AI Agent & Non-Human Identity Governance
AI agents — Microsoft 365 Copilot Studio agents, Microsoft Foundry agents, custom-built
ones, plus traditional service principals and managed identities — are now the
fastest-growing identity population in most tenants. They authenticate, hold permissions,
act on behalf of users (or themselves), and are usually under-governed.
This skill is the lifecycle governance layer for those identities: ownership, scoping,
credential hygiene, reviews, decommissioning, and incident response.
When to use
Establishing or maturing governance for the agent / NHI population — Copilot Studio
agents, Foundry agents, custom LLM agents, and the service principals that back them.
Do not use this skill for workload identity federation patterns alone
(entra-workload-identity), human identity governance (entra-id-governance), or
generic agent build guidance.
Agent identity inventory — know what you're governing
| Class |
Identity model |
Surface |
| Copilot Studio agent (M365) |
Tenant-scoped agent identity + per-user delegated permissions |
M365 admin center / Copilot Studio |
| Microsoft Foundry agent |
Service principal + managed identity + per-user OBO |
Azure portal / Foundry |
| Custom AI agent (your code) |
App registration + workload identity federation / managed identity |
Entra admin center |
| Plugin / connector |
Service principal + delegated/app Graph permissions |
Entra admin center |
| Legacy automation service principal |
App registration, often with secret |
Entra admin center |
Approach
Inventory and tag. Pull every app registration, service principal, and Copilot
Studio / Foundry agent. Tag each with:
- Owner (person + group).
- Sponsor / business owner.
- Purpose (one sentence).
- Data scope (which tenants/sites/mailboxes/resources).
- Lifecycle stage (pilot / production / sunset).
- Criticality (tier 0 / 1 / 2).
Orphaned identities → freeze them; require owner re-claim.
Scope permissions tightly.
- Microsoft Graph: prefer Sites.Selected over
Sites.Read.All, mailbox
scoping via Exchange Online RBAC for Applications (the successor to Application
Access Policies) over tenant-wide Mail.Send, custom security
attributes over broad directory roles.
- Azure: scope role assignments at RG or resource, never subscription Owner unless
truly required.
- Copilot Studio agent knowledge sources: explicit site/library lists, not "All
SharePoint."
- Foundry agent tools: only the tools needed; remove
http plugin unless
necessary.
Credential hygiene. No client secrets in new builds — federated credentials
(GitHub Actions, Azure DevOps, AKS, external OIDC) or certificates with auto-rotation
via Key Vault. Existing secrets: inventory, cap expiry at 180 days, rotate via
automation, plan migration to federation.
Conditional Access for workloads (Workload Identities Premium). Apply to
tier-0 agents and externally-callable agents:
- Restrict source IP ranges.
- Block legacy auth.
- Require named locations.
Don't try to apply to every SP in the tenant — focus on high-blast-radius identities.
Access reviews for agents via Entra ID Governance. Owner reviews per quarter:
- Still needed?
- Still the right scope?
- Credential rotation up to date?
- Owner / sponsor still in role?
Auto-disable on owner non-response.
Lifecycle workflows. Build automation for:
- Provisioning: owner-initiated request → approval → SP created with template
permissions, tagged, owner assigned.
- Modification: scope change requires re-approval.
- Decommissioning: 30-day disable window, then delete; remove role
assignments, federated credentials, knowledge-source attachments.
Audit and monitoring.
- Stream
ServicePrincipalSignInLogs and AuditLogs to Sentinel.
- For Copilot Studio agents: interaction audit logs via Purview Audit.
- Detections:
- New high-privilege role assignment to an agent identity.
- Agent sign-in from unexpected IP/country.
- Sudden spike in Graph API calls per agent.
- Sensitive data access by agent outside business hours.
- New credential added to an agent by an identity other than its owner.
Incident response when an agent is compromised.
- Disable the identity (block sign-in on the app registration / SP).
- Rotate credentials, revoke refresh tokens.
- Hunt actions taken by the agent identity in the past 7–30 days
(Graph audit, resource activity).
- Notify data owners for the resources the agent had access to.
