API BOPLA — Broken Object Property Level Authorization (OWASP API3)
Purpose
Test whether API responses expose restricted properties to unauthorized callers (READ) and whether unauthorized callers can modify properties they should not control (WRITE/mass assignment).
Preconditions
- At least one valid account/session (for differential testing)
- Known API endpoints that return or accept object properties
- The authz_matrix tool available for cross-role comparison
Attack Surface Signals
- API responses containing fields beyond what the UI displays
- Endpoints that accept JSON/XML bodies with multiple properties
- PATCH/PUT endpoints that update object fields
- OpenAPI specs listing restricted fields
- Different response shapes for different roles
Methodology
Unauthorized Property READ (Excessive Data Exposure)
Establish what the caller SHOULD see, then verify what they ACTUALLY receive:
# 1. Get the legitimate response for the lowest-privilege caller
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer USER_TOKEN" "https://TARGET/api/users/me" | jq . > tmp/user_response.json
# 2. Check for restricted properties in the response
# Look for: role, isAdmin, internalId, permissions, balance, tenantId,
# is_verified, price_override, created_by, deleted_at, api_key, password_hash
jq 'keys' tmp/user_response.json
# 3. Compare against the same endpoint as a higher-privilege caller
# (if available) or against the UI display
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer ADMIN_TOKEN" "https://TARGET/api/users/me" | jq . > tmp/admin_response.json
diff <(jq -S 'keys' tmp/user_response.json) <(jq -S 'keys' tmp/admin_response.json)
IMPORTANT: Field NAMES alone are not evidence. Verify the VALUE is:
- Genuinely sensitive (PII, credentials, internal flags, financial data)
- Not accessible to the caller through any intended UI
- Returned in a context where the caller should not see it
Unauthorized Property WRITE (Mass Assignment)
Test whether restricted properties can be set via the API:
# 1. Establish the baseline object state
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer USER_TOKEN" "https://TARGET/api/users/me" | jq . > tmp/before.json
# 2. Attempt to set a restricted property
curl -sk -X PATCH "https://TARGET/api/users/me" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer USER_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"role":"admin","is_admin":true,"balance":99999,"is_verified":true}' \
| jq .
# 3. Verify the change actually persisted (READ-BACK)
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer USER_TOKEN" "https://TARGET/api/users/me" | jq . > tmp/after.json
diff <(jq -S . tmp/before.json) <(jq -S . tmp/after.json)
Verification is mandatory: a 200 response does NOT prove the write happened. Read back and diff.
Cross-Role Property Access
Use authz_matrix for automated differential testing:
authz_matrix(endpoint="/api/users/me", roleA="USER_TOKEN", roleB="ADMIN_TOKEN")
Evidence Contract
A BOPLA finding requires ALL of:
- Baseline: legitimate low-privilege request establishes normal state
- Manipulation: same request with restricted property present
- Differential: the restricted property's value CHANGED (write) or was RETURNED when it should not have been (read)
- The value is genuinely restricted — not ordinary metadata
NOT evidence: field named "internal_id" exists, response has more fields than the UI, HTTP 200 on a PATCH
Common Misses
- Nested objects:
{"user": {"role": "admin"}}in a PATCH body - Query parameter mass assignment:
?role=admin - Headers as property sources:
X-User-Role: admin - Batching: multiple objects in one request
- Partial response masks:
?fields=role,isAdmin
False Positives / Non-Findings
- Public metadata (creation date, public UUID) is not sensitive by default
- A field existing in the API but not in the current UI version may be planned feature
- Debug fields in staging environments that don't exist in production
- The API returning the user's OWN settings (which they can legitimately see)
Xalgorix Tool Strategy
authz_matrixfor automated cross-role property differentialterminal_executewith curl for precise property manipulation- Python for batch property enumeration across all discovered fields
Stopping Rule
Exhaust every discovered property on every endpoint accessible to the tested role. Test both read and write paths.
Handoff
Report each confirmed unauthorized property access with: endpoint, property name, expected access level, actual behavior, and the concrete value that was exposed or persisted.
