FERPA Education Records
Overview
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) protects education records—records directly related to a student maintained by an educational agency or institution (or party acting on its behalf).
| Concept |
Regulation |
Agent/EdTech relevance |
| Education record |
34 CFR §99.3 |
Grades, discipline, IDs, biometrics, AI chat logs tied to student |
| Personally identifiable information (PII) |
§99.3 |
Name + student ID in agent prompts = FERPA PII |
| School official |
§99.31(a)(1) |
LLM vendor may be school official with DPA + LEA |
| Legitimate educational interest |
§99.31(a)(1)(i) |
Agent must have LEA-defined purpose |
| Directory information |
§99.37 |
Opt-out affects what agents may disclose |
| Parent/eligible student rights |
§99.10–99.12 |
Access, amend, consent to disclose |
| Recordation |
§99.32 |
Audit log of disclosures from agent systems |
HIPAA interaction: Most K-12 health records in education records are FERPA, not HIPAA (except school nurse as covered entity in narrow cases—legal review).
AI agents: Tutoring bots, grading assistants, and analytics pipelines that store prompts with student identity are high-risk FERPA systems.
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- EdTech SaaS or district deploys AI agents accessing student data
- Drafting Data Processing Agreements with LLM/MCP vendors as school officials
- Legitimate educational interest analysis for new agent features
- Parent consent or notification for directory information / disclosures
- Audit of agent logs, MCP Postgres, or Slack for improper redisclosure
- State student privacy laws overlay (SOPIPA, PPRA, state §)—FERPA is floor
Do not use this skill when:
- De-identified research datasets with no student IDs (may be outside FERPA—confirm)
- Pure COPPA consumer app not acting as school agent (use
coppa-children-privacy)
- Employee (faculty) HR records (not education records)
- PCI payment for tuition without student academic data
Core Process
Execute steps in order.
Step 1: Education record inventory
- Map systems: LMS, SIS, agent gateway, MCP evidence DB, LLM vendor logs.
- Classify data elements per student:
- Education record vs directory information vs de-identified
- Biometric (voice/face in agent)—treat as sensitive PII
- Document who maintains each record (LEA vs vendor).
- Artifact:
templates/ferpa-school-official.yaml inventory section.
Step 2: School official and subcontractor chain
- Vendor qualifies as school official only if (34 CFR §99.31(a)(1)):
- Performs institutional service/function
- Under direct control regarding use/maintenance of records
- DPA meets §99.31(a)(1) requirements (use template)
- Map LLM provider role: subprocessors require LEA approval and flow-down terms.
- MCP servers holding student data = extensions of vendor/LEA—same control requirements.
- Prohibit training vendor models on identifiable education records without consent.
Step 3: Legitimate educational interest (LEI)
- For each agent capability, document:
- Educational purpose (tutoring, feedback, compliance audit of IT—not marketing)
- Scope of records accessed (minimum necessary)
- Role of user (teacher, admin, student)
- Deny agent access where LEI cannot be articulated (e.g., unrelated LLM experimentation).
- Align with
hipaa-privacy-minimum-necessary conceptually—FERPA uses LEI instead.
Step 4: Consent and directory information
- Directory information (name, email, grade level)—annual notice + opt-out per §99.37.
- Agent must not combine directory info with non-directory records for unauthorized parties.
- Redisclosure rules §99.33: agent outputs to unauthorized third parties = violation.
- Parent/eligible student consent required for non-excepted disclosures (§99.30).
Step 5: Technical safeguards for agents
- Authentication: student vs teacher RBAC (
access-control-identity-audit).
- Redaction: use
hipaa-phi-redaction-pipeline patterns for student names/IDs in logs sent to LLM—prefer pseudonymous session IDs in prompts.
- Audit trail §99.32: log each disclosure from agent (who, what record, recipient, purpose).
- Deanonymization in
agent.py — disable for student-facing production paths unless authorized.
Step 6: Parent and eligible student rights
- Inspection §99.10: provide access to education records including agent interaction logs tied to student.
- Amendment §99.20: process to correct inaccurate records (including wrong AI-generated summaries in record).
- Hearing procedures if amendment denied.
- DSAR-style workflows — use structured export, not raw LLM summarization of other students' data.
Step 7: Breach and improper disclosure
- FERPA has no federal breach notification statute like HIPAA. However:
- Contract and state laws may require notification
- FTC and state AG for EdTech deceptive practices
- Route confirmed leaks to
breach-incident-response + legal.
