Cloud Secrets & Data Access
Purpose
Enumerate and retrieve cloud-held secrets once any cloud context exists (credentials, metadata chain, or public exposure), then separate four very different states: name visible, value retrievable, placeholder, live credential.
Entry Conditions
- A cloud identity (from
cloud-credential-abuse) or a public exposure path (JS, config files, git, storage) - Scope for secret retrieval governed by runtime policy — reading a secret value is an audit-visible, sometimes-irreversible action
Discovery Signals
- Credentialed: Secrets Manager names, SSM parameter names, Key Vault certificate/secret/key lists, Secret Manager entries
- Black-box:
.env/config in deployment bundles, source maps, git history, serverless packages, CI/CD variables exposed via public API metadata, storage bucket contents - Token/audience: Key Vault requires its own audience (
https://<vault>.vault.azure.net)
Attack Model
secret NAME visible ≠ secret VALUE retrievable
test placeholder ≠ live usable credential
Report the exact state proven. A name leak is an information disclosure; a value retrieval with a live downstream system is a full compromise chain.
Methodology
AWS
aws secretsmanager list-secrets
aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id <name> # the actual retrieval
aws ssm describe-parameters # names, KMS state, version
aws ssm get-parameter --name <name> --with-decryption
# Lambda/EC2/ECS env vars carry secrets too: check function configuration
aws lambda get-function-configuration --function-name <fn>
Azure
# Key Vault needs the right audience; list first, then get
az keyvault list
az keyvault secret list --vault-name <vault>
az keyvault secret show --vault-name <vault> --name <secret>
# Automation accounts: az automation credential list; connection strings in app settings:
az webapp config appsettings list --name <app> -g <rg>
GCP
gcloud secrets list
gcloud secrets versions access latest --secret=<name>
# Deployment/app config: GCS bucket next to the service, environment variables in Cloud Run/Functions:
gcloud run services describe <svc> --format="value(spec.template.spec.containers[0].env)"
Black-Box Sources (no cloud identity needed)
- Deployment packages/layers of serverless functions when code disclosure exists
- CI/CD systems reachable via public API (pipeline variables, deployment tokens)
- Connection strings in error messages or exported configs
- Presigned URLs in JS pointing at config buckets
Chaining
Every retrieved live credential goes to cloud-credential-abuse for validation and expansion. Database/connection-string credentials go to the corresponding network-service testing. Report the full chain: exposure point → secret → validated identity → impact.
Evidence Contract
secret name visible (list) → information disclosure finding (low)
secret value retrievable → retrieve, classify content (credential? key? PII?)
retrieved value validated live → full chain finding with impact
retrieved value = test/placeholder → document as hygiene exposure, not compromise
NOT evidence: a secret existing (name) treated as value compromise, a placeholder value treated as a live credential, an unreadable (KMS-denied) secret treated as exposed
Common Misses
- Parameter Store SecureString entries skipped (
--with-decryptionforgotten) - Key Vault audience confusion (using an ARM token and concluding "no access")
- Lambda/ECS env vars and Cloud Run env never enumerated after secrets come up empty
- Secret VERSIONS (old values often linger with old passwords that still work)
- Managed-identity access to Key Vault never tested from the workload context
- CI/CD variable exposure in public pipeline definitions
False Positives / Non-Findings
- RDS-generated credential placeholders in templates
- Dev/test vault contents with no production connectivity
- Names in
ListSecretswithoutGetSecretValue(access properly denied at value level)
Xalgorix Tool Strategy
terminal_executewith aws/az/gcloud for enumeration and retrieval- Python for parsing retrieved bundles (env files, key files)
- Every retrieved credential → ledger with validation state
Specialist Handoffs
- Retrieved cloud credentials →
cloud-credential-abuse - API keys (SaaS) → api-security skills / credential-specific testing
- Database strings → network-services-pentesting skills
Stopping Rule
For each secret surface: enumerate names once, retrieve values for a bounded set of high-signal targets (production-looking names), validate the top candidates live. Do not attempt every secret in a 1000-secret vault; prioritize by name and last-accessed metadata.
