How do I install the Ebpf Syscall Monitoring skill?

Run npx skillmds add yanacuti1121/ebpf-syscall-monitoring in your terminal (requires Node.js), paste this page's agent-chat prompt into Claude, Cursor, or any MCP-connected agent, or download the SKILL.md file and copy it into your agent's skills directory.

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Is Ebpf Syscall Monitoring free to use?

Yes. Installing skills from SkillMD is free. This skill is licensed under Apache-2.

Who published Ebpf Syscall Monitoring?

yanacuti1121 (@yanacuti1121) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Ebpf Syscall Monitoring by yanacuti1121

Name: Ebpf Syscall Monitoring
Rating: 4.2 (5 reviews)
Author: yanacuti1121

Ebpf Syscall Monitoring

Monitor and intercept Linux kernel syscalls from agent processes using eBPF (Extended Berkeley Packet Filter). Real-time syscall filtering, PID-based policy enforcement, cgroups v2 throttling, and seccomp profile generation.

yanacuti1121 1e0b8f4 3.1 KB Updated Sep 9, 2026 2 repo stars

File contents

eBPF Syscall Monitoring

Instrument the Linux kernel to intercept agent process syscalls in real time — without modifying agent code.

When to Use

Detecting when a containerized agent calls forbidden syscalls (open, write to protected paths)
Building a dynamic seccomp profile from observed agent behavior
Monitoring byte-level network activity between agent containers
Enforcing cgroups v2 CPU/RAM hard limits on per-agent processes

Do NOT use for

macOS or Windows environments (eBPF is Linux-only)
Application-level API monitoring (use OpenTelemetry spans instead)
Replacing sandboxing — eBPF observes, seccomp enforces

Core Tools

# Install BCC (BPF Compiler Collection)
apt-get install bpfcc-tools linux-headers-$(uname -r)

# Trace all file opens by a specific PID
opensnoop-bpfcc -p <agent-pid>

# Watch syscalls in real-time
syscount-bpfcc -p <agent-pid> --syscall write

# Monitor network bytes per container
nethogs  # or use cilium/tetragon for pod-level

Seccomp Profile Generation

# Record allowed syscalls during a safe training run
oci-seccomp-bpf-hook --record --output agent-profile.json \
  -- node core/scripts/agent-runner.js

# Apply generated profile to restrict future runs
docker run --security-opt seccomp=agent-profile.json ...

Dynamic Seccomp Morphing

// Adjust allowed syscalls based on current task phase
const PHASE_PROFILES = {
  read_only:  ['read', 'close', 'stat', 'getdents64', 'mmap'],
  write_logs: ['read', 'close', 'stat', 'write', 'fsync', 'mmap'],
  network:    ['read', 'write', 'close', 'connect', 'send', 'recv'],
};

function applySeccompProfile(pid, phase) {
  const allowed = PHASE_PROFILES[phase];
  // write seccomp BPF filter to /proc/<pid>/fd via prctl() wrapper
  execSync(`seccomp-apply --pid ${pid} --allow ${allowed.join(',')}`);
}

cgroups v2 Hard Limits

# Create per-agent cgroup
mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/yamtam/agent-42

# Memory hard limit: 512MB
echo "536870912" > /sys/fs/cgroup/yamtam/agent-42/memory.max

# CPU: max 50% of one core
echo "50000 100000" > /sys/fs/cgroup/yamtam/agent-42/cpu.max

# Assign agent PID to cgroup
echo <agent-pid> > /sys/fs/cgroup/yamtam/agent-42/cgroup.procs

OOM Score Tuning (Lớp 16)

# Agent gets killed first when system is under memory pressure
echo 900 > /proc/<agent-pid>/oom_score_adj  # range: -1000 to 1000

Anti-Fake-Pass Checklist

eBPF program loaded successfully (bpftool prog list shows it)
Seccomp profile tested in dry-run mode before enforcing
cgroup memory.max verified with cat /sys/fs/cgroup/yamtam/agent-<id>/memory.current
OOM score confirmed with cat /proc/<pid>/oom_score_adj
Syscall violations logged to Merkle audit chain (not just stderr)

---name: ebpf-syscall-monitoringdescription: Monitor and intercept Linux kernel syscalls from agent processes using eBPF (Extended Berkeley Packet Filter). Real-time syscall filtering, PID-based policy enforcement, cgroups v2 throttling, and seccomp profile generation.license: Apache-2.0--- # eBPF Syscall Monitoring Instrument the Linux kernel to intercept agent process syscalls in real time — without modifying agent code. ## When to Use - Detecting when a containerized agent calls forbidden syscalls (open, write to protected paths) - Building a dynamic seccomp profile from observed agent behavior - Monitoring byte-level network activity between agent containers - Enforcing cgroups v2 CPU/RAM hard limits on per-agent processes ## Do NOT use for - macOS or Windows environments (eBPF is Linux-only) - Application-level API monitoring (use OpenTelemetry spans instead) - Replacing sandboxing — eBPF observes, seccomp enforces ## Core Tools ```bash # Install BCC (BPF Compiler Collection) apt-get install bpfcc-tools linux-headers-$(uname -r) # Trace all file opens by a specific PID opensnoop-bpfcc -p <agent-pid> # Watch syscalls in real-time syscount-bpfcc -p <agent-pid> --syscall write # Monitor network bytes per container nethogs # or use cilium/tetragon for pod-level ``` ## Seccomp Profile Generation ```bash # Record allowed syscalls during a safe training run oci-seccomp-bpf-hook --record --output agent-profile.json \ -- node core/scripts/agent-runner.js # Apply generated profile to restrict future runs docker run --security-opt seccomp=agent-profile.json ... ``` ## Dynamic Seccomp Morphing ```js // Adjust allowed syscalls based on current task phase const PHASE_PROFILES = { read_only: ['read', 'close', 'stat', 'getdents64', 'mmap'], write_logs: ['read', 'close', 'stat', 'write', 'fsync', 'mmap'], network: ['read', 'write', 'close', 'connect', 'send', 'recv'], }; function applySeccompProfile(pid, phase) { const allowed = PHASE_PROFILES[phase]; // write seccomp BPF filter to /proc/<pid>/fd via prctl() wrapper execSync(`seccomp-apply --pid ${pid} --allow ${allowed.join(',')}`); } ``` ## cgroups v2 Hard Limits ```bash # Create per-agent cgroup mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/yamtam/agent-42 # Memory hard limit: 512MB echo "536870912" > /sys/fs/cgroup/yamtam/agent-42/memory.max # CPU: max 50% of one core echo "50000 100000" > /sys/fs/cgroup/yamtam/agent-42/cpu.max # Assign agent PID to cgroup echo <agent-pid> > /sys/fs/cgroup/yamtam/agent-42/cgroup.procs ``` ## OOM Score Tuning (Lớp 16) ```bash # Agent gets killed first when system is under memory pressure echo 900 > /proc/<agent-pid>/oom_score_adj # range: -1000 to 1000 ``` ## Anti-Fake-Pass Checklist - [ ] eBPF program loaded successfully (`bpftool prog list` shows it) - [ ] Seccomp profile tested in dry-run mode before enforcing - [ ] cgroup memory.max verified with `cat /sys/fs/cgroup/yamtam/agent-<id>/memory.current` - [ ] OOM score confirmed with `cat /proc/<pid>/oom_score_adj` - [ ] Syscall violations logged to Merkle audit chain (not just stderr)

Frequently asked questions