Performing Ransomware Response
When to Use
- Ransomware has been detected executing or file encryption is actively occurring
- Users report inability to open files with unfamiliar extensions appended
- A ransom note is discovered on one or more systems
- EDR detects mass file modification patterns consistent with encryption behavior
- Threat intelligence warns of an imminent ransomware campaign targeting the organization
Do not use for general malware incidents that do not involve file encryption or extortion; use malware incident response procedures instead.
Prerequisites
- Ransomware-specific incident response playbook reviewed and approved by executive leadership
- Tested and verified offline backup strategy with air-gapped or immutable copies
- Incident retainer with a specialized ransomware response firm (e.g., Mandiant, CrowdStrike Services, Kroll)
- Legal counsel pre-engaged for OFAC sanctions screening and regulatory notification
- Cyber insurance carrier contact information and policy coverage details
- Bitcoin/cryptocurrency analysis capability or third-party engagement for payment tracing
Workflow
Step 1: Detect and Confirm Ransomware
Validate that the incident is ransomware and determine the variant:
- Identify the ransomware by analyzing the ransom note filename, extension appended to encrypted files, and note content
- Upload the ransom note and a sample encrypted file to ID Ransomware (id-ransomware.malwarehunterteam.com)
- Check NoMoreRansom.org for available free decryptors
- Determine the ransomware deployment method from EDR/SIEM logs
- Identify the ransomware group (e.g., LockBit, BlackCat/ALPHV, Royal, Akira, Play)
Ransomware Identification:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Variant: LockBit 3.0 (Black)
Extension: .lockbit3
Ransom Note: README-LOCKBIT.txt
Tor Site: lockbit[redacted].onion
Deployment: Group Policy Object pushing ransomware.exe to all domain-joined systems
Initial Access: VPN credential compromise (no MFA)
Dwell Time: 12 days
Data Exfiltration: Yes - 47GB uploaded to MEGA via rclone prior to encryption
Step 2: Immediate Containment
Stop ransomware propagation before assessing damage:
- Priority 1: Disconnect affected network segments from core infrastructure (pull the network cable, not shutdown)
- Priority 2: Isolate all domain controllers immediately if GPO-based deployment is suspected
- Priority 3: Disable the compromised accounts used for deployment
- Priority 4: Block lateral movement protocols (SMB TCP/445, RDP TCP/3389, WinRM TCP/5985-5986)
- Priority 5: Preserve at least one encrypted system live (do not power off) for memory forensics
- Do NOT: Shut down encrypted systems; keep them powered on to preserve encryption keys in memory
Step 3: Assess Damage and Scope
Quantify the impact to inform recovery and business decisions:
- Count the number of encrypted systems (workstations, servers, domain controllers)
- Determine which business-critical systems and data are affected
- Verify backup integrity: check that backups were not encrypted, deleted, or corrupted
- Assess whether data exfiltration occurred (check for rclone, WinSCP, MEGA, cloud storage activity)
- Determine the ransom demand amount and payment deadline
- Check OFAC sanctions lists to verify the ransomware group is not a sanctioned entity (paying is legally risky)
Impact Assessment:
Encrypted Systems: 187 of 340 endpoints (55%)
Encrypted Servers: 12 of 28 (43%) - includes 2 file servers, 1 database server
Domain Controllers: 2 of 3 encrypted
Backup Status: Veeam repository intact (offline copy verified clean)
Data Exfiltration: Confirmed - 47GB to MEGA (file listing under analysis)
Ransom Demand: $2.5M in Bitcoin (72-hour deadline)
OFAC Screening: LockBit - not currently sanctioned entity (verify with counsel)
Step 4: Recovery Decision Matrix
