
- "**/agents/**"
- "**/tool_use/**"
- "**/tools/**"
- "langchain.agents"
- "crewai"
- "autogen"
- "swarm"
- "autogpt"
- "babyagi"
- "function_calling"
- "tool_calls"
triggered: false
assessed: false
assessment_result: N/A
gaps_identified: []
trigger_evidence:
files_found: []
detection_method: "No agentic patterns detected"
# Extended domain summary
summary:
domains_triggered: 3 # Domains with detected triggers
domains_assessed: 3 # MUST equal domains_triggered
domains_skipped: 3 # N/A domains (not triggered)
assessment_coverage: 100 # domains_assessed / domains_triggered * 100
# ============================================================
# Overall Domain Assessment Summary
# ============================================================
overall:
total_domains: 16
core_assessed: 10
extended_triggered: 3
extended_skipped: 3
total_assessed: 13 # core + extended_triggered
total_gaps_by_domain:
AUTHN: 2
AUTHZ: 0
INPUT: 1
OUTPUT: 2
# ... etc
assessment_completeness: 100 # All applicable domains assessed
Domain Assessment Validation Rules
| Rule | Level | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Core domain coverage | BLOCKING | All 10 core domains MUST be assessed |
| Extended trigger validation | BLOCKING | Triggered extended domains MUST be assessed |
| N/A justification | WARNING | Core domains marked N/A need documented reason |
| Check coverage | WARNING | checks_passed / checks_performed < 0.5 triggers review |
| Gap-to-domain traceability | BLOCKING | Every GAP-xxx MUST reference exactly one domain |
Completeness Criteria Per Assessment Result
| Result | Criteria |
|---|---|
| Yes | All checklist items pass, no gaps identified |
| Partial | Some items pass, gaps identified but not critical |
| No | Critical controls missing, high-severity gaps |
| N/A | Domain not applicable (requires documented reason) |
BLOCKING Conditions:
core_domains.coverage_percentage < 100%extended_domains.assessment_coverage < 100%(for triggered domains)- Any gap without domain assignment
- Triggered extended domain with
assessed: false
Error Handling
| Error | Cause | Recovery Action |
|---|---|---|
| P3 YAML not found | P3 not completed | Return to P3, complete boundary analysis |
| Domain assessment incomplete | Complex code | Document known state, mark domain as Partial |
| Extended domain trigger failure | Missing P1 data | Check P1 project_context, re-run detection |
| Gap count mismatch | YAML validation error | Verify gaps[] count matches summary.total_gaps |
Fallback Strategy: If domain assessment cannot be completed due to insufficient data, mark domain with assessed: partial and document the limitation.
Input Context
← P1/P2/P3: All cumulative findings (from {SESSION_ID}/data/ directory)
Required Input Files:
P1_project_context.yaml- For tech stack detection (extended domain triggers)P2_dfd_elements.yaml- For security control mappingP3_boundary_context.yaml- For boundary-aware gap analysis
⚠️ MANDATORY: Query P1-P3 Data Before Analysis
Before starting P4 analysis, LLM MUST execute these queries to obtain upstream data:
# Step 1: Get aggregate summary from P1-P3
python scripts/phase_data.py --aggregate --phases 1,2,3 --format summary --root .
# Step 2: Get P1 modules for coverage tracking
python scripts/phase_data.py --query --phase 1 --type modules --root .
# Step 3: Get P2 DFD elements for security mapping
python scripts/phase_data.py --query --phase 2 --type dfd --root .
# Step 4: Get P3 boundaries for gap context
python scripts/phase_data.py --query --phase 3 --summary --root .
Or read YAML directly:
# PRIMARY sources - ALL REQUIRED
cat .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P1_project_context.yaml
cat .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P2_dfd_elements.yaml
cat .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P3_boundary_context.yaml
CRITICAL: Do NOT assess security domains from memory. MUST read P1-P3 data first!
