You are helping an enterprise architect design an AI agent security architecture that establishes sandboxing, permissions, injection defences, and output validation for autonomous AI agent systems.
User Input
$ARGUMENTS
Instructions
Note: Before generating, scan projects/ for existing project directories. For each project, list all ARC-*.md artifacts, check external/ for reference documents, and check 000-global/ for cross-project policies. If no external docs exist but they would improve output, ask the user.
1. Identify the context
The user should specify:
- Project name/number or agent ID
- Scope of security assessment (single agent, multi-agent system, or full program)
- Applicable security frameworks (if known)
2. Read existing artifacts from the project context
MANDATORY (warn if missing):
- AAGI (Agent Inventory) — Extract: Agent list, capabilities, risk levels
- If missing: warn user to run
$arckit-agent-inventory first
- AAGR (Agent Design) — Extract: Design patterns, tool contracts, integration points
- If missing: warn user to run
$arckit-agent-design first
RECOMMENDED (read if available, note if missing):
- SEC or SBD (Secure by Design) — Extract: Existing security controls, threat models, security standards
- If missing: warn user to run
$arckit-secure or $arckit-mod-secure first
- RISK (Risk Register) — Extract: AI-specific risks, tool security risks, data handling risks
- If missing: note that risk context is limited
- PRIN (Architecture Principles) — Extract: Security principles, technology constraints
OPTIONAL (read if available, skip silently if missing):
- AAOV (Agent Governance) — Extract: Oversight tiers, compliance requirements
- DPIA (Data Protection Impact Assessment) — Extract: Personal data processing, lawful basis
- AIPB (AI Playbook) — Extract: AI ethics, model governance, bias considerations
3. Read the template
Read the template (with user override support):
- First, check if
.arckit/templates-custom/agent-security-template.md exists in the project root
- If found: Read the user's customized template (user override takes precedence)
- If not found: Read
.arckit/templates/agent-security-template.md (default)
- Then, read
.arckit/templates/_partials/RENDERING.md and resolve the template's <!-- DOC-CONTROL-HEADER --> marker to the Document Control partial it selects, applying the ${organisation_name} and ${default_classification} substitutions. Remove the marker and its comment from the output — a rendered artefact must never contain either.
Tip: Users can customize templates with $arckit-customize agent-security
4. Read agent designs and security context
- From AAGI: Extract all agents, their risk classifications, capabilities, and operational domains
- From AAGR: Extract tool contracts, memory architectures, guardrail configurations, and integration points
- From SEC/SBD: Extract existing security controls, threat models, and compliance requirements
- If AAGI/AAGR not available: ask user for agent details and risk assessments
5. Generate security architecture
A. Threat Model (Mermaid mindmap with ≥12 threat categories)
Map threats across four attack surface dimensions:
- Input layer: Prompt injection, data poisoning, context overflow, adversarial inputs, model probing, supply chain attacks
- Execution layer: Tool abuse, privilege escalation, sandboxing escape, resource exhaustion, tool chain manipulation, cross-agent injection
- Output layer: Data exfiltration, PII leakage, hallucination, prompt template extraction, instruction leakage, model weights extraction
- Infrastructure layer: Model theft, API abuse, side-channel attacks, denial of service, credential theft, infrastructure manipulation
B. Sandboxing Architecture
Define isolation boundaries:
- Agent process isolation: Container/sandbox boundaries, OS-level enforcement
- Tool execution isolation: Separate processes, permission boundaries
- Memory isolation: Scoped access, RBAC, cross-session boundaries
- Network isolation: API call boundaries, egress controls
- Data isolation: Input/output separation, context sandboxing
C. Tool Permission Matrix (≥5 tools)
For each tool in the agent design:
- Tool ID and name from AAGR tool contracts
- Permission level: Read / Write / Execute
- Access scope: Full / Limited / None
- Risk classification: Low / Medium / High
- Mitigation: Specific control for each high-risk tool
D. Data Handling Policy
Define handling per data classification:
- PII: Encryption at rest, masking in prompts, retention limits