Evaluate recovery options in consultation with legal, executive leadership, and cyber insurance:
| Option |
Pros |
Cons |
Recommended When |
| Restore from backup |
No payment, no legal risk |
Recovery time may be days |
Clean backups available |
| Free decryptor |
No payment, fast |
Rare availability |
Variant has published decryptor |
| Negotiate and pay |
Potentially faster |
No guarantee, legal risk, funds threat actors |
No backups, business survival at stake |
| Rebuild from scratch |
Clean environment |
Longest timeline, data loss |
Backups compromised, willing to accept data loss |
Step 5: Execute Recovery
Implement the chosen recovery strategy:
If restoring from backup:
- Build a clean isolated network segment for recovery operations
- Rebuild domain controllers first from clean media (do NOT restore DC backups older than the dwell time)
- Reset ALL user and service account passwords before joining any system to the new domain
- Restore servers in priority order: authentication, DNS, DHCP, then business-critical applications
- Restore workstations via reimaging, not file-level restore
- Restore data from verified clean backups to rebuilt file servers
- Reconnect to production network only after validation
If using a decryptor:
- Test the decryptor on a non-critical system first
- Decrypt in order of business priority
- Scan all decrypted systems for residual malware before reconnection
Step 6: Post-Ransomware Hardening
Implement controls to prevent recurrence:
- Enforce MFA on all remote access (VPN, RDP, cloud portals)
- Implement 3-2-1-1-0 backup strategy (3 copies, 2 media types, 1 offsite, 1 immutable, 0 errors)
- Deploy application whitelisting on servers
- Implement network segmentation between workstation and server VLANs
- Enable Protected Users security group for privileged accounts
- Disable NTLM authentication where possible
- Deploy LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) for local admin accounts
Key Concepts
| Term |
Definition |
| Double Extortion |
Ransomware tactic combining file encryption with data exfiltration and threat to publish stolen data |
| Immutable Backup |
Backup storage that cannot be modified or deleted for a defined retention period, protecting against ransomware targeting backups |
| OFAC Sanctions |
U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control restrictions that may prohibit ransom payments to sanctioned entities or jurisdictions |
| Dwell Time |
Days the attacker was present before deploying ransomware; critical for determining which backups are clean |
| Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) |
Criminal business model where ransomware developers lease their malware to affiliates who conduct attacks |
| Rclone |
Legitimate cloud sync tool commonly abused by ransomware operators for data exfiltration before encryption |
| 3-2-1-1-0 Backup Rule |
Backup strategy requiring 3 copies, 2 media types, 1 offsite, 1 immutable/air-gapped, and 0 errors in recovery testing |
Tools & Systems
- ID Ransomware: Online service to identify ransomware variant from ransom note or encrypted file sample
- NoMoreRansom.org: Europol-backed project providing free decryption tools for certain ransomware families
- Veeam / Commvault: Enterprise backup platforms with immutable repository and instant VM recovery capabilities
- KAPE: Rapid forensic triage collection from encrypted systems to determine initial access and dwell time
- Cado Response: Cloud-native forensics platform for investigating ransomware that affects cloud infrastructure
Common Scenarios
Scenario: LockBit 3.0 via Compromised VPN
Context: Attackers compromised VPN credentials (no MFA), spent 12 days performing reconnaissance, disabled antivirus via GPO, exfiltrated 47GB of data, and deployed LockBit 3.0 across the domain via GPO at 2:00 AM on a Sunday.