- Document in disclosure log §99.32.
Step 8: Evidence and audit
- DPA signed with all school officials (LLM, MCP host, analytics).
- LEI matrix approved by LEA privacy officer.
- Annual FERPA training for staff operating agents.
- SHA-256 evidence manifest for audit binders.
Common Rationalizations
| Excuse |
Rebuttal |
| "We're a vendor—not subject to FERPA." |
Vendors handling records on behalf of LEA are bound by contract and §99.31(a)(1) school official terms. |
| "Chat logs aren't education records." |
Logs directly related to a student and maintained by institution/vendor are records under §99.3. |
| "LLM is ephemeral—no FERPA." |
Vendor retention, caching, and training policies determine compliance—not user assumption. |
| "De-identified prompts are fine." |
Re-identification via session context may still link to student—use pseudonymization policy. |
| "Teachers can paste any student data into the agent." |
LEI and minimum access must govern—even teacher misuse is institutional control failure. |
Red Flags
- LLM vendor DPA missing school official / FERPA clauses
- Agent prompts contain student names + grades with no LEI documentation
- MCP Postgres shared across schools without tenant isolation
- No §99.32 disclosure logging for agent exports
- Directory information used in agent training data
- Parent access request answered by unredacted LLM dump of all chats
Verification
1---2name: ferpa-education-records3description: Implements FERPA (20 U.S.C. §1232g; 34 CFR Part 99) protections for student education records in EdTech, LMS integrations, and AI tutoring agents—school official exceptions, legitimate educational interest, directory information, parent/eligible student rights, and vendor DPAs. Trigger when K-12 or higher-ed systems process student records, deploying AI agents in classrooms, auditing EdTech subprocessors, or assessing LLM use with FERPA-regulated data. Do not use for HIPAA PHI in clinical settings (use hipaa-technical-safeguards), COPPA under-13 consumer apps without school context (use coppa-children-privacy), or general PII without education record nexus (use us-state-privacy-laws).4---56# FERPA Education Records78## Overview910The **Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)** protects **education records**—records directly related to a student maintained by an educational agency or institution (or party acting on its behalf).1112| Concept | Regulation | Agent/EdTech relevance |13| --- | --- | --- |14| **Education record** | 34 CFR §99.3 | Grades, discipline, IDs, biometrics, AI chat logs tied to student |15| **Personally identifiable information (PII)** | §99.3 | Name + student ID in agent prompts = FERPA PII |16| **School official** | §99.31(a)(1) | LLM vendor may be school official with DPA + LEA |17| **Legitimate educational interest** | §99.31(a)(1)(i) | Agent must have LEA-defined purpose |18| **Directory information** | §99.37 | Opt-out affects what agents may disclose |19| **Parent/eligible student rights** | §99.10–99.12 | Access, amend, consent to disclose |20| **Recordation** | §99.32 | Audit log of disclosures from agent systems |2122**HIPAA interaction:** Most K-12 health records in education records are **FERPA**, not HIPAA (except school nurse as covered entity in narrow cases—legal review).2324**AI agents:** Tutoring bots, grading assistants, and analytics pipelines that store **prompts with student identity** are high-risk FERPA systems.2526## When to Use2728Use this skill when:2930- **EdTech SaaS** or **district** deploys AI agents accessing student data31- Drafting **Data Processing Agreements** with LLM/MCP vendors as school officials32- **Legitimate educational interest** analysis for new agent features33- **Parent consent** or notification for directory information / disclosures34- **Audit** of agent logs, MCP Postgres, or Slack for improper redisclosure35- **State student privacy laws** overlay (SOPIPA, PPRA, state §)—FERPA is floor3637Do **not** use this skill when:3839- De-identified research datasets with no student IDs (may be outside FERPA—confirm)40- Pure COPPA consumer app not acting as school agent (use `coppa-children-privacy`)41- Employee (faculty) HR records (not education records)42- PCI payment for tuition without student academic data4344## Core Process4546Execute steps **in order**.4748### Step 1: Education record inventory49501. Map systems: LMS, SIS, agent gateway, MCP evidence DB, LLM vendor logs.512. Classify data elements per student:52 - **Education record** vs directory information vs de-identified53 - **Biometric** (voice/face in agent)—treat as sensitive PII543. Document **who maintains** each record (LEA vs vendor).554. Artifact: `templates/ferpa-school-official.yaml` inventory