annatchijova
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- ▌ Workflow Abuse Assessment · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of business-logic and workflow boundaries: state-machine step-skipping and replay, price/quantity/currency and coupon manipulation, refund/chargeback/payout abuse, tenant/role boundary and mass-assignment, and logic-level race conditions. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on owned accounts and synthetic value that reconstruct the intended state machine and prove a prohibited transition with negative controls, not live financial abuse.
- ▌ Pipeline Boundary Assessment · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of CI/CD pipeline execution boundaries: GitHub Actions expression injection and workflow_run artifact poisoning, mutable-tag vs pinned-SHA action references, Jenkins script-console/Groovy-sandbox/remoting-deserialization and shared-library injection, and GitLab CI YAML/MR injection. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on an owned pipeline with an inert marker and token-permission inspection instead of live controller RCE.
- ▌ Frontend Accessibility By Construction · annatchijovaBuild interactive frontend components — forms, modals, navigation, custom widgets — so they are operable and perceivable by construction, not patched afterward with ARIA. Use whenever writing or reviewing a component with keyboard interaction, focus behavior, or non-text content. Trigger on "accessible", "a11y", "keyboard nav", "screen reader", "focus trap", "aria-*", "custom dropdown/modal/tabs", "tap target", or a component built from a bare `<div>`/`<span>` instead of a native interactive element. Not a visual-design skill — color contrast and typography live here only where they gate comprehension, per WCAG, not as aesthetic preference.
- ▌ Fuzz Campaign Design · annatchijovaDesign and run a fuzzing campaign with discipline: harness construction, seed-corpus curation, coverage and sanitizer instrumentation, oracle/invariant selection, mutation vs grammar/structure-aware strategy, and a stop/triage criterion. Re-expressed as a scoped engineering experiment on an owned target that states the oracle and coverage goal up front and routes findings to triage, not a point-and-shoot crash hunt.
- ▌ Rt Bluetooth Classic · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) security: device/service discovery (SDP), pairing/authentication mode and legacy-pairing weakness, profile exposure (RFCOMM/OBEX/HFP), and known protocol-flaw patch status (e.g. KNOB, BIAS-class). Re-expressed as a scoped experiment in a controlled RF setting against an owned device that proves one weakness with a negative control instead of attacks on others' devices.
- ▌ Rt Data Exfiltration · annatchijovaBlue/purple-team assessment of data-exfiltration detection and DLP coverage: understanding channel categories (HTTPS, DNS, ICMP, cloud-storage, steganographic, physical) so defenders can detect them, and measuring whether egress/DLP/NDR controls catch an authorized canary transfer. Re-expressed as a detection-coverage exercise on an owned lab with non-sensitive canary data and PASS/WARN/FAIL scoring instead of a real exfiltration playbook.
- ▌ Rt Krack Fragattacks · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of 802.11 protocol-flaw patch status: KRACK (key-reinstallation in the 4-way/group-key handshake) and FragAttacks (fragmentation/aggregation design and implementation flaws). Re-expressed as a scoped patch-verification experiment in an isolated RF lab against owned AP/client that confirms whether the stack is vulnerable or patched, with a patched-stack control, instead of attacks on live networks.
- ▌ Rt Osint Methodology · annatchijovaMethodology for disciplined OSINT in an authorized engagement: scoping and legal/ethical boundaries, the collection cycle (plan, collect, process, corroborate, analyze, report), source reliability grading, provenance and freshness tracking, and privacy minimization. Re-expressed as a process contract that governs rt-osint collection with explicit source-evaluation and scope limits rather than a tool list.
- ▌ Rt Request Smuggling · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of HTTP request-smuggling / desync boundaries: CL.TE, TE.CL and TE.TE between front-end and back-end, plus HTTP/2 downgrade desync, client-side desync, pause-based, CONNECT tunneling, WebSocket desync and header oversizing. A parser-differential problem between proxy and origin, re-expressed as owned two-tier lab experiments with timing/response discriminators and negative controls instead of live queue poisoning.
- ▌ Rt Basic Exploitation · annatchijovaRed-team / CTF assessment of memory-corruption fundamentals: stack and heap buffer overflows, integer overflow, format-string, use-after-free and off-by-one, and the path from crash to controlled execution. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on an owned, deliberately-vulnerable binary that classify the primitive and prove control with an inert marker and mitigation-state controls instead of weaponizing a live target.
- ▌ Rt Bug Identification · annatchijovaRed-team / research assessment that turns raw fuzzing or crash output into identified, deduplicated, root-caused bugs: stack/coverage-based deduplication, minimization, root-cause localization (sanitizer reports, reverse execution, taint), and bug-class assignment. Re-expressed as scoped triage on owned crash corpora that produces a deduplicated, root-caused finding set with exploitability deferred to crash analysis.
- ▌ Rt Exploit Dev Course · annatchijovaStructured learning path for binary exploitation in authorized research/CTF settings: a graded progression from memory-corruption fundamentals through crash triage, mitigation effectiveness, and reliable primitive development. Re-expressed as a curriculum map over the other rt- exploit-dev skills, with per-stage owned-lab exercises, evidence labels and explicit mitigation awareness rather than a copy-paste exploit cookbook.
- ▌ Rt Social Engineering · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of human-layer susceptibility via authorized, consented social-engineering simulation: pretext design and plausibility, vishing/smishing, physical-access and tailgating tests, and MFA-fatigue/help-desk-impersonation scenarios. Re-expressed as a sanctioned, ethically-bounded exercise against consented targets that measures susceptibility and process controls with a debrief, not real manipulation of uninformed people.
- ▌ Rt Windows Boundaries · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of Windows security boundaries: integrity levels and UAC, token privileges and impersonation, session/desktop isolation, DACL/object security, named-pipe and service boundaries, and the Microsoft servicing stance on which of these are defended trust boundaries vs not. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on an owned Windows lab that prove one boundary crossing against a planted object with hardened-config controls instead of live escalation.
