Arckit Fr Anssi Carto

⚠️ Community-contributed command — not part of the officially-maintained ArcKit baseline. Output should be reviewed by qualified DPO / RSSI / legal counsel before reliance. Citations to ANSSI / CNIL / EU regulations may lag the current text — verify against the source.

You are helping an enterprise architect produce an ANSSI information system cartography following the ANSSI guide "Cartographie du système d'information" (2021). SI cartography is a structured four-level representation of an information system that provides RSSI, architects, and auditors with a shared understanding of the system boundary, components, interdependencies, and attack surface.

SI cartography is a prerequisite for EBIOS Risk Manager (feeds the ecosystem map in Workshop 3), for homologation dossiers, for NIS2 Article 21 compliance assessments, and for OIV security plans.

User Input

$ARGUMENTS

Instructions

Note: Before generating, scan projects/ for existing project directories. For each project, list all ARC-*.md artifacts, check external/ for reference documents, and check 000-global/ for cross-project policies. If no external docs exist but they would improve output, ask the user.

Step 0: Read existing artifacts from the project context

MANDATORY (warn if missing):

• REQ (Requirements) — Extract: system functional description, integration requirements (INT-xxx), deployment environment (cloud/on-premise/hybrid), user population, data flows to external parties
  • If missing: STOP — cartography requires a minimum understanding of the system. Run $arckit-requirements first.

RECOMMENDED (read if available, note if missing):

• DATA (Data Model) — Extract: data assets, data classification levels, data flows — essential for business and application levels
• STKE (Stakeholder Analysis) — Extract: external entities, partners, third-party providers — essential for ecosystem cartography
• SECD (Secure by Design) — Extract: existing network segmentation, security zones, access controls
• ANSSI (ANSSI Assessment) — Extract: any prior hygiene findings relating to network or infrastructure

OPTIONAL (read if available, skip silently):

• EBIOS (EBIOS RM Study) — Extract: ecosystem map from Workshop 3 if a prior EBIOS study exists — avoid duplication
• PRIN (Architecture Principles, 000-global) — Extract: data classification policy, infrastructure standards
• SECNUM (SecNumCloud Assessment) — Extract: cloud provider details for system and network levels

Step 0b: Read external documents and policies

• Read any external documents in external/ — extract network diagrams, infrastructure inventories, previous cartographies, penetration test reports (reveal attack surface findings)
• Read any global policies in 000-global/policies/ — extract data classification policy, network security policy

Step 1: Identify or Create Project

Identify the target project from the hook context. If the project doesn't exist:

1. Use Glob to list projects/*/ directories and find the highest NNN-* number
2. Calculate the next number (zero-padded to 3 digits)
3. Slugify the project name
4. Use the Write tool to create projects/{NNN}-{slug}/README.md
5. Set PROJECT_ID and PROJECT_PATH

Step 2: Read Source Artifacts

Read all documents from Step 0. Extract:

• Business processes and essential data assets (Level 1 inputs)
• Application inventory and interdependencies (Level 2 inputs)
• Server, database, and infrastructure inventory (Level 3 inputs)
• Network segments, interconnections, and internet entry points (Level 4 inputs)
• External parties and trusted relationships across all levels

Step 3: Cartography Template Reading

Read the template (with user override support):

• First, check if .arckit/templates-custom/fr-anssi-carto-template.md exists in the project root
• If found: Read the user's customized template
• If not found: Read .arckit/templates/fr-anssi-carto-template.md
• Then read .arckit/templates/_partials/RENDERING.md and resolve the <!-- DOC-CONTROL-HEADER --> marker in the template before writing. CARTO carries the France regime, which hard-routes to _partials/document-control-fr.md whatever the operator's user config says.

Step 4: Four-Level Cartography

Work through the four ANSSI cartography levels in order. Each level progressively increases in technical detail. Use information from source artifacts where available; flag gaps where information is insufficient to complete a level.

Level 1 — Business View (Vue Métier)

Objective: Identify the business processes and essential information assets that the IS supports. This is the "what does it do and what does it protect?" level.

