Triaging Security Incidents
When to Use
- A SIEM or EDR alert fires and requires human classification before escalation
- Multiple concurrent alerts arrive and the SOC must prioritize response order
- An end user reports suspicious activity and the incident needs initial categorization
- A threat intelligence feed matches an IOC observed in the environment
Do not use for routine vulnerability scanning results or compliance audit findings that do not represent active security incidents.
Prerequisites
- Access to SIEM platform (Splunk, Elastic, Microsoft Sentinel) with current alert data
- Incident classification taxonomy aligned to NIST SP 800-61r3 categories
- Predefined severity matrix mapping asset criticality to threat type
- Contact roster for escalation paths (Tier 1 through Tier 3 and CIRT)
- Asset inventory with business criticality ratings
Workflow
Step 1: Collect Initial Alert Data
Gather all available context from the triggering alert before making classification decisions:
- Alert source: Which detection system generated the alert (EDR, SIEM, IDS/IPS, firewall, user report)
- Timestamp: When the event occurred and when it was detected (dwell time gap)
- Affected assets: Hostnames, IP addresses, user accounts involved
- Alert fidelity: Historical true-positive rate for this detection rule
- Raw evidence: Log entries, packet captures, process execution chains
Example SIEM alert context:
Source: CrowdStrike Falcon
Detection: Suspicious PowerShell Execution (T1059.001)
Host: WORKSTATION-FIN-042
User: jsmith@corp.example.com
Timestamp: 2025-11-15T14:23:17Z
Severity: High (detection rule confidence: 92%)
Process: powershell.exe -enc SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoA...
Parent: outlook.exe (PID 4812)
Step 2: Classify the Incident Type
Map the alert to a standard incident category per NIST SP 800-61r3:
| Category |
Examples |
| Unauthorized Access |
Compromised credentials, privilege escalation, IDOR |
| Denial of Service |
Volumetric DDoS, application-layer flood, resource exhaustion |
| Malicious Code |
Malware execution, ransomware detonation, cryptominer |
| Improper Usage |
Policy violation, insider data exfiltration, shadow IT |
| Reconnaissance |
Port scanning, directory enumeration, credential spraying |
| Web Application Attack |
SQL injection, XSS, SSRF exploitation |
Step 3: Assign Severity Using Impact Matrix
Calculate severity by combining asset criticality with threat severity:
Severity = f(Asset Criticality, Threat Type, Data Sensitivity, Lateral Movement Potential)
Critical (P1): Crown jewel systems compromised, active data exfiltration, ransomware spreading
High (P2): Production system compromise, confirmed malware execution, privileged account takeover
Medium (P3): Non-production compromise, unsuccessful exploitation attempt, single endpoint malware
Low (P4): Reconnaissance activity, policy violation, benign true positive
Response SLA targets:
- P1: Acknowledge within 15 minutes, containment within 1 hour
- P2: Acknowledge within 30 minutes, containment within 4 hours
- P3: Acknowledge within 2 hours, investigation within 24 hours
- P4: Acknowledge within 8 hours, investigation within 72 hours
Step 4: Perform Initial Enrichment
Before escalation, enrich the alert with contextual data:
- Threat intelligence: Check IOCs (IP, hash, domain) against TI platforms (VirusTotal, OTX, MISP)
- Asset context: Query CMDB for asset owner, business function, data classification
- User context: Check identity provider for recent authentication anomalies, MFA status
- Historical correlation: Search for related alerts on the same host/user in the past 30 days
- Network context: Verify if source/destination IPs are internal, known partners, or external threat actors
Step 5: Document and Escalate
Create a structured triage record and route to the appropriate response tier:
Incident Triage Record
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Ticket ID: INC-2025-1547
Triage Analyst: [analyst name]
Triage Time: 2025-11-15T14:35:00Z (12 min from alert)
Classification: Malicious Code - Macro-based initial access
Severity: P2 - High
Affected Assets: WORKSTATION-FIN-042 (Finance dept, handles PII)
Affected Users: jsmith@corp.example.com
IOCs Identified: powershell.exe spawned by outlook.exe, encoded command
TI Matches: Base64 payload matches known Qakbot loader pattern
Escalation: Tier 2 - Malware IR team
Recommended: Isolate endpoint, preserve memory dump, block sender domain
Step 6: Initiate Containment Hold
If severity is P1 or P2, initiate immediate containment actions while awaiting full investigation:
- Network-isolate the affected endpoint via EDR (CrowdStrike contain, Defender isolate)
- Disable compromised user accounts in Active Directory or identity provider
- Block identified malicious IPs/domains at firewall and DNS sinkhole
- Preserve volatile evidence (memory dump) before any remediation
Key Concepts
| Term |
Definition |
| Triage |
