Hermes Tool Guardrails

Provenance correction (2026-06-20)

This skill was originally tagged license: MIT / source: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent when imported (commit 98f1d51b). After the real upstream source was vendored and read (vendor/hermes-agent/_upstream/), a full grep for this skill's content (allowlist, auto_approve, require_approval, always_block, "Approval needed") found zero matches anywhere in the actual hermes-agent source. The real agent/tool_guardrails.py is loop-detection logic only — ported verbatim as core/lib/hermes_adapted/tool_guardrails.py and documented correctly in [[hermes-tool-loop-guard]]. The attribution on this file was false provenance, not a real hermes-agent pattern. Source/license header removed; content below is Yana AI-native guidance, kept because it doesn't duplicate the cited rule files below — not because it came from hermes-agent.

Hermes Tool Guardrails

Defense-in-depth for shell command execution. Works alongside YAMTAM's hook layer — hooks block at the OS level, this skill enforces at the agent decision level before the call is even made.

Trigger phrases: "command approval", "allowlist", "safe commands", "guardrails", "restrict tools", "auto-deny subagent", "command safety"

Three Execution Modes

Default for subagents: non-interactive (safe). Never pass --allow-all when spawning a worker.

Allowlist Config

# .yana/tool-guardrails.yaml
approval:
  auto_approve:
    - "git status"
    - "git diff *"
    - "git log *"
    - "npm test *"
    - "cargo test *"
    - "cat *"
    - "ls *"

  require_approval:
    - "git push *"
    - "npm publish *"
    - "cargo publish *"
    - "gh release *"
    - "kubectl apply *"
    - "terraform apply *"

  always_block:
    - "rm -rf *"
    - "git push --force *"
    - "chmod 777 *"
    - "curl * | bash"
    - "eval *"

Approval Gate Logic

def check_command(cmd: str, interactive: bool) -> bool:
    if matches_always_block(cmd):
        print(f"[BLOCKED] {cmd}")
        return False

    if matches_auto_approve(cmd):
        return True

    if not interactive:
        # Subagent: deny anything not pre-approved
        print(f"[DENIED — non-interactive] {cmd}")
        return False

    # Interactive session: ask human
    print(f"\n⚠ Approval needed:\n  {cmd}\n")
    answer = input("Allow? [y/N] ").strip().lower()
    return answer == 'y'

Subagent Tool Restriction

Give subagents only what they need:

delegate_task(
    goal="Run the test suite and report failures",
    toolsets=["terminal"],
    disabled_tools=[
        "write_file",    # cannot modify files
        "delegate_task", # no further delegation
        "web_search"     # no internet
    ]
)

Minimum toolset by role:

Dangerous Pattern Detection

Beyond the allowlist — always suspicious:

DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
    r"rm\s+-[rf]{1,2}\s",       # destructive delete
    r"\|\s*(ba)?sh",             # pipe to shell interpreter
    r"eval\s+['\"`$]",          # eval with dynamic content
    r"base64\s+-d.*\|",          # decode and pipe
    r"curl.*\|\s*(ba)?sh",       # remote script execution
    r"sudo\s+",                  # privilege escalation
    r"chmod\s+[0-7]*7[0-7]*\s+",# world-writable permission
]

Mutation Verification

After write operations, confirm the change happened:

before=$(sha256sum src/auth.ts | cut -d' ' -f1)
# ... write operation ...
after=$(sha256sum src/auth.ts | cut -d' ' -f1)
[ "$before" != "$after" ] && echo "VERIFIED" || echo "WARNING: no change"

YAMTAM Defense Layers

Anti-Fake-Pass

❌ Config defined but not checked before execution
❌ Interactive mode in cron job — hangs forever
❌ Same allowlist for orchestrator and workers — workers need tighter restrictions
❌ "Approve everything in dev" — bad habit that leaks to prod
❌ Skipping mutation verification on critical writes

See Also

• core/rules/02-terminal-validator.md — YAMTAM hard-block patterns
• core/scripts/safe-run.sh — shell-level enforcement
• core/hooks/guard-destructive.sh — PreToolUse hook