Guardrail Patterns

Skill: Guardrail Patterns for opencode-swarm

Source knowledge: 098926ef, 2c1e4689, 54c33fa4, 4f51d11a

Load this skill before modifying src/hooks/guardrails.ts — adding, removing, or changing guardrail blocks in checkDestructiveCommand(). It documents the pattern structure, known bypass surfaces, regex anti-patterns, and test conventions used across 41 guardrail test files and the ~3900-line guardrails.ts file.

When to load this skill

Load before any change to:

• src/hooks/guardrails.ts — especially checkDestructiveCommand() or dcNormalizeCommand()
• tests/unit/hooks/guardrails*.test.ts — any guardrail test file
• Adding a new section (currently Sections 1–22) to checkDestructiveCommand()
• Adding regex patterns for shell command blocking

Architecture overview

checkDestructiveCommand() — the shell command guard

Located at src/hooks/guardrails.ts (line 1304). This is the only function that blocks destructive shell commands. It is invoked by the toolBefore hook in guardrails.ts before every bash or shell tool call.

Pipeline (in order):

1. dcNormalizeCommand() (line ~627) — NFKC normalization + evasion collapse: collapses "" (doubled double-quotes) and '' (doubled single-quotes). Single-quote splice like m'v' remains OPEN.
2. dcStripOneWrapper() (line ~664) — detects and strips individual shell wrappers: bash, sh, zsh, dash, fish, pwsh, powershell, cmd (with -c/-Command), sudo, nohup, time, nice, env VAR=val, call (batch), Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock, & { } script blocks, wsl, iex
3. dcUnwrapWrappers() (line ~737) — loops dcStripOneWrapper until no more wrappers remain (max depth 10)
4. dcSplitSegments() (line ~753) — splits compound commands on &&, ;, |, newlines
5. Per-segment loop — each segment evaluated against 22+ guardrail sections
6. dcValidateTargets() — runtime lstat-ancestor walk on destructive targets

Key normalization functions

Known wrapper unwrapping limitation: sh -c and bash -c with single-quoted inner commands (sh -c 'mv ...') are NOT unwrapped because dcStripOneWrapper uses "? (optional double-quote). Only double-quoted inner commands are properly stripped.

Adding a new guardrail block

Step 1 — Determine the pattern placement

Inside checkDestructiveCommand(), the per-segment for loop evaluates each segment against sections 1–22. A new section should be added after the last existing section and before the closing } of the for loop (currently after Section 22 at approximately line 1733).

Step 2 — Choose the regex pattern structure

There are three patterns used in the codebase:

Pattern A — Simple inline regex (single condition):

// Good for: single-command blocking with no complex extraction
if (/^blockedcommand\b.*\.swarm[\x5c/\s]?/i.test(seg)) {
  throw new Error(`BLOCKED: "blockedcommand" targeting .swarm/ detected — ...`);
}

Pattern B — Multi-condition (flag check + path check):

// Good for: archive tools with flags + .swarm/ path (prevents argument-order bypass)
if (
  /^toolname\b.*--dangerous-flag\b/i.test(seg) &&
  /\.swarm(?:[\x5c/\s]|$)/i.test(seg)
) {

This is recommended because it handles both tool --flag .swarm/path and tool .swarm/path --flag argument orders.

Pattern C — Argument extraction + stripped check:

// Good for: commands where you need argument isolation (e.g., `mv` with arg capture)
if (/^\\?command\s/i.test(seg)) {
  const match = seg.match(/^\\?command\s+(.+)$/i);
  if (match) {
    const argsStr = match[1].replace(/["']/g, '');
    if (/\.swarm(?:[\x5c/\s]|$)/.test(argsStr)) {
      throw new Error(`BLOCKED: ...`);
    }
  }
}

Step 3 — Handle all platform variants

POSIX, Windows cmd.exe, and PowerShell often use different commands for the same operation. All three must be covered:

// POSIX section
if (/^\\?posix-cmd\s/i.test(seg) && /\.swarm/i.test(strippedArgs)) { ... }

// Windows cmd section (case-insensitive, optional .exe)
if (/^\\?(?:cmd-cmd|cmd-cmd-alias)(?:\.exe)?\s/i.test(seg) && /\.swarm/i.test(argsStr)) { ... }

// PowerShell section (case-insensitive, all aliases)
if (/^\\?(?:PowerShell-Cmdlet|alias1|alias2)\b.*\.swarm/i.test(seg)) { ... }

Step 4 — Handle the .swarm path separator

Always use \x5c (backslash) for cross-platform path matching — \ alone is the regex escape character.