Rapid assessment process to classify and prioritize security incidents based on severity and business impact |
| PICERL |
SANS incident response framework: Preparation, Identification, Containment, Eradication, Recovery, Lessons Learned |
| Dwell Time |
Duration between initial compromise and detection; average is 10 days per Mandiant M-Trends 2025 |
| True Positive Rate |
Percentage of alerts from a detection rule that represent genuine security incidents |
| Crown Jewel Assets |
Systems and data critical to business operations whose compromise would cause severe organizational impact |
| Alert Fatigue |
Degraded analyst performance caused by high volumes of low-fidelity or false-positive alerts |
| Mean Time to Acknowledge (MTTA) |
Average time from alert generation to analyst acknowledgment; key SOC performance metric |
Tools & Systems
- Splunk Enterprise Security: SIEM platform for alert aggregation, correlation, and triage workflow management
- CrowdStrike Falcon: EDR platform providing endpoint telemetry, detection, and one-click host containment
- TheHive: Open-source incident response platform for case management, task tracking, and team collaboration
- MISP: Threat intelligence sharing platform for IOC enrichment during triage
- Cortex XSOAR: SOAR platform for automating enrichment playbooks and triage decision trees
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Encoded PowerShell from Email Client
Context: SOC analyst receives a P2 alert showing powershell.exe with a Base64-encoded command spawned as a child process of outlook.exe on a finance department workstation.
Approach:
- Decode the Base64 payload to determine the command intent
- Check the parent process chain for anomalies (Outlook spawning PowerShell is abnormal)
- Query VirusTotal for the decoded payload hash
- Correlate with email gateway logs to identify the triggering email and sender
- Check if other recipients in the organization received the same email
- Isolate the endpoint and escalate to Tier 2 with full triage context
Pitfalls:
- Dismissing encoded PowerShell as a false positive without decoding the payload
- Failing to check for lateral spread to other recipients of the same phishing email
- Remediating the endpoint before capturing volatile memory evidence
Output Format
INCIDENT TRIAGE REPORT
======================
Ticket: INC-[YYYY]-[NNNN]
Date/Time: [ISO 8601 timestamp]
Triage Analyst: [Name]
Time to Triage: [minutes from alert to classification]
CLASSIFICATION
Type: [NIST category]
Severity: [P1-P4] - [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Confidence: [High/Medium/Low]
MITRE ATT&CK: [Technique ID and name]
AFFECTED SCOPE
Assets: [hostname(s), IP(s)]
Users: [account(s)]
Data at Risk: [classification level]
Business Unit: [department]
EVIDENCE SUMMARY
[Bullet list of key observations]
ENRICHMENT RESULTS
TI Matches: [Yes/No - details]
Historical: [Related prior incidents]
Asset Criticality: [rating]
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
1. [Immediate action]
2. [Investigation step]
3. [Escalation target]
ESCALATION
Routed To: [Team/Individual]
SLA Target: [Containment deadline]
1---
2name: triaging-security-incident
3description: 'Performs initial triage of security incidents to determine severity,
4 scope, and required response actions using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL
5 frameworks. Classifies incidents by type, assigns priority based on business impact,
6 and routes to appropriate response teams. Activates for requests involving incident
7 triage, security alert classification, severity assessment, incident prioritization,
8 or initial incident analysis.
9
10 '
11domain: cybersecurity
12subdomain: incident-response
13tags:
14- incident-triage
15- NIST-800-61
16- SANS-PICERL
17- severity-classification
18- SOC-operations
19mitre_attack:
20- T1486
21- T1490
22- T1070
23- T1078
24version: 1.0.0
25author: mahipal
26license: Apache-2.0
27d3fend_techniques:
28- Executable Denylisting
29- Execution Isolation
30- File Metadata Consistency Validation
31- Content Format Conversion
32- File Content Analysis
33nist_csf:
34- RS.MA-01
35- RS.MA-02
36- RS.AN-03
37- RC.RP-01
38source: https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
39source_commit: 04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d
40metadata:
41 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/yanacuti1121/triaging-security-incident
42---
43
44# Triaging Security Incidents
45
46## When to Use
47
48- A SIEM or EDR alert fires and requires human classification before escalation
49- Multiple concurrent alerts arrive and the SOC must prioritize response order
50- An end user reports suspicious activity and the incident needs initial categorization
51- A threat intelligence feed matches an IOC observed in the environment
52
53**Do not use** for routine vulnerability scanning results or compliance audit findings that do not represent active security incidents.
