Vue.js Web Security Spec (Vue 3.x, TypeScript/JavaScript, common tooling: Vite)

Vue.js Web Security Spec (Vue 3.x, TypeScript/JavaScript, common tooling: Vite)

This document is designed as a security spec that supports:

1. Secure-by-default code generation for new Vue code.
2. Security review / vulnerability hunting in existing Vue code (passive “notice issues while working” and active “scan the repo and report findings”).

It is intentionally written as a set of normative requirements (“MUST/SHOULD/MAY”) plus audit rules (what bad patterns look like, how to detect them, and how to fix/mitigate them).

0) Safety, boundaries, and anti-abuse constraints (MUST FOLLOW)

• MUST NOT request, output, log, or commit secrets (API keys, passwords, private keys, session cookies, auth tokens).
• MUST NOT “fix” security by disabling protections (e.g., weakening CSP, turning on unsafe template compilation, using v-html as a shortcut, bypassing backend auth, or “just store the token in localStorage”).
• MUST provide evidence-based findings during audits: cite file paths, code snippets, and configuration values that justify the claim.
• MUST treat uncertainty honestly: if a protection might exist at the edge (CDN, reverse proxy, WAF, server headers), report it as “not visible in repo; verify runtime/infra config”.
• MUST remember the frontend trust model: any code shipped to browsers is attacker-readable and attacker-modifiable. Secrets and “security enforcement” cannot rely on frontend-only logic.

1) Operating modes

1.1 Generation mode (default)

When asked to write new Vue code or modify existing code:

• MUST follow every MUST requirement in this spec.
• SHOULD follow every SHOULD requirement unless the user explicitly says otherwise.
• MUST prefer safe-by-default framework features and proven libraries over custom security code.
• MUST avoid introducing new risky sinks (runtime template compilation, v-html / innerHTML, unsafe URL navigation, dynamic script injection, etc.). (Vue.js)

1.2 Passive review mode (always on while editing)

While working anywhere in a Vue repo (even if the user did not ask for a security scan):

• MUST “notice” violations of this spec in touched/nearby code.
• SHOULD mention issues as they come up, with a brief explanation + safe fix.

1.3 Active audit mode (explicit scan request)

When the user asks to “scan”, “audit”, or “hunt for vulns”:

• MUST systematically search the codebase for violations of this spec.
• MUST output findings in a structured format (see §2.3).

Recommended audit order:

1. Build/deploy entrypoints and hosting config (Docker, CI, static hosting, SSR server).
2. Secrets exposure (env usage, .env*, hard-coded keys). (vitejs)
3. XSS surface: templates, v-html / innerHTML, URL/style injection, DOM APIs. (Vue.js)
4. Auth/session handling in the browser (token storage, credentialed requests, CSRF integration). (Vue.js)
5. Routing/navigation (open redirects, “return_to/next”, unsafe external navigation). (Vue.js)
6. Third-party scripts and content (CDN assets, analytics, widgets, iframes). (Vue.js)
7. Security headers and browser hardening expectations (CSP, clickjacking). (Vue.js)
8. SSR-specific concerns (state serialization, template boundaries) when applicable. (Vue.js)

2) Definitions and review guidance

2.1 Untrusted input (treat as attacker-controlled unless proven otherwise)

In a Vue app, untrusted input includes (non-exhaustive):

• Anything from APIs: fetch, axios, GraphQL responses, webhooks, third-party SDKs.
• Router-controlled data: route.params, route.query, route.hash, and anything derived from window.location.
• User-controlled persisted content: DB-backed content displayed in the UI (comments, profiles, CMS content).
• Browser-controlled storage: localStorage, sessionStorage, IndexedDB.
• Cross-window messages: postMessage inputs.
• Anything that can be influenced by an attacker through DOM clobbering or injected HTML (especially if Vue is mounted onto non-sterile DOM). (Vue.js)

2.2 State-changing action (frontend perspective)

An action is state-changing if it can:

• Create/update/delete data via API calls.
• Change authentication/session state (login, logout, refresh token).
• Trigger privileged operations (payments, admin actions).
• Cause side effects (sending emails, triggering webhooks, changing account settings).

