Supply Chain Hardened CI CD

Supply Chain Hardened CI/CD

GitHub Actions Audit Checklist

Run on every .github/workflows/*.yml file reviewed. Flag each failure with its specific line.

• All uses: references pinned to 40-character commit SHAs — not @v4, @main, etc.
  • March 2026 TeamPCP campaign specifically hijacked release tags on Trivy, Checkmarx, LiteLLM, Bitwarden CLI, SAP CAP
• permissions: {} at workflow level with per-job opt-in; no job has broader permissions than needed
• No pull_request_target trigger combined with actions/checkout of the PR head SHA (Pwn Request — runs with secrets in target repo context)
• Build and publish steps in separate jobs; registry credentials exist only in the publish job
• npm ci --ignore-scripts (or Python equivalent) in install steps — preinstall/postinstall hooks are the dominant execution vector
• No long-lived secrets where OIDC Trusted Publishing is available (PyPI, npm)
• GitHub environment with required reviewers gates the publish job
• Artifact verified (checksums, provenance) before publication
• Cache keys scoped to avoid cross-fork poisoning
• Egress firewall or harden-runner with egress-policy: block preferred for release jobs
• SBOM generated for releases; signatures verified (Sigstore, npm provenance)

Key Hardening Patterns

SHA-pinning

# Bad
- uses: actions/checkout@v4

# Good
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683  # v4.2.2

Verify the SHA belongs to the expected tag: git -C <cloned-actions-repo> tag --points-at <sha>

OIDC Trusted Publishing (no long-lived tokens)

permissions:
  id-token: write
  contents: read

- uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1
  # No TWINE_PASSWORD or API token needed

Two-job split (build / publish)

jobs:
  build:
    permissions:
      contents: read
    steps:
      - run: python -m build
      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@...

  publish:
    needs: build
    environment: pypi-release  # requires reviewer approval
    permissions:
      id-token: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/download-artifact@...
      - uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@...

Registry credentials (OIDC or token) appear only in the publish job. The build job has no network write access.

Deny-by-default permissions

permissions: {}  # deny all at workflow level

jobs:
  test:
    permissions:
      contents: read  # minimum needed

Pwn Request prevention

Never combine pull_request_target with checkout of the PR head:

# Dangerous
on: pull_request_target
steps:
  - uses: actions/checkout@...
    with:
      ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}  # executes untrusted code with secrets

Use pull_request (no secrets) or audit all code paths before accessing secrets in pull_request_target.

Findings Format

For each finding: file path, line number, violation type (e.g., "mutable tag reference", "Pwn Request pattern"), and remediation (the exact SHA-pinned replacement or restructured job split).