// Correct: matches both / and \
/\.swarm[\x5c/]/

// More complete: also matches .swarm followed by whitespace or end-of-string
// (catches whole-directory targeting like `mv .swarm /tmp/`)
/\.swarm(?:[\x5c/\s]|$)/

Step 5 — Handle backslash-prefixed command evasion

Commands prefixed with \ (e.g., \mv) bypass simple ^command\s anchors. Always add \\?:

// Correct: catches both mv and \mv
if (/^\\?mv\s/i.test(seg)) { ... }

// Correct for rm (uses \b instead of \s)
if (/^\\?rm\b/i.test(seg)) { ... }

Known bypass surfaces (must document in adversarial tests)

These are documented bypass vectors that the current regex-based approach cannot fully close. Every new guardrail section should include adversarial tests for these patterns:

Regex anti-patterns (from prior bugs)

Anti-pattern 1: [^-] consuming path characters

// WRONG — [^-] consumes the first character of the path
if (/^rm\s+(?!\s*-)(?!-)[^-].*\.swarm/i.test(seg)) {
  // "rm .swarm/file" → [^-] consumes '.' → "swarm/file" doesn't match "\.swarm"
}

// CORRECT — use negative lookahead for flag exclusion
if (
  /^rm\b/i.test(seg) &&
  !/^rm\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z]*[rR][a-zA-Z]*|--recursive)\b/i.test(seg) &&
  /\.swarm(?:[\x5c/\s]|$)/i.test(seg)
) {
  // "rm .swarm/file" → BLOCKED ✓
  // "rm -rf .swarm/" → Section 3 handles ✓
  // "rm -v .swarm/file" → BLOCKED ✓
}

Anti-pattern 2: Negative lookahead too broad ((?!-\S))

// WRONG — (?!-\S) excludes ALL flag-prefixed rm commands,
// but Section 3 only catches recursive/force flags
if (/^rm\s+(?!-\S).*\.swarm/i.test(seg)) {
  // "rm -v .swarm/file" → NOT blocked by S19 (excluded by lookahead)
  // "rm -v .swarm/file" → NOT blocked by S3 (no -r/-f flags)
}

// CORRECT — use three-part condition

Anti-pattern 3: .exec() confused by SAST

// WRONG — SAST confuses RegExp.prototype.exec() with child_process.exec()
const match = /^command\s+(.+)$/i.exec(seg);  // SAST false positive

// CORRECT — use String.prototype.match()
const match = seg.match(/^command\s+(.+)$/i);  // No SAST false positive

Anti-pattern 4: Argument-order dependent patterns

// WRONG — .swarm/ must appear AFTER the flag in the command string
if (/^tool\b.*--flag\b.*\.swarm/i.test(seg)) {
  // "tool --flag .swarm/" → BLOCKED ✓
  // "tool .swarm/ --flag" → NOT BLOCKED ✗
}

// CORRECT — split flag check and path check
if (/^tool\b.*--flag\b/i.test(seg) && /\.swarm(?:[\x5c/\s]|$)/i.test(seg)) {
  // Both argument orders BLOCKED ✓
}

Test conventions

Test file structure

// Positive tests: "command → BLOCKED"
test('mv .swarm/evidence/file.json /tmp/ → BLOCKED', async () => { ... });

// Negative tests: "command → ALLOWED (reason)"
test('ls .swarm/evidence/ → ALLOWED (read-only)', async () => { ... });

// Bypass when feature is disabled
test('mv .swarm/file /tmp/ → ALLOWED when block_destructive_commands=false', async () => { ... });