2.3 Required audit finding format

For each issue found, output:

• Rule ID:
• Severity: Critical / High / Medium / Low
• Location: file path + component/function + line(s)
• Evidence: the exact code/config snippet
• Impact: what could go wrong, who can exploit it
• Fix: safe change (prefer minimal diff)
• Mitigation: defense-in-depth if immediate fix is hard
• False positive notes: what to verify if uncertain

3) Secure baseline: minimum production configuration (MUST in production)

This is the smallest “production baseline” that prevents common Vue/front-end misconfigurations.

• MUST ship a production build (not a development build or dev server). (Vue.js)
• MUST NOT ship secrets in frontend bundles; treat all client-exposed env variables as public. (vitejs)
• MUST NOT render non-trusted templates or allow user-provided Vue templates (equivalent to arbitrary JS execution). (Vue.js)
• SHOULD avoid raw HTML injection (v-html, innerHTML) unless content is trusted or strongly sandboxed. (Vue.js)
• SHOULD deploy baseline security headers (especially CSP and clickjacking defenses) at the server/CDN layer. (OWASP Cheat Sheet Series)
• SHOULD use safe auth patterns (prefer HttpOnly cookies for session tokens; coordinate with backend on CSRF). (Vue.js)

4) Rules (generation + audit)

Each rule contains: required practice, insecure patterns, detection hints, and remediation.

VUE-DEPLOY-001: Do not run dev/preview servers in production

Severity: High

Required:

• MUST NOT deploy the Vite/Vue dev server (vite, npm run dev, HMR) as the production server.
• MUST NOT use vite preview as a production server. (vitejs)
• MUST build (vite build) and serve the built assets using a production-grade static server/CDN, or a production SSR server if you are doing SSR. (vitejs)

Insecure patterns:

• Docker/Procfile/systemd running vite, npm run dev, or vite preview as the production entrypoint.
• Publicly exposed HMR endpoints.

Detection hints:

• Search: vite, npm run dev, pnpm dev, yarn dev, vite preview, vue-cli-service serve.
• Check Docker CMD, ENTRYPOINT, CI deploy scripts, platform config.

Fix:

• Build artifacts with vite build.
• Serve dist/ with hardened hosting (CDN/static server) or integrate into your backend server as static assets.

Notes:

• Using dev/preview servers locally is fine; only flag if it is the production entrypoint.

VUE-DEPLOY-002: Use Vue production builds and keep devtools off in production

Severity: Medium (High if production devtools/debug hooks are enabled)

Required:

• If loading Vue from CDN/self-host without a bundler, MUST use the .prod.js builds in production. (Vue.js)
• SHOULD ensure production bundles do not enable Vue devtools in production builds, and SHOULD not intentionally enable production devtools flags. (Vue.js)

Insecure patterns:

• Production includes development build artifacts.
• Explicitly enabling production devtools/diagnostic hooks.

Detection hints:

• Search HTML for vue.global.js / non-.prod.js variants when using CDN builds.
• Search build config for Vue feature flags like __VUE_PROD_DEVTOOLS__. (Vue.js)

Fix:

• Switch to production build artifacts and ensure compile-time flags are configured for production.

VUE-SECRETS-001: Never ship secrets in frontend code or env variables

Severity: High (Critical if real credentials are exposed)

Required:

• MUST treat all frontend code and configuration as public.

• MUST NOT embed secrets in:

  • source code
  • .env files committed to repo
  • import.meta.env.* variables included in the bundle

• MUST assume any env var that ends up in the client bundle is attacker-readable. (vitejs)

Insecure patterns:

• VITE_API_KEY=... containing a true secret (not just a public identifier).
• Hard-coded API keys, private tokens, service credentials, signing keys in JS/TS.