- Sensitive: Encrypted storage, scoped access, audit logging
- Public: Standard handling, unrestricted access
- Model weights: Restricted access, integrity verification
E. Prompt Injection Defences (≥4 defences)
| Defence |
Method |
Coverage |
| Input sanitization |
Regex, LLM guard, allowlist filtering |
Direct prompts |
| Context boundary |
System prompt separation, delimiter enforcement |
Indirect injection |
| Output validation |
Schema check, content filter, format enforcement |
Response |
| Tool call validation |
Permission check, argument validation, rate limiting |
Tool abuse |
F. Output Validation Pipeline (Mermaid flowchart)
Design pipeline stages:
- Schema validation: Format and structure checks
- Content filtering: Safety and policy enforcement
- PII scanning: Automated detection and redaction
- Human review gate: Flagged content routing
- Release: Approved output delivery
G. Secret Management
Define secret lifecycle:
- API keys: Vault storage, scoped access, 90-day rotation
- Model credentials: Secrets manager, scoped access, 90-day rotation
- Database credentials: Vault storage, scoped access, 30-day rotation
- Encryption keys: HSM or KMS, automated rotation, 30-day cycle
H. Incident Response
Define severity-based response:
- Critical (<15 min): SRE owner — isolate, investigate, patch
- High (<1h): Security owner — contain, assess, remediate
- Medium (<24h): Team owner — patch, monitor
- Low (<72h): Team owner — log, review, improve
6. Risk Assessment
Identify security risks:
- HIGH: No sandboxing, unrestricted tool access, missing input sanitization, no output validation, unencrypted secrets
- MEDIUM: Partial isolation, limited injection defences, weak secret rotation, incomplete audit logging
- LOW: Documentation gaps, missing monitoring alerts, incomplete compliance mapping
7. Generate Security Document
CRITICAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR QUALITY:
This is a LARGE document (threat model + architecture + matrices, 400-800+ lines). You MUST use the Write tool to create the file. DO NOT output the full document to the user (you will exceed token limits).
Follow the template structure with all 9 sections:
- Section 1: Threat Model — Mermaid mindmap with ≥12 threat categories across 4 dimensions
- Section 2: Sandboxing Architecture — Isolation boundary table with components, isolation levels, enforcement
- Section 3: Tool Permission Matrix — ≥5 tools with permissions, access, risk
- Section 4: Data Handling Policy — Data type table with handling, access, retention
- Section 5: Prompt Injection Defences — ≥4 defences with method and coverage
- Section 6: Output Validation Pipeline — Mermaid flowchart with pipeline stages
- Section 7: Secret Management — Secret types, storage, access, rotation schedule
- Section 8: Incident Response — Severity tiers with response times and owners
- Section 9: Traceability — AAGI → AAGR → AASE → SEC links
Auto-populate from artifacts:
- Tool list from AAGR tool contracts
- Risk categories from RISK register
- Security controls from SEC/SBD
- Agent capabilities from AAGI
Mermaid diagram requirements:
- Mindmap for threat model (4 root branches with ≥3 sub-branches each)
- Flowchart for output validation pipeline (at least 5 stages)
- All diagrams must use valid Mermaid syntax
8. Auto-Populate Document Control Fields
CRITICAL - Auto-Populate Document Control Fields:
Before completing the document, populate ALL document control fields in the header:
Construct Document ID:
- Document ID:
ARC-{PROJECT_ID}-AASE-v{VERSION} (e.g., ARC-001-AASE-v1.0)
Populate Required Fields:
Auto-populated fields (populate these automatically):
[PROJECT_ID] → Extract from project path (e.g., "001" from "projects/001-project-name")
[VERSION] → "1.0" (or increment if previous version exists)
[DATE] / [YYYY-MM-DD] → Current date in YYYY-MM-DD format
[DOCUMENT_TYPE_NAME] → "Agent Security Architecture"
ARC-[PROJECT_ID]-AASE-v[VERSION] → Construct using format above
[COMMAND] → "arckit.agent-security"
User-provided fields (extract from project metadata or user input):
[PROJECT_NAME] → Full project name from project metadata or user input
[OWNER_NAME_AND_ROLE] → Document owner (prompt user if not in metadata)
- Classification → comes from the resolved Document Control header, not from a placeholder.
_partials/RENDERING.md fixes the ladder from the artefact's own regime; ${default_classification} applies only where that regime falls through to user config.
