Cloud Storage Exposure Testing (S3 / Azure Blob / GCS)
Purpose
Test cloud storage for unauthorized access — externally (black-box) or with credentials — proving the exact permission level obtained: existence, listing, read, write, overwrite, delete, or policy modification. Never collapse these into a single "public bucket" status.
Entry Conditions
- Candidate bucket/container names (from
cloud-attack-surface-discovery, recon, or credentialed enumeration) - Anonymous context always; authenticated-low-priv and discovered-credential contexts where available
- Credentialed mode:
s3:GetBucketPolicy-class read access to evaluate effective configuration
Discovery Signals
- Bucket hostnames in JS/CNAME/error messages
- Company/domain/project naming seeds (
<company>-backups,<domain>-assets,<project>-staging) - Presigned URLs (scope, expiry, and signature reveal bucket + often account ID)
- Credentialed:
s3api list-buckets, storage account keys,gsutil ls
Attack Model
Separate the permission levels and prove each independently:
existence — does the resource exist at all?
listing — can the caller enumerate object keys?
read — can the caller retrieve object contents?
write — can the caller create objects?
overwrite — can the caller replace existing objects?
delete — can the caller remove objects?
ACL/policy mod — can the caller rewrite the access policy itself?
signed URLs — can the caller mint/extend/abuse presigned access?
cross-account — can another tenant/account principal reach it?
Methodology
Step 1: Existence and Anonymous Baseline (AWS)
# Existence: 404 vs AccessDenied (a 403 on anonymous GET means the bucket EXISTS)
curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://s3.amazonaws.com/<bucket> # 404=absent, 403=exists-protected
curl -sk "https://s3.amazonaws.com/<bucket>/" | head -c 200 # 200 = anonymous LISTING
curl -sk "https://s3.amazonaws.com/<bucket>/known-object-key" # object-level read
aws s3 ls s3://<bucket> --no-sign-request # anonymous listing via CLI
Step 2: Effective Access (not policy text)
Before declaring exposure, resolve the actual s3 public access state (Block Public Access, access points, object ACLs) end to end. A policy containing "Principal": "*" is only a CANDIDATE. Effective access can still be denied by:
- Block Public Access (account and bucket level)
- policy conditions (
aws:SourceIp,s3:authType-*) - access point policies
- object-level ACLs
- VPC endpoint policies
- organizational SCPs
Verify the account/bucket configuration directly when credentialed:
aws s3api get-public-access-block --bucket <bucket> # and account level
aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket <bucket>
Prove it: actually list and read. Conversely, allAuthenticatedUsers (GCS allUsers/allAuthenticatedUsers, Azure public container/SAS) is a candidate until a real object is retrieved with the anonymous/authenticated-low context.
Step 3: Write/Delete Probes (where scope permits)
# Create a uniquely-named test object — never touch existing data
echo "xalgorix-probe-$(date +%s)" > /tmp/probe.txt
aws s3 cp /tmp/probe.txt s3://<bucket>/xalgorix-probe-test.txt --no-sign-request
aws s3api put-object --bucket <bucket> --key xalgorix-probe-test.txt --body /tmp/probe.txt --no-sign-request
# Overwrite/delete probes only with explicit runtime authorization for state changes
Step 4: Azure Blob
# Public access: container-level "blob"/"container" publicAccess
curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" "https://<account>.blob.core.windows.net/<container>?restype=container&comp=list"
# SAS tokens: check expiry, permissions (sp=rwdl...), IP scope; try extension/abuse
# Credentialed: az storage container list --account-name <account>
Step 5: GCP Cloud Storage
curl -sk "https://storage.googleapis.com/<bucket>" | head -c 200 # XML API anonymous listing
gsutil ls -L gs://<bucket> # if authenticated
# TestIamPermissions is a claim, not proof — follow with actual ls/cp
# Run enumeration BOTH anonymous AND with any Google account (allAuthenticatedUsers grants)
Step 6: Credentialed Configuration Review
In credentialed mode, configuration evidence can itself be a finding when the assessment asks for misconfigurations: public policies without BPA, wildcard principals, over-broad SAS, disabled soft-delete on sensitive data. Distinguish these as configuration findings, not exploit-proven findings.
Evidence Contract
candidate bucket
→ anonymous request
→ actual private object returned / written / deleted (concrete object name + content class)
→ sensitivity/impact assessment (what data, how sensitive, how much)
→ report at the proven permission level
A bucket existing is not a vulnerability. A wildcard policy is not proof. Read/list/write must each be demonstrated. A write is only a finding with the probe object name recorded.
NOT evidence: 403 on anonymous GET (existence only), policy text with Principal:"*" (candidate), allAuthenticatedUsers mention (candidate), tool output (CloudStorage scan) without retrieval
Common Misses
- Object-level ACLs granting read on a public-in-policy bucket (or vice versa)
- Access points (S3) with policies differing from the bucket policy
- Presigned URL leakage in JS/referers — often grants write or higher
- Azure SAS tokens with excessive permissions/long expiry
- GCS buckets granting
allAuthenticatedUsers— missed when only anonymous tests ran - Snapshot/AMI sharing (adjacent storage surfaces):
restorable-by-user-ids allin credentialed mode - Region-specific endpoints (s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com) when the global endpoint 404s
False Positives / Non-Findings
- Public-by-design assets (marketing images, public releases) with no sensitive objects
- Existence-only signals (403s)
- Expired presigned URLs
- Buckets belonging to third parties that merely share a naming seed
Xalgorix Tool Strategy
terminal_executewith aws CLI/az/gsutil/curl for direct evidence- Python for seed-based candidate generation (bounded wordlists)
- GCPBucketBrute optional for anonymous+authenticated enumeration with custom keywords
- Every confirmed level → ledger with object name + sensitivity
Specialist Handoffs
- Credentials found in bucket contents →
cloud-credential-abuse - Bucket serving a web app / origin for CDN →
cloud-attack-surface-discoveryattack model entry - Credentialed configuration-only findings → configuration assessment mode section of the provider skill
Stopping Rule
For each candidate: prove existence, then anonymous listing/read, then (where authorized) write. Stop candidate generation once target-derived seeds are exhausted and no new high-confidence names emerge. Do not enumerate unlimited global namespaces.