Detection hints:

• Search: VITE_, import.meta.env, .env, .env.production, .env.*.local.
• Grep for API_KEY, SECRET, TOKEN, PRIVATE_KEY, BEGIN, sk-, AKIA, etc.

Fix:

• Move secrets to backend/edge functions.
• Use backend-minted short-lived tokens for the browser when needed.

Notes:

• Vite specifically warns that .env.*.local should be gitignored and that VITE_* vars end up in the client bundle, so they must not contain sensitive info. (vitejs)

VUE-SECRETS-002: Do not broaden Vite env exposure

Severity: High

Required:

• MUST NOT configure Vite to expose all environment variables to the client.
• SHOULD keep envPrefix strict and explicit.

Insecure patterns:

• Setting envPrefix to overly broad values (or '') to “make env vars work”.
• Custom scripts that inject server secrets into global variables in HTML at build time.

Detection hints:

• Check vite.config.* for envPrefix.
• Look for define: { 'process.env': ... } or manual injection into window.__CONFIG__.

Fix:

• Keep secrets server-side.
• Only expose non-sensitive values intentionally designed to be public.

Notes:

• Vite’s docs explain that only prefixed variables are exposed and that exposed variables land in the client bundle. (vitejs)

VUE-XSS-001: Prefer Vue’s default escaping; avoid raw HTML injection

Severity: High

Required:

• MUST rely on Vue’s automatic escaping for text interpolation and attribute binding where possible. (Vue.js)

• MUST NOT render user-provided HTML via:

  • v-html
  • innerHTML in render functions / JSX
  • direct DOM APIs (element.innerHTML, insertAdjacentHTML) unless the HTML is trusted or robustly sanitized and the risk is explicitly accepted. (Vue.js)

Insecure patterns:

• <div v-html="userProvidedHtml"></div>
• h('div', { innerHTML: userProvidedHtml })
• <div innerHTML={userProvidedHtml}></div>
• el.innerHTML = untrusted

Detection hints:

• Search: v-html, innerHTML, insertAdjacentHTML, DOMParser, document.write.

Fix:

• Render untrusted content as text (interpolation).
• If HTML rendering is required (e.g., Markdown), sanitize with a well-maintained HTML sanitizer and apply defense-in-depth (CSP, Trusted Types). (Vue.js)

Notes:

• Vue’s docs explicitly warn that user-provided HTML is never “100% safe” unless sandboxed or strictly self-only exposure. (Vue.js)

VUE-XSS-002: Never use non-trusted templates (client-side template/code injection)

Severity: Critical

Required:

• MUST NOT use non-trusted content as a Vue component template.
• MUST treat “user can write a Vue template” as “user can execute arbitrary JavaScript in your app”, and potentially in SSR contexts too. (Vue.js)
• SHOULD prefer the runtime-only build (templates compiled at build time) and avoid shipping the runtime compiler unless you have a vetted need.

Insecure patterns:

• createApp({ template: '<div>' + userProvidedString + '</div>' }).mount(...)
• Storing templates in DB and compiling/rendering them in the browser.
• Admin/CMS features that allow entering Vue template syntax.

Detection hints:

• Search: template: where the value is not a static string.
• Search: @vue/compiler-dom, compile(, “runtime compiler” build selection, dynamic SFC compilation.
• Search for “template editor”, “custom template”, “theme HTML” features.

Fix:

• Treat templates as code: keep them developer-controlled.
• If end-user customization is required, use a safe format (restricted Markdown subset) rendered via a sanitizer, or isolate in a sandboxed iframe.

VUE-XSS-003: Do not mount Vue onto DOM that may contain user-provided server-rendered HTML

Severity: Medium

Required:

• MUST NOT mount Vue on nodes that may contain server-rendered and user-provided content (because attacker-controlled HTML that is “safe as HTML” may become unsafe as a Vue template). (Vue.js)
• SHOULD mount Vue into a “sterile” root element and render the app’s DOM from Vue-controlled templates/components.

Insecure patterns:

• Server renders user content into #app, then Vue mounts on #app and compiles/interprets that DOM as a template.
• “Sprinkling Vue” on large server-rendered pages that include user-generated content.