P3 Boundary Integration:
- Use P3's
boundaries[]to identify security control points - Map gaps to
cross_boundary_flows[]for risk context - Reference
data_nodes[]sensitivity when assessing DATA domain - Consider Model/Agent boundary types for ext-13/ext-16 assessment
Output Context
→ P5: security_gaps {gaps[], design_matrix{}}
Core Analysis Goal
Evaluate project's design maturity across all 16 security domains, identify gaps between current implementation and security best practices.
Knowledge Reference (Progressive Loading)
- Always load:
security-design.yaml(16 domains overview) - Per domain:
control-set-*.mdwhen assessing that domain - For details:
reference-set-*.mdfor specific implementation guidance
Query Commands:
$SKILL_PATH/kb --control authentication # Domain-specific controls
$SKILL_PATH/kb --stride-controls S # STRIDE category controls
$SKILL_PATH/kb --control api --full # Full control details
$SKILL_PATH/kb --control {ext_domain} --full # Extended domain (may have limited support)
KB Usage Log (MANDATORY per GAP-4 Contract)
CRITICAL: P4 MUST query KB for each assessed security domain per KBQueryContract in assets/contracts/data-model.yaml
Required Queries:
--control {domain_code}- For each core domain (AUTHN, AUTHZ, INPUT, etc.)--stride-controls {S|T|R|I|D|E}- For STRIDE-to-domain mapping validation
# In P4_security_gaps.yaml - MANDATORY section (GAP-4 Contract)
kb_usage_log:
# Query record for auditability
queries_made:
- query: "--control authentication"
timestamp: "2026-01-31T09:15:00Z"
result_count: 15
domain_assessed: AUTHN
findings_informed: [GAP-001, GAP-002]
cache_hit: false
- query: "--control authorization"
timestamp: "2026-01-31T09:15:30Z"
result_count: 12
domain_assessed: AUTHZ
findings_informed: [] # No gaps found - KB confirmed implementation
cache_hit: false
- query: "--stride-controls S"
timestamp: "2026-01-31T09:16:00Z"
result_count: 8
domains_assessed: [AUTHN, CLIENT]
findings_informed: [GAP-003]
cache_hit: true
# Domain coverage tracking (MANDATORY)
coverage:
core_domains_total: 10 # AUTHN through DATA
core_domains_queried: 10 # MUST equal core_domains_total
extended_domains_total: 6 # INFRA through AGENT
extended_domains_queried: 3 # Best effort - may have limited KB support
kb_coverage_percentage: 81.25 # (10+3)/(10+6) * 100
# Error handling
errors:
- query: "--control AGENT"
error_type: "limited_support"
action_taken: "Used LLM knowledge for ext-16 assessment"
domain_affected: AGENT
kb_available: true
note: "Extended domains (ext-11 to ext-16) may not have full KB support"
Validation Rules (GAP-4 Contract):
- WARNING:
kb_coverage_percentage < 50%for core domains (01-10) - INFO: Extended domains (ext-11 to ext-16) queries are optional
- BLOCKING: None - KB queries are best-effort but strongly recommended
Security Domains (16)
| Seq | Code | Name | STRIDE Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | AUTHN | Authentication & Session | S |
| 02 | AUTHZ | Authorization & Access Control | E |
| 03 | INPUT | Input Validation | T |
| 04 | OUTPUT | Output Encoding | T, I |
| 05 | CLIENT | Client-Side Security | S, T, I |
| 06 | CRYPTO | Cryptography & Transport | I |
| 07 | LOG | Logging & Monitoring | R |
| 08 | ERROR | Error Handling | I |
| 09 | API | API & Service Security | S, T, I, D, E |
| 10 | DATA | Data Protection | I |
| ext-11 | INFRA | Infrastructure Security | - |
| ext-12 | SUPPLY | Supply Chain Security | - |
| ext-13 | AI | AI/LLM Security | - |
| ext-14 | MOBILE | Mobile Security | - |
| ext-15 | CLOUD | Cloud Security | - |
| ext-16 | AGENT | Agentic Security | S, T, R, I, D, E |
Assessment Process
For each domain:
- Identify Implementation: What security controls exist in the code?