Calculated fields:
[YYYY-MM-DD] for Next Review → Current date + 90 days (quarterly review cycle)
Pending fields (leave as [PENDING] until manually updated):
[REVIEWER_NAME] → [PENDING]
[APPROVER_NAME] → [PENDING]
[DISTRIBUTION_LIST] → Default to "Security Team, Architecture Team, Agent Governance Board" or [PENDING]
Populate Revision History:
| 1.0 | {DATE} | ArcKit AI | Initial creation from `$arckit-agent-security` command | [PENDING] | [PENDING] |
Populate Generation Metadata Footer:
The footer should be populated with:
**Generated by**: ArcKit `$arckit-agent-security` command
**Generated on**: {DATE} {TIME} GMT
**ArcKit Version**: {ARCKIT_VERSION}
**Project**: {PROJECT_NAME} (Project {PROJECT_ID})
**AI Model**: [Use actual model name, e.g., "Claude Sonnet 5 (session default)"]
**Generation Context**: [Brief note about source documents used]
Before writing the file, read .arckit/references/quality-checklist.md and verify all Common Checks plus the AASE per-type checks pass. Fix any failures before proceeding.
9. Quality Checks
Verify the security architecture meets minimum standards:
- Threat model: ≥12 threat categories across 4 attack surface dimensions (Input, Execution, Output, Infrastructure)
- Sandboxing architecture: At least 3 components with isolation levels and enforcement mechanisms
- Tool permission matrix: ≥5 tools with permissions, access levels, and risk ratings
- Data handling policy: At least 3 data types with handling, access, and retention policies
- Prompt injection defences: ≥4 defences covering direct, indirect, output, and tool abuse
- Output validation pipeline: Complete Mermaid flowchart with at least 5 stages
- Secret management: At least 3 secret types with storage, access, and rotation policies
- Incident response: At least 3 severity levels with response times and owners
- Traceability links: Established to AAGI, AAGR, and SEC/SBD documents
10. Write output
projects/{project-dir}/ARC-{PROJECT_ID}-AASE-v1.0.md — Full security architecture document
- Update traceability matrix with security references
CRITICAL - Show Summary Only:
After writing the file, show ONLY a brief summary with key security metrics (threat categories covered, defences implemented, risk posture). Do NOT output the full security document content in your response.
Example Usage
User: $arckit-agent-security research-agent
You should:
- Read AAGI (agent inventory) for research-agent project
- Read AAGR (agent design) for tool contracts and integration points
- Read SEC/SBD for existing security controls
- Generate threat model with ≥12 categories across 4 dimensions
- Design sandboxing architecture with isolation boundaries
- Build tool permission matrix (≥5 tools with risk ratings)
- Define data handling policy for PII, sensitive, and public data
- Implement ≥4 prompt injection defences
- Design output validation pipeline with Mermaid flowchart
- Establish secret management with rotation schedules
- Define incident response with 3+ severity levels
- Status: SECURITY ARCHITECTURE COMPLETE
- Key findings:
- ✅ 14 threat categories identified across 4 dimensions
- ✅ 4-layer sandboxing with OS-level enforcement
- ✅ 7 tool permissions assessed, 2 high-risk tools with mitigations
- ✅ 4 injection defences covering all attack vectors
- ✅ Output validation pipeline with 6 stages
- ✅ Secret rotation: 30-day (DB), 90-day (API, model)
- Write to
projects/001-research-agent/ARC-001-AASE-v1.0.md
Important Notes
- Security architecture is a LIVING document — review quarterly or after significant agent changes
- Be thorough on threat modelling (gaps are BLOCKING for deployment)
- All security controls must reference specific agent capabilities and threat categories
- Sandboxing requirements increase with agent autonomy and tool access
- Audit trails for tool executions must be immutable and cryptographically verifiable
- Prompt injection defences must cover both direct and indirect attack vectors
- Output validation must be automated with human review escalation for flagged content
- Secret management must follow zero-trust principles — no hardcoded credentials
- Security architecture feeds into governance requirements — handoff to
$arckit-agent-governance after completion
- Markdown escaping: When writing less-than or greater-than comparisons, always include a space after
< or > (e.g., < 15 min response, > 99% coverage) to prevent markdown renderers from interpreting them as HTML tags or emoji
Suggested Next Steps
After completing this command, consider running:
$arckit-agent-governance -- Align security controls with governance requirements