- Root cause (leaked secret? OAuth consent phishing? supply chain?).
- Restore with tightened scope or retire.
Couple with usage signals. Purview AI Hub / DSPM for AI shows what the agent
does (sensitive data flowing through prompts). Pair with identity audit to get a
complete view.
Guardrails
- Every agent identity has a named human owner. Empty owners list = orphan =
audit/security risk.
- No client secrets for new identities. Federation > certificate > secret.
- Sites.Selected (and similar) is mandatory where it exists. "Quick start with
.All and we'll scope later" never scopes later.
- Conditional Access for workloads is a separate license. Confirm SKU before
designing.
- OAuth consent for new agents must be admin-reviewed. End-user consent for high-
privilege scopes is the agent equivalent of a phishing onboarding.
- Decommissioned ≠ deleted in 1 day. 30-day disable window catches "wait, that was
in use somewhere."
- Agent credentials are not for human use. Don't share an agent's secret with the
team for "easier debugging."
- Tag agents with data scope and tier. Without it, IR and reviews are guesswork.
Common anti-patterns
- "Copilot Studio agent grounded on 'All SharePoint'" — same oversharing problem as
Copilot itself, scaled. Use site-scoped knowledge sources.
- "Agent SP granted Mail.Send Application permission tenant-wide" — can email as
anyone. Use app access policies to scope to specific mailboxes.
- "Owner field set to a leaver's account" — orphaned, no review, no rotation.
- "Long-lived client secret in agent code" — git history forever; leak detection
too late.
- "All agents in tier-0 because 'they're all important'" — review and IR effort
becomes uniform but is uniformly low quality. Real tiering.
- "Decommissioned by deleting the app reg, leaving role assignments behind" —
dangling principal IDs in RBAC; restore-with-same-id risk.
- "No audit on Copilot Studio agent interactions" — compromised agent acts
invisibly.
- "Treated agent identity governance as identical to human IGA" — different
lifecycle, different controls, different reviews.
Example prompts
Inventory all Copilot Studio agents, Foundry agents, and service principals in the tenant and produce an owner + scope + tier report.
Roll out access reviews for 600 agent identities via Entra ID Governance quarterly.
Scope a Copilot Studio agent for HR from "All SharePoint" to 4 specific knowledge sites.
Build a decommissioning workflow: 30-day disable, owner notification, full cleanup of RBAC and federated credentials.
Sentinel detections for agent identity compromise: new credential, anomalous sign-in, spike in Graph calls.
IR runbook: compromised Foundry agent that called Microsoft Graph for 48 hours — containment, hunt, notification.
Replace client secrets across 120 legacy automation SPs with workload identity federation or Key Vault certificates.
Apply Conditional Access for workload identities to all tier-0 agents.
Microsoft Learn
1---2name: agent-identity-governance3description: "Guidance for governing the identities of AI agents and non-human identities (NHIs) — Microsoft 365 Copilot Studio agents, Microsoft Foundry agents, custom AI agents, and traditional service principals/managed identities — through their full lifecycle. Covers ownership and tagging, scoped permissions and consent (delegated vs application; Sites.Selected; mailbox-scoped Graph), credential hygiene (federated credentials, certificates, no secrets), Conditional Access for workloads, agent-level access reviews via Entra ID Governance, lifecycle workflows for agent decommissioning, audit (agent prompts, agent actions, agent identity sign-ins), incident response when an agent is compromised, and integration with Purview AI Hub for usage signals. WHEN: AI agent identity governance, non-human identity governance, NHI lifecycle, Copilot Studio agent identity, Foundry agent governance, agent service principal, scoped Graph permissions agent, agent access review, decommission AI agent, agent credential rotation, compromised agent response. DO NOT USE for workload identity federation patterns alone (use entra-workload-identity), Entra ID Governance for humans (use entra-id-governance), or Copilot Studio agent build guidance unrelated to security."4license: MIT5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/vinayaklatthe/agent-identity-governance7 author: Microsoft8 version: "0.1.0"9---1011# AI Agent & Non-Human Identity Governance1213AI agents — Microsoft 365 Copilot Studio agents, Microsoft Foundry agents, custom-built14ones, plus