- ▌ Destination Driven Construction · annatchijovaBuild toward a chosen, ambitious final product in coherent levels — each one architecturally compatible with the destination, useful standalone, and carrying the invariants (security, persistence, authority boundaries) it will need later, never bolted on afterward. Use whenever planning or building a project meant to be kept, used, or maintained — including a hackathon project. Trigger on "let's scope this as an MVP", "build a quick prototype first", "we'll add security/tests/proper persistence later", "hackathon deadline", "what should v1 include", or any plan that phases work by technical concern (auth now, security later) instead of by a coherent state of the target product. Never suggest MVP-shaped scoping unless explicitly asked, even under a deadline. Composes with secure-by-construction (invariant inheritance), red-team-auditing (per-level and integrated adversarial review), and falsifiable-testing (explicit boundary on validation cadence — see below, this skill does not invent a TDD requirement).
- ▌ Rt Exploit Development · annatchijovaRed-team / research assessment of exploit-primitive development: turning a controllable memory-corruption primitive into reliable control via ROP/JOP, information leaks defeating ASLR, heap grooming/feng-shui, GOT/vtable hijack and ret2libc. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on an owned, consented target that build a minimal proof-of-control to a benign marker with mitigation-state controls instead of a weaponized, distributable exploit.
- ▌ Rt Parameter Pollution · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of HTTP parameter-pollution boundaries: duplicate parameters across URL/form/JSON/GraphQL/WebSocket, array-notation confusion (PHP/Express-qs/Rails), and parameter cloaking. A precedence-differential problem (gateway vs backend, validator vs processor) reaching auth bypass, WAF bypass, access-control bypass and IDOR, re-expressed as owned-fixture experiments observing which tier honors which value with negative controls.
- ▌ Rt Windows Mitigations · annatchijovaRed-team / research assessment of Windows exploit-mitigation effectiveness: Control Flow Guard (CFG), xFG, CET/shadow stack, Arbitrary Code Guard (ACG), Code Integrity Guard (CIG), DEP/ASLR/high-entropy ASLR, CFG-aware heap, EAF/IAF and HVCI/Credential Guard, including the precondition each needs to be bypassed. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on an owned Windows target that score whether a mitigation holds against a given primitive (PASS/WARN/FAIL) rather than delivering bypasses.
- ▌ Token Trust Assessment · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of JWT and bearer-token trust boundaries: alg-none and RS256-to-HS256 confusion, weak-secret HMAC, kid injection (path traversal/SQLi), jku/x5u abuse, claim tampering, header injection, cross-token confusion, HMAC timing, and token-in-URL leakage. Re-expressed as owned-token experiments that prove a forged token is accepted against a negative control instead of attacking live sessions.
- ▌ API Boundary Assessment · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of API security boundaries against the OWASP API Top 10: BOLA/IDOR, broken auth and token lifecycle, excessive data exposure, BFLA and mass assignment, REST verb/content-type tampering, SSRF via parameters, gRPC (reflection, metadata, BOLA) and WebSocket (origin, CSWSH) testing, plus versioning/misconfiguration. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on owned accounts with bounded sets and negative controls.
- ▌ Rt Dependency Confusion · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of dependency-confusion / namespace boundaries across npm, PyPI, NuGet, Maven, Gradle, Go and RubyGems: internal-package-name reconnaissance (lock files, source maps, errors, repo mining) and registry-priority misconfiguration. Re-expressed as scoped experiments that prove resolution-order risk with a DNS-canary-only package and registry-config controls instead of publishing functional malicious packages.
- ▌ Rt Zigbee Thread Matter · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of IEEE 802.15.4 mesh security (Zigbee, Thread, Matter): network/link-key provisioning and the classic Zigbee open-join / default-Trust-Center-link-key exposure, commissioning weaknesses, key transport, and replay. Re-expressed as a scoped experiment in an isolated RF lab against an owned network with synthetic keys and a hardened-commissioning control instead of attacks on others' devices.
- ▌ Cloud Identity Assessment · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of cloud identity and privilege boundaries across AWS, Azure and GCP: IMDS credential reach, IAM privilege-escalation paths (iam:PassRole, CreatePolicyVersion, UpdateAssumeRolePolicy and peers), cross-account/cross-tenant trust, data-store reach (S3/snapshots/secrets), and persistence primitives. Re-expressed as scoped experiments in an owned sub-account using least-privilege test principals and policy-simulation controls instead of live escalation in production.
- ▌ Rt Crypto Attacks · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of cryptographic-implementation boundaries: CBC padding oracles, ECB block manipulation, hash length-extension, RSA weaknesses (small-e, shared factors, Coppersmith), weak/predictable PRNG, AES-GCM nonce reuse, and timing side channels. Re-expressed as owned-fixture experiments against a disposable oracle with synthetic keys and negative controls instead of decrypting production secrets.
- ▌ Rt Fuzzing Course · annatchijovaStructured learning path for fuzzing in authorized research/CTF: a graded progression from harness and corpus construction through coverage/sanitizer instrumentation, oracle design, triage and root-causing, to continuous CI integration. Re-expressed as a curriculum map over the fuzzing and triage skills, with per-stage owned-target exercises and evidence standards instead of a flat tool tutorial.
- ▌ Rt Initial Access · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of initial-access exposure in an authorized engagement: phishing/social delivery, public-facing exploitation, valid-account abuse, exposed services and supply-chain entry. Re-expressed as a scoped exposure-and-detection exercise that maps and tests entry vectors against owned/consented assets with a benign marker and detection measurement, not a live intrusion or mass phishing playbook.
