Arckit Us Icam

⚠️ Community-contributed command — not part of the officially-maintained ArcKit baseline. Output should be reviewed by qualified US federal counsel, your agency's Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP), CISO, Chief AI Officer (CAIO), and (for FedRAMP matters) the agency PMO and 3PAO before reliance.

Statutory currency: EO 14110 was revoked January 2025; the active AI assurance mandates are OMB M-24-10 (use of AI) and OMB M-25-21 (acquisition of AI). FedRAMP completed the transition to NIST 800-53 Rev 5 baselines in 2024 — Rev 4 references are deprecated. Verify all citations against the current Federal Register, OMB Circulars page, NIST publications, and FedRAMP.gov before relying on this output.

You are an enterprise architect designing the Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) architecture for a US federal civilian system under OMB M-19-17.

User Input

$ARGUMENTS

Context

OMB M-19-17 ("Enabling Mission Delivery through Improved Identity, Credential, and Access Management") sets the federal ICAM policy framework. It directs agencies to adopt a risk-based approach to identity assurance using NIST SP 800-63-3 Digital Identity Guidelines, which decompose identity assurance into three orthogonal levels:

• IAL (Identity Assurance Level) 1 / 2 / 3 — strength of identity proofing
• AAL (Authenticator Assurance Level) 1 / 2 / 3 — strength of authentication
• FAL (Federation Assurance Level) 1 / 2 / 3 — strength of federated assertion

Federal employees and contractors authenticate using PIV (Personal Identity Verification) credentials per FIPS 201-3. Public-facing federal services predominantly federate to login.gov (operated by GSA / Technology Transformation Services) which provides IAL1, IAL2, and AAL2 services. Agencies may operate additional federated identity providers (e.g. HHS IAM, VA.gov).

Authoritative anchors:

• OMB M-19-17 (Enabling Mission Delivery through Improved Identity, Credential, and Access Management) — https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/M-19-17.pdf
• NIST SP 800-63-3 (Digital Identity Guidelines) — https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/
• NIST SP 800-63A (Enrollment and Identity Proofing) — https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63a.html
• NIST SP 800-63B (Authentication and Lifecycle Management) — https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html
• NIST SP 800-63C (Federation and Assertions) — https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63c.html
• FIPS 201-3 (Personal Identity Verification of Federal Employees and Contractors) — https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.201-3.pdf
• login.gov technical documentation — https://developers.login.gov/
• GSA IDmanagement.gov ICAM Architecture — https://www.idmanagement.gov/

Process

1. Read prerequisites:

   • projects/000-global/ARC-000-PRIN-*.md (architecture principles, if present)
   • The project's REQ artefact — extract NFR-SEC-* (security NFRs), INT-* (integration requirements), DR-* (data requirements)
   • The project's FIPS 199 artefact — system water-mark influences AAL minimums
   • The project's STKE artefact — for user populations (federal employees, contractors, citizens, partners)
   • .arckit/templates/_partials/RENDERING.md

2. Read the template:

   • First, check .arckit/templates-custom/us-icam-template.md (user override)
   • Then, .arckit/templates-custom/us-icam-template.md
   • Fallback, .arckit/templates/us-icam-template.md

3. Use scripts/bash/create-project.sh --json --name "<project-name>" if the project does not yet exist; otherwise locate it.

4. Use node scripts/generate-document-id.mjs <PROJECT_ID> ICAM --filename for the artefact filename. The type code for this command is ICAM.

5. Resolve the <!-- DOC-CONTROL-HEADER --> marker per RENDERING.md before writing the artefact. RENDERING.md hard-routes the US regime to _partials/document-control-us.md, which already carries the EO 13526 / 32 CFR Part 2002 marking ladder — no per-command classification override is needed.

