AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
Purpose
Prove privilege escalation in AWS: from the current principal's permissions to a higher-privilege identity, resolving permission boundaries, SCPs, and conditions before claiming the path — then demonstrating the formerly denied action.
Entry Conditions
- Valid low-privilege AWS credentials with an enumerated permission map (
aws-cloud-pentestingstep 1) - Runtime authorization for state-changing operations (policy versions, role assumption, service execution) — this skill exercises them
Attack Model
baseline: denied action A
→ escalation primitive (policy modify / pass role / assume / service exec)
→ changed identity or effective permission
→ action A now SUCCEEDS
→ report (restore modified state)
Tool output (Pacu iam__privesc_scan, PMapper edge, CloudFox) is a HYPOTHESIS. Resolve it into proof.
Methodology
Priority Order (depth-first on strong signals)
- Direct policy modification
- Role assumption
- PassRole + service execution
- Credential creation
- Data access (if the goal is data, not admin)
- Indirect/service-specific escalation
Family 1 — Direct Policy Modification
# iam:CreatePolicyVersion (managed policies cap at 5 versions)
aws iam create-policy-version --policy-arn <arn> --policy-document '{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":"*","Resource":"*"}]}' --set-as-default
# iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion (flip to an old permissive version that already exists)
aws iam set-default-policy-version --policy-arn <arn> --version-id v3
# iam:AttachUserPolicy / AttachRolePolicy / AttachGroupPolicy
aws iam attach-user-policy --user-name <u> --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess
# iam:PutUserPolicy / PutRolePolicy / PutGroupPolicy (inline)
aws iam put-user-policy --user-name <u> --policy-name xalgorix-test --policy-document '{...}'
# PROOF: previously denied action now succeeds; record and RESTORE original state
aws iam list-users # example: was AccessDenied before escalation
Family 2 — PassRole + Service Execution
iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction → function with admin role, invoke
iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances → instance with admin instance profile
iam:PassRole + glue:CreateDevEndpoint → dev endpoint, SSH creds
iam:PassRole + sagemaker:CreateNotebookInstance
iam:PassRole + cloudformation:CreateStack → stack with admin-capable role
iam:PassRole + ssm:SendCommand / ecs:RunTask / databrew etc.
Scoped PassRole is the usual gate: enumerate exactly which role ARNs are passable (read the policy Resource element and conditions) before claiming the vector. Then execute the path and prove the resulting identity.
Family 3 — Role Assumption
aws sts assume-role --role-arn <arn> --role-session-name xalgorix-test
# Requires: identity-side sts:AssumeRole AND the target trust policy allowing your principal
# AND every condition (ExternalId, MFA, SourceOrgID) satisfied
See cloud-cross-account-tenant-trust for the full trust-edge model.
Family 4 — Credential Creation
iam:CreateAccessKey on a more privileged user, iam:CreateLoginProfile (console access), sts:GetFederationToken/sts:GetSessionToken context checks, service-specific credential issuance (CodeBuild tokens, etc.).
Family 5 — Service-Specific Escapes
- EC2: modify instance metadata options (IMDSv2 downgrade) when
ec2:ModifyInstanceMetadataOptionsis held - Lambda:
lambda:UpdateFunctionCodeon an existing privileged function (no PassRole needed) - ECR/CodeBuild/other pipeline poisoning (writable artifacts → execution)
- Glue/DataPipeline/SageMaker: interactive compute with privileged roles
Resolving the Hypothesis (where tool output dies)
For every candidate path, resolve BEFORE claiming:
- policy
Resourcescoping and condition keys - permission boundaries (
iam:ListPolicies...→aws iam simulate-principal-policyhonors boundaries) - SCPs (invisible from inside — infer from effective denials; note as constraint in the report)
- session policies (for assumed-role contexts)
- trust policy of the target role
- service control restrictions on the passed role
Evidence Contract
escalation candidate (permission held / tool edge)
→ constraint resolution (boundaries/SCPs/conditions checked)
→ escalation operation performed (within runtime policy)
→ new identity/credentials obtained (get-caller-identity recorded)
→ previously denied action now succeeds (the proof)
→ state restored where modified (delete created key/policy/function, restore default version)
→ report
NOT evidence: Pacu/PMapper output alone, iam:PassRole held without a usable target-role + execution service, a trust policy read but no successful assumption, CreateFunction returning 200 without invoking the function under the admin role
Eventual Consistency Rule
Do NOT blind-retry every AccessDenied. Retry-on-denial is justified only in the seconds after a relevant state change (new policy version, modified trust, new role/credential you just created or observed). A static denial after enumeration-complete is a real negative.
Common Misses
- Permission boundaries and SCPs blocking the scanner-found path
- Scoped PassRole (role restricted to specific ARNs) unenumerated
- Non-Lambda/EC2 vectors never tried (Glue, SageMaker, DataPipeline, CloudFormation, SSM)
lambda:UpdateFunctionCodeon existing privileged functions (no PassRole needed)- Resource-policy escalation (S3/KMS policies granting
iam:-adjacent influence) - Old permissive policy versions still present (
SetDefaultPolicyVersionto v1)
False Positives / Non-Findings
- Escalation paths fully blocked by boundaries/SCPs (record as hardening observation, not a finding)
- PassRole to non-privileged roles only
- Trust policies that do not include your principal or conditions
- Group-policy manipulation where no group membership exists
Xalgorix Tool Strategy
terminal_executewith AWS CLI for every primitive; Pacu/PMapper/CloudFox for hypothesis generation onlyaws iam simulate-principal-policyfor boundary-aware checks- Ledger: candidate paths with constraint-resolution state, verified escalations with before/after proof
Specialist Handoffs
- Trust-edge paths →
cloud-cross-account-tenant-trust - Data-first goals →
cloud-secrets-data-access,cloud-storage-exposure-testing - Post-escalation account domination →
aws-cloud-pentestingstep 2 re-run at higher privilege
Stopping Rule
Prioritize direct policy modification > role assumption > PassRole/service execution > credential creation; go depth-first. Stop when admin-equivalent access is proven OR the top 3 families are constraint-resolved and blocked. Do not enumerate every theoretical escalation indefinitely.