section.5657### Step 2: School official and subcontractor chain58591. Vendor qualifies as **school official** only if (34 CFR §99.31(a)(1)):60 - Performs institutional service/function61 - Under **direct control** regarding use/maintenance of records62 - **DPA** meets §99.31(a)(1) requirements (use template)632. Map **LLM provider** role: subprocessors require LEA approval and flow-down terms.643. **MCP servers** holding student data = extensions of vendor/LEA—same control requirements.654. Prohibit **training** vendor models on identifiable education records without consent.6667### Step 3: Legitimate educational interest (LEI)68691. For each agent capability, document:70 - **Educational purpose** (tutoring, feedback, compliance audit of IT—not marketing)71 - **Scope** of records accessed (minimum necessary)72 - **Role** of user (teacher, admin, student)732. Deny agent access where LEI cannot be articulated (e.g., unrelated LLM experimentation).743. Align with `hipaa-privacy-minimum-necessary` conceptually—FERPA uses LEI instead.7576### Step 4: Consent and directory information77781. **Directory information** (name, email, grade level)—annual notice + opt-out per §99.37.792. Agent must **not** combine directory info with non-directory records for unauthorized parties.803. **Redisclosure** rules §99.33: agent outputs to unauthorized third parties = violation.814. **Parent/eligible student** consent required for non-excepted disclosures (§99.30).8283### Step 5: Technical safeguards for agents84851. **Authentication**: student vs teacher RBAC (`access-control-identity-audit`).862. **Redaction**: use `hipaa-phi-redaction-pipeline` patterns for student names/IDs in logs sent to LLM—prefer **pseudonymous session IDs** in prompts.873. **Audit trail** §99.32: log each disclosure from agent (who, what record, recipient, purpose).884. **Deanonymization** in `agent.py` — disable for student-facing production paths unless authorized.8990### Step 6: Parent and eligible student rights91921. **Inspection** §99.10: provide access to education records including agent interaction logs tied to student.932. **Amendment** §99.20: process to correct inaccurate records (including wrong AI-generated summaries in record).943. **Hearing** procedures if amendment denied.954. DSAR-style workflows — use structured export, not raw LLM summarization of other students' data.9697### Step 7: Breach and improper disclosure98991. FERPA has **no federal breach notification statute** like HIPAA. However:100 - Contract and **state laws** may require notification101 - **FTC** and state AG for EdTech deceptive practices1022. Route confirmed leaks to `breach-incident-response` + legal.1033. Document in disclosure log §99.32.104105### Step 8: Evidence and audit1061071. DPA signed with all school officials (LLM, MCP host, analytics).1082. LEI matrix approved by LEA privacy officer.1093. Annual FERPA training for staff operating agents.1104. SHA-256 evidence manifest for audit binders.111112## Common Rationalizations113114| Excuse | Rebuttal |115| --- | --- |116| "We're a vendor—not subject to FERPA." | Vendors handling records **on behalf of LEA** are bound by contract and §99.31(a)(1) school official terms. |117| "Chat logs aren't education records." | Logs **directly related to a student** and maintained by institution/vendor are records under §99.3. |118| "LLM is ephemeral—no FERPA." | Vendor **retention**, caching, and training policies determine compliance—not user assumption. |119| "De-identified prompts are fine." | Re-identification via session context may still link to student—use pseudonymization policy. |120| "Teachers can paste any student data into the agent." | **LEI and minimum access** must govern—even teacher misuse is institutional control failure. |121122## Red Flags123124- LLM vendor DPA missing school official / FERPA clauses125- Agent prompts contain student names + grades with no LEI documentation126- MCP Postgres shared across schools without tenant isolation127- No §99.32 disclosure logging for agent exports128- Directory information used in agent training data129- Parent access request answered by unredacted LLM dump of all chats130131## Verification132133- [ ] Education record inventory and maintainer roles documented134- [ ] School official DPAs executed for LLM/MCP/analytics vendors135- [ ] LEI matrix approved for each agent capability136- [ ] Directory information notice and opt-out process current137- [ ] Technical RBAC, redaction/pseudonymization, and audit logging implemented138- [ ] Parent/eligible student access and amendment procedures defined139- [ ] Improper disclosure playbook linked to incident response140- [ ] Evidence package with privacy officer sign-off