Engagement Deliverables & Validation Conventions
Workspace-specific conventions for authorized bug bounty / pentest engagements.
Complements (does not replace) bb-methodology and bug-bounty-reporting-workflow,
which are manually authored and hold the general methodology. This skill captures
the operator's standing corrections that those skills cannot be auto-updated with.
1. Deliverable Location & Format (hard user preference)
User corrections, verbatim: "taro di folder report bro kan udah ada contohnya" and
"kenapa bentuknya zip".
- Canonical tree:
/workspace/reports/<target>/ with subdirs findings/,
pocs/, evidence/, plus SUMMARY.md and metadata.json.
- Plain individual files ONLY — never zip. Zips are for transport on explicit request only.
- Mirror the house format — list
/workspace/reports/*/ first and copy the structure
of prior engagements (xyrusrouter_xyz/, 127_0_0_1_8888/): emoji severity matrix table
in SUMMARY.md; metadata.json keys = target, scan_time, total_findings,
severity_summary{CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW,INFORMATIONAL}, findings[]
(file_name, relative_path, title, severity, cvss, cwe, endpoint, last_modified),
pocs[], evidence_files[].
- Fallback if
/workspace unwritable: ~/reports/<target>/ with the SAME tree shape.
- Write ONE canonical copy;
cp (never independently edit) if the user wants it elsewhere.
Aggregator overwrite trap
/workspace/tools/aggregate_reports.py <target> regenerates SUMMARY.md +
metadata.json from findings/*.md on every run and silently discards hand-written
analysis sections (bypass matrices, IDOR methodology, narrative). Order of operations:
run aggregator FIRST → then append analysis sections via targeted patches → do NOT
re-run the aggregator afterward without re-checking your sections survived.
2. Bypass-Before-Clear Gate (for negative claims)
Operator expectation: "jangan ambigu menganggap hal itu tervalidasi" — never declare a
control secure from plain unauth probes alone. A negative claim ("rate-limit works",
"middleware protects /api/*") is report-grade only after its known bypass battery was
ATTEMPTED and recorded failing:
| Control |
Minimum bypass battery |
| Middleware/auth gate |
CVE-2025-29927 full variant set (x-middleware-subrequest: middleware, src/middleware, pages/_middleware, each ×5-chain); XFF internal IPs; X-Original-URL/X-Rewrite-URL; X-Forwarded-Host; path normalization (//, /./, %2f, case variants, matrix params) |
| Rate limiter |
X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP spoofing. Spoofed CF-Connecting-IP → Cloudflare itself rejects (403 error code 1000): that is the WAF working, NOT a bypass success — classify correctly |
| Parser-level auth |
duplicate JSON keys, array-typed values, NoSQL $gt, null/missing fields, unicode homoglyphs, form-encoded vs JSON vs text/plain content-type differentials |
| Cache isolation |
static-extension probes on sensitive API paths + inspect cf-cache-status (BYPASS/DYNAMIC ⇒ not cacheable ⇒ WCD dead) |
Save every failed vector to evidence/evidence_roundN_bypass_validation.txt and surface
the matrix in SUMMARY.md — documented failed bypasses are coverage proof, not wasted requests.
3. Cloudflare UA Pitfall in Multi-Tool Reproduction
When reproducing/validating findings against Cloudflare-fronted targets:
python3 urllib/requests with default UA often gets 403 (CF block) while curl
gets 200 on the same URL. This fabricates false tool-differentials — exactly what
cross-tool reproduction is supposed to rule out.
- Fix: send a real browser UA in every scripted probe
(
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 ... Chrome/126.0 Safari/537.36) and keep it identical
across curl and Python runs so responses are comparable.
- Also remember urllib string-slicing truncation breaks JSON parsing — read full bodies
before
json.loads in PoC scripts.
4. Layered Rate-Limiter Response Shapes (detection technique)
429 shapes can differ by REQUEST PATH, not just identity: JSON content-type hits the
app-layer limiter (verbose quarantine body w/ retryAfter), while text/plain bodies
or dot-segment paths (/api/auth/./login) hit a global edge/global layer (plain
{"error":"Too many requests"}). When auditing login endpoints, fingerprint BOTH
layers and flag inconsistent response shapes between them as CWE-204 info-leak
(retryAfter exposure aids brute-force timing) even when no bypass exists.
Related skills
bb-methodology — 5-phase workflow + discipline rules (manually authored).
bug-bounty-reporting-workflow — language/validation/sensitive-data preferences (manually authored).
hunt-idor, triage-validation — per-class hunting and pre-severity gates.