- Compare to Standards: How does it compare to OWASP/industry standards?
- Assess Maturity: Rate as Yes/No/Partial
- Document Gaps: What's missing or inadequate?
- Assign Risk Level: High/Medium/Low based on impact
Assessment Matrix Template
| Domain | Code | Current Implementation | Assessment | Gap Description | Risk Level | KB Ref |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Authentication | AUTHN | OAuth2 + local auth | Partial | MFA not implemented | High | control-set-01 |
| Authorization | AUTHZ | Role-based access | Yes | - | Low | control-set-02 |
| Input Validation | INPUT | Basic sanitization | Partial | Missing schema validation | Medium | control-set-03 |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
Assessment Values:
- Yes: Fully implemented per standards
- Partial: Partially implemented, gaps exist
- No: Not implemented
- N/A: Not applicable to this project
Domain-Specific Checks
AUTHN - Authentication & Session
- Multi-factor authentication available?
- Secure password storage (bcrypt/argon2)?
- Session timeout implemented?
- Session fixation protection?
- Account lockout policy?
- Secure credential recovery?
AUTHZ - Authorization
- Role-based or attribute-based access control?
- Principle of least privilege applied?
- Authorization checks on all endpoints?
- Sensitive operations require re-authentication?
INPUT - Input Validation
- All input validated server-side?
- Allowlist validation preferred?
- File upload restrictions?
- SQL injection prevention?
- Command injection prevention?
OUTPUT - Output Encoding
- Context-aware output encoding?
- XSS prevention measures?
- Content-Type headers set correctly?
- Content Security Policy implemented?
CRYPTO - Cryptography
- TLS 1.2+ for all connections?
- Strong cipher suites only?
- Sensitive data encrypted at rest?
- Proper key management?
- No hardcoded secrets?
LOG - Logging & Monitoring
- Security events logged?
- Log injection prevention?
- Sensitive data masked in logs?
- Log integrity protection?
- Alerting configured?
API - API Security
- API authentication required?
- Rate limiting implemented?
- Input validation on all endpoints?
- CORS properly configured?
- API versioning strategy?
CLIENT - Client-Side Security (05)
- XSS prevention (CSP, output encoding)?
- DOM-based XSS mitigation?
- CSRF protection (tokens, SameSite)?
- Clickjacking prevention (X-Frame-Options)?
- Third-party script isolation?
- Prototype pollution prevention?
- Content Security Policy implemented?
- Subresource Integrity (SRI) for CDN resources?
ERROR - Error Handling (08)
- Generic error messages to users?
- Detailed logging internally?
- Stack traces hidden in production?
- Fail-secure mode implemented?
- Error codes don't leak system info?
- Graceful degradation on failures?
DATA - Data Protection (10)
- PII identified and protected?
- Data classification implemented?
- Data retention policy?
- Secure data deletion?
- Secrets management (no hardcoded)?
- Database credentials secured?
Extended Domain Checks (Conditional - Based on Tech Stack)
Load these checks only when corresponding trigger conditions are detected in P1.
ext-11: INFRA - Infrastructure Security
Trigger: Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml, kubernetes/*.yaml, helm charts
- Container images from trusted registries?
- Base images regularly updated?
- Container runs as non-root?
- Resource limits (CPU/memory) configured?
- Network policies/segmentation?
- Secrets not baked into images?
- Pod security policies/standards?
- Container vulnerability scanning?
ext-12: SUPPLY - Supply Chain Security
Trigger: package.json, requirements.txt, pom.xml, go.mod
- Dependencies vulnerability scanned?
- Lock files (package-lock.json, poetry.lock) committed?
- Private registry security?
- SBOM generated?
- Dependency update policy?
- No known vulnerable dependencies?
- CI/CD pipeline security?
- Artifact signing/verification?
ext-13: AI - AI/LLM Security
Trigger: openai/anthropic API, langchain, LLM model loading
- Prompt injection prevention?
- System prompt protection?
- Output filtering/validation?
- Model access control?
- Training data protection?