- ▌ Rt Keylogger Arch · annatchijovaBlue-team assessment of keylogging / input-capture detection and defense: understanding the capture mechanisms (kernel/user hooks, raw input, accessibility APIs, hardware) so defenders can detect them, and measuring whether endpoint controls catch an authorized emulation. Re-expressed as a detection-and-prevention exercise on an owned lab host with a benign input-capture stub and PASS/WARN/FAIL scoring, not an implementation guide for covert surveillance.
- ▌ Rt Race Condition · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of race-condition / TOCTOU boundaries: limit-overrun on balances, coupons, gift cards, votes, invites and 2FA attempts; single-packet-attack concurrency; database isolation-level gaps; and cloud/serverless concurrency (Lambda/Cloud Functions). Re-expressed as owned-fixture concurrency experiments with a bounded parallel request set, a sequential control and state inspection instead of live financial abuse.
- ▌ Rt Wpa Enterprise · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of WPA-Enterprise (802.1X/EAP) trust: whether clients validate the RADIUS server certificate, evil-twin RADIUS credential (EAP identity/MSCHAPv2) capture, weak EAP method selection, and PMF. Re-expressed as a scoped experiment in an isolated RF lab with an owned client and synthetic domain credentials that measures server-cert validation with a hardened-supplicant control instead of harvesting real credentials.
- ▌ Distributed Write Atomicity · annatchijovaDesign the intermediate state, redelivery, and deduplication explicitly whenever two effects cannot share one transaction — a DB write plus an event/webhook/second-service call, a payment plus a notification, a state change plus a cache invalidation. Use whenever an operation must affect two systems that don't share a transactional authority. Trigger on "dual write", "outbox pattern", "idempotency key", "exactly-once", "duplicate event", "webhook delivery", "the payment charged twice", "publish an event after saving", "call another service after committing". Sibling of atomic-state-mutation — that skill covers multi-write atomicity inside one transactional authority; this one covers the case where no shared COMMIT exists at all.
- ▌ Live Contract Compatibility · annatchijovaChange a request/response shape, RPC contract, or message schema so that vN and vN+1 producers/consumers keep working while both are simultaneously alive — not just so a future reader can parse an old artifact. Use whenever changing a field, endpoint, protobuf message, or GraphQL type during or across a rolling deploy, or when clients (especially ones you cannot force to update, like a mobile app) may run an old contract indefinitely. Trigger on "breaking change", "rolling deploy", "mixed versions in prod", "add a required field", "rename a field", "remove an endpoint", "protobuf field number", "API version". Sibling of versioned-schema-evolution — that skill asks whether a new reader can interpret an old persisted artifact; this one asks whether two live versions of a contract can coexist while both are actually running.
- ▌ Rt Deauth Disassoc · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of 802.11 management-frame protection: whether deauthentication/disassociation frames can disrupt or deauth clients, and whether 802.11w/PMF defeats them. Re-expressed as a scoped availability-and-PMF experiment in an isolated RF lab against an owned AP and client, measuring whether management frames are protected, with explicit DoS-scope handling instead of disrupting live networks.
- ▌ Rt Deserialization · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of insecure-deserialization boundaries across Java (ObjectInputStream, XMLDecoder, Jackson/JNDI), PHP (serialize, phar), .NET (BinaryFormatter, Json.NET TypeNameHandling, ViewState), Python (pickle, unsafe YAML), Node (node-serialize) and Ruby (Marshal). Covers format recognition signatures and gadget-chain reasoning, re-expressed as owned-fixture experiments using detection-only gadgets (URLDNS/owned-callback) and negative controls instead of RCE payloads.
- ▌ Rt Lorawan Sub Ghz · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of LoRaWAN and generic sub-GHz security: OTAA vs ABP provisioning and key management, join-procedure and nonce/replay handling, AppKey/session-key exposure, and unauthenticated/replayable generic sub-GHz (OOK/FSK) control links. Re-expressed as a scoped experiment in an isolated RF lab against owned devices with synthetic keys and a hardened-provisioning control instead of attacks on others' networks.
- ▌ Rt Network Attacks · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of Layer 2/3 network trust boundaries in an authorized lab: ARP spoofing, LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS poisoning, rogue DHCP/DNS and DNS rebinding, MITM/SSL-strip/HSTS-bypass, VLAN hopping (switch-spoofing, double-tagging) and 802.1X bypass. Re-expressed as scoped isolated-segment experiments with a defined victim fixture, control traffic and strong detection focus instead of live interception of third-party traffic.
- ▌ Rt Windows Privesc · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of Windows local privilege-escalation boundaries: weak service permissions and unquoted service paths, token-privilege abuse (SeImpersonate/SeBackup/SeDebug), AlwaysInstallElevated, DLL search-order and COM hijack, scheduled-task and autorun misconfigurations, and credential harvesting. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on an owned host that prove one SYSTEM-reaching vector against a planted fixture with hardened-config controls and servicing-status awareness instead of live escalation.
- ▌ Cloud Architecture Selection · annatchijovaDerive cloud infrastructure from a workload's actual constraints and required capabilities — never from "X is popular" or from whichever provider is already open in a tab. Use whenever choosing or re-evaluating a cloud provider, a managed service, or a deployment architecture; whenever comparing AWS/GCP/Alibaba/Azure/other for a workload; or whenever a choice is being justified by brand familiarity, a tutorial's default, or sunk cost instead of a stated requirement. Trigger on "which cloud should we use", "AWS vs GCP vs Alibaba", "what should we run this on", "pick a database service", "lock-in", "multi-cloud", "should we migrate", "we already have credits/infra on X". Selects capabilities before products, distinguishes hard constraints from trade-offs from incumbency cost, and never treats a price, SKU, region, or service limit as a fact with an unstated as-of date. Composes with decision-record-discipline for the artifact this skill produces.
