API Abuse Boundary Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill. Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the domain experiments below. This revision restores the upstream's API-abuse craft as scoped experiments: it names the chaining, batching, webhook, JWT and discovery families, confirming each on owned accounts/keys with bounded request sets rather than exfiltrating real data.
Scope and prerequisites
APIs expose logic and data directly; abuse combines legitimate calls in illegitimate orders or volumes. Use owned accounts and owned API keys; cap batch/pagination/complexity probes so a test does not become mass exfiltration or DoS.
Declare target, API style (REST/GraphQL/gRPC), attempt budget, stop condition. Source/spec-only authorization yields a hypothesis marked NOT TESTED.
Attack surface and classes
- Logic chaining — skip payment, manipulate price/state/quantity (see
workflow-abuse-assessment). - GraphQL — introspection, depth/alias amplification, batched brute force (see
rt-graphql). - Pagination — oversized page size, cursor forging to reach arbitrary records, sort/filter injection.
- Webhooks — register an owned-server URL (SSRF), list to discover internal URLs.
- Transaction races — parallel calls (see
rt-race-condition). - JWT — alg confusion / none / kid / jku (see
token-trust-assessment). - Key leakage — repo search, client-bundle extraction, error-message leakage.
- Discovery — hidden params (Arjun), archive mining (ParamSpider), JS-bundle routes, predictable naming.
- Complexity — algorithmic-exhaustion endpoints.
Mechanism and observation
Trace a sequence of calls to the invariant or control it bypasses.
Firstness: Record the state/data reached by the crafted sequence (an order confirmed unpaid; records returned past the owner boundary via a forged cursor; a webhook reaching your collector). Secondness: State the intended control (payment gating, per-owner scoping, rate/complexity limits) and the deviation. Thirdness: Infer the defect class only after a controlled sequence confirms it on owned fixtures.
Abduction and refutation
Mechanism hypothesis: An endpoint trusts client-supplied order/values/cursors/tokens without server-side re-validation, or lacks per-operation limits, so a crafted sequence reaches data/state/volume it should not.
Competing benign explanation: The server re-validates each step and recomputes values; cursors are signed/scoped; rate limits count operations (defeating batching); the JWT is verified with the right algorithm and key; the "leaked key" is a public/test key.
Deduction and controls
The legitimate call sequence behaves correctly (positive control). A confirmed finding reaches a forbidden state/record/volume via the crafted sequence where the control refuses. Predeclare the confirming artifact. Server-side re-validation / signed cursors / operation-count limits / correct JWT verification are PASS controls.
Induction: bounded laboratory procedure
Owned accounts and keys; bounded sets.
- Baseline. Run the legitimate flow; capture controls (auth, rate limits, cursor format).
- Chaining. Reorder/skip calls; submit client values the server should recompute.
- Pagination/cursor. Forge/modify a cursor and large page size against owned data; observe scope and volume (bounded).
- Webhook. Register an owned-collector URL; confirm server-side fetch and whether internal URLs are listable.
- JWT/discovery/key. Route JWT to
token-trust-assessment; test discovery on owned endpoints; confirm any key is owned/non-production before use. - Complexity (bounded). Measure cost growth on a suspected endpoint; stop before impact.
- Control. Confirm the legitimate flow and limits hold.
Record results including refutations. Keep finding and control status separate.
Domain-specific failure modes
A reordered call the server re-validates is a refutation. A forged cursor that returns only owned records is not a scope break. Rate limits on HTTP requests are bypassed by batching, not more requests. A "leaked" key may be a public client key with no privilege. Complexity probes can DoS — keep them bounded.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the call sequence, the forbidden state/data/volume reached, the account/key context, and the control refusal. Use owned accounts/keys; keep real data out of portable reports. Attach minimal replay, expected/observed, rival explanation, falsifier, uncovered endpoints.
Versions and tool limitations
Pin the API framework and gateway versions. Discovery/complexity tools can exfiltrate or DoS; keep bounded and owned. No endpoint behavior was verified by this content; confirm the live API first.
Remediation and detection
Re-validate every step and recompute values server-side, sign and scope cursors, enforce per-operation and complexity limits, validate webhook URLs (see rt-ssrf), verify JWTs with pinned alg/key, and rotate leaked keys. Add regressions for each bypass. Detect out-of-order sequences, cursor tampering, batched operations, and webhook registrations to internal/collector hosts.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | A crafted sequence reaches a forbidden state/record/volume on owned fixtures where the control refuses: CONFIRMED; FAIL. |
| Benign refutation | Server-side re-validation / signed cursors / operation limits reject the sequence: REFUTED; PASS for the control. |
| Insufficient evidence | A reordered call with no confirmed forbidden effect: CANDIDATE; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/api/offensive-api-abuse/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's chaining, pagination, webhook-SSRF, JWT, key-leakage and discovery craft, re-expressed as owned-account/owned-key experiments with bounded request sets and negative controls, replacing live exfiltration and mass abuse with bounded proof. Composes with workflow-abuse-assessment, rt-graphql, rt-race-condition, token-trust-assessment, rt-ssrf.