Detection hints:

• Check server templates (e.g., Rails/Django/Express templates) for user HTML inserted inside the Vue mount root.
• Look for mount('#app') where #app includes server-rendered UGC.

Fix:

• Move user-rendered HTML outside the Vue mount root, or render it in a safe way (text/sanitized HTML) from Vue components.

VUE-XSS-004: Prevent URL injection in bindings and navigations

Severity: High

Required:

• MUST validate/sanitize any user-influenced URL before binding to navigation sinks (href, src, action, window.location, window.open, router navigation to external).
• MUST specifically prevent javascript: URL execution in bindings like <a :href="userProvidedUrl">. (Vue.js)
• SHOULD validate protocol and destination (allowlist https: and expected hosts; allow mailto:/tel: only if intended).

Insecure patterns:

• <iframe :src="userProvidedUrl">
• window.location = route.query.next
• window.open(userProvidedUrl)

Detection hints:

• Search: :href=, :src=, window.location, location.href, window.open, router.push( with untrusted input.
• Look for next, return_to, redirect query params.

Fix:

• Prefer internal navigation via route names/paths you control.
• For external URLs: parse with new URL(...), allowlist protocol/host, reject javascript: and other dangerous schemes.
• Sanitize and validate on the backend before storing user URLs (Vue docs explicitly recommend backend sanitization). (Vue.js)

VUE-XSS-005: Prevent style/CSS injection and UI redress

Severity: Low

Required:

• MUST NOT bind attacker-controlled CSS strings broadly (e.g., :style="userProvidedStyles").
• SHOULD use Vue’s style object syntax and only allow safe, specific properties if user customization is needed. (Vue.js)
• SHOULD isolate “user can control layout/CSS” features inside sandboxed iframes.

Insecure patterns:

• :style="userProvidedStyles" where styles are attacker-controlled.
• Rendering user-provided <style> content (even if Vue blocks some patterns, don’t try to work around it).

Detection hints:

• Search: :style=" bound to non-constant variables that originate from API/user content.
• Search for “custom CSS”, “theme editor”, “profile CSS”.

Fix:

• Allowlist properties and values; avoid raw style strings.
• Use sandboxed iframes for rich user customization.

VUE-XSS-006: Never bind user-provided JavaScript into event handler attributes

Severity: Critical

Required:

• MUST NOT bind attacker-provided strings into event handler attributes (e.g., onclick, onfocus, etc.).
• MUST treat “user-provided JS” as unsafe unless sandboxed and self-only exposure is guaranteed. (Vue.js)

Insecure patterns:

• <div :onclick="userProvidedString">
• <a :onmouseenter="userProvidedString">

Detection hints:

• Search: :on followed by event attribute names (:onclick, :onload, etc.).
• Search for setAttribute('on patterns.

Fix:

• Use real event listeners with developer-controlled handlers.
• If you truly need user scripting, isolate it (sandboxed iframe + strict boundaries).

VUE-ROUTER-001: Do not treat client-side route guards as authorization

Severity: High

Required:

• MUST NOT rely on Vue Router guards, UI hiding, or client-side checks to enforce authorization.
• MUST enforce authorization on the backend for every privileged action and sensitive data response. (OWASP Cheat Sheet Series)

Insecure patterns:

• “Admin route is protected because beforeEach checks user.isAdmin.”
• Sensitive API endpoints that assume “the frontend won’t call this unless allowed.”

Detection hints:

• Search router.beforeEach for role-based gating and see if the backend is also enforcing.
• Look for “security by route meta” patterns (meta.requiresAdmin) with no server corroboration.

Fix:

• Keep route guards as UX only (reduce accidental access), but enforce real checks server-side.

