Entra Id

Microsoft Entra ID

Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) is the cloud identity and access management service that authenticates users, devices, and workloads. It is the control plane for Zero Trust and the foundation every other Microsoft security control assumes is healthy.

When to use

Establishing the identity foundation: tenants, users/groups, authentication methods, SSO for apps, and hybrid identity with on-premises Active Directory. Use this skill before configuring Conditional Access, Identity Protection, or PIM - they all assume a clean Entra ID baseline.

Do not use this skill for risk-based sign-in detection (entra-id-protection), policy enforcement (conditional-access-mfa), just-in-time admin roles (azure-pim), or lifecycle workflows (entra-id-governance).

Map the identity goal to the right Entra control

Rule of thumb: if you are about to type a username and password into a Microsoft service in 2026, stop. Move to passkeys or WHfB. Password reuse + phishing is still the #1 root cause in identity incident response.

Approach

1. Tenant & identity model — Decide cloud-only vs hybrid. Define naming conventions for users, groups (assigned vs dynamic), and administrative units. Block guest invites at tenant level by default; allow per-collaboration scenario. Verify: Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy shows allowedToCreateApps = false for default users; admin consent workflow is enabled.

2. Hybrid identity — Choose Entra Cloud Sync for new deployments (agent-based, lightweight, supports disconnected forests). Use Entra Connect Sync only if you need PHS + write-back features Cloud Sync doesn't yet support. Avoid new AD FS - it adds an on-prem dependency and an attack surface (MDI sensor required). Verify: Get-MgDirectoryOnPremisesSynchronization shows healthy sync; password hash sync enabled.

3. Authentication methods - move to phishing-resistant — Manage via the Authentication methods policy (replaces legacy MFA + SSPR registration policies). Roll out in this order: Authenticator (push + number matching) → WHfB on managed devices → FIDO2 passkeys for admins → broad passkey rollout. Disable SMS as a primary method. Verify: User Registration Details report shows > 90% of users with at least one phishing-resistant method.

4. Applications & consent governance — Use the gallery for SSO where available. Enable admin consent workflow so users request high-risk permissions instead of granting them. Run the Risky Apps report monthly. Apply least-privilege Graph permissions and review app credentials (secrets vs certs vs federated identity). Verify: no consented apps with Application.ReadWrite.All or Directory.ReadWrite.All outside the approved list.

5. Self-service & lifecycle — Enable SSPR with writeback for hybrid users. Configure My Account / My Apps. Use dynamic groups for attribute-driven membership (department, country, employeeType).

6. Break-glass accounts — Create two cloud-only emergency access accounts. Exclude from all Conditional Access policies. Authenticate only with FIDO2 hardware keys stored physically separately. Alert on every sign-in via Sentinel. Verify: monthly sign-in test from each break-glass account; alert fires within 5 minutes.

7. Block legacy auth and weak methods — Use Conditional Access (separate skill) to block legacy authentication protocols (POP, IMAP, SMTP AUTH, basic auth). Disable SMS / voice as primary MFA methods.

Guardrails

• Break-glass accounts are sacred. Two of them, cloud-only, hardware FIDO2, excluded from every CA policy, monitored on every sign-in. Test monthly. If you skip this, you can lose the tenant in a CA misconfiguration.
• Avoid new AD FS deployments. It's an on-prem identity dependency, an attack surface, and a maintenance burden. PHS + WHfB covers nearly every requirement.
• Block legacy authentication. POP, IMAP, SMTP AUTH, basic auth bypass MFA. Block via Conditional Access, then monitor the sign-in logs for stragglers for 30 days.
• Govern app consent. Illicit consent grants are how attackers stay resident after password reset. Enable the admin consent workflow and review the Risky Apps report.
• Don't use group-based licensing as the only assignment mechanism for admin accounts. If the group sync breaks, admins lose their licence and access. Direct-assign for break-glass and tier-0 admins.
• Cloud Sync is preferred over Connect Sync for new builds. Lighter, no server farm, fewer failure modes.

Common anti-patterns

• "We use SMS for MFA - it's good enough" - SMS is phishable and SIM-swappable. Treat as recovery factor only, never as primary.
• "One break-glass account in Keepass" - Single point of failure and not auditable. Two hardware-key accounts with separated custody.
• "Federated sign-in via AD FS because that's how we always did it" - In 2026 this adds cost and risk. Move to PHS + Conditional Access unless there's a specific federation requirement.
• "Allow user app consent for all permissions" - Tenant gets cluttered with risky consented apps. Enable admin consent workflow.
• "Don't bother with Administrative Units, just use global admin" - Breaks separation of duties and bypasses RBAC. Scope helpdesk and regional admins to AUs.
• "Disable security defaults but skip Conditional Access for a week" - Tenant is wide open during that gap. Enable CA policies before disabling defaults.

Example prompts

• Design a hybrid identity model with Entra Cloud Sync and password hash sync.
• Plan a rollout from passwords to passkeys for 5,000 users.
• Configure break-glass accounts for our Entra tenant and the monitoring alert.
• Move users off SMS MFA - what's the migration path?
• Prevent illicit consent grants in our Entra ID tenant.
• Configure SSPR with writeback for a hybrid environment.
• When should I use Administrative Units vs custom roles for delegated admin?

Microsoft Learn

• Overview: https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/fundamentals/whatis
• Entra Cloud Sync: https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/hybrid/cloud-sync/what-is-cloud-sync
• Authentication methods policy: https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-methods
• Passkeys (FIDO2): https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-passwordless
• Break-glass accounts: https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/security-emergency-access
• Admin consent workflow: https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/configure-admin-consent-workflow
• Administrative Units: https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/administrative-units
• Block legacy authentication: https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/conditional-access/policy-block-legacy-authentication
• Zero Trust identity: https://learn.microsoft.com/security/zero-trust/deploy/identity