API BOLA — Broken Object Level Authorization (OWASP API1)
Purpose
Test whether authenticated callers can access or modify other users' objects by manipulating object identifiers, when the server fails to enforce per-object authorization.
Preconditions
- At least two accounts with distinct data (the two-account differential is mandatory for confirmation)
- A mapped API surface (consume reconnaissance API discovery; do not re-enumerate here)
- Object IDs observed in requests (numeric, UUID, slug, encoded)
Attack Surface Signals
- Path segments with IDs:
/orders/1042,/users/{id}/documents/{uuid} - Query/body parameters:
?order_id=,{"userId": ...}, filter params - List endpoints that leak other-context IDs (harvest victims here)
- Batch/bulk endpoints accepting arrays of IDs
- GraphQL node/relay IDs (base64
Order:5003) anduser(id:)arguments
Methodology
Step 1: Harvest Object IDs
# Legitimate IDs first (own account), then victim IDs from list endpoints,
# search responses, exports, logs, comments, and any shared context.
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer USER_A" "https://TARGET/api/users/me" | jq -r '.id'
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer USER_A" "https://TARGET/api/users/me/orders" | jq -r '.orders[].id'
Step 2: Two-Account Differential
# User B legitimately accesses their own object (baseline B)
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer USER_B" "https://TARGET/api/orders/5003" > tmp/b_own.json
# User A attacks the same object
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer USER_A" "https://TARGET/api/orders/5003" > tmp/a_cross.json
# User A's own object (baseline A) and anonymous request complete the matrix
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer USER_A" "https://TARGET/api/orders/5001" > tmp/a_own.json
curl -sk "https://TARGET/api/orders/5003" > tmp/anon.json
diff <(jq -S . tmp/b_own.json) <(jq -S . tmp/a_cross.json)
Confirm the response is User B's ACTUAL data (match a known victim-owned value: email, address, total), never an empty shell or generic 200.
Step 3: Test Every ID Location
- Path:
/orders/{victim}and nested/users/{victim}/orders/{victim_order} - Query:
?user_id={victim}, filter params - JSON body:
{"order_id": victim}on POST detail/export endpoints - Parameter pollution: path carries your ID, query carries victim's (and vice versa)
- Batch arrays: mix own + victim IDs in one bulk request
- GraphQL:
user(id:"VICTIM"){email orders{edges{node{totalAmount}}}}and relaynode(id:"T3JkZXI6NTAwMw==")
Step 4: Test Every Method
for method in GET PUT PATCH DELETE; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X $method \
-H "Authorization: Bearer USER_A" "https://TARGET/api/addresses/2002")
echo "$method: $code"
done
GET may 403 while PUT/PATCH/DELETE succeed. For write hits, read back as the victim (or admin) to verify the change persisted.
Step 5: Version and Shape Drift
/api/v2/...often lacks the authz middleware v1 has; sweep v0/beta/legacy/internal too- ID encoding variants: increment/decrement sequential IDs, decode base64/hashids, swap UUID casing
- Same object via different routes: direct ID, search, export, mobile-specific endpoints
Evidence Contract
A BOLA finding requires ALL of:
- Baseline: victim legitimately accesses their object; attacker legitimately accesses own object
- Manipulation: attacker's session references the victim's object ID
- Differential: attacker receives the victim's actual data (verified by a known victim-owned value) or modifies/deletes it (verified by read-back)
- Anonymous/low-priv controls show the endpoint is otherwise protected
NOT evidence: HTTP 200 with an empty body, a 200 on the attacker's own object, 404/405 responses, existence of an ID parameter, error-message leaks
Common Misses
- Write verbs (PUT/PATCH/DELETE) never tested — read is 403 but write succeeds
- IDs only swapped in the path; query/body/batch/nested locations missed
- UUIDs assumed safe — they leak via list endpoints, exports, shared contexts
- Only one API version tested
- GraphQL global relay IDs not base64-decoded
- Response assumed to be victim data without matching a known value
False Positives / Non-Findings
- Public-by-design objects (public profiles, shared documents, storefront products)
- 200 returning the attacker's own data regardless of requested ID
- Soft-deleted objects returning 404 for everyone
- Admin/support tooling where cross-object access is intended
Xalgorix Tool Strategy
authz_matrixfor automated A/B session differentialshttp_request/curl for precise ID swaps; Python for batch sweeps across harvested IDs- ffuf with harvested ID wordlists for sequential enumeration
Stopping Rule
Every object-ID-bearing endpoint x every ID location x every method, with a verified victim-data differential before reporting.
Handoff
Report endpoint, method, ID location, victim object reference, and the concrete victim-owned value returned or changed. Property-level leaks within a cross-object read also belong to api-bopla; write-side role changes belong to api-bfla.