traditional service principals and managed identities — are now the15fastest-growing identity population in most tenants. They authenticate, hold permissions,16act on behalf of users (or themselves), and are usually under-governed.1718This skill is the lifecycle governance layer for those identities: ownership, scoping,19credential hygiene, reviews, decommissioning, and incident response.2021## When to use22Establishing or maturing governance for the agent / NHI population — Copilot Studio23agents, Foundry agents, custom LLM agents, and the service principals that back them.2425**Do not use this skill** for workload identity federation patterns alone26(`entra-workload-identity`), human identity governance (`entra-id-governance`), or27generic agent build guidance.2829## Agent identity inventory — know what you're governing3031| Class | Identity model | Surface |32|---|---|---|33| **Copilot Studio agent (M365)** | Tenant-scoped agent identity + per-user delegated permissions | M365 admin center / Copilot Studio |34| **Microsoft Foundry agent** | Service principal + managed identity + per-user OBO | Azure portal / Foundry |35| **Custom AI agent (your code)** | App registration + workload identity federation / managed identity | Entra admin center |36| **Plugin / connector** | Service principal + delegated/app Graph permissions | Entra admin center |37| **Legacy automation service principal** | App registration, often with secret | Entra admin center |3839## Approach40411. **Inventory and tag.** Pull every app registration, service principal, and Copilot42 Studio / Foundry agent. Tag each with:43 - **Owner** (person + group).44 - **Sponsor / business owner**.45 - **Purpose** (one sentence).46 - **Data scope** (which tenants/sites/mailboxes/resources).47 - **Lifecycle stage** (pilot / production / sunset).48 - **Criticality** (tier 0 / 1 / 2).49 Orphaned identities → freeze them; require owner re-claim.50512. **Scope permissions tightly.**52 - Microsoft Graph: prefer **Sites.Selected** over `Sites.Read.All`, **mailbox53 scoping via Exchange Online RBAC for Applications** (the successor to Application54 Access Policies) over tenant-wide `Mail.Send`, custom security55 attributes over broad directory roles.56 - Azure: scope role assignments at RG or resource, never subscription Owner unless57 truly required.58 - Copilot Studio agent knowledge sources: explicit site/library lists, not "All59 SharePoint."60 - Foundry agent tools: only the tools needed; remove `http` plugin unless61 necessary.62633. **Credential hygiene.** No client secrets in new builds — federated credentials64 (GitHub Actions, Azure DevOps, AKS, external OIDC) or certificates with auto-rotation65 via Key Vault. Existing secrets: inventory, cap expiry at 180 days, rotate via66 automation, plan migration to federation.67684. **Conditional Access for workloads** (Workload Identities Premium). Apply to69 tier-0 agents and externally-callable agents:70 - Restrict source IP ranges.71 - Block legacy auth.72 - Require named locations.73 Don't try to apply to every SP in the tenant — focus on high-blast-radius identities.74755. **Access reviews for agents** via Entra ID Governance. Owner reviews per quarter:76 - Still needed?77 - Still the right scope?78 - Credential rotation up to date?79 - Owner / sponsor still in role?80 Auto-disable on owner non-response.81826. **Lifecycle workflows.** Build automation for:83 - **Provisioning**: owner-initiated request → approval → SP created with template84 permissions, tagged, owner assigned.85 - **Modification**: scope change requires re-approval.86 - **Decommissioning**: 30-day disable window, then delete; remove role87 assignments, federated credentials, knowledge-source attachments.88897. **Audit and monitoring.**90 - Stream `ServicePrincipalSignInLogs` and `AuditLogs` to Sentinel.91 - For Copilot Studio agents: interaction audit logs via Purview Audit.92 - Detections:93 - New high-privilege role assignment to an agent identity.94 - Agent sign-in from unexpected IP/country.95 - Sudden spike in Graph API calls per agent.96 - Sensitive data access by agent outside business hours.97 - New credential added to an agent by an identity other than its owner.98998. **Incident response when an agent is compromised.**100 1. **Disable the identity** (block sign-in on the app registration / SP).101 2. **Rotate credentials**, revoke refresh tokens.102 3. **Hunt actions** taken by the agent identity in the past 7–30 days103 (Graph audit, resource activity).104 4. **Notify data owners** for the resources the agent had access to.105 5. **Root cause** (leaked secret? OAuth consent phishing? supply chain?).106 6. **Restore with tightened scope** or retire.1071089. **Couple with usage signals.