1---2name: engagement-deliverables-and-validation3description: Workspace conventions for authorized security-engagement deliverables — canonical report location (/workspace/reports/<target>/), plain files not zip, follow-the-existing-format rule, report-aggregator overwrite trap, bypass-before-clear validation gate for negative claims, and Cloudflare UA pitfalls in PoC reproduction. Use at report-writing time or before declaring any control "secure".4metadata:5 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/zyrexnn/engagement-deliverables-and-validation6---78# Engagement Deliverables & Validation Conventions910Workspace-specific conventions for authorized bug bounty / pentest engagements.11Complements (does not replace) `bb-methodology` and `bug-bounty-reporting-workflow`,12which are manually authored and hold the general methodology. This skill captures13the operator's standing corrections that those skills cannot be auto-updated with.1415## 1. Deliverable Location & Format (hard user preference)1617User corrections, verbatim: "taro di folder report bro kan udah ada contohnya" and18"kenapa bentuknya zip".1920- **Canonical tree:** `/workspace/reports/<target>/` with subdirs `findings/`,21 `pocs/`, `evidence/`, plus `SUMMARY.md` and `metadata.json`.22- **Plain individual files ONLY — never zip.** Zips are for transport on explicit request only.23- **Mirror the house format** — list `/workspace/reports/*/` first and copy the structure24 of prior engagements (`xyrusrouter_xyz/`, `127_0_0_1_8888/`): emoji severity matrix table25 in SUMMARY.md; metadata.json keys = `target`, `scan_time`, `total_findings`,26 `severity_summary{CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW,INFORMATIONAL}`, `findings[]`27 (file_name, relative_path, title, severity, cvss, cwe, endpoint, last_modified),28 `pocs[]`, `evidence_files[]`.29- Fallback if `/workspace` unwritable: `~/reports/<target>/` with the SAME tree shape.30- Write ONE canonical copy; `cp` (never independently edit) if the user wants it elsewhere.3132### Aggregator overwrite trap33`/workspace/tools/aggregate_reports.py <target>` regenerates `SUMMARY.md` +34`metadata.json` from `findings/*.md` on every run and silently discards hand-written35analysis sections (bypass matrices, IDOR methodology, narrative). Order of operations:36run aggregator FIRST → then append analysis sections via targeted patches → do NOT37re-run the aggregator afterward without re-checking your sections survived.3839## 2. Bypass-Before-Clear Gate (for negative claims)4041Operator expectation: "jangan ambigu menganggap hal itu tervalidasi" — never declare a42control secure from plain unauth probes alone. A negative claim ("rate-limit works",43"middleware protects /api/*") is report-grade only after its known bypass battery was44ATTEMPTED and recorded failing:4546| Control | Minimum bypass battery |47|---|---|48| Middleware/auth gate | CVE-2025-29927 full variant set (`x-middleware-subrequest`: `middleware`, `src/middleware`, `pages/_middleware`, each ×5-chain); XFF internal IPs; `X-Original-URL`/`X-Rewrite-URL`; `X-Forwarded-Host`; path normalization (`//`, `/./`, `%2f`, case variants, matrix params) |49| Rate limiter | `X-Forwarded-For`/`X-Real-IP` spoofing. Spoofed `CF-Connecting-IP` → Cloudflare itself rejects (403 error code 1000): that is the WAF working, NOT a bypass success — classify correctly |50| Parser-level auth | duplicate JSON keys, array-typed values, NoSQL `$gt`, null/missing fields, unicode homoglyphs, form-encoded vs JSON vs text/plain content-type differentials |51| Cache isolation | static-extension probes on sensitive API paths + inspect `cf-cache-status` (BYPASS/DYNAMIC ⇒ not cacheable ⇒ WCD dead) |5253Save every failed vector to `evidence/evidence_roundN_bypass_validation.txt` and surface54the matrix in SUMMARY.md — documented failed bypasses are coverage proof, not wasted requests.5556## 3. Cloudflare UA Pitfall in Multi-Tool Reproduction5758When reproducing/validating findings against Cloudflare-fronted targets:59- `python3 urllib/requests` with default UA often gets **403 (CF block)** while `curl`60 gets 200 on the same URL. This fabricates false tool-differentials — exactly what61 cross-tool reproduction is supposed to rule out.62- Fix: send a real browser UA in every scripted probe63 (`User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 ... Chrome/126.0 Safari/537.36`) and keep it identical64 across curl and Python runs so responses are comparable.65- Also remember urllib string-slicing truncation breaks JSON parsing — read full bodies66 before `json.loads` in PoC scripts.6768## 4. Layered Rate-Limiter Response Shapes (detection technique)6970429 shapes can differ by REQUEST PATH, not just identity: JSON content-type hits the71app-layer limiter (verbose quarantine body w/ `retryAfter`), while `text/plain` bodies72or dot-segment paths (`/api/auth/./login`) hit a global edge/global layer (plain73`{"error":"Too many requests"}`). When auditing login endpoints, fingerprint BOTH74layers and flag inconsistent response shapes between them as CWE-204 info-leak75(retryAfter exposure aids brute-force timing) even when no bypass exists.7677## Related skills78- `bb-methodology` — 5-phase workflow + discipline rules (manually authored).79- `bug-bounty-reporting-workflow` — language/validation/sensitive-data preferences (manually authored).80- `hunt-idor`, `triage-validation` — per-class hunting and pre-severity gates.