54
55## Prerequisites
56
57- Access to SIEM platform (Splunk, Elastic, Microsoft Sentinel) with current alert data
58- Incident classification taxonomy aligned to NIST SP 800-61r3 categories
59- Predefined severity matrix mapping asset criticality to threat type
60- Contact roster for escalation paths (Tier 1 through Tier 3 and CIRT)
61- Asset inventory with business criticality ratings
62
63## Workflow
64
65### Step 1: Collect Initial Alert Data
66
67Gather all available context from the triggering alert before making classification decisions:
68
69- **Alert source**: Which detection system generated the alert (EDR, SIEM, IDS/IPS, firewall, user report)
70- **Timestamp**: When the event occurred and when it was detected (dwell time gap)
71- **Affected assets**: Hostnames, IP addresses, user accounts involved
72- **Alert fidelity**: Historical true-positive rate for this detection rule
73- **Raw evidence**: Log entries, packet captures, process execution chains
74
75```
76Example SIEM alert context:
77Source: CrowdStrike Falcon
78Detection: Suspicious PowerShell Execution (T1059.001)
79Host: WORKSTATION-FIN-042
80User: jsmith@corp.example.com
81Timestamp: 2025-11-15T14:23:17Z
82Severity: High (detection rule confidence: 92%)
83Process: powershell.exe -enc SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoA...
84Parent: outlook.exe (PID 4812)
85```
86
87### Step 2: Classify the Incident Type
88
89Map the alert to a standard incident category per NIST SP 800-61r3:
90
91| Category | Examples |
92|----------|----------|
93| Unauthorized Access | Compromised credentials, privilege escalation, IDOR |
94| Denial of Service | Volumetric DDoS, application-layer flood, resource exhaustion |
95| Malicious Code | Malware execution, ransomware detonation, cryptominer |
96| Improper Usage | Policy violation, insider data exfiltration, shadow IT |
97| Reconnaissance | Port scanning, directory enumeration, credential spraying |
98| Web Application Attack | SQL injection, XSS, SSRF exploitation |
99
100### Step 3: Assign Severity Using Impact Matrix
101
102Calculate severity by combining asset criticality with threat severity:
103
104```
105Severity = f(Asset Criticality, Threat Type, Data Sensitivity, Lateral Movement Potential)
106
107Critical (P1): Crown jewel systems compromised, active data exfiltration, ransomware spreading
108High (P2): Production system compromise, confirmed malware execution, privileged account takeover
109Medium (P3): Non-production compromise, unsuccessful exploitation attempt, single endpoint malware
110Low (P4): Reconnaissance activity, policy violation, benign true positive
111```
112
113Response SLA targets:
114- P1: Acknowledge within 15 minutes, containment within 1 hour
115- P2: Acknowledge within 30 minutes, containment within 4 hours
116- P3: Acknowledge within 2 hours, investigation within 24 hours
117- P4: Acknowledge within 8 hours, investigation within 72 hours
118
119### Step 4: Perform Initial Enrichment
120
121Before escalation, enrich the alert with contextual data:
122
123- **Threat intelligence**: Check IOCs (IP, hash, domain) against TI platforms (VirusTotal, OTX, MISP)
124- **Asset context**: Query CMDB for asset owner, business function, data classification
125- **User context**: Check identity provider for recent authentication anomalies, MFA status
126- **Historical correlation**: Search for related alerts on the same host/user in the past 30 days
127- **Network context**: Verify if source/destination IPs are internal, known partners, or external threat actors
128
129### Step 5: Document and Escalate
130
131Create a structured triage record and route to the appropriate response tier:
132
133```
134Incident Triage Record
135━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
136Ticket ID: INC-2025-1547
137Triage Analyst: [analyst name]
138Triage Time: 2025-11-15T14:35:00Z (12 min from alert)
139Classification: Malicious Code - Macro-based initial access
140Severity: P2 - High
141Affected Assets: WORKSTATION-FIN-042 (Finance dept, handles PII)
142Affected Users: jsmith@corp.example.com
143IOCs Identified: powershell.exe spawned by outlook.exe, encoded command
