安全和加固
概览
面向 Web 应用的安全优先开发实践。把每个外部输入都视为敌意输入,把每个 secret 都视为不可泄露,把每次授权检查都视为必需。安全不是一个阶段,而是触及用户数据、认证或外部系统的每一行代码都必须满足的约束。
何时使用
- 构建任何接受用户输入的东西
- 实现认证或授权
- 存储或传输敏感数据
- 集成外部 API 或服务
- 添加文件上传、webhooks 或 callbacks
- 处理支付或 PII 数据
三层边界系统
必须始终执行(无例外)
- 在系统边界验证所有外部输入(API routes、form handlers)
- 参数化所有数据库查询,绝不要把用户输入拼接进 SQL
- 编码输出 以防止 XSS(使用框架自动转义,不要绕过它)
- 所有外部通信使用 HTTPS
- 使用 bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 哈希密码(绝不存储明文)
- 设置安全 header(CSP、HSTS、X-Frame-Options、X-Content-Type-Options)
- 会话使用 httpOnly、secure、sameSite cookies
- 每次发布前运行
npm audit(或等价工具)
先询问(需要人工批准)
- 添加新的认证流程或修改 auth 逻辑
- 存储新的敏感数据类别(PII、支付信息)
- 添加新的外部服务集成
- 修改 CORS 配置
- 添加文件上传 handler
- 修改 rate limiting 或 throttling
- 授予提升后的权限或角色
绝不执行
- 绝不要将 secrets commit 到版本控制(API keys、passwords、tokens)
- 绝不要记录敏感数据到日志(passwords、tokens、完整信用卡号)
- 绝不要把客户端校验当作安全边界
- 绝不要为了方便禁用安全 header
- 绝不要对用户提供的数据使用
eval()或innerHTML - 绝不要把会话存储在客户端可访问的存储中(auth tokens 放在 localStorage)
- 绝不要向用户暴露 stack traces 或内部错误细节
OWASP Top 10 防护
1. Injection(SQL、NoSQL、OS Command)
// BAD: SQL injection via string concatenation
const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '${userId}'`;
// GOOD: Parameterized query
const user = await db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1', [userId]);
// GOOD: ORM with parameterized input
const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: userId } });
2. Broken Authentication
// Password hashing
import { hash, compare } from 'bcrypt';
const SALT_ROUNDS = 12;
const hashedPassword = await hash(plaintext, SALT_ROUNDS);
const isValid = await compare(plaintext, hashedPassword);
// Session management
app.use(session({
secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET, // From environment, not code
resave: false,
saveUninitialized: false,
cookie: {
httpOnly: true, // Not accessible via JavaScript
secure: true, // HTTPS only
sameSite: 'lax', // CSRF protection
maxAge: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 24 hours
},
}));
3. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
// BAD: Rendering user input as HTML
element.innerHTML = userInput;
// GOOD: Use framework auto-escaping (React does this by default)
return <div>{userInput}</div>;
// If you MUST render HTML, sanitize first
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput);
4. Broken Access Control
// Always check authorization, not just authentication
app.patch('/api/tasks/:id', authenticate, async (req, res) => {
const task = await taskService.findById(req.params.id);
// Check that the authenticated user owns this resource
if (task.ownerId !== req.user.id) {
return res.status(403).json({
error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Not authorized to modify this task' }
});
}
// Proceed with update
const updated = await taskService.update(req.params.id, req.body);
return res.json(updated);
});
5. Security Misconfiguration
// Security headers (use helmet for Express)
import helmet from 'helmet';
app.use(helmet());
// Content Security Policy
app.use(helmet.contentSecurityPolicy({
directives: {
defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
scriptSrc: ["'self'"],
styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"], // Tighten if possible
imgSrc: ["'self'", 'data:', 'https:'],
connectSrc: ["'self'"],
},
}));
// CORS — restrict to known origins
app.use(cors({
origin: process.env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS?.split(',') || 'http://localhost:3000',
credentials: true,
}));
6. Sensitive Data Exposure
// Never return sensitive fields in API responses
function sanitizeUser(user: UserRecord): PublicUser {
const { passwordHash, resetToken, ...publicFields } = user;
return publicFields;
}
// Use environment variables for secrets
const API_KEY = process.env.STRIPE_API_KEY;
if (!API_KEY) throw new Error('STRIPE_API_KEY not configured');
输入校验模式
在边界进行 Schema Validation
import { z } from 'zod';
const CreateTaskSchema = z.object({
title: z.string().min(1).max(200).trim(),
description: z.string().max(2000).optional(),
priority: z.enum(['low', 'medium', 'high']).default('medium'),
dueDate: z.string().datetime().optional(),
});
// Validate at the route handler
app.post('/api/tasks', async (req, res) => {
const result = CreateTaskSchema.safeParse(req.body);
if (!result.success) {
return res.status(422).json({
error: {
code: 'VALIDATION_ERROR',
message: 'Invalid input',
details: result.error.flatten(),
},
});
}
// result.data is now typed and validated
const task = await taskService.create(result.data);
return res.status(201).json(task);
});
文件上传安全
// Restrict file types and sizes
const ALLOWED_TYPES = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp'];
const MAX_SIZE = 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5MB
function validateUpload(file: UploadedFile) {
if (!ALLOWED_TYPES.includes(file.mimetype)) {
throw new ValidationError('File type not allowed');
}
if (file.size > MAX_SIZE) {
throw new ValidationError('File too large (max 5MB)');
}
// Don't trust the file extension — check magic bytes if critical
}
分流 npm audit 结果
不是所有 audit 发现都需要立即处理。使用这个决策树:
npm audit reports a vulnerability
├── Severity: critical or high
│ ├── Is the vulnerable code reachable in your app?
