Analyzing Malware Persistence with Autoruns
Overview
Sysinternals Autoruns extracts data from hundreds of Auto-Start Extensibility Points (ASEPs) on Windows, scanning 18+ categories including Run/RunOnce keys, services, scheduled tasks, drivers, Winlogon entries, LSA providers, print monitors, WMI subscriptions, and AppInit DLLs. Digital signature verification filters Microsoft-signed entries. The compare function identifies newly added persistence via baseline diffing. VirusTotal integration checks hash reputation. Offline analysis via -z flag enables forensic disk image examination.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing malware persistence with autoruns
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Sysinternals Autoruns (GUI) and Autorunsc (CLI)
- Administrative privileges on target system
- Python 3.9+ for automated analysis
- VirusTotal API key for reputation checks
- Clean baseline export for comparison
Workflow
Step 1: Automated Persistence Scanning
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Automate Autoruns-based persistence analysis."""
import subprocess
import csv
import json
import sys
def scan_and_analyze(autorunsc_path="autorunsc64.exe", csv_path="scan.csv"):
cmd = [autorunsc_path, "-a", "*", "-c", "-h", "-s", "-nobanner", "*"]
result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=600)
with open(csv_path, 'w') as f:
f.write(result.stdout)
return parse_and_flag(csv_path)
def parse_and_flag(csv_path):
suspicious = []
with open(csv_path, 'r', errors='replace') as f:
for row in csv.DictReader(f):
reasons = []
signer = row.get("Signer", "")
if not signer or signer == "(Not verified)":
reasons.append("Unsigned binary")
if not row.get("Description") and not row.get("Company"):
reasons.append("Missing metadata")
path = row.get("Image Path", "").lower()
for sp in ["\temp\\", "\appdata\local\temp", "\users\public\\"]:
if sp in path:
reasons.append(f"Suspicious path")
launch = row.get("Launch String", "").lower()
for kw in ["powershell", "cmd /c", "wscript", "mshta", "regsvr32"]:
if kw in launch:
reasons.append(f"LOLBin: {kw}")
if reasons:
row["reasons"] = reasons
suspicious.append(row)
return suspicious
if __name__ == "__main__":
if len(sys.argv) > 1:
results = parse_and_flag(sys.argv[1])
print(f"[!] {len(results)} suspicious entries")
for r in results:
print(f" {r.get('Entry','')} - {r.get('Image Path','')}")
for reason in r.get('reasons', []):
print(f" - {reason}")
Validation Criteria
- All ASEP categories scanned and cataloged
- Unsigned entries flagged for investigation
- Suspicious paths and LOLBin launch strings highlighted
- Baseline comparison identifies new persistence mechanisms
References
1---2name: analyzing-malware-persistence-with-autoruns3description: Use Sysinternals Autoruns to systematically identify and analyze malware persistence mechanisms across registry keys, scheduled tasks, services, drivers, and startup locations on Windows systems.4license: Apache-2.05---6# Analyzing Malware Persistence with Autoruns
7
8## Overview
9
10Sysinternals Autoruns extracts data from hundreds of Auto-Start Extensibility Points (ASEPs) on Windows, scanning 18+ categories including Run/RunOnce keys, services, scheduled tasks, drivers, Winlogon entries, LSA providers, print monitors, WMI subscriptions, and AppInit DLLs. Digital signature verification filters Microsoft-signed entries. The compare function identifies newly added persistence via baseline diffing. VirusTotal integration checks hash reputation. Offline analysis via -z flag enables forensic disk image examination.
11
12
13## When to Use
14
15- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing malware persistence with autoruns
16- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
17- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
18- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
19
20## Prerequisites
21
22- Sysinternals Autoruns (GUI) and Autorunsc (CLI)
23- Administrative privileges on target system
24- Python 3.9+ for automated analysis
25- VirusTotal API key for reputation checks
26- Clean baseline export for comparison
27
28## Workflow
29
30### Step 1: Automated Persistence Scanning
31
32```python
33#!/usr/bin/env python3
34"""Automate Autoruns-based persistence analysis."""
35import subprocess
36import csv
37import json
38import sys
39
40
41def scan_and_analyze(autorunsc_path="autorunsc64.exe", csv_path="scan.csv"):
42 cmd = [autorunsc_path, "-a", "*", "-c", "-h", "-s", "-nobanner", "*"]
43 result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=600)
44 with open(csv_path, 'w') as f:
45 f.write(result.stdout)
46 return parse_and_flag(csv_path)
47
48
49def parse_and_flag(csv_path):
50 suspicious = []
51 with open(csv_path, 'r', errors='replace') as f:
52 for row in csv.DictReader(f):
53 reasons = []
54 signer = row.get("Signer", "")
55 if not signer or signer == "(Not verified)":
56 reasons.append("Unsigned binary")
57 if not row.get("Description") and not row.get("Company"):
58 reasons.append("Missing metadata")
59 path = row.get("Image Path", "").lower()
60 for sp in ["\temp\\", "\appdata\local\temp", "\users\public\\"]:
61 if sp in path:
62 reasons.append(f"Suspicious path")
63 launch = row.get("Launch String", "").lower()
64 for kw in ["powershell", "cmd /c", "wscript", "mshta", "regsvr32"]:
65 if kw in launch:
66 reasons.append(f"LOLBin: {kw}")
67 if reasons:
68 row["reasons"] = reasons
69 suspicious.append(row)
70 return suspicious
71
72
73if __name__ == "__main__":
74 if len(sys.argv) > 1:
75 results = parse_and_flag(sys.argv[1])
76 print(f"[!] {len(results)} suspicious entries")
77 for r in results:
78 print(f" {r.get('Entry','')} - {r.get('Image Path','')}")
79 for reason in r.get('reasons', []):
80 print(f" - {reason}")
81```
82
83## Validation Criteria
84
85- All ASEP categories scanned and cataloged
86- Unsigned entries flagged for investigation
87- Suspicious paths and LOLBin launch strings highlighted
88- Baseline comparison identifies new persistence mechanisms
89
90## References
91
92- [Sysinternals Autoruns](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns)
93- [SANS - Offline Autoruns Revisited](https://www.sans.org/blog/offline-autoruns-revisited-auditing-malware-persistence/)
94- [Hunting Malware with Autoruns](https://nasbench.medium.com/hunting-malware-with-windows-sysinternals-autoruns-19cbfe4103c2)
95- [MITRE ATT&CK T1547 - Boot or Logon Autostart](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/)