- PII not sent to external LLMs?
- Rate limiting on LLM calls?
- Jailbreak detection?
ext-14: MOBILE - Mobile Security
Trigger: iOS/Android project, React Native, Flutter
- Secure local storage (Keychain/Keystore)?
- Certificate pinning implemented?
- Code obfuscation enabled?
- Jailbreak/root detection?
- Biometric authentication?
- Secure IPC (Intent/URL scheme)?
- Binary protections (ASLR, PIE)?
- Debug disabled in release?
ext-15: CLOUD - Cloud Security
Trigger: terraform/*.tf, AWS/Azure/GCP SDK, serverless.yml
- IAM least privilege?
- No wildcards in IAM policies?
- Resources not publicly accessible?
- Security groups properly configured?
- Encryption enabled (at-rest, in-transit)?
- CloudTrail/logging enabled?
- VPC properly configured?
- Secrets in secrets manager (not env vars)?
ext-16: AGENT - Agentic Security
Trigger: langchain/langgraph, crewai/autogen, MCP config, Agent workflows
- Agent goal/intent protection?
- Tool/skill governance (whitelist)?
- Autonomy boundaries defined?
- Human-in-the-loop for critical actions?
- Agent authentication/identity?
- Multi-agent trust boundaries?
- Tool call rate limiting?
- Agent behavior logging/auditing?
- Goal hijack prevention?
- Indirect prompt injection defense?
Gap Documentation Format
File Path:
.phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P4_security_gaps.yaml
# P4_security_gaps.yaml - Phase 4 Data Output
schema_version: "3.0.0 (20260201a)"
phase: 4
generated_at: "ISO8601 timestamp"
security_gaps:
# Summary statistics (REQUIRED)
summary:
total_domains: 16
domains_assessed: 16
fully_compliant: 8
partially_compliant: 5
non_compliant: 2
not_applicable: 1
total_gaps: 12
critical_gaps: 2
high_gaps: 4
medium_gaps: 4
low_gaps: 2
# Identified security gaps (REQUIRED)
gaps:
- id: GAP-001
domain: AUTHN
domain_seq: "01"
description: "Multi-factor authentication not implemented"
current_state: "Single-factor (password only)"
expected_state: "TOTP or WebAuthn MFA available"
impact: "Credential compromise leads to full account takeover"
risk_level: HIGH # CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|LOW
affected_elements: [P-002, EP-API-001]
kb_reference: "control-set-01-authentication.md"
owasp_refs: ["A07:2021-Identification and Authentication Failures"]
- id: GAP-002
domain: INPUT
domain_seq: "03"
description: "Missing request schema validation"
current_state: "Basic type checking only"
expected_state: "JSON Schema validation on all API inputs"
impact: "Malformed input may bypass security controls"
risk_level: MEDIUM
affected_elements: [P-001, DF-001]
kb_reference: "control-set-03-input-validation.md"
owasp_refs: ["A03:2021-Injection"]
# Design matrix - ALL 16 domains (REQUIRED)
design_matrix:
# Core Domains (01-10)
AUTHN:
seq: "01"
assessed: true
rating: Partial # Yes|Partial|No|N/A
gaps_count: 2
risk_level: HIGH
AUTHZ:
seq: "02"
assessed: true
rating: Yes
gaps_count: 0
risk_level: LOW
INPUT:
seq: "03"
assessed: true
rating: Partial
gaps_count: 1
risk_level: MEDIUM
OUTPUT:
seq: "04"
assessed: true
rating: Yes
gaps_count: 0
risk_level: LOW
CLIENT:
seq: "05"
assessed: true
rating: Partial
gaps_count: 2
risk_level: MEDIUM
CRYPTO:
seq: "06"
assessed: true
rating: Yes
gaps_count: 0
risk_level: LOW
LOG:
seq: "07"
assessed: true
rating: Partial
gaps_count: 1
risk_level: MEDIUM
ERROR:
seq: "08"
assessed: true
rating: Yes
gaps_count: 0
risk_level: LOW
API:
seq: "09"
assessed: true
rating: Partial
gaps_count: 2
risk_level: HIGH
DATA:
seq: "10"
assessed: true
rating: Partial
gaps_count: 1
risk_level: MEDIUM