│ │ ├── YES --> Fix immediately (update, patch, or replace the dependency)
│ │ └── NO (dev-only dep, unused code path) --> Fix soon, but not a blocker
│ └── Is a fix available?
│ ├── YES --> Update to the patched version
│ └── NO --> Check for workarounds, consider replacing the dependency, or add to allowlist with a review date
├── Severity: moderate
│ ├── Reachable in production? --> Fix in the next release cycle
│ └── Dev-only? --> Fix when convenient, track in backlog
└── Severity: low
└── Track and fix during regular dependency updates
关键问题:
- 存在漏洞的函数是否真的会在你的代码路径中被调用?
- 该依赖是 runtime dependency 还是 dev-only?
- 在你的部署上下文中,该漏洞是否可被利用(例如 client-only app 中的 server-side vulnerability)?
当你延期修复时,记录原因并设置 review date。
Rate Limiting
import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit';
// General API rate limit
app.use('/api/', rateLimit({
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
max: 100, // 100 requests per window
standardHeaders: true,
legacyHeaders: false,
}));
// Stricter limit for auth endpoints
app.use('/api/auth/', rateLimit({
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
max: 10, // 10 attempts per 15 minutes
}));
Secrets 管理
.env files:
├── .env.example → Committed (template with placeholder values)
├── .env → NOT committed (contains real secrets)
└── .env.local → NOT committed (local overrides)
.gitignore must include:
.env
.env.local
.env.*.local
*.pem
*.key
提交前始终检查:
# Check for accidentally staged secrets
git diff --cached | grep -i "password\|secret\|api_key\|token"
安全审查检查清单
### Authentication
- [ ] Passwords hashed with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 (salt rounds ≥ 12)
- [ ] Session tokens are httpOnly, secure, sameSite
- [ ] Login has rate limiting
- [ ] Password reset tokens expire
### Authorization
- [ ] Every endpoint checks user permissions
- [ ] Users can only access their own resources
- [ ] Admin actions require admin role verification
### Input
- [ ] All user input validated at the boundary
- [ ] SQL queries are parameterized
- [ ] HTML output is encoded/escaped
### Data
- [ ] No secrets in code or version control
- [ ] Sensitive fields excluded from API responses
- [ ] PII encrypted at rest (if applicable)
### Infrastructure
- [ ] Security headers configured (CSP, HSTS, etc.)
- [ ] CORS restricted to known origins
- [ ] Dependencies audited for vulnerabilities
- [ ] Error messages don't expose internals
另请参阅
详细安全检查清单和 pre-commit 验证步骤见 references/security-checklist.md。
常见合理化借口
| 合理化借口 | 现实 |
|---|---|
| “这是内部工具,安全不重要” | 内部工具也会被攻破。攻击者会瞄准最薄弱环节。 |
| “以后再加安全” | 事后补安全比一开始就内建安全难 10 倍。现在就加。 |
| “没人会尝试利用这个” | 自动扫描器会发现它。Security by obscurity 不是安全。 |
| “框架会处理安全” | 框架提供工具,不提供保证。你仍然需要正确使用它们。 |
| “这只是原型” | 原型会变成生产系统。从第一天就养成安全习惯。 |
危险信号
- 用户输入直接传入数据库查询、shell commands 或 HTML rendering
- 源代码或 commit history 中有 secrets
- API endpoints 没有认证或授权检查
- 缺少 CORS 配置,或使用通配符(
*)origins - 认证 endpoints 没有 rate limiting
- Stack traces 或内部错误暴露给用户
- 依赖存在已知 critical 漏洞
验证
实现安全相关代码后:
-
npm audit没有 critical 或 high 漏洞 - 源代码或 git history 中没有 secrets
- 所有用户输入都在系统边界验证
- 每个受保护 endpoint 都检查认证和授权
- 响应中存在安全 header(用 browser DevTools 检查)
- 错误响应不暴露内部细节
- auth endpoints 已启用 rate limiting