VUE-ROUTER-002: Prevent open redirects and unsafe “return_to/next” handling

Severity: Low

Required:

• MUST validate redirect destinations derived from untrusted input (next, return_to, redirect).
• SHOULD allow only same-site relative paths or an explicit allowlist of destinations.
• MUST NOT allow non http / https protos (such as javascript:)

Insecure patterns:

• router.push(route.query.next as string)
• window.location.href = route.query.redirect

Detection hints:

• Search for route.query.next, route.query.redirect, return_to, continue, callback.
• Trace the value into router/window navigation sinks.

Fix:

• Allow only relative paths starting with / (and reject //host, javascript:, etc.).
• Prefer redirecting to named routes you control.

Notes:

• Even Vue’s docs note that sanitized URLs still may not guarantee safe destinations. (Vue.js)

VUE-AUTH-001: Token storage must assume XSS is possible

Severity: Low

Required:

• MUST assume any token accessible to JavaScript can be stolen via XSS.
• SHOULD prefer HttpOnly cookies (set by the backend) for session tokens, combined with CSRF protections where relevant. (Vue.js)
• SHOULD avoid storing long-lived tokens (especially refresh tokens) in localStorage/sessionStorage.

Insecure patterns:

• localStorage.setItem('token', ...) for long-lived bearer tokens.
• Storing refresh tokens in JS-accessible storage.

Detection hints:

• Search: localStorage, sessionStorage, indexedDB, persist, pinia-plugin-persistedstate.
• Identify whether stored values are auth/session material.

Fix:

• Prefer backend-managed sessions via HttpOnly cookies.
• If bearer tokens are unavoidable, keep them short-lived, stored in memory, and rotate frequently; combine with strong XSS mitigations (CSP, Trusted Types, strict sanitization). (OWASP Cheat Sheet Series)

VUE-CSRF-001: Coordinate with the backend for CSRF when using cookies

Severity: High (for cookie-authenticated state-changing requests)

NOTE: If the application is not using cookie based authentication (for example if it passes an Authorization header), then CSRF is not a concern

Required:

• If API requests include cookies (credentials: 'include' / withCredentials: true) and cookies authenticate the user, MUST include CSRF protections coordinated with the backend (token/header patterns, Origin checks, SameSite cookies as defense-in-depth). (Vue.js)
• MUST NOT “solve CORS/CSRF errors” by disabling protections on the backend or using mode: 'no-cors' on the frontend.

Insecure patterns:

• fetch(url, { credentials: 'include', method: 'POST', body: ... }) with no CSRF token/header usage anywhere.
• Enabling cross-origin credentialed requests without strict origin allowlists (backend-side).

Detection hints:

• Search: credentials: 'include', withCredentials, xsrf, csrf, X-CSRF-Token, X-XSRF-TOKEN.
• Look at API wrapper modules for headers and cookie settings.

Fix:

• Implement backend-issued CSRF tokens and require them on state-changing requests.
• Keep cookies SameSite=Lax/Strict where compatible and verify Origin/Referer where appropriate (backend-driven). (OWASP Cheat Sheet Series)

Notes:

• Vue’s docs explicitly say CSRF is primarily backend-addressed but recommends coordinating on CSRF token submission. (Vue.js)

VUE-HTTP-001: Do not put secrets in URLs; avoid leaking sensitive data in navigation/logs

Severity: Medium

Required:

• MUST NOT place tokens/secrets in query strings or fragments (they leak via logs, referrers, browser history).
• SHOULD avoid logging sensitive values to console in production.

Insecure patterns:

• /?token=..., /#access_token=... used beyond short-lived OAuth handoff.
• console.log(userSession) that includes tokens/PII.

Detection hints:

• Search for token= in router parsing, auth callback handlers, and analytics logs.
• Search for console.log( around auth code.

Fix:

• Use Authorization headers or HttpOnly cookies.
• Scrub logs; gate debug logs behind dev-only checks.

