Detecting Modbus Command Injection Attacks

Detecting Modbus Command Injection Attacks

When to Use

• When deploying intrusion detection for environments using Modbus TCP (port 502) or Modbus RTU
• When investigating suspected unauthorized modifications to PLC registers or coils
• When building detection analytics for OT SOC monitoring Modbus-heavy environments
• When responding to FrostyGoop-style attacks that leverage Modbus TCP for operational impact
• When performing baseline validation after a suspected compromise of a Modbus master

Do not use for detecting attacks on non-Modbus protocols (see detecting-dnp3-protocol-anomalies for DNP3), for general IT network intrusion detection, or for Modbus device configuration (see performing-ot-vulnerability-scanning-safely).

Detection Gaps & Validation

• Source IP is the only identity, and it spoofs. Modbus/TCP has no authentication, so a malicious write (FC5/FC6/FC15/FC16) from a spoofed master IP looks legitimate. Without ARP inspection or static MAC bindings, IP-based allowlisting alone produces false negatives.
• Writes inside the learned register range evade detection. FrostyGoop-style attacks reuse permitted function codes and registers; pair the FC allowlist with register value/setpoint bounds and write-rate limits, not just function-code matching.
• Broadcast and serial gaps. A unit ID 0 broadcast write hits every slave on the segment at once and needs its own rule; and a SPAN watching only TCP/502 misses Modbus RTU serial behind a gateway.
• Validate the rule safely. Replay a labeled pcap containing injected FC16 writes, a broadcast write, and an out-of-range register access through the detector offline. Never write to a live PLC register to test detection. Before escalating, check the source against the authorized-writer list and the change/maintenance log — legitimate SCADA and engineering writes use the same function codes.

Prerequisites

• Network SPAN/TAP on the segment carrying Modbus TCP traffic (typically port 502)
• Baseline of normal Modbus communication patterns (masters, slaves, function codes, register ranges, polling intervals)
• Suricata, Zeek, or commercial OT IDS deployed with Modbus protocol parsers enabled
• Understanding of Modbus function codes used in the environment (read vs write operations)
• Access to PLC programming documentation to validate expected register ranges

Workflow

Step 1: Build Modbus Communication Baseline

Capture and analyze normal Modbus traffic to establish what constitutes legitimate communication patterns.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Modbus Command Injection Detector.

Monitors Modbus TCP traffic for unauthorized write operations, anomalous
function codes, and deviations from established communication baselines.
Detects attacks like FrostyGoop that use Modbus TCP for operational impact.
"""

import json
import struct
import sys
import time
from collections import defaultdict
from datetime import datetime
from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Set, Tuple

try:
    from scapy.all import sniff, IP, TCP
except ImportError:
    print("Install scapy: pip install scapy")
    sys.exit(1)


# Modbus function code definitions
MODBUS_READ_FUNCTIONS = {1, 2, 3, 4}
MODBUS_WRITE_FUNCTIONS = {5, 6, 15, 16}
MODBUS_DIAGNOSTIC_FUNCTIONS = {8, 17, 43}

MODBUS_FUNC_NAMES = {
    1: "Read Coils", 2: "Read Discrete Inputs",
    3: "Read Holding Registers", 4: "Read Input Registers",
    5: "Write Single Coil", 6: "Write Single Register",
    8: "Diagnostics", 15: "Write Multiple Coils",
    16: "Write Multiple Registers", 17: "Report Slave ID",
    22: "Mask Write Register", 23: "Read/Write Multiple Registers",
    43: "Encapsulated Interface Transport",
}


class ModbusAlert:
    """Represents a detected Modbus anomaly."""