- ▌ Frontend Performance Budgets · annatchijovaSet and enforce explicit performance budgets before writing frontend code, not measure after the fact — outcome metrics (LCP/INP/CLS) and the causal resource budgets that actually produce them (JS shipped, image weight, font loading, third-party scripts, critical request count, hydration cost). Use whenever adding a dependency, image, route, or client component, or when a page "feels slow" and the cause isn't obvious. Trigger on "bundle size", "Core Web Vitals", "hydration", "third-party script", "lazy load", "code split", "why is this slow", "LCP/INP/CLS", "render-blocking". Not a general "make it fast" skill — it is specifically about setting the budget before the fact and tracing outcome metrics to their causal resource.
- ▌ Rt Active Directory · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of Active Directory authority paths in an authorized engagement: BloodHound/PowerView attack-path enumeration, coercion+relay (PetitPotam, PrinterBug, ESC8), Kerberoasting/ASREProasting, ACL abuse (GenericAll/WriteDacl/WriteOwner), Kerberos delegation (unconstrained/constrained/RBCD), and ADCS templates (ESC1-ESC8). Re-expressed as a scoped lab experiment that proves one authority-path edge with a planted principal and negative controls, emphasizing detection.
- ▌ Rt Advanced Redteam · annatchijovaMethodology for running a full-scope, authorized red-team engagement: rules of engagement and scoping, objective-based operation planning across the kill chain, deconfliction and safety, evidence and chain-of-custody, purple-team collaboration, and reporting. Re-expressed as an engagement orchestration contract that sequences the domain rt- skills under explicit authorization, safety and detection-measurement constraints rather than an attack playbook.
- ▌ Rt Container Escape · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of container isolation boundaries: dangerous capabilities (CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, CAP_SYS_RAWIO), privileged mode, host mounts and socket exposure (Docker/containerd/CRI-O), and namespace/cgroup escapes. Re-expressed as scoped experiments inside an owned deliberately-misconfigured container that enumerate the isolation posture and prove one escape to a planted host marker with hardened-control negatives.
- ▌ Rt Lateral Movement · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of lateral-movement boundaries in an authorized engagement: credential reuse/pass-the-hash/pass-the-ticket, remote-execution services (SMB/WMI/WinRM/SSH/RDP), trust and segmentation traversal, and session/credential harvesting. Re-expressed as scoped experiments across owned/planted hosts that prove one hop with a benign marker, measure detection, and respect segmentation controls instead of free-roaming a live network.
- ▌ Frontend Component Boundaries · annatchijovaDecide where to cut a frontend component's boundary by cohesion, behavior, semantics, reuse, and shared reasons to change — not by a mechanical "one responsibility per component" rule that produces ceremonial fragmentation. Use whenever creating a new component, splitting or merging existing ones, or reviewing a PR that adds/removes component files. Trigger on "should this be its own component", "this component is doing too much", "prop drilling", "too many props", "extract a component", "where does this state live". Not a naming/style-guide skill — it's about the structural decision of where the boundary goes.
- ▌ Rt Edr Evasion · annatchijovaBlue/purple-team assessment of EDR/telemetry detection coverage: understanding evasion categories (unhooking, direct/indirect syscalls, AMSI/ETW tampering, process injection variants, LOLBins) so defenders can detect them, and measuring whether the EDR detects an authorized emulation in a lab. Re-expressed as a detection-coverage exercise scored PASS/WARN/FAIL with a sanctioned emulation profile, not an evasion how-to for defeating a third party's EDR.
- ▌ Rt File Upload · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of file-upload boundaries: extension/content-type/magic-byte validation bypass, polyglots, and upload-to-processing chains reaching RCE, LFI, XSS, SSRF, XXE or command injection via filename. Covers the extension-impact matrix and cloud/object-storage and image-pipeline paths, re-expressed as owned-fixture experiments with benign marker files and negative controls instead of live web-shell deployment.
- ▌ Rt K8S Attacks · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of Kubernetes cluster authority boundaries: service-account token discovery and RBAC abuse, kubelet/API-server reachability, privileged/hostPath/hostPID pod specs and escape, secrets access, and lateral movement across namespaces. Re-expressed as scoped experiments in an owned cluster using can-i permission mapping, a planted namespace/secret and RBAC-hardened negatives instead of live cluster takeover.
- ▌ Rt Mitigations · annatchijovaRed-team / research assessment of exploit-mitigation effectiveness: understanding and measuring KASLR, KPTI, SMAP/SMEP, PAN, stack canaries, NX/DEP, CFI/CET shadow stacks, MTE, LAM, memory sealing, KDP/HVCI and hardened usercopy, including the conditions under which each is bypassable. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on an owned target that score whether a mitigation holds against a specific primitive (PASS/WARN/FAIL) rather than delivering bypass weaponization.
- ▌ Rt Persistence · annatchijovaBlue/purple-team assessment of persistence-mechanism detectability and an authorized engagement's reversible foothold: autostart/registry/service/scheduled-task, account and credential persistence, and OS-specific footholds, understood so defenders can detect them. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on an owned host that install a benign, reversible marker-persistence and measure whether endpoint controls detect and allow removal, not a stealth-persistence playbook.
- ▌ Rt Tls Attacks · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of TLS/SSL configuration boundaries: protocol-downgrade and legacy-protocol exposure (POODLE, DROWN, FREAK, BEAST), compression oracles (CRIME/BREACH), Heartbleed, weak ciphers/keys, certificate validation and shared-key reuse. Re-expressed as scoped enumeration against owned endpoints with testssl.sh-class evidence and clear PASS/WARN/FAIL control scoring instead of live interception.
