Coalition Denied Identity Proofing And Insider Risk Expulsion Cell

Coalition Denied Identity Proofing and Insider Risk Expulsion Cell

Mission Scope

• Treat this skill as a planning and decision-support aid for U.S. warfighter missions in this domain.
• Confirm command echelon, authorities, coalition constraints, data handling requirements, and commander decision timeline.
• Keep outputs unclassified by default unless handling instructions are explicitly provided.

Workflow

1. Frame the mission problem with current threat picture, mission objectives, operational constraints, and required effects.
2. Define assumptions, invalidation triggers, and branch conditions.
3. Build a primary and at least one alternate option with tradeoffs in tempo, survivability, interoperability, sustainment burden, and escalation.
4. Bind recommendations to cross-domain dependencies across C2, intelligence, fires/effects, protection, sustainment, and information.
5. Produce commander-facing and staff-facing outputs with owners, suspense, and acknowledgment criteria.

Required Output Format

Deliver in this order:

1. Situation snapshot.
2. Recommended option.
3. Alternatives and branch triggers.
4. Decision points and timing.
5. Staff tasking with owners/suspense.
6. Tool invocation packet summary with protocol details.

Domain Products

Primary products for this skill: coalition identity assurance board, insider-risk isolation ladder, legal authority handoff packet.

Domain Tool Stack

Use these tool categories as the baseline stack: federated identity proofing suites, coalition watchlist and biometrics reconciliation tools, insider-risk forensics workflows.

Protocol Profile

Preferred protocol families for this skill: NIEM, CJIS, NATO APP-11/ADatP-3 aligned, STIX/TAXII, API/JSON.

External Tools and Protocol Integration

• Use ../_shared/references/warfighter-external-tool-and-protocol-catalog.md to select a mission-fit tool_suite_id and protocol_stack_id.
• Use ../_shared/references/joint-operations-external-toolchain-profiles.md and bind each recommendation to concrete primary and cross-check systems.
• Use ../_shared/references/external-tool-endpoints-and-adapters.md and define endpoint contract, transport mode, timeout, and degraded fallback.
• Include tool_suite_id, protocol_stack_id, interop_standard_set, endpoint_security_profile, primary_exchange_path, and degraded_exchange_method for each critical recommendation.

Interoperability and Assurance Gates

• Run ../_shared/references/mission-assurance-checklist.md before release.
• Run ../_shared/references/us-joint-protocol-assurance-drill.md before release.
• Apply authority controls from ../_shared/references/warfighter-tool-authority-gates.md and ../_shared/references/human-agent-command-escalation-matrix.md.
• If data freshness, authority, or protocol acknowledgment is uncertain, downgrade to advisory-only and require human command review.

Tool Invocation Contract

For each critical external dependency include:

• Objective and decision linkage.
• Required input schema and validation checks.
• Query or action template.
• Expected output schema and freshness SLA.
• Transport protocol and acknowledgment timeout.
• Degraded-mode fallback path and confidence impact.

Guardrails

• Distinguish facts, assessments, and unknowns.
• Identify legal, policy, ROE, safety, medical, and coalition interoperability constraints early.
• Do not fabricate intelligence, authorities, approvals, tool outputs, or system connectivity.
• Require explicit commander/legal review for recommendations that can materially alter force posture, casualty risk, or escalation.

Domain Toolchain Override (2026-03-12, Expansion Wave XXIV Addendum)

• Prioritize tool_suite_id=ts-coalition-denied-identity-insider-expulsion-v1 + protocol_stack_id=ps-coalition-denied-identity-insider-expulsion-stack-v1 when this mission set is the critical path for commander decision timelines.
• Add packet_id=DPL-COALITION-IDENTITY-INSIDER-001 for the primary course of action and packet_id=DPL-COALITION-IDENTITY-INSIDER-002 for degraded-mode fallback actions.
• Include validation_owner, revalidation_utc, and ack_chain_status for both packet paths before release.