    def __init__(self, severity: str, alert_type: str, src_ip: str,
                 dst_ip: str, unit_id: int, func_code: int,
                 description: str, mitre_technique: str = ""):
        self.timestamp = datetime.now().isoformat()
        self.severity = severity
        self.alert_type = alert_type
        self.src_ip = src_ip
        self.dst_ip = dst_ip
        self.unit_id = unit_id
        self.func_code = func_code
        self.func_name = MODBUS_FUNC_NAMES.get(func_code, f"Unknown FC {func_code}")
        self.description = description
        self.mitre_technique = mitre_technique

    def __str__(self):
        return (
            f"[{self.severity}] {self.alert_type} | {self.src_ip} -> {self.dst_ip} "
            f"| Unit {self.unit_id} | {self.func_name} | {self.description}"
        )


class ModbusInjectionDetector:
    """Detects Modbus command injection attacks."""

    def __init__(self, baseline_file: Optional[str] = None):
        self.alerts: List[ModbusAlert] = []
        self.packet_count = 0
        self.modbus_count = 0

        # Baseline data
        self.authorized_masters: Set[str] = set()
        self.authorized_pairs: Set[Tuple[str, str]] = set()
        self.allowed_write_sources: Set[str] = set()
        self.allowed_function_codes: Dict[str, Set[int]] = defaultdict(set)
        self.allowed_register_ranges: Dict[str, List[Tuple[int, int]]] = defaultdict(list)
        self.polling_intervals: Dict[str, float] = {}
        self.last_seen: Dict[str, float] = {}

        # Counters for rate detection
        self.write_counts: Dict[str, List[float]] = defaultdict(list)

        if baseline_file:
            self.load_baseline(baseline_file)

    def load_baseline(self, filepath: str):
        """Load established Modbus communication baseline."""
        with open(filepath, "r") as f:
            baseline = json.load(f)

        for session_key, data in baseline.get("modbus_baselines", {}).items():
            src, dst = session_key.split("->")
            self.authorized_pairs.add((src.strip(), dst.strip()))
            self.authorized_masters.add(src.strip())

            fc_set = set(data.get("allowed_function_codes", []))
            self.allowed_function_codes[session_key] = fc_set

            if fc_set & MODBUS_WRITE_FUNCTIONS:
                self.allowed_write_sources.add(src.strip())

            for reg_range in data.get("register_ranges", []):
                self.allowed_register_ranges[session_key].append(
                    (reg_range["start"], reg_range["end"])
                )

            if data.get("polling_interval_avg_sec"):
                self.polling_intervals[session_key] = data["polling_interval_avg_sec"]

        print(f"[*] Baseline loaded: {len(self.authorized_pairs)} authorized pairs, "
              f"{len(self.allowed_write_sources)} authorized write sources")

    def parse_modbus_mbap(self, payload: bytes) -> Optional[dict]:
        """Parse Modbus TCP MBAP header and PDU."""
        if len(payload) < 8:
            return None

        transaction_id = struct.unpack(">H", payload[0:2])[0]
        protocol_id = struct.unpack(">H", payload[2:4])[0]
        length = struct.unpack(">H", payload[4:6])[0]
        unit_id = payload[6]
        func_code = payload[7]

        if protocol_id != 0:  # Not Modbus
            return None

        result = {
            "transaction_id": transaction_id,
            "protocol_id": protocol_id,
            "length": length,
            "unit_id": unit_id,
            "func_code": func_code,
        }

        # Parse register address and count for read/write operations
        if len(payload) >= 12 and func_code in (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 15, 16):
            result["start_address"] = struct.unpack(">H", payload[8:10])[0]
            result["quantity"] = struct.unpack(">H", payload[10:12])[0]

        return result

    def analyze_packet(self, pkt):
        """Analyze a network packet for Modbus command injection."""
        self.packet_count += 1

        if not pkt.haslayer(IP) or not pkt.haslayer(TCP):
            return

        tcp = pkt[TCP]
        if tcp.dport != 502 and tcp.sport != 502:
            return

        payload = bytes(tcp.payload)
        if not payload:
            return

        modbus = self.parse_modbus_mbap(payload)
        if not modbus:
            return

        self.modbus_count += 1
        src_ip = pkt[IP].src
        dst_ip = pkt[IP].dst
        session_key = f"{src_ip}->{dst_ip}"
        now = time.time()