1---2name: arckit-agent-security3description: Design AI agent security — sandboxing, permissions, injection defences, output validation4---56You are helping an enterprise architect design an AI agent security architecture that establishes sandboxing, permissions, injection defences, and output validation for autonomous AI agent systems.78## User Input910```text11$ARGUMENTS12```1314## Instructions1516> **Note**: Before generating, scan `projects/` for existing project directories. For each project, list all `ARC-*.md` artifacts, check `external/` for reference documents, and check `000-global/` for cross-project policies. If no external docs exist but they would improve output, ask the user.1718### 1. Identify the context1920The user should specify:2122- Project name/number or agent ID23- Scope of security assessment (single agent, multi-agent system, or full program)24- Applicable security frameworks (if known)2526### 2. Read existing artifacts from the project context2728**MANDATORY** (warn if missing):2930- **AAGI** (Agent Inventory) — Extract: Agent list, capabilities, risk levels31 - If missing: warn user to run `$arckit-agent-inventory` first32- **AAGR** (Agent Design) — Extract: Design patterns, tool contracts, integration points33 - If missing: warn user to run `$arckit-agent-design` first3435**RECOMMENDED** (read if available, note if missing):3637- **SEC** or **SBD** (Secure by Design) — Extract: Existing security controls, threat models, security standards38 - If missing: warn user to run `$arckit-secure` or `$arckit-mod-secure` first39- **RISK** (Risk Register) — Extract: AI-specific risks, tool security risks, data handling risks40 - If missing: note that risk context is limited41- **PRIN** (Architecture Principles) — Extract: Security principles, technology constraints4243**OPTIONAL** (read if available, skip silently if missing):4445- **AAOV** (Agent Governance) — Extract: Oversight tiers, compliance requirements46- **DPIA** (Data Protection Impact Assessment) — Extract: Personal data processing, lawful basis47- **AIPB** (AI Playbook) — Extract: AI ethics, model governance, bias considerations4849### 3. Read the template5051**Read the template** (with user override support):5253- **First**, check if `.arckit/templates-custom/agent-security-template.md` exists in the project root54- **If found**: Read the user's customized template (user override takes precedence)55- **If not found**: Read `.arckit/templates/agent-security-template.md` (default)56- **Then**, read `.arckit/templates/_partials/RENDERING.md` and resolve the template's `<!-- DOC-CONTROL-HEADER -->` marker to the Document Control partial it selects, applying the `${organisation_name}` and `${default_classification}` substitutions. Remove the marker and its comment from the output — a rendered artefact must never contain either.5758> **Tip**: Users can customize templates with `$arckit-customize agent-security`5960### 4. Read agent designs and security context6162- From AAGI: Extract all agents, their risk classifications, capabilities, and operational domains63- From AAGR: Extract tool contracts, memory architectures, guardrail configurations, and integration points64- From SEC/SBD: Extract existing security controls, threat models, and compliance requirements65- If AAGI/AAGR not available: ask user for agent details and risk assessments6667### 5. Generate security architecture6869#### A. Threat Model (Mermaid mindmap with ≥12 threat categories)7071Map threats across four attack surface dimensions:7273- **Input layer**: Prompt injection, data poisoning, context overflow, adversarial inputs, model probing, supply chain attacks74- **Execution layer**: Tool abuse, privilege escalation, sandboxing escape, resource exhaustion, tool chain manipulation, cross-agent injection75- **Output layer**: Data exfiltration, PII leakage, hallucination, prompt template extraction, instruction leakage, model weights extraction76- **Infrastructure layer**: Model theft, API abuse, side-channel attacks, denial of service, credential theft, infrastructure manipulation7778#### B. Sandboxing Architecture7980Define isolation boundaries:8182- **Agent process isolation**: Container/sandbox boundaries, OS-level enforcement83- **Tool execution isolation**: Separate processes, permission boundaries84- **Memory isolation**: Scoped access, RBAC, cross-session boundaries85- **Network isolation**: API call boundaries, egress controls86- **Data isolation**: Input/output separation, context sandboxing8788#### C. Tool Permission Matrix (≥5 tools)8990For each tool in the agent design:9192- **Tool ID and name** from AAGR tool contracts93- **Permission level**: Read / Write / Execute94- **Access scope**: Full / Limited / None95- **Risk classification**: Low / Medium / High96- **Mitigation**: Specific control for each high-risk tool9798#### D. Data Handling Policy99100Define handling per data classification:101102- **PII**: Encryption at rest, masking in prompts, retention limits103- **Sensitive**: Encrypted storage, scoped access, audit logging104- **Public**: Standard handling, unrestricted access105- **Model weights**: Restricted access, integrity verification106107#### E. Prompt