Bluetooth Low Energy Boundary Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill. Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the experiment below. This revision restores the BLE craft as a scoped experiment against an owned BLE device in a controlled RF setting: it enumerates GATT, tests pairing strength and unauthenticated access, and proves one weakness with a control, rather than attacking others' devices.
Scope and prerequisites
BLE security spans GATT access control, pairing/bonding strength, and link-layer confidentiality. Work on an owned BLE device (and its owned companion app). Prove a weakness against the owned device; do not interact with others' BLE devices. Respect spectrum law.
Declare the owned device, the RF environment, attempt budget, stop condition. Config-only review yields a hypothesis marked NOT TESTED.
Attack surface and classes
- GATT access control — services/characteristics readable/writable without authentication; sensitive characteristics exposed.
- Pairing/bonding — Just-Works (no MITM protection) vs Passkey/Numeric-Comparison/OOB; LE Secure Connections vs legacy.
- Link-layer — sniffing (where unencrypted), connection-parameter abuse.
- Replay/relay — replaying captured commands; relay/distance attacks on proximity auth.
Mechanism and observation
Enumerate GATT and test the access/pairing controls against the owned device.
Firstness: Record which characteristics are readable/writable without auth, the pairing method negotiated, and whether a captured command replays. Secondness: State the expected protection (authenticated pairing, access-controlled characteristics, LE Secure Connections) and the deviation. Thirdness: Infer a weakness only after a controlled read/write/replay confirms it on the owned device.
Abduction and refutation
Hypothesis: The device exposes sensitive GATT without authentication, uses Just-Works pairing, or accepts replayed commands.