        # Detection Rule 1: Unauthorized Modbus master
        if self.authorized_masters and src_ip not in self.authorized_masters:
            if tcp.dport == 502:
                self.alerts.append(ModbusAlert(
                    severity="CRITICAL",
                    alert_type="UNAUTHORIZED_MASTER",
                    src_ip=src_ip, dst_ip=dst_ip,
                    unit_id=modbus["unit_id"],
                    func_code=modbus["func_code"],
                    description=f"Unauthorized device {src_ip} sending Modbus commands to {dst_ip}",
                    mitre_technique="T0843 - Program Download",
                ))

        # Detection Rule 2: Unauthorized write operation
        if modbus["func_code"] in MODBUS_WRITE_FUNCTIONS:
            if self.allowed_write_sources and src_ip not in self.allowed_write_sources:
                self.alerts.append(ModbusAlert(
                    severity="CRITICAL",
                    alert_type="UNAUTHORIZED_WRITE",
                    src_ip=src_ip, dst_ip=dst_ip,
                    unit_id=modbus["unit_id"],
                    func_code=modbus["func_code"],
                    description=f"Write command from non-authorized source {src_ip}",
                    mitre_technique="T0855 - Unauthorized Command Message",
                ))

            # Track write frequency for rate anomaly detection
            self.write_counts[src_ip].append(now)
            recent_writes = [t for t in self.write_counts[src_ip] if now - t < 60]
            self.write_counts[src_ip] = recent_writes
            if len(recent_writes) > 20:
                self.alerts.append(ModbusAlert(
                    severity="HIGH",
                    alert_type="WRITE_FLOOD",
                    src_ip=src_ip, dst_ip=dst_ip,
                    unit_id=modbus["unit_id"],
                    func_code=modbus["func_code"],
                    description=f"Excessive write rate: {len(recent_writes)} writes in 60s from {src_ip}",
                    mitre_technique="T0836 - Modify Parameter",
                ))

        # Detection Rule 3: Anomalous function code
        if session_key in self.allowed_function_codes:
            if modbus["func_code"] not in self.allowed_function_codes[session_key]:
                self.alerts.append(ModbusAlert(
                    severity="HIGH",
                    alert_type="ANOMALOUS_FUNCTION_CODE",
                    src_ip=src_ip, dst_ip=dst_ip,
                    unit_id=modbus["unit_id"],
                    func_code=modbus["func_code"],
                    description=(
                        f"Function code {modbus['func_code']} ({MODBUS_FUNC_NAMES.get(modbus['func_code'], 'Unknown')}) "
                        f"not in baseline for {session_key}"
                    ),
                    mitre_technique="T0855 - Unauthorized Command Message",
                ))

        # Detection Rule 4: Broadcast write (unit ID 0)
        if modbus["unit_id"] == 0 and modbus["func_code"] in MODBUS_WRITE_FUNCTIONS:
            self.alerts.append(ModbusAlert(
                severity="CRITICAL",
                alert_type="BROADCAST_WRITE",
                src_ip=src_ip, dst_ip=dst_ip,
                unit_id=0,
                func_code=modbus["func_code"],
                description="Broadcast write command (unit ID 0) affects ALL Modbus devices on segment",
                mitre_technique="T0855 - Unauthorized Command Message",
            ))

        # Detection Rule 5: Out-of-range register access
        if "start_address" in modbus and session_key in self.allowed_register_ranges:
            addr = modbus["start_address"]
            qty = modbus.get("quantity", 1)
            in_range = any(
                start <= addr and addr + qty <= end
                for start, end in self.allowed_register_ranges[session_key]
            )
            if not in_range:
                self.alerts.append(ModbusAlert(
                    severity="HIGH",
                    alert_type="OUT_OF_RANGE_REGISTER",
                    src_ip=src_ip, dst_ip=dst_ip,
                    unit_id=modbus["unit_id"],
                    func_code=modbus["func_code"],
                    description=f"Register access {addr}-{addr+qty} outside baseline ranges",
                    mitre_technique="T0836 - Modify Parameter",
                ))