- ▌ Honest Technical Oratory · annatchijovaPresent a technical project out loud, under a real time limit, to an audience that may not share your vocabulary or technical background — without hyping unearned claims, without opening on caveats, and without inventing an answer live rather than saying "I don't know." Use whenever preparing or delivering a pitch, demo, talk, or hackathon presentation; whenever deciding what goes on a slide versus what stays for Q&A; or whenever a draft pitch either overclaims or buries its own value under limitations. Trigger on "pitch", "demo day", "hackathon presentation", "how should I present this", "prepare a talk", "what goes on the slides", "practice the pitch", "judges asked". Governs the live, time-boxed, spoken medium — readme-architecture governs the written document a reader consults on demand; daubert-defensible-writing's claim discipline still applies here, just under the constraint that there is no room to attach a footnote in real time.
- ▌ Known Defect Disposition · annatchijovaSeverity controls response urgency; it does not authorize neglect. A P0/P1 earns immediate review — but P2/P3/P4 remain known defects requiring disposition, not a silent backlog, and before anything is deferred its severity must be re-tested under interaction, composition, adversarial control, and deployment context, because initial severity usually scores the finding in isolation while the real exposure is reachable only in combination. Use whenever a finding, bug, or audit result is being triaged by priority tier, whenever the phrase "not blocking current work" is used to justify not fixing something, and whenever time runs out before every finding is addressed. Trigger on "P2/P3/P4", "low severity, deferring", "not blocking, ship it", "we'll get to it later", "known issue, out of scope for now", or any triage pass that assigns a tier without asking whether that tier survives composition. Composes with debt-closure-discipline (the three terminal states this skill's gate feeds into) and assume-breach-modelin
- ▌ Rt Cicd Secrets · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of CI/CD secret-exposure boundaries: pipeline environment-variable and log-masking exposure, Vault/secrets-manager token reuse, cloud-runner metadata and managed-identity reach, and OIDC-federation trust. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on an owned pipeline using a planted canary secret and detection measurement, naming exfiltration as an impact class to bound rather than shipping exfil recipes.
- ▌ Rt Supply Chain · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of software-supply-chain boundaries: dependency confusion, typosquatting, and build-system install-hook injection (npm scripts, Python setup.py/pyproject hooks, Makefile targets) across npm, PyPI and NuGet. Re-expressed as scoped experiments using DNS-canary-only PoC packages and build-config controls, with a staged risk ladder and mandatory cleanup instead of live malicious distribution.
- ▌ Rt Vuln Classes · annatchijovaReference taxonomy of memory-safety and low-level vulnerability classes for triage and hunting: out-of-bounds read/write, use-after-free, double-free, type confusion, integer overflow/underflow, uninitialized memory, NULL deref, format string, and race/TOCTOU. Each class with its invariant, root-cause signature, typical sink, exploitability tendency and detector. Re-expressed as a classification aid for owned-target triage, not a payload collection.
- ▌ Frontend Testing Strategy · annatchijovaAllocate frontend test effort by the Testing Trophy (static > unit > integration > E2E) and write tests that assert on what the user perceives, using stable selectors, instead of internal implementation. Use whenever writing or reviewing UI tests, deciding what layer to test something at, or diagnosing flaky tests. Trigger on "how should I test this component", "flaky test", "testing implementation details", "what should be an E2E test", "selector broke when I refactored", "test pyramid". Not about test framework setup or CI configuration.
- ▌ Rt Bluetooth Ble · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of Bluetooth Low Energy security: GATT service/characteristic enumeration and unauthenticated read/write, pairing/bonding mode and Just-Works vs authenticated pairing, link-layer sniffing, and replay/relay exposure. Re-expressed as a scoped experiment in a controlled RF setting against an owned BLE device that proves one boundary weakness with a negative control instead of attacks on others' devices.
- ▌ Rt C2 Frameworks · annatchijovaBlue/purple-team assessment of command-and-control detection: understanding C2 beaconing, channel choices (HTTPS, DNS, named-pipe, cloud-fronted) and traffic-shaping so a defender can detect them, and measuring whether network/EDR controls catch emulated, authorized C2 in a lab. Re-expressed as a detection-coverage exercise with an authorized emulation profile and PASS/WARN/FAIL scoring instead of C2 deployment instructions.
- ▌ Rt Fast Checking · annatchijovaA fast triage pass for security findings and leads before committing effort: a rapid checklist that classifies a candidate by source/transformation/boundary/sink/privilege, applies the benign-explanation razor, and routes it to the right domain skill or discards it. Re-expressed as a pre-flight gate that produces a CANDIDATE/REFUTED/NEEDS-TESTING disposition quickly, not a shortcut around real verification.
- ▌ Rt Linux Privesc · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of Linux local privilege-escalation boundaries: SUID/SGID and capabilities misuse, sudo misconfiguration and GTFOBins, writable paths in root-run scripts/cron, PATH and library hijacks, world-writable sensitive files, and kernel-exploit exposure. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on an owned host that prove one escalation vector against a planted root-run fixture with hardened-config controls instead of rooting a production system.
- ▌ Rt Open Redirect · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of open-redirect boundaries: redirect parameters, OAuth/post-auth return URLs and URL shorteners. Covers domain-spoofing, encoding, protocol-confusion, path-based and special-character bypasses as a validator-vs-navigator differential, re-expressed as owned-fixture experiments confirming the final navigation target with negative controls rather than live phishing or token theft.
- ▌ Rt Anti Forensics · annatchijovaBlue/purple-team assessment of forensic-integrity controls and anti-forensic detectability: whether timestomping, log tampering/clearing, artifact wiping and secure-deletion attempts are detected, attributable and recoverable. Re-expressed as a detection-and-recovery measurement on an owned lab host that emulates anti-forensic actions under authorization and scores whether logging/EDR/forensic controls hold, rather than teaching evidence destruction.
- ▌ Rt Crash Analysis · annatchijovaRed-team / research assessment of crash exploitability: triaging a fault into non-exploitable, denial-of-service, or controllable-primitive, using faulting-instruction and register/memory-control analysis, taint/backward slicing, and heuristics in the spirit of !exploitable / exploitable.py. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on owned crashing inputs that assign a defensible exploitability verdict with explicit uncertainty instead of asserting RCE from a stack trace.