Approach:
- Disconnect all network segments at the core switch level
- Verify offline backup integrity (Veeam repository on immutable storage)
- Preserve two encrypted servers powered on for memory forensics
- Engage incident response retainer and cyber insurance carrier
- Begin recovery in isolated network: rebuild DCs, reset all passwords, restore in priority order
- Conduct forensic investigation in parallel to determine initial access and full adversary activity
Pitfalls:
- Restoring from backups that were created during the 12-day dwell time (may contain backdoors)
- Paying the ransom without OFAC screening and legal counsel review
- Reconnecting recovered systems to the production network before full password reset
- Not checking for data exfiltration, leaving the organization exposed to the extortion threat
Output Format
RANSOMWARE INCIDENT REPORT
===========================
Incident: INC-2025-1892
Ransomware Family: LockBit 3.0 (Black)
Date Detected: 2025-11-17T06:45:00Z
Initial Access: VPN credential compromise (no MFA)
Dwell Time: 12 days
IMPACT SUMMARY
Encrypted Systems: 187 endpoints, 12 servers
Business Impact: Full operations disruption
Data Exfiltrated: 47GB (finance, HR, legal documents)
Ransom Demand: $2.5M BTC (72-hour deadline)
Backup Status: Veeam immutable repository - CLEAN
RECOVERY APPROACH
Decision: Restore from backup (no ransom payment)
Recovery Start: 2025-11-17T10:00:00Z
DC Rebuild: Complete - 2025-11-17T18:00:00Z
Critical Systems: Restored - 2025-11-18T12:00:00Z
Full Recovery: Estimated 2025-11-21
CONTAINMENT TIMELINE
06:45 UTC - Ransomware detected by SOC analyst
07:00 UTC - Network segments disconnected
07:15 UTC - Incident commander activated IR plan
07:30 UTC - Backup integrity verification started
08:00 UTC - Memory forensics initiated on 2 live systems
10:00 UTC - Recovery operations commenced in clean room
POST-INCIDENT ACTIONS
1. MFA enforced on all VPN and remote access
2. 3-2-1-1-0 backup architecture implemented
3. Network segmentation between workstation/server VLANs
4. LAPS deployed for local administrator passwords
5. Regulatory notifications filed (GDPR 72-hour, state AG)
1---
2name: performing-ransomware-response
3description: 'Executes a structured ransomware incident response from initial detection
4 through containment, forensic analysis, decryption assessment, recovery, and post-incident
5 hardening. Addresses ransom negotiation considerations, backup integrity verification,
6 and regulatory notification requirements. Activates for requests involving ransomware
7 response, ransomware recovery, crypto-ransomware, data encryption attack, ransom
8 payment decision, or ransomware containment.
9
10 '
11domain: cybersecurity
12subdomain: incident-response
13tags:
14- ransomware
15- encryption-recovery
16- backup-restoration
17- ransom-negotiation
18- CISA-guidance
19mitre_attack:
20- T1486
21- T1490
22- T1070
23- T1078
24- T1489
25version: 1.0.0
26author: mahipal
27license: Apache-2.0
28nist_csf:
29- RS.MA-01
30- RS.MA-02
31- RS.AN-03
32- RC.RP-01
33source: https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
34source_commit: 04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d
35metadata:
36 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/yanacuti1121/performing-ransomware-response
37---
38
39# Performing Ransomware Response
40
41## When to Use
42
43- Ransomware has been detected executing or file encryption is actively occurring
44- Users report inability to open files with unfamiliar extensions appended
45- A ransom note is discovered on one or more systems
46- EDR detects mass file modification patterns consistent with encryption behavior
47- Threat intelligence warns of an imminent ransomware campaign targeting the organization
48
49**Do not use** for general malware incidents that do not involve file encryption or extortion; use malware incident response procedures instead.
50
51## Prerequisites
52
53- Ransomware-specific incident response playbook reviewed and approved by executive leadership
54- Tested and verified offline backup strategy with air-gapped or immutable copies
55- Incident retainer with a specialized ransomware response firm (e.g., Mandiant, CrowdStrike Services, Kroll)
56- Legal counsel pre-engaged for OFAC sanctions screening and regulatory notification
57- Cyber insurance carrier contact information and policy coverage details
58- Bitcoin/cryptocurrency analysis capability or third-party engagement for payment tracing
59
60## Workflow
61
62### Step 1: Detect and Confirm Ransomware
63
64Validate that the incident is ransomware and determine the variant:
65