** Purview AI Hub / DSPM for AI shows *what the agent109 does* (sensitive data flowing through prompts). Pair with identity audit to get a110 complete view.111112## Guardrails113- **Every agent identity has a named human owner.** Empty owners list = orphan =114 audit/security risk.115- **No client secrets for new identities.** Federation > certificate > secret.116- **Sites.Selected (and similar) is mandatory where it exists.** "Quick start with117 `.All` and we'll scope later" never scopes later.118- **Conditional Access for workloads is a separate license.** Confirm SKU before119 designing.120- **OAuth consent for new agents must be admin-reviewed.** End-user consent for high-121 privilege scopes is the agent equivalent of a phishing onboarding.122- **Decommissioned ≠ deleted in 1 day.** 30-day disable window catches "wait, that was123 in use somewhere."124- **Agent credentials are not for human use.** Don't share an agent's secret with the125 team for "easier debugging."126- **Tag agents with data scope and tier.** Without it, IR and reviews are guesswork.127128## Common anti-patterns129- **"Copilot Studio agent grounded on 'All SharePoint'"** — same oversharing problem as130 Copilot itself, scaled. Use site-scoped knowledge sources.131- **"Agent SP granted Mail.Send Application permission tenant-wide"** — can email as132 anyone. Use app access policies to scope to specific mailboxes.133- **"Owner field set to a leaver's account"** — orphaned, no review, no rotation.134- **"Long-lived client secret in agent code"** — git history forever; leak detection135 too late.136- **"All agents in tier-0 because 'they're all important'"** — review and IR effort137 becomes uniform but is uniformly low quality. Real tiering.138- **"Decommissioned by deleting the app reg, leaving role assignments behind"** —139 dangling principal IDs in RBAC; restore-with-same-id risk.140- **"No audit on Copilot Studio agent interactions"** — compromised agent acts141 invisibly.142- **"Treated agent identity governance as identical to human IGA"** — different143 lifecycle, different controls, different reviews.144145## Example prompts146- `Inventory all Copilot Studio agents, Foundry agents, and service principals in the147 tenant and produce an owner + scope + tier report.`148- `Roll out access reviews for 600 agent identities via Entra ID Governance quarterly.`149- `Scope a Copilot Studio agent for HR from "All SharePoint" to 4 specific knowledge150 sites.`151- `Build a decommissioning workflow: 30-day disable, owner notification, full cleanup of152 RBAC and federated credentials.`153- `Sentinel detections for agent identity compromise: new credential, anomalous sign-in,154 spike in Graph calls.`155- `IR runbook: compromised Foundry agent that called Microsoft Graph for 48 hours —156 containment, hunt, notification.`157- `Replace client secrets across 120 legacy automation SPs with workload identity158 federation or Key Vault certificates.`159- `Apply Conditional Access for workload identities to all tier-0 agents.`160161## Microsoft Learn162- Workload identities overview: https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/workload-id/workload-identities-overview163- Entra ID Governance overview: https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/id-governance/identity-governance-overview164- Access reviews for service principals: https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/id-governance/create-access-review165- Conditional Access for workload identities: https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/conditional-access/workload-identity166- RBAC for Applications in Exchange Online (mailbox scoping): https://learn.microsoft.com/exchange/permissions-exo/application-rbac167- Sites.Selected: https://learn.microsoft.com/sharepoint/dev/solution-guidance/security-apponly-azuread168- Copilot Studio security and governance: https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-copilot-studio/security-and-governance169- Microsoft Foundry agent security: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/foundry/agents/concepts/agent-identity170- Audit (unified) for Copilot: https://learn.microsoft.com/purview/audit-copilot171- Workload identity federation: https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/workload-id/workload-identity-federation