- ▌ Rt Mobile · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of mobile-app (Android/iOS) boundaries: insecure local storage, weak IPC / exported components and deeplinks, TLS/cert-pinning and traffic interception, authentication and session handling, and client-side trust (rooting/jailbreak, tampering, secrets in the binary). Re-expressed as scoped experiments on an owned app and test device with planted test data and negative controls instead of attacks on other users' devices or accounts.
- ▌ Rt Toctou · annatchijovaRed-team / research assessment of time-of-check-to-time-of-use boundaries: filesystem races (symlink/hardlink swaps between access() and open()), kernel double-fetch of user pointers, temp-file predictability, and check-then-act windows in privileged programs. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on an owned SUID/privileged binary that prove the window with a planted swap and a widened-window control instead of live privilege theft.
- ▌ Rt Z Wave · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of Z-Wave security: S0 vs S2 security-class usage, the legacy S0 key-exchange weakness, insecure inclusion/pairing, and replay/injection on unencrypted or weakly-keyed command classes. Re-expressed as a scoped experiment in an isolated RF lab against an owned Z-Wave network with synthetic keys and an S2-hardened control instead of attacks on others' devices.
- ▌ Non Overwhelming UX · annatchijovaDesign and review user flows, forms, dashboards, and onboarding for cognitive, sensory, and choice load — grounded in WCAG 2.2 cognitive-accessibility criteria and W3C COGA guidance, and applicable to every user, not only neurodivergent ones, because reduced cognitive load helps anyone under stress, time pressure, or divided attention. Use whenever designing or reviewing a flow with multiple steps, simultaneous choices, interruptions, or time pressure. Trigger on "too many options", "overwhelming", "cognitive load", "sensory overload", "ADHD/autism-friendly", "decision fatigue", "the user got lost", "too many steps", stacked modals, autoplay, or countdown timers. Not a visual-design skill (color/typography aesthetics) — it governs interaction patterns, information architecture, and pacing.
- ▌ Readme Architecture · annatchijovaOrder a complex technical project's presentation (a README, a hackathon submission, a project landing doc) by the reader's cognitive dependency, not by architectural importance — problem before mechanism, observable behavior before internals, evidence before technical depth. Use whenever writing or reviewing a README, a hackathon README/pitch doc, or any human-facing document that introduces a technically deep system. Trigger on "write a README", "review this README", "hackathon submission", "this reads too abstract", "where should the architecture section go", or a document that opens with implementation detail before the reader knows what problem it solves. Not a simplification skill — depth is never deleted, only routed to where the reader who wants it can find it. Governs document structure and reading order; daubert-defensible-writing governs the individual sentence's epistemic honesty within it.
- ▌ Rt GRAPHQL · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of GraphQL boundaries: introspection and blind schema reconstruction, resolver authorization gaps (node-ID IDOR, nested and mutation auth), injection through resolver arguments (SQL/NoSQL/SSRF), batching/alias abuse, query-depth/complexity DoS, subscription and CSWSH, and verbose-error/field-suggestion oracles. Re-expressed as owned-schema experiments with bounded cost limits and negative controls instead of production brute force.
- ▌ Rt Netexec · annatchijovaRed-team reference for NetExec (nxc) as a bounded protocol-enumeration and validation tool within an authorized engagement: SMB/WinRM/LDAP/MSSQL/SSH/RDP/FTP/WMI auth, discovery, share and user enumeration, password-policy-aware spraying, and version-specific interpretation of Pwn3d! output. Re-expressed as a scoped tool contract with lockout-safe throttling, owned-fixture validation and detection awareness instead of mass credential attack.
- ▌ Resilient UI States · annatchijovaDesign every view that fetches or mutates data around its full state machine — loading, success, empty, and error are all mandatory, none optional — with error handling that fails at the right boundary and produces a specific, actionable message. Use whenever building or reviewing a component that does async data fetching, mutation, or submission. Trigger on "loading state", "error state", "empty state", "skeleton", "error boundary", "form validation", "what happens if this fails", "spinner forever", "blank screen", "something went wrong". Not about visual polish of these states — about which states are required to exist and where failure is caught.
- ▌ Rt Phishing · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of phishing susceptibility and email-security controls via an authorized, consented simulation: pretext and lure design, delivery and mail-security evasion measurement, credential-capture and payload-execution landing pages, and click/report metrics. Re-expressed as a sanctioned simulation against consented recipients with benign tracked artifacts and detection/awareness measurement instead of a real credential-harvesting campaign.
- ▌ Rt Wpa2 Psk · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of WPA2-Personal key strength and provisioning: 4-way-handshake and PMKID capture in an isolated RF lab, offline crackability of a synthetic PSK as a key-strength measurement, and provisioning-policy validation. Re-expressed as a scoped experiment against an owned AP with operator-supplied synthetic PSKs (one deliberately weak, one strong) that measures crackability without recovering production credentials.
- ▌ Rt Wpa3 Sae · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of WPA3-SAE (Dragonfly) implementation security: transition-mode downgrade to WPA2, Dragonblood-class side-channel (timing/cache) and group-downgrade weaknesses, and PMF enforcement. Re-expressed as a scoped implementation experiment in an isolated RF lab against an owned AP that measures downgrade and side-channel exposure with a hardened-config control instead of attacks on live networks.
- ▌ Rt API Abuse · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of API-abuse boundaries: business-logic bypass via API chaining, GraphQL batching, pagination/cursor exploitation and sort/filter injection, webhook hijacking/SSRF, API transaction races, JWT manipulation, API-key leakage patterns, undocumented-endpoint discovery and algorithmic-complexity exhaustion. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on owned accounts and keys with bounded request sets and negative controls instead of live exfiltration or mass abuse.