Injection Defences (≥4 defences)108109| Defence | Method | Coverage |110|---------|--------|----------|111| Input sanitization | Regex, LLM guard, allowlist filtering | Direct prompts |112| Context boundary | System prompt separation, delimiter enforcement | Indirect injection |113| Output validation | Schema check, content filter, format enforcement | Response |114| Tool call validation | Permission check, argument validation, rate limiting | Tool abuse |115116#### F. Output Validation Pipeline (Mermaid flowchart)117118Design pipeline stages:119120- **Schema validation**: Format and structure checks121- **Content filtering**: Safety and policy enforcement122- **PII scanning**: Automated detection and redaction123- **Human review gate**: Flagged content routing124- **Release**: Approved output delivery125126#### G. Secret Management127128Define secret lifecycle:129130- **API keys**: Vault storage, scoped access, 90-day rotation131- **Model credentials**: Secrets manager, scoped access, 90-day rotation132- **Database credentials**: Vault storage, scoped access, 30-day rotation133- **Encryption keys**: HSM or KMS, automated rotation, 30-day cycle134135#### H. Incident Response136137Define severity-based response:138139- **Critical** (<15 min): SRE owner — isolate, investigate, patch140- **High** (<1h): Security owner — contain, assess, remediate141- **Medium** (<24h): Team owner — patch, monitor142- **Low** (<72h): Team owner — log, review, improve143144### 6. Risk Assessment145146Identify security risks:147148- **HIGH**: No sandboxing, unrestricted tool access, missing input sanitization, no output validation, unencrypted secrets149- **MEDIUM**: Partial isolation, limited injection defences, weak secret rotation, incomplete audit logging150- **LOW**: Documentation gaps, missing monitoring alerts, incomplete compliance mapping151152### 7. Generate Security Document153154**CRITICAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR QUALITY**:1551561. **This is a LARGE document** (threat model + architecture + matrices, 400-800+ lines). You MUST use the **Write tool** to create the file. DO NOT output the full document to the user (you will exceed token limits).1571582. **Follow the template structure** with all 9 sections:159 - **Section 1: Threat Model** — Mermaid mindmap with ≥12 threat categories across 4 dimensions160 - **Section 2: Sandboxing Architecture** — Isolation boundary table with components, isolation levels, enforcement161 - **Section 3: Tool Permission Matrix** — ≥5 tools with permissions, access, risk162 - **Section 4: Data Handling Policy** — Data type table with handling, access, retention163 - **Section 5: Prompt Injection Defences** — ≥4 defences with method and coverage164 - **Section 6: Output Validation Pipeline** — Mermaid flowchart with pipeline stages165 - **Section 7: Secret Management** — Secret types, storage, access, rotation schedule166 - **Section 8: Incident Response** — Severity tiers with response times and owners167 - **Section 9: Traceability** — AAGI → AAGR → AASE → SEC links1681693. **Auto-populate from artifacts**:170 - Tool list from AAGR tool contracts171 - Risk categories from RISK register172 - Security controls from SEC/SBD173 - Agent capabilities from AAGI1741754. **Mermaid diagram requirements**:176 - Mindmap for threat model (4 root branches with ≥3 sub-branches each)177 - Flowchart for output validation pipeline (at least 5 stages)178 - All diagrams must use valid Mermaid syntax179180### 8. Auto-Populate Document Control Fields181182**CRITICAL - Auto-Populate Document Control Fields**:183184Before completing the document, populate ALL document control fields in the header:185186**Construct Document ID**:187188- **Document ID**: `ARC-{PROJECT_ID}-AASE-v{VERSION}` (e.g., `ARC-001-AASE-v1.0`)189190**Populate Required Fields**:191192*Auto-populated fields* (populate these automatically):193194- `[PROJECT_ID]` → Extract from project path (e.g., "001" from "projects/001-project-name")195- `[VERSION]` → "1.0" (or increment if previous version exists)196- `[DATE]` / `[YYYY-MM-DD]` → Current date in YYYY-MM-DD format197- `[DOCUMENT_TYPE_NAME]` → "Agent Security Architecture"198- `ARC-[PROJECT_ID]-AASE-v[VERSION]` → Construct using format above199- `[COMMAND]` → "arckit.agent-security"200201*User-provided fields* (extract from project metadata or user input):202203- `[PROJECT_NAME]` → Full project name from project metadata or user input204- `[OWNER_NAME_AND_ROLE]` → Document owner (prompt user if not in metadata)205- **Classification** → comes from the resolved Document Control header, not from a placeholder. `_partials/RENDERING.md` fixes the ladder from the artefact's own regime; `${default_classification}` applies only where that regime falls through to user config.206207*Calculated fields*:208209- `[YYYY-MM-DD]` for Next Review → Current date + 90 days (quarterly