1. Business processes: List all business processes supported by the IS (P-xx IDs). For each, note criticality (critical/important/standard) and data sensitivity.
2. Essential information assets (Valeurs Métier): From the data model and requirements, identify the assets whose protection justifies the IS's existence — core data, key services, critical processes. Assign VM-xx IDs (consistent with EBIOS if a study exists).
3. External actors: Identify all external organisations that interact with the IS — citizens, partners, regulators, service providers. Note the nature of the interaction and trust level.
4. Business-level dependencies: Which business processes depend on which external actors or partner systems?

Level 2 — Application View (Vue Applicative)

Objective: Map business processes to the applications and services that implement them, and document the data flows between applications.

1. Application inventory: For each application and service (APP-xx IDs), note its purpose, which business process(es) it supports, criticality, and hosting model (cloud/on-premise/SaaS).
2. Application interdependencies: Document all application-to-application flows — protocol, data type, data classification, authentication mechanism.
3. External SaaS and third-party services: List all external digital services used — email, analytics, identity providers, payment processors, storage. Note data shared with each.
4. Sensitive application flows: Flag any flows crossing trust boundaries or carrying sensitive/classified data.

Level 3 — System / Infrastructure View (Vue Système)

Objective: Map applications to the physical or virtual infrastructure components that host them.

1. Server inventory: For each server or virtual machine (SRV-xx IDs) — hostname/role, OS, applications hosted, environment (prod/staging/dev), location (data centre, cloud region), criticality.
2. Database inventory: For each database (DB-xx) — DBMS, data owner, classification level, encryption at rest status.
3. Identity infrastructure: Document Active Directory domains, identity providers (IdP), privileged access management (PAM) solutions, certificate authorities.
4. Sensitive equipment: Firewalls, load balancers, HSMs, network appliances — location and whether administration interfaces are exposed.
5. Administration paths: How are servers administered — bastion hosts, jump servers, direct access? From which networks?

Level 4 — Network View (Vue Réseau)

Objective: Map network segments and their interconnections, including external connections and internet exposure.

1. Network segments: For each segment (NET-xx) — name, VLAN/IP range, security zone (internet-facing/internal/restricted/admin), purpose, and which systems it hosts.
2. External interconnections: All connections to external networks — RIE, partner VPNs, cloud provider connections, MPLS circuits. For each: encryption, authentication, direction.
3. Internet entry points: All points where the internet can reach the IS — public IPs, domains, APIs, email gateways, VPN endpoints. For each: protection in place (WAF, DDoS, firewall rules).
4. Administration channels: How does the administration plane connect — bastion/jump host configuration, protocols, MFA, logging.
5. Sensitive flows: Map flows identified at Level 2 onto the network — does the application flow cross network zones? Is it encrypted? Does it transit an untrusted network?

Attack Surface Summary

After completing all four levels, synthesise the key attack surface findings:

1. Internet-facing entry points: Enumerate all internet-exposed services with their protection level
2. Administration exposure: Any admin interfaces reachable from non-restricted zones?
3. Third-party interconnections: Which external connections could be used as an entry vector?
4. Unencrypted sensitive flows: Any flows carrying sensitive data without encryption?
5. Supply chain dependencies: Critical SaaS or cloud services with single points of failure or data exposure?

Step 5: Generate Cartography Document

CRITICAL: Use the Write tool to create the full cartography document.

1. Detect version: Check for existing ARC-{PROJECT_ID}-CARTO-v*.md files:

   • No existing file → VERSION="1.0"
   • Existing file → minor increment if refreshed, major if scope changed

2. Auto-populate Document Control:

   • Document ID: ARC-{PROJECT_ID}-CARTO-v{VERSION}
   • Status: DRAFT
   • Created Date: {current_date}
   • Next Review Date: {current_date + 12 months}
   • Classification: Diffusion Restreinte minimum (cartography reveals attack surface — restrict distribution)

3. Write the complete cartography following the template populated with Step 4 findings.

Before writing the file, read .arckit/references/quality-checklist.md and verify all Common Checks plus CARTO per-type checks pass.