VUE-HEADERS-001: Require security headers at the deployment layer

Severity: Medium

Required:

• SHOULD deploy a CSP (Content-Security-Policy) suitable for your Vue app.
• SHOULD deploy clickjacking defenses (CSP frame-ancestors and/or X-Frame-Options) unless intentional embedding is required.
• SHOULD deploy X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, plus other headers as appropriate (Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy). (OWASP Cheat Sheet Series)

Insecure patterns:

• No evidence of headers in server/CDN config for an app with UGC or rich HTML rendering.
• CSP includes unsafe-inline/unsafe-eval without strong justification.

Detection hints:

• Look for hosting config: nginx, Netlify/Vercel headers config, CloudFront/Cloudflare rules.
• If absent in repo, flag as “verify at edge”.

Fix:

• Set headers at the edge or in the server. Start with a conservative CSP and tighten.

VUE-CSP-001: Use Trusted Types and DOM XSS hardening when feasible

Severity: Low

Required:

• For apps with significant DOM injection surface (rich text, plugins, v-html), SHOULD consider enabling Trusted Types to reduce DOM XSS risk. (web.dev)
• SHOULD treat Trusted Types as defense-in-depth, not a replacement for sanitization.

Insecure patterns:

• Frequent use of innerHTML/v-html without sanitization or CSP hardening.

Detection hints:

• Search: v-html, innerHTML, insertAdjacentHTML.
• Check CSP for require-trusted-types-for 'script' usage (if headers are in repo).

Fix:

• Reduce/centralize HTML injection, sanitize inputs, and add Trusted Types policies where appropriate.

VUE-THIRDPARTY-001: Avoid dynamic third-party script injection; prefer static, vetted loading

Severity: Low

Required:

• MUST NOT inject <script src="..."> where the URL is user-controlled.
• SHOULD treat third-party widgets/analytics as supply-chain risk; load only from vetted, pinned sources.

Insecure patterns:

• const s=document.createElement('script'); s.src = userProvidedUrl; ...
• “Plugin marketplace” that loads arbitrary remote scripts.

Detection hints:

• Search: createElement('script'), .src =, appendChild(script).
• Search for “loadExternalScript”, “injectScript”, “cdnUrl”.

Fix:

• Bundle dependencies, or allowlist strict origins and enforce integrity (see SRI rule).
• Consider sandboxed iframes for untrusted third-party UI.

VUE-SRI-001: Use Subresource Integrity for CDN-hosted scripts/styles

Severity: Low

Required:

• If loading scripts/styles from a CDN, SHOULD use Subresource Integrity (integrity attribute) with appropriate crossorigin configuration. (MDN Web Docs)
• SHOULD prefer self-hosting or bundling over runtime CDN dependencies for security-critical code.

Insecure patterns:

• <script src="https://cdn.example/..."> with no integrity.
• Remote script URLs that can change content without version pinning.

Detection hints:

• Search index.html and server templates for https:// script/style tags.
• Check for integrity=.

Fix:

• Add SRI hashes (and pin versions), or bundle assets with your build.

VUE-SUPPLY-001: Dependency and patch hygiene is mandatory

Severity: Low

Required:

• SHOULD keep Vue and official companion libraries updated; Vue explicitly recommends using latest versions to remain as secure as possible. (Vue.js)
• MUST respond to security advisories promptly.
• SHOULD pin dependencies and keep lockfiles committed (to reduce drift in production artifacts).

Insecure patterns:

• Outdated major versions with known CVEs.
• No lockfile in repo; wide semver ranges for critical deps.
• Ignoring advisories for template/rendering/compiler packages.

Detection hints:

• Inspect package.json, lockfiles, CI install commands.
• Search for npm audit disabled, “ignore vulnerabilities” scripts.

Fix:

• Upgrade dependencies and add regression tests around the impacted behavior.
• Add dependency scanning in CI.

VUE-SSR-001: SSR adds additional trust boundaries; treat state injection as XSS-sensitive

Severity: Medium

Required:

• When using SSR, MUST treat anything injected into the HTML document (initial state, serialized data, inline scripts) as XSS-sensitive.
• MUST keep the “trusted templates only” rule even stricter, because unsafe templates can lead to server-side execution during rendering. (Vue.js)
• SHOULD follow Vue SSR documentation and best practices for SSR security. (Vue.js)

Insecure patterns:

• Concatenating untrusted strings into SSR templates.
• Injecting JSON into <script> blocks without robust escaping/serialization controls.