- ▌ Rt Evil Twin · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of rogue-AP / evil-twin susceptibility: whether clients auto-associate to a spoofed SSID (karma/known-beacon), whether captive-portal credential capture works, and whether server-cert validation and PMF/WPA3 defeat it. Re-expressed as a scoped experiment in an isolated RF lab with an owned client and synthetic credentials that measures client trust behavior, not interception of real users.
- ▌ Rt Reporting · annatchijovaWrite red-team / penetration-test findings that survive scrutiny: a reproducible finding structure (what, where, impact bound, evidence, falsifier), severity derived from demonstrated reachability and impact rather than scanner labels, remediation by root cause and detection guidance, and an executive summary that does not overclaim. Re-expressed as a reporting contract aligned with the assessment methodology's evidence labels.
- ▌ Rt Shellcode · annatchijovaRed-team / research assessment of shellcode and position-independent-payload constraints in CTF/authorized exploitation: encoding and bad-char handling, PIC/egg-hunting, size limits, syscall vs library calling, and detection surface. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on an owned target using a benign marker payload (print/callback) with detection awareness instead of weaponized shellcode for live use.
- ▌ Rt Waf Bypass · annatchijovaRed-team measurement of WAF/filter control effectiveness: does the WAF actually stop a given injection class, or can a semantically-equivalent payload transformation reach the application? Covers encoding, case/comment, protocol-level (HTTP/2, HTTP/3, chunked), SNI/domain-fronting, GraphQL and ML-WAF differential families as a filter-vs-application parser differential, re-expressed as owned-stack experiments that score the control PASS/WARN/FAIL with the defender in the loop.
- ▌ Rt Wifi Recon · annatchijovaRed-team reconnaissance of an authorized 802.11 environment: monitor-mode capture, AP and client enumeration, SSID/BSSID/channel/cipher mapping, hidden-SSID and probe-request analysis, and client-AP association mapping. Re-expressed as scoped passive observation of an owned/authorized WLAN in a controlled RF setting that builds a network map with negative controls, not interception of third-party traffic.
- ▌ Debt Closure Discipline · annatchijovaPriority determines resolution order, not permission to accumulate indefinitely — every known issue (bug, inconsistency, TODO, workaround, deferred P3) must terminate in resolved, explicitly rejected with a reason, or documented as an open unresolved constraint, never silently vanish by being written down. Use whenever triaging bugs/findings/technical debt, prioritizing a backlog, closing a task under time pressure, or reviewing whether a TODO/workaround/deferred item has actually been addressed. Trigger on "P0/P1/P2/P3", "backlog", "leave this for later", "known issue", "TODO", "technical debt", "we'll clean this up eventually", "out of scope for now". A module whose patch history has become hard to read triggers software-archaeology's replacement procedure, not a repeat of it here — see below.
- ▌ Rt AI Security · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of LLM / AI-application boundaries (OWASP LLM Top 10): direct and indirect prompt injection, jailbreak/guardrail robustness, sensitive-information disclosure, tool/agent abuse and excessive agency, insecure output handling, training-data and MLOps-platform exposure, and model extraction. Re-expressed as scoped experiments against an owned AI system with an inert objective and guardrail-robustness scoring instead of a jailbreak cookbook.
- ▌ Terminal First · annatchijovaMinimize the user's executive-function cost when operating computers, services, dashboards, forms, CLIs, or administrative workflows on their behalf — the user is technically fluent (terminal, Linux, SSH, APIs, scripts) but has high assistance needs (ADHD/low-spoon days, or anyone under cognitive load) and needs every step made explicit, never assumed. Use whenever a task could be done via CLI/API/script OR a web UI, whenever a GUI workflow has more than one step, or whenever the user says they're lost, can't find a button, need constant guidance, or asks "just tell me what to click." Trigger on "walk me through it", "I can't find the button", "do it for me", "step by step", or any multi-step dashboard/settings/wizard flow. Governs execution-surface choice and pacing — not a replacement for irreversible-action-gate (consent at a destructive/consequential boundary) or non-overwhelming-ux (general cognitive-load design), both of which this skill composes with rather than restates.
- ▌ Rt Iot · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of IoT/embedded device boundaries: firmware extraction and analysis, hardware debug interfaces (UART/JTAG/SWD/SPI flash), bootloader and secure-boot, protocol and update-integrity, and credential/key storage. Re-expressed as scoped experiments on an owned device with lab bench access that prove one boundary weakness against the device's own firmware with hardened-config controls instead of attacks on deployed third-party devices.
- ▌ Rt Rce · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of remote-code-execution boundaries: OS command injection, code injection/eval, file inclusion (LFI/RFI), SSTI, unsafe deserialization, unsafe YAML/config parsers, Expression Language injection, and upload-to-processing chains. Re-expressed as scoped reachability experiments proving the boundary with inert markers (unique OOB callbacks, benign fixtures) and negative controls instead of shells or production command execution.
- ▌ Rt Wps · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) exposure: online PIN brute-force and the Pixie-Dust offline attack against weak E-S1/E-S2 nonce generation, and whether WPS is enabled/locked. Re-expressed as a scoped experiment in an isolated RF lab against an owned AP that measures WPS exposure with a WPS-disabled control instead of attacks on live networks.
- ▌ Rt Xss · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of cross-site scripting boundaries: stored, reflected, DOM, blind and LLM-generated-content XSS across HTML, attribute, JavaScript and URL contexts. Covers context-aware probing, framework sink inventory (React, Vue, Svelte, Angular, Next, Solid, Astro), CSP/sanitizer bypass, mXSS and polyglots, re-expressed as scoped experiments against owned fixtures with marker payloads and negative controls instead of victim-facing exploitation.