Write the document to:

projects/{project_id}/ARC-{PROJECT_ID}-CARTO-v{VERSION}.md

Step 6: Summary Output

━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
✅ SI Cartography Generated
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📄 Document: projects/{project_id}/ARC-{PROJECT_ID}-CARTO-v{VERSION}.md
📋 Document ID: {document_id}
📅 Date: {date}
🔒 Classification: Diffusion Restreinte

━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
📊 Cartography Summary
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

Level 1 — Business:    {N} processes, {N} essential assets, {N} external actors
Level 2 — Application: {N} applications, {N} SaaS services, {N} interdependency flows
Level 3 — System:      {N} servers, {N} databases, {N} admin paths
Level 4 — Network:     {N} segments, {N} external interconnections, {N} internet entry points

━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
🚨 Attack Surface Findings
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

Internet-exposed entry points:        {N}
Admin interfaces exposed (risk):      {N}
Third-party interconnections:         {N}
Unencrypted sensitive flows:          {N}
High-priority recommendations:        {N}

━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Next steps:
1. Run $arckit-fr-ebios — cartography feeds Workshop 3 ecosystem map directly
2. Run $arckit-fr-anssi — use network and system findings to prioritise hygiene gaps
3. Run $arckit-diagram — generate visual diagrams from cartography data
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Important Notes

• Cartography is security-sensitive: A complete SI cartography reveals attack surface, administration paths, and asset locations. Always classify Diffusion Restreinte minimum and restrict distribution to personnel with a need to know.
• Four levels are complementary, not alternatives: The value of ANSSI cartography is the ability to trace from a business asset (Level 1) through the application (Level 2) and infrastructure (Level 3) down to the network exposure (Level 4). Completing only one or two levels produces an incomplete picture.
• EBIOS synergy: If an EBIOS Risk Manager study is planned or exists, the cartography feeds directly into Workshop 3 (ecosystem map) and Workshop 4 (operational scenarios). The VM-xx IDs should be consistent between the two documents.
• Living document: The cartography must be updated when the IS architecture changes significantly. A stale cartography is worse than no cartography — it gives false confidence. Set a review trigger on major architectural change.
• Visual diagrams: This command produces a structured text cartography. Use $arckit-diagram to generate visual Mermaid or PlantUML diagrams from the cartography data for presentations and homologation dossiers.

Key References

Success Criteria

• ✅ Cartography document created at projects/{project_id}/ARC-{PROJECT_ID}-CARTO-v{VERSION}.md
• ✅ Level 1 (business): processes, essential assets, and external actors documented
• ✅ Level 2 (application): application inventory, interdependencies, and SaaS services documented
• ✅ Level 3 (system): server and database inventory, identity infrastructure, admin paths documented
• ✅ Level 4 (network): network segments, external interconnections, and internet entry points documented
• ✅ Sensitive flows identified and mapped across all four levels
• ✅ Attack surface summary with internet-exposed entry points and admin exposure
• ✅ Security recommendations prioritised from attack surface findings
• ✅ Document classified Diffusion Restreinte minimum

Example Usage

$arckit-fr-anssi-carto Produce SI cartography for a French ministry digital services platform — three production data centres, Azure cloud, 50k citizen users, integration with FranceConnect and DGFIP APIs

$arckit-fr-anssi-carto Cartography for 001 — regional hospital IS (SIH), OIV santé designation, connected to Mon Espace Santé, mix of on-premise VMware and SaaS clinical software

$arckit-fr-anssi-carto ANSSI cartography for a French energy operator (OIV énergie), separate IT and OT networks, SCADA interconnection, cloud-hosted analytics platform

Suggested Next Steps

After completing this command, consider running:

• $arckit-fr-ebios -- Use the cartography ecosystem map and attack surface summary as Workshop 3 input (when Cartography reveals interconnections and trust boundaries that need risk analysis)
• $arckit-fr-anssi -- Use cartography findings to prioritise ANSSI hygiene measures assessment (when Network view reveals exposed interfaces or unprotected sensitive flows)
• $arckit-diagram -- Generate architecture diagrams from the cartography data (when Visual diagram representation of cartography levels is needed)
• $arckit-secure -- Address security findings from the cartography attack surface analysis (when Cartography reveals unacceptable attack surface exposure)