Detection hints:

• Search server code for __INITIAL_STATE__, window.__*STATE__, template concatenation, and SSR render pipelines.
• Trace untrusted data into those sinks.

Fix:

• Use safe serialization patterns recommended by your SSR stack.
• Avoid rendering untrusted HTML; sanitize or isolate.

5) Practical scanning heuristics (how to “hunt”)

When actively scanning, use these high-signal patterns:

• Dev/preview servers in production:

  • npm run dev, vite, vite preview, vue-cli-service serve (vitejs)

• Secrets exposure:

  • .env, .env.production, .env.*.local, VITE_, import.meta.env, hard-coded API_KEY / SECRET (vitejs)

• XSS sinks:

  • v-html, innerHTML, insertAdjacentHTML, DOMParser, document.write (Vue.js)

• Client-side template injection:

  • template: concatenation, compile(, runtime compiler usage, mounting on non-sterile DOM (Vue.js)

• URL injection / open redirects:

  • :href="..." / :src="..." from user data
  • javascript: occurrences
  • route.query.next / redirect / return_to flowing into router.push or window.location (Vue.js)

• Style injection:

  • :style="userProvidedStyles" or user-driven theme CSS (Vue.js)

• Token storage:

  • localStorage.setItem('token'...), persisted auth stores, refresh tokens in JS-accessible storage

• CSRF integration red flags:

  • credentials: 'include' / withCredentials: true without any CSRF header/token handling (Vue.js)

• Third-party scripts:

  • dynamic script injection (createElement('script')), CDN scripts without SRI (MDN Web Docs)

• External links security:

  • target="_blank" without rel="noopener"/noreferrer (still recommended for legacy and explicitness) (MDN Web Docs)

Always try to confirm:

• data origin (untrusted vs trusted)
• sink type (HTML/DOM insertion, template compilation, URL navigation, style injection, script injection)
• protective controls present (sanitization, allowlists, CSP/Trusted Types, backend validation)

6) Sources (accessed 2026-01-27)

Primary Vue documentation:

• Vue Docs: Security — https://vuejs.org/guide/best-practices/security (Vue.js)
• Vue Docs: Template Syntax (security warning about in-DOM templates) — https://vuejs.org/guide/essentials/template-syntax (Vue.js)
• Vue Docs: Production Deployment — https://vuejs.org/guide/best-practices/production-deployment (Vue.js)
• Vue Docs: Feature Flags — https://link.vuejs.org/feature-flags (Vue.js)

Vite documentation (common Vue tooling):

• Vite Docs: Env Variables and Modes (VITE_* exposure + security notes) — https://vite.dev/guide/env-and-mode (vitejs)
• Vite Docs: CLI (vite preview not designed for production) — https://vite.dev/guide/cli (vitejs)
• Vite Docs: Server Options (server.host can listen on public addresses) — https://vite.dev/config/server-options (vitejs)

OWASP and web platform hardening references:

• OWASP Cheat Sheet Series: XSS Prevention — https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html (Vue.js)
• OWASP Cheat Sheet Series: CSRF Prevention — https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html (OWASP Cheat Sheet Series)
• OWASP Cheat Sheet Series: Authorization — https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authorization_Cheat_Sheet.html (OWASP Cheat Sheet Series)
• OWASP Cheat Sheet Series: HTTP Headers — https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html (OWASP Cheat Sheet Series)
• HTML5 Security Cheat Sheet (referenced by Vue) — https://html5sec.org/ (Vue.js)

Browser/platform references:

• MDN: rel="noopener" — https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTML/Reference/Attributes/rel/noopener (MDN Web Docs)
• MDN: Subresource Integrity — https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Subresource_Integrity (MDN Web Docs)
• web.dev: Trusted Types — https://web.dev/trusted-types/ (web.dev)