        # Detection Rule 6: Diagnostic/restart commands
        if modbus["func_code"] in MODBUS_DIAGNOSTIC_FUNCTIONS:
            self.alerts.append(ModbusAlert(
                severity="HIGH",
                alert_type="DIAGNOSTIC_COMMAND",
                src_ip=src_ip, dst_ip=dst_ip,
                unit_id=modbus["unit_id"],
                func_code=modbus["func_code"],
                description=f"Diagnostic function code {modbus['func_code']} detected - potential DoS or reconnaissance",
                mitre_technique="T0814 - Denial of Service",
            ))

    def print_report(self):
        """Print detection report."""
        print(f"\n{'='*70}")
        print(f"MODBUS COMMAND INJECTION DETECTION REPORT")
        print(f"{'='*70}")
        print(f"Analysis Time: {datetime.now().isoformat()}")
        print(f"Total Packets Analyzed: {self.packet_count}")
        print(f"Modbus Packets: {self.modbus_count}")
        print(f"Alerts Generated: {len(self.alerts)}")

        if self.alerts:
            severity_counts = defaultdict(int)
            for alert in self.alerts:
                severity_counts[alert.severity] += 1

            print(f"\nSeverity Distribution:")
            for sev in ["CRITICAL", "HIGH", "MEDIUM", "LOW"]:
                if sev in severity_counts:
                    print(f"  {sev}: {severity_counts[sev]}")

            print(f"\nDetailed Alerts:")
            for alert in self.alerts:
                print(f"\n  [{alert.severity}] {alert.alert_type}")
                print(f"    Time: {alert.timestamp}")
                print(f"    Source: {alert.src_ip} -> {alert.dst_ip}")
                print(f"    Unit ID: {alert.unit_id}")
                print(f"    Function: {alert.func_name} (FC {alert.func_code})")
                print(f"    Detail: {alert.description}")
                if alert.mitre_technique:
                    print(f"    MITRE ATT&CK ICS: {alert.mitre_technique}")

    def start_live_monitoring(self, interface: str, duration: int = 0):
        """Start live Modbus traffic monitoring."""
        print(f"[*] Starting Modbus monitoring on {interface}...")
        print(f"[*] Press Ctrl+C to stop")
        try:
            sniff(
                iface=interface,
                filter="tcp port 502",
                prn=self.analyze_packet,
                timeout=duration if duration > 0 else None,
            )
        except KeyboardInterrupt:
            pass
        self.print_report()


if __name__ == "__main__":
    detector = ModbusInjectionDetector(
        baseline_file=sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else None
    )

    if len(sys.argv) >= 2:
        if sys.argv[1].endswith(".pcap") or sys.argv[1].endswith(".pcapng"):
            from scapy.all import rdpcap
            print(f"[*] Analyzing capture file: {sys.argv[1]}")
            packets = rdpcap(sys.argv[1])
            for pkt in packets:
                detector.analyze_packet(pkt)
            detector.print_report()
        else:
            detector.start_live_monitoring(sys.argv[1])
    else:
        print("Usage:")
        print("  Live:    python modbus_detector.py <interface> [baseline.json]")
        print("  Offline: python modbus_detector.py <capture.pcap> [baseline.json]")

Step 2: Deploy Suricata Rules for Modbus Attack Detection

# Suricata IDS Rules for Modbus Command Injection Detection
# Reference: MITRE ATT&CK for ICS, FrostyGoop analysis

# Unauthorized Modbus write from non-engineering workstation
alert modbus !$MODBUS_AUTHORIZED_WRITERS any -> $OT_PLC_SUBNET 502 (
  msg:"MODBUS-INJECT Unauthorized write operation detected";
  modbus_func:write_single_coil;
  flow:to_server,established;
  classtype:attempted-admin;
  sid:4000001; rev:1; priority:1;
)

alert modbus !$MODBUS_AUTHORIZED_WRITERS any -> $OT_PLC_SUBNET 502 (
  msg:"MODBUS-INJECT Unauthorized write multiple registers";
  modbus_func:write_multiple_registers;
  flow:to_server,established;
  classtype:attempted-admin;
  sid:4000002; rev:1; priority:1;
)

# Modbus broadcast write affecting all slaves
alert modbus any any -> $OT_PLC_SUBNET 502 (
  msg:"MODBUS-INJECT Broadcast write command (Unit ID 0)";
  modbus_unit_id:0;
  flow:to_server,established;
  classtype:attempted-admin;
  sid:4000003; rev:1; priority:1;
)

# Excessive Modbus write rate (potential automated attack)
alert modbus any any -> $OT_PLC_SUBNET 502 (
  msg:"MODBUS-INJECT Excessive write rate - possible automated attack";
  modbus_func:write_multiple_registers;
  flow:to_server,established;
  threshold:type threshold, track by_src, count 20, seconds 60;
  classtype:attempted-admin;
  sid:4000004; rev:1;
)

# Modbus diagnostics/restart command
alert modbus any any -> $OT_PLC_SUBNET 502 (
  msg:"MODBUS-INJECT Diagnostics function code detected";
  modbus_func:diagnostics;
  flow:to_server,established;
  classtype:attempted-dos;
  sid:4000005; rev:1;
)

# FrostyGoop-pattern: write to specific register ranges used for heating control
alert modbus any any -> $OT_PLC_SUBNET 502 (
  msg:"MODBUS-INJECT Potential FrostyGoop - write to heating control registers";
  modbus_func:write_multiple_registers;
  content:"|00 10|"; offset:8; depth:2;
  flow:to_server,established;
  classtype:attempted-admin;
  sid:4000010; rev:1; priority:1;
)

Key Concepts

Common Scenarios

Scenario: FrostyGoop-Style Heating Control Attack

Context: A building automation system uses Modbus TCP to control HVAC equipment. Monitoring detects unexpected write commands to heating control registers from an IP not associated with any authorized BMS controller.

Approach:

1. Verify the source IP against the authorized Modbus master list
2. Check if any authorized maintenance or configuration change is in progress
3. Capture full Modbus transaction including register addresses and values being written
4. Compare written values against safe operating ranges for the heating equipment
5. If unauthorized, immediately block the source IP at the industrial firewall
6. Inspect the source device for compromise indicators (malware, unauthorized remote access)
7. Verify current setpoints on all affected controllers against known-good values
8. Restore safe setpoints if manipulation is confirmed

Pitfalls: Modbus lacks authentication, so the source IP is the only identifier -- attackers can spoof IPs if ARP protections are not in place. Do not assume all writes are malicious; legitimate SCADA operations include writes. Always verify against the change management log before escalating.

Output Format

MODBUS INJECTION DETECTION REPORT
====================================
Analysis Period: [start] to [end]
Monitoring Point: [interface/SPAN description]

TRAFFIC SUMMARY:
  Total Modbus Packets: [count]
  Read Operations: [count]
  Write Operations: [count]
  Unauthorized Writes Detected: [count]

ALERTS:
  [CRITICAL] Unauthorized write from [IP] to PLC [IP]
    Function: Write Multiple Registers (FC 16)
    Registers: [start]-[end]
    MITRE: T0855 - Unauthorized Command Message

BASELINE DEVIATIONS:
  New Modbus masters: [list]
  Unusual function codes: [list]
  Out-of-range register access: [list]

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:
  1. Verify source [IP] authorization status
  2. Block unauthorized sources at industrial firewall
  3. Validate PLC register values against known-good state