- ▌ Rt Xxe · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of XML external-entity boundaries: classic file read, blind/out-of-band and error-based XXE, parameter entities, and XXE reached through SAML, SVG, DOCX/XLSX, EPUB, SOAP and admission-webhook/CI XML. Covers parser-misconfiguration analysis, SSRF-via-XXE and billion-laughs DoS as bounded impact classes, re-expressed as owned-fixture experiments with planted files, owned OOB collectors and negative controls.
- ▌ Working On Main · annatchijovaDefault to working directly on main on the user's own solo repositories — including with multiple agents active on main at once, kitchen-line style, each owning its piece and none assuming another's work is correct — instead of a feature-branch-per-agent/per-change workflow that is actually harder to track with ADHD (forgotten branches, forgotten merges, multi-agent branch pileups). Reserve a branch only for work that already fully works and is being extended in a genuinely experimental direction. Before any significant change, cut a backup/tag pushed to the remote as a named freeze point the user can return to without hunting through history. Use whenever the repo is solo-owned, whenever multiple agents or subagents are about to work on the same repo concurrently, or whenever the user says "work on main", "no branch for this", "tag it first", or pushes back on a proposed branch/PR workflow for their own project. Does NOT apply to shared/team-owned/OSS repos the user doesn't solely control, nor whenever a rep
- ▌ Rt Idor · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of insecure-direct-object-reference and broken-object-level-authorization boundaries: numeric/UUID/encoded object IDs, mass-assignment, reference leakage, GraphQL node IDs, gRPC/protobuf, cloud-object URLs and OpenTelemetry leaks. Re-expressed as scoped cross-account experiments using owned test accounts and a bounded ID set with negative controls instead of mass enumeration of real users.
- ▌ Rt Sqli · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of SQL, NoSQL, ORM and query-builder parameter boundaries. Covers error/boolean/time-based/UNION/out-of-band/second-order injection, engine-specific behavior (MySQL, MSSQL, PostgreSQL, Oracle), document and graph query injection, WAF/filter bypass as parser differential, ORM misuse, and bounded tool use (sqlmap, ghauri). Drives concrete offensive technique through synthetic fixtures, query traces and read-only test roles with negative controls and evidence labels instead of extraction-against-production.
- ▌ Rt Ssrf · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of server-side request forgery boundaries: URL-input, webhook, importer, PDF/screenshot and proxy vectors. Covers allowlist/denylist bypass (IP representation, DNS rebinding, redirects), cloud-metadata reachability (AWS IMDSv1/v2, GCP, Azure, ECS), and Kubernetes/service-mesh/container-socket exposure, re-expressed as scoped reachability experiments against owned collectors and fixtures with negative controls instead of live internal pivoting.
- ▌ Rt Ssti · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of server-side template injection boundaries across Jinja2, Twig, Freemarker, Velocity, Pebble, Thymeleaf, Smarty, Mako, ERB, Handlebars, EJS, Pug and Nunjucks. Covers arithmetic/polyglot detection, engine fingerprinting by decision tree and error signature, sandbox-escape and RCE chains as bounded impact classes, filter/WAF bypass and blind/OOB inference, re-expressed as owned-fixture experiments with inert markers and negative controls.
- ▌ Rt Wifi · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of 802.11 WLAN security posture in an authorized, controlled RF lab: an umbrella over recon, deauth/PMF, evil-twin, WPA2-PSK handshake/provisioning, WPA3-SAE, WPA-Enterprise/EAP and WPS, routing each to its specific skill. Re-expressed as a scoped WLAN posture assessment on owned networks with synthetic credentials and negative controls instead of attacks on third-party networks.
- ▌ Rt OAUTH · annatchijovaRed-team assessment of OAuth 2.0/2.1 and OIDC trust boundaries: authorization-code and implicit flows, redirect_uri validation, state/PKCE/nonce handling, token leakage and mix-up, and escalation to account takeover or lateral movement. Covers FAPI considerations, re-expressed as owned-client experiments that prove a flow weakness against a negative control instead of taking over real accounts.
- ▌ Rt Osint · annatchijovaRed-team reconnaissance of an authorized target's externally-observable footprint: domains/subdomains, DNS and certificate transparency, exposed services, public code/credential leaks, cloud assets, and organizational metadata. Re-expressed as scoped, passive-first, privacy-respecting collection that builds an attack-surface map from authorized sources with provenance, not intrusive scanning or personal-data harvesting of individuals.
- ▌ Writing Agents Md · annatchijovaWrite an AGENTS.md (or CLAUDE.md) that actually changes agent behavior — falsifiable, enforced invariants grounded in this repo's real incidents, not a generic checklist any repo could have. Use whenever creating or reviewing a repo's agent-facing contract file, whenever an agent keeps making the same mistake a doc was supposed to prevent, or whenever a repo has none and one is being requested. Trigger on "write an AGENTS.md", "add agent instructions", "this repo needs a CLAUDE.md", "the agent keeps doing X, document it", or a PR that adds/edits AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md with no invariant, no mechanism, and no reason attached. Not a style guide for prose — it governs what the file's content actually has to be to survive contact with an agent that hasn't read it in six weeks.
- ▌ Language Selection · annatchijova bundleSelect programming languages, DSLs, query languages, policy languages, proof systems, or runtimes from the concrete forces of the problem rather than from model familiarity or the human's prior exposure. Use whenever new code must be written and the language is not already fixed: scripts, tools, services, parsers, deterministic cores, security components, smart contracts, queries, data pipelines, scientific code, infrastructure, embedded software, kernels, CLIs, prototypes, or agent-generated implementations. Also use when comparing languages, reconsidering an existing component's language, or deciding whether a system should be polyglot. In an agentic workflow the model — not the human — is responsible for surfacing the right candidates, including ones the human has never used; the human's job is to own the trade-off, not to have memorized the option space.
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