66- Identify the ransomware by analyzing the ransom note filename, extension appended to encrypted files, and note content
67- Upload the ransom note and a sample encrypted file to ID Ransomware (id-ransomware.malwarehunterteam.com)
68- Check NoMoreRansom.org for available free decryptors
69- Determine the ransomware deployment method from EDR/SIEM logs
70- Identify the ransomware group (e.g., LockBit, BlackCat/ALPHV, Royal, Akira, Play)
71
72```
73Ransomware Identification:
74━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
75Variant: LockBit 3.0 (Black)
76Extension: .lockbit3
77Ransom Note: README-LOCKBIT.txt
78Tor Site: lockbit[redacted].onion
79Deployment: Group Policy Object pushing ransomware.exe to all domain-joined systems
80Initial Access: VPN credential compromise (no MFA)
81Dwell Time: 12 days
82Data Exfiltration: Yes - 47GB uploaded to MEGA via rclone prior to encryption
83```
84
85### Step 2: Immediate Containment
86
87Stop ransomware propagation before assessing damage:
88
89- **Priority 1**: Disconnect affected network segments from core infrastructure (pull the network cable, not shutdown)
90- **Priority 2**: Isolate all domain controllers immediately if GPO-based deployment is suspected
91- **Priority 3**: Disable the compromised accounts used for deployment
92- **Priority 4**: Block lateral movement protocols (SMB TCP/445, RDP TCP/3389, WinRM TCP/5985-5986)
93- **Priority 5**: Preserve at least one encrypted system live (do not power off) for memory forensics
94- **Do NOT**: Shut down encrypted systems; keep them powered on to preserve encryption keys in memory
95
96### Step 3: Assess Damage and Scope
97
98Quantify the impact to inform recovery and business decisions:
99
100- Count the number of encrypted systems (workstations, servers, domain controllers)
101- Determine which business-critical systems and data are affected
102- Verify backup integrity: check that backups were not encrypted, deleted, or corrupted
103- Assess whether data exfiltration occurred (check for rclone, WinSCP, MEGA, cloud storage activity)
104- Determine the ransom demand amount and payment deadline
105- Check OFAC sanctions lists to verify the ransomware group is not a sanctioned entity (paying is legally risky)
106
107```
108Impact Assessment:
109Encrypted Systems: 187 of 340 endpoints (55%)
110Encrypted Servers: 12 of 28 (43%) - includes 2 file servers, 1 database server
111Domain Controllers: 2 of 3 encrypted
112Backup Status: Veeam repository intact (offline copy verified clean)
113Data Exfiltration: Confirmed - 47GB to MEGA (file listing under analysis)
114Ransom Demand: $2.5M in Bitcoin (72-hour deadline)
115OFAC Screening: LockBit - not currently sanctioned entity (verify with counsel)
116```
117
118### Step 4: Recovery Decision Matrix
119
120Evaluate recovery options in consultation with legal, executive leadership, and cyber insurance:
121
122| Option | Pros | Cons | Recommended When |
123|--------|------|------|-----------------|
124| Restore from backup | No payment, no legal risk | Recovery time may be days | Clean backups available |
125| Free decryptor | No payment, fast | Rare availability | Variant has published decryptor |
126| Negotiate and pay | Potentially faster | No guarantee, legal risk, funds threat actors | No backups, business survival at stake |
127| Rebuild from scratch | Clean environment | Longest timeline, data loss | Backups compromised, willing to accept data loss |
128
129### Step 5: Execute Recovery
130
131Implement the chosen recovery strategy:
132
133**If restoring from backup:**
1341. Build a clean isolated network segment for recovery operations
1352. Rebuild domain controllers first from clean media (do NOT restore DC backups older than the dwell time)
1363. Reset ALL user and service account passwords before joining any system to the new domain
1374. Restore servers in priority order: authentication, DNS, DHCP, then business-critical applications
1385. Restore workstations via reimaging, not file-level restore
1396. Restore data from verified clean backups to rebuilt file servers
1407. Reconnect to production network only after validation
141
142**If using a decryptor:**
1431. Test the decryptor on a non-critical system first
1442. Decrypt in order of business priority
1453. Scan all decrypted systems for residual malware before reconnection
146
147### Step 6: Post-Ransomware Hardening
148
149Implement controls to prevent recurrence:
150
151- Enforce MFA on all remote access (VPN, RDP, cloud portals)
152- Implement 3-2-1-1-0 backup strategy (3 copies, 2 media types, 1 offsite, 1 immutable, 0 errors)
153- Deploy application whitelisting on servers