6. Generate the following sections:

   • User Populations and Use Cases — enumerate the user populations the system serves: Federal Employees, Contractors, Citizens (public-facing), Partner Agencies, Privileged Administrators, Service Accounts. For each population list the use cases (e.g. "claim a benefit", "process a case", "administer the cloud account").
   • IAL / AAL / FAL Determination Matrix — for each use case score IAL (1/2/3), AAL (1/2/3), FAL (1/2/3) per the SP 800-63-3 risk assessment methodology. Capture the rationale referencing the impact categories (inconvenience/distress, financial loss, harm to programs, unauthorized release of sensitive info, personal safety, civil/criminal violations).
   • Identity Proofing Architecture — for IAL2/IAL3 use cases, document the proofing process: collected evidence (STRONG / SUPERIOR / FAIR), in-person vs remote (supervised) proofing, identity-proofing provider (login.gov, ID.me, agency-operated), proofing data retention and disposal policy. Cross-reference the PIA.
   • Authenticator Selection — for each AAL tier select acceptable authenticators per SP 800-63B (e.g. AAL2: Multi-Factor OTP + Memorised Secret, MF Cryptographic Software; AAL3: MF Cryptographic Hardware such as PIV card or FIDO2 hardware key with verifier impersonation resistance).
   • Federal Employee / Contractor Pattern — PIV-card-as-primary-credential per HSPD-12 and FIPS 201-3. Document PIV derivation for mobile (Derived PIV per SP 800-157 Rev 1). Identify cross-agency PIV interoperability requirements via the Federal PKI.
   • Public-Facing Citizen Pattern — login.gov as the default per M-19-17 direction. Document login.gov tenant configuration: IAL/AAL requirements, attribute bundles, redirect/logout flows, SAML vs OIDC, branded vs unbranded interface.
   • Federation Pattern — SAML 2.0 vs OIDC; SP-initiated vs IdP-initiated; assertion encryption; session management; single-logout (SLO) handling.
   • Privileged Access Management (PAM) — break-glass accounts, just-in-time elevation, session recording, separation of duties, MFA-bound to hardware roots of trust for AAL3.
   • Credential Lifecycle — issuance, suspension, revocation, re-issuance, renewal; PIV-specific lifecycle per FIPS 201-3 §5.
   • Authorization Model — RBAC / ABAC / ReBAC choice with rationale; policy decision point (PDP), policy information point (PIP), policy enforcement point (PEP) placement; integration with the Zero Trust policy engine.

7. Before writing the file, read .arckit/references/quality-checklist.md and verify all Common Checks plus the ICAM per-type checks pass. Fix any failures before proceeding.

8. Use the Write tool to save the artefact at the path returned by create-project.sh + generate-document-id.mjs.

9. Emit a short summary to the user — user-population count, highest IAL/AAL/FAL required, selected identity providers (login.gov, PIV, agency IdP), and any open architecture decisions. Do not echo the full artefact.

Handoffs

ICAM is the foundation of the Zero Trust Identity pillar — feed IAL/AAL/FAL outputs into $arckit-us-zero-trust scoring. The proofing data flows (especially at IAL2/IAL3) collect significant PII, so trigger $arckit-us-privacy-pia. Identity-provider selection and federation pattern decisions should be captured as ADRs via $arckit-adr.

Important Notes

• IAL / AAL / FAL are orthogonal — do not equate IAL2 with AAL2 with FAL2. A use case can require IAL2 (proofed identity) with AAL3 (phishing-resistant MFA) and FAL2 (encrypted assertion). The xALs are chosen independently per risk impact.
• login.gov is the federal default for public-facing services — per M-19-17 direction. Agencies operating their own consumer IdP must justify the deviation. Internal-employee patterns continue to use PIV.
• PIV-Derived credentials are first-class — Derived PIV (SP 800-157 Rev 1) provides PIV-equivalent authentication on mobile devices and is now widely accepted. Do not block mobile use cases on a misconception that only physical PIV cards qualify.
• NIST SP 800-63 Rev 4 is in flight — the draft introduces material changes (phishing-resistant authenticators required at AAL2, syncable authenticators, broader IAL options). Track the Rev 4 publication and update this artefact when it lands.
• Federation Assurance Level often gets shortcut — FAL1 (bearer assertion over TLS) is the default for SAML/OIDC, but high-impact use cases require FAL2 (encrypted assertion) or FAL3 (holder-of-key). Do not default everything to FAL1 by accident.

Suggested Next Steps

After completing this command, consider running:

• $arckit-us-zero-trust -- ICAM is the foundation of the Zero Trust Identity pillar; IAL/AAL/FAL selections directly score ZTMM Identity functions.
• $arckit-us-privacy-pia -- Identity proofing collects and processes PII (especially IAL2/IAL3); the ICAM data flows feed the PIA personal-information inventory.
• $arckit-adr -- Identity provider selection (PIV vs login.gov vs agency-specific) and federation pattern decisions warrant ADRs.