144TI Matches: Base64 payload matches known Qakbot loader pattern
145Escalation: Tier 2 - Malware IR team
146Recommended: Isolate endpoint, preserve memory dump, block sender domain
147```
148
149### Step 6: Initiate Containment Hold
150
151If severity is P1 or P2, initiate immediate containment actions while awaiting full investigation:
152
153- Network-isolate the affected endpoint via EDR (CrowdStrike contain, Defender isolate)
154- Disable compromised user accounts in Active Directory or identity provider
155- Block identified malicious IPs/domains at firewall and DNS sinkhole
156- Preserve volatile evidence (memory dump) before any remediation
157
158## Key Concepts
159
160| Term | Definition |
161|------|------------|
162| **Triage** | Rapid assessment process to classify and prioritize security incidents based on severity and business impact |
163| **PICERL** | SANS incident response framework: Preparation, Identification, Containment, Eradication, Recovery, Lessons Learned |
164| **Dwell Time** | Duration between initial compromise and detection; average is 10 days per Mandiant M-Trends 2025 |
165| **True Positive Rate** | Percentage of alerts from a detection rule that represent genuine security incidents |
166| **Crown Jewel Assets** | Systems and data critical to business operations whose compromise would cause severe organizational impact |
167| **Alert Fatigue** | Degraded analyst performance caused by high volumes of low-fidelity or false-positive alerts |
168| **Mean Time to Acknowledge (MTTA)** | Average time from alert generation to analyst acknowledgment; key SOC performance metric |
169
170## Tools & Systems
171
172- **Splunk Enterprise Security**: SIEM platform for alert aggregation, correlation, and triage workflow management
173- **CrowdStrike Falcon**: EDR platform providing endpoint telemetry, detection, and one-click host containment
174- **TheHive**: Open-source incident response platform for case management, task tracking, and team collaboration
175- **MISP**: Threat intelligence sharing platform for IOC enrichment during triage
176- **Cortex XSOAR**: SOAR platform for automating enrichment playbooks and triage decision trees
177
178## Common Scenarios
179
180### Scenario: Encoded PowerShell from Email Client
181
182**Context**: SOC analyst receives a P2 alert showing `powershell.exe` with a Base64-encoded command spawned as a child process of `outlook.exe` on a finance department workstation.
183
184**Approach**:
1851. Decode the Base64 payload to determine the command intent
1862. Check the parent process chain for anomalies (Outlook spawning PowerShell is abnormal)
1873. Query VirusTotal for the decoded payload hash
1884. Correlate with email gateway logs to identify the triggering email and sender
1895. Check if other recipients in the organization received the same email
1906. Isolate the endpoint and escalate to Tier 2 with full triage context
191
192**Pitfalls**:
193- Dismissing encoded PowerShell as a false positive without decoding the payload
194- Failing to check for lateral spread to other recipients of the same phishing email
195- Remediating the endpoint before capturing volatile memory evidence
196
197## Output Format
198
199```
200INCIDENT TRIAGE REPORT
201======================
202Ticket: INC-[YYYY]-[NNNN]
203Date/Time: [ISO 8601 timestamp]
204Triage Analyst: [Name]
205Time to Triage: [minutes from alert to classification]
206
207CLASSIFICATION
208Type: [NIST category]
209Severity: [P1-P4] - [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
210Confidence: [High/Medium/Low]
211MITRE ATT&CK: [Technique ID and name]
212
213AFFECTED SCOPE
214Assets: [hostname(s), IP(s)]
215Users: [account(s)]
216Data at Risk: [classification level]
217Business Unit: [department]
218
219EVIDENCE SUMMARY
220[Bullet list of key observations]
221
222ENRICHMENT RESULTS
223TI Matches: [Yes/No - details]
224Historical: [Related prior incidents]
225Asset Criticality: [rating]
226
227RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
2281. [Immediate action]
2292. [Investigation step]
2303. [Escalation target]
231
232ESCALATION
233Routed To: [Team/Individual]
234SLA Target: [Containment deadline]
235```