154- Implement network segmentation between workstation and server VLANs
155- Enable Protected Users security group for privileged accounts
156- Disable NTLM authentication where possible
157- Deploy LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) for local admin accounts
158
159## Key Concepts
160
161| Term | Definition |
162|------|------------|
163| **Double Extortion** | Ransomware tactic combining file encryption with data exfiltration and threat to publish stolen data |
164| **Immutable Backup** | Backup storage that cannot be modified or deleted for a defined retention period, protecting against ransomware targeting backups |
165| **OFAC Sanctions** | U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control restrictions that may prohibit ransom payments to sanctioned entities or jurisdictions |
166| **Dwell Time** | Days the attacker was present before deploying ransomware; critical for determining which backups are clean |
167| **Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS)** | Criminal business model where ransomware developers lease their malware to affiliates who conduct attacks |
168| **Rclone** | Legitimate cloud sync tool commonly abused by ransomware operators for data exfiltration before encryption |
169| **3-2-1-1-0 Backup Rule** | Backup strategy requiring 3 copies, 2 media types, 1 offsite, 1 immutable/air-gapped, and 0 errors in recovery testing |
170
171## Tools & Systems
172
173- **ID Ransomware**: Online service to identify ransomware variant from ransom note or encrypted file sample
174- **NoMoreRansom.org**: Europol-backed project providing free decryption tools for certain ransomware families
175- **Veeam / Commvault**: Enterprise backup platforms with immutable repository and instant VM recovery capabilities
176- **KAPE**: Rapid forensic triage collection from encrypted systems to determine initial access and dwell time
177- **Cado Response**: Cloud-native forensics platform for investigating ransomware that affects cloud infrastructure
178
179## Common Scenarios
180
181### Scenario: LockBit 3.0 via Compromised VPN
182
183**Context**: Attackers compromised VPN credentials (no MFA), spent 12 days performing reconnaissance, disabled antivirus via GPO, exfiltrated 47GB of data, and deployed LockBit 3.0 across the domain via GPO at 2:00 AM on a Sunday.
184
185**Approach**:
1861. Disconnect all network segments at the core switch level
1872. Verify offline backup integrity (Veeam repository on immutable storage)
1883. Preserve two encrypted servers powered on for memory forensics
1894. Engage incident response retainer and cyber insurance carrier
1905. Begin recovery in isolated network: rebuild DCs, reset all passwords, restore in priority order
1916. Conduct forensic investigation in parallel to determine initial access and full adversary activity
192
193**Pitfalls**:
194- Restoring from backups that were created during the 12-day dwell time (may contain backdoors)
195- Paying the ransom without OFAC screening and legal counsel review
196- Reconnecting recovered systems to the production network before full password reset
197- Not checking for data exfiltration, leaving the organization exposed to the extortion threat
198
199## Output Format
200
201```
202RANSOMWARE INCIDENT REPORT
203===========================
204Incident: INC-2025-1892
205Ransomware Family: LockBit 3.0 (Black)
206Date Detected: 2025-11-17T06:45:00Z
207Initial Access: VPN credential compromise (no MFA)
208Dwell Time: 12 days
209
210IMPACT SUMMARY
211Encrypted Systems: 187 endpoints, 12 servers
212Business Impact: Full operations disruption
213Data Exfiltrated: 47GB (finance, HR, legal documents)
214Ransom Demand: $2.5M BTC (72-hour deadline)
215Backup Status: Veeam immutable repository - CLEAN
216
217RECOVERY APPROACH
218Decision: Restore from backup (no ransom payment)
219Recovery Start: 2025-11-17T10:00:00Z
220DC Rebuild: Complete - 2025-11-17T18:00:00Z
221Critical Systems: Restored - 2025-11-18T12:00:00Z
222Full Recovery: Estimated 2025-11-21
223
224CONTAINMENT TIMELINE
22506:45 UTC - Ransomware detected by SOC analyst
22607:00 UTC - Network segments disconnected
22707:15 UTC - Incident commander activated IR plan
22807:30 UTC - Backup integrity verification started
22908:00 UTC - Memory forensics initiated on 2 live systems
23010:00 UTC - Recovery operations commenced in clean room
231
232POST-INCIDENT ACTIONS
2331. MFA enforced on all VPN and remote access
2342. 3-2-1-1-0 backup architecture implemented
2353. Network segmentation between workstation/server VLANs
2364. LAPS deployed for local administrator passwords
2375. Regulatory notifications filed (GDPR 72-hour, state AG)
238```