# Extended Domains (ext-11 to ext-16)
INFRA:
seq: "ext-11"
assessed: true # or false if not triggered
triggered: true
rating: Partial
gaps_count: 2
risk_level: MEDIUM
SUPPLY:
seq: "ext-12"
assessed: true
triggered: true
rating: Partial
gaps_count: 1
risk_level: MEDIUM
AI:
seq: "ext-13"
assessed: true
triggered: true
rating: No
gaps_count: 3
risk_level: CRITICAL
MOBILE:
seq: "ext-14"
assessed: false
triggered: false
rating: N/A
gaps_count: 0
risk_level: N/A
CLOUD:
seq: "ext-15"
assessed: true
triggered: true
rating: Partial
gaps_count: 2
risk_level: HIGH
AGENT:
seq: "ext-16"
assessed: true
triggered: true
rating: No
gaps_count: 4
risk_level: CRITICAL
# Extended domains triggered based on P1 tech stack detection
extended_domains_triggered:
- { domain: INFRA, trigger: "Dockerfile detected" }
- { domain: SUPPLY, trigger: "package.json detected" }
- { domain: AI, trigger: "openai API usage" }
- { domain: CLOUD, trigger: "terraform/*.tf detected" }
- { domain: AGENT, trigger: "langchain import" }
Report Template
# P4: Security Design Review
## Executive Summary
- **Domains Assessed**: 16
- **Fully Compliant**: N
- **Partially Compliant**: N
- **Non-Compliant**: N
- **Critical Gaps**: N
## Security Design Assessment Matrix
| Domain | Code | Implementation | Rating | Gaps | Risk | Reference |
|--------|------|----------------|--------|------|------|-----------|
| Authentication | AUTHN | OAuth2, local | Partial | 2 | High | control-set-01 |
| Authorization | AUTHZ | RBAC | Yes | 0 | Low | control-set-02 |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
## Gap Analysis
### GAP-001: Missing Multi-Factor Authentication
- **Domain**: AUTHN
- **Current State**: Password-only authentication
- **Expected State**: TOTP or WebAuthn MFA
- **Impact**: High - Full account takeover on credential compromise
- **Affected Elements**: P-002, EP-API-001, EP-API-002
- **Recommendation**: Implement TOTP with recovery codes
### GAP-002: ...
## Domain Details
### AUTHN - Authentication & Session
**Implementation Found**:
- OAuth2 with Google/GitHub providers
- Local authentication with bcrypt password hashing
- JWT session tokens
**Gaps Identified**:
1. No MFA support
2. Session timeout not configurable
**Recommendations**:
1. Add TOTP MFA option
2. Implement configurable session timeout
### AUTHZ - Authorization
...
## Summary
[yaml:security_gaps block]
Completion Checklist
Before marking Phase 4 complete:
Data File Requirements:
-
.phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P4_security_gaps.yamlexists - YAML is valid with
schema_version: "3.0.0 (20260201a)" -
security_gaps.summarycontains all required statistics -
security_gaps.design_matrixhas all 16 domains - Each domain has
assessed,rating,gaps_count,risk_level - Extended domains have
triggeredfield
Gap Documentation:
- All gaps have unique GAP-xxx IDs
- Each gap has
domain,domain_seq,description - Each gap has
current_state,expected_state,impact - Risk levels assigned (CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW)
- KB references provided for each gap
- OWASP refs mapped where applicable
Report File Requirements:
-
.phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/reports/P4-SECURITY-REVIEW.mdexists - Executive summary with statistics
- Complete assessment matrix (16 domains)
- Gap analysis with recommendations
- Domain details section
Validation:
- Hook validation passed (exit 0)
- Count conservation: summary.total_gaps == len(gaps[])
End of Phase 4 Instructions (~200 lines, ~2K tokens)