review cycle)210211*Pending fields* (leave as [PENDING] until manually updated):212213- `[REVIEWER_NAME]` → [PENDING]214- `[APPROVER_NAME]` → [PENDING]215- `[DISTRIBUTION_LIST]` → Default to "Security Team, Architecture Team, Agent Governance Board" or [PENDING]216217**Populate Revision History**:218219```markdown220| 1.0 | {DATE} | ArcKit AI | Initial creation from `$arckit-agent-security` command | [PENDING] | [PENDING] |221```222223**Populate Generation Metadata Footer**:224225The footer should be populated with:226227```markdown228**Generated by**: ArcKit `$arckit-agent-security` command229**Generated on**: {DATE} {TIME} GMT230**ArcKit Version**: {ARCKIT_VERSION}231**Project**: {PROJECT_NAME} (Project {PROJECT_ID})232**AI Model**: [Use actual model name, e.g., "Claude Sonnet 5 (session default)"]233**Generation Context**: [Brief note about source documents used]234```235236---237238Before writing the file, read `.arckit/references/quality-checklist.md` and verify all **Common Checks** plus the **AASE** per-type checks pass. Fix any failures before proceeding.239240### 9. Quality Checks241242Verify the security architecture meets minimum standards:243244- **Threat model**: ≥12 threat categories across 4 attack surface dimensions (Input, Execution, Output, Infrastructure)245- **Sandboxing architecture**: At least 3 components with isolation levels and enforcement mechanisms246- **Tool permission matrix**: ≥5 tools with permissions, access levels, and risk ratings247- **Data handling policy**: At least 3 data types with handling, access, and retention policies248- **Prompt injection defences**: ≥4 defences covering direct, indirect, output, and tool abuse249- **Output validation pipeline**: Complete Mermaid flowchart with at least 5 stages250- **Secret management**: At least 3 secret types with storage, access, and rotation policies251- **Incident response**: At least 3 severity levels with response times and owners252- **Traceability links**: Established to AAGI, AAGR, and SEC/SBD documents253254### 10. Write output255256- `projects/{project-dir}/ARC-{PROJECT_ID}-AASE-v1.0.md` — Full security architecture document257- Update traceability matrix with security references258259**CRITICAL - Show Summary Only**:260After writing the file, show ONLY a brief summary with key security metrics (threat categories covered, defences implemented, risk posture). Do NOT output the full security document content in your response.261262## Example Usage263264User: `$arckit-agent-security research-agent`265266You should:267268- Read AAGI (agent inventory) for research-agent project269- Read AAGR (agent design) for tool contracts and integration points270- Read SEC/SBD for existing security controls271- Generate threat model with ≥12 categories across 4 dimensions272- Design sandboxing architecture with isolation boundaries273- Build tool permission matrix (≥5 tools with risk ratings)274- Define data handling policy for PII, sensitive, and public data275- Implement ≥4 prompt injection defences276- Design output validation pipeline with Mermaid flowchart277- Establish secret management with rotation schedules278- Define incident response with 3+ severity levels279- **Status**: SECURITY ARCHITECTURE COMPLETE280- **Key findings**:281 - ✅ 14 threat categories identified across 4 dimensions282 - ✅ 4-layer sandboxing with OS-level enforcement283 - ✅ 7 tool permissions assessed, 2 high-risk tools with mitigations284 - ✅ 4 injection defences covering all attack vectors285 - ✅ Output validation pipeline with 6 stages286 - ✅ Secret rotation: 30-day (DB), 90-day (API, model)287- Write to `projects/001-research-agent/ARC-001-AASE-v1.0.md`288289## Important Notes290291- Security architecture is a LIVING document — review quarterly or after significant agent changes292- Be thorough on threat modelling (gaps are BLOCKING for deployment)293- All security controls must reference specific agent capabilities and threat categories294- Sandboxing requirements increase with agent autonomy and tool access295- Audit trails for tool executions must be immutable and cryptographically verifiable296- Prompt injection defences must cover both direct and indirect attack vectors297- Output validation must be automated with human review escalation for flagged content298- Secret management must follow zero-trust principles — no hardcoded credentials299- Security architecture feeds into governance requirements — handoff to `$arckit-agent-governance` after completion300- **Markdown escaping**: When writing less-than or greater-than comparisons, always include a space after `<` or `>` (e.g., `< 15 min response`, `> 99% coverage`) to prevent markdown renderers from interpreting them as HTML tags or emoji301302## Suggested Next Steps303304After completing this command, consider running:305306- `$arckit-agent-governance` -- Align security controls with governance requirements