Test infrastructure pattern

import { mkdtempSync, realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { createGuardrailsHooks } from '../../../src/hooks/guardrails';
import { resetSwarmState, startAgentSession } from '../../../src/state';

const TEST_DIR = realpathSync(mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'guardrail-pattern-')));

function defaultConfig(overrides?: Partial<GuardrailsConfig>): GuardrailsConfig {
  return {
    enabled: true,
    max_tool_calls: 200,
    max_duration_minutes: 30,
    idle_timeout_minutes: 60,
    max_repetitions: 10,
    max_consecutive_errors: 5,
    warning_threshold: 0.75,
    profiles: undefined,
    block_destructive_commands: true,
    ...overrides,
  };
}

function makeBashInput(sessionID = 'test-session', command: string) {
  // Note: command is accepted but passed to makeBashOutput, not makeBashInput
  return { tool: 'bash', sessionID, callID: 'call-1' };
}

function makeBashOutput(command: string) {
  return { args: { command } };
}

Required test categories

Every new guardrail section MUST have tests for:

1. Positive — command targeting .swarm/ is blocked
2. Negative — same command with non-.swarm/ path is allowed
3. Read-only — read-only commands (ls, cat, find) are not blocked
4. Config bypass — verified unblocked when block_destructive_commands: false
5. Platform variants — POSIX, Windows cmd, PowerShell forms where applicable
6. Adversarial — documented bypass surfaces (one test per known evasion type)

Key testing rules

• Use bun:test only (no Jest/Vitest)
• Use rejects.toThrow(/BLOCKED/) for positive assertions
• Use resolves.toBeUndefined() for negative assertions
• No hardcoded /tmp — use os.tmpdir() + mkdtempSync
• No hardcoded C:\ strings
• Wrap mkdtempSync in realpathSync for macOS compatibility

Section pattern reference (current guardrail sections 1–22)

| Section | Line | Commands blocked | Notes | |---|---|---|---|---| | 2 | ~1347 | Junction/symlink CREATION out-of-cwd | dcCheckJunctionCreation — creation of junctions/symlinks targeting outside cwd | | 3 | ~1353 | rm -r[Ff]*, rm -f -r, etc | Recursive + force only ([rRfF]+ flag set) | | 4 | ~1378 | rmdir /s, rd /s | Windows cmd, recursive | | 5 | ~1400 | del /s | Windows cmd | | 6–7 | ~1418 | Remove-Item -Recurse + pipeline form | PowerShell | | 8 | ~1457 | Ransomware-grade | vssadmin, wbadmin, diskpart, bcdedit, sdelete, fsutil, takeown, cipher, format, robocopy /MIR | | 9 | ~1510 | chmod -R 000, chattr +i, icacls /deny | Permission denial-of-service | | 10 | ~1529 | dd with /dev/zero/null/urandom | Data wipe | | 11 | ~1538 | Git destructive | push --force, reset --hard, reset --mixed, clean -fd, worktree remove --force | | 12 | ~1567 | rsync --delete(-before/-after/-during/-delay) | Mirror/sync with delete | | 13 | ~1576 | kubectl delete, docker system prune | Cluster/container | | 14 | ~1590 | DROP TABLE/DATABASE/SCHEMA, TRUNCATE TABLE | SQL DDL | | 15 | ~1604 | mkfs | Disk format | | 16 | ~1615 | mv | POSIX — blocked on .swarm/ | | 17 | ~1635 | move, ren | Windows cmd — blocked on .swarm\ | | 18 | ~1652 | Move-Item, Rename-Item, aliases | PowerShell — blocked on .swarm/ | | 19 | ~1667 | rm (non-recursive) | Blocked on .swarm/ (recursive → Section 3) | | 20 | ~1682 | cp + rm chain | Secondary defense (rm guard is primary) | | 21 | ~1697 | rsync --remove-source-files, tar --remove-files, zip -m, 7z -sdel | Archive tools with delete-source flags | | 22 | ~1728 | git clean -fd, git worktree remove --force | Verified existing patterns cover .swarm/ |

Task checklist for adding a new guardrail block

• Pattern chosen (A/B/C) and placed in correct section order
• Command anchor includes ^\\? (backslash prefix)
• .swarm path check uses (?:[\x5c/\s]|$) (whole-root + subpath)
• Argument-order independent (split flag check from path check)
• Platform variants covered (POSIX + cmd + PowerShell)
• .exec() → .match() to avoid SAST false positives
• Positive test: .swarm/ path blocked
• Negative test: non-.swarm/ path allowed
• Read-only test: read commands not blocked
• Config bypass test: block_destructive_commands: false
• Adversarial tests: document known bypasses
• bun run build succeeds
• bunx biome ci . clean
• All guardrail test suites pass