gRPC API Security
Purpose
Test gRPC services for reflection exposure, method-level authorization, message tampering, and gateway/REST transcoding inconsistencies.
Preconditions
- A gRPC endpoint identified (typically port 50051, 443 with gRPC content-type, or via gateway)
- grpcurl available (or ability to install: go install github.com/fullstorydev/grpcurl/cmd/grpcurl@latest)
Attack Surface Signals
- HTTP/2 with
Content-Type: application/grpcorapplication/grpc+proto - Port 50051, 50052, 6565 commonly used for gRPC
grpc-statusin response trailers- gRPC-Web content-type:
application/grpc-web+proto - Gateway that proxies REST to gRPC (transcoding)
Methodology
Service Discovery via Reflection
# List services (if reflection is enabled)
grpcurl -plaintext TARGET:50051 list
# List methods for a service
grpcurl -plaintext TARGET:50051 list mypackage.MyService
# Get message descriptors
grpcurl -plaintext TARGET:50051 describe mypackage.MyService/GetUser
Direct Method Invocation
# Call a method with parameters
grpcurl -plaintext -d '{"id": "123"}' TARGET:50051 mypackage.MyService/GetUser
# Try calling admin methods with a regular user token
grpcurl -plaintext -H "authorization: Bearer USER_TOKEN" \
-d '{"id": "123"}' TARGET:50051 mypackage.AdminService/DeleteUser
Method-Level Authorization Testing
# Test if per-method auth is enforced (not just per-service)
for method in GetUser ListUsers CreateUser DeleteUser UpdateUser; do
result=$(grpcurl -plaintext -d '{}' TARGET:50051 "mypackage.UserService/$method" 2>&1)
echo "[$method] $result" | head -1
done
# Test anonymous access
grpcurl -plaintext -d '{"id": "1"}' TARGET:50051 mypackage.UserService/GetUser
Message Tampering
# Object ID manipulation (BOLA in gRPC)
grpcurl -plaintext -H "authorization: Bearer USER_A_TOKEN" \
-d '{"user_id": "USER_B_ID"}' TARGET:50051 mypackage.UserService/GetUser
# Property tampering (BOPLA in gRPC)
grpcurl -plaintext -H "authorization: Bearer USER_TOKEN" \
-d '{"user_id": "123", "role": "admin", "is_verified": true}' TARGET:50051 mypackage.UserService/UpdateUser
Unknown / Extra Fields
# Some protobuf parsers accept unknown fields silently
# Try sending fields not in the schema (if the server deserializes into a dynamic message)
echo '{"id": "1", "unknown_field": "test", "debug": true}' | \
grpcurl -plaintext -d @ TARGET:50051 mypackage.UserService/GetUser
Gateway/REST Transcoding Inconsistencies
# If the gRPC service is exposed via a REST gateway (gRPC transcoding):
# Test that authorization is consistent between the REST and gRPC paths
# REST path (through gateway)
curl -sk "https://TARGET/api/users/123" -H "Authorization: Bearer USER_TOKEN"
# Direct gRPC path (if accessible)
grpcurl -plaintext -H "authorization: Bearer USER_TOKEN" \
-d '{"id": "123"}' TARGET:50051 mypackage.UserService/GetUser
# A finding: REST path returns 403 but gRPC path returns data
Oversized Messages / Resource Consumption
# Large payloads
python3 -c "print(json.dumps({'data': 'A' * 1000000}))" | \
grpcurl -plaintext -d @ TARGET:50051 mypackage.UploadService/Process
Metadata Header Testing
# Test custom metadata
grpcurl -plaintext \
-H "x-user-role: admin" \
-H "x-internal: true" \
-d '{}' TARGET:50051 mypackage.AdminService/ListAll
Evidence Contract
- Reflection exposure: Reflection reveals sensitive service/method names AND leads to a confirmed access-control bypass
- BOLA in gRPC: User A's token retrieves User B's data via a gRPC call
- BFLA in gRPC: Regular user executes an admin method
- Message tampering: A property change in the gRPC message is reflected in the server's behavior
- Gateway inconsistency: Different authorization outcomes for the same operation via REST vs gRPC
- NOT evidence: Reflection enabled alone, gRPC service exists, a 200-equivalent (OK status) from a public method
Common Misses
- gRPC-Web endpoints accessible via the browser (different auth)
- Server streaming methods that don't check authorization per-message
- Client streaming methods that process all messages before auth
- Interceptor-level auth that doesn't apply to all methods
- Health check services exposing internal service information
- mTLS that can be bypassed via the REST gateway
False Positives / Non-Findings
- Reflection enabled on a service with no sensitive methods
- A method returning UNAUTHENTICATED (auth is working)
- An empty response from a correctly permissioned endpoint
Xalgorix Tool Strategy
terminal_executewith grpcurl for direct gRPC interaction- Python with grpcio for complex message construction
- curl for REST gateway comparison testing
Stopping Rule
Exhaust every discovered service and method. Test read and write paths. Compare gRPC and REST gateway authorization.
Handoff
Report each confirmed gRPC issue with the service, method, the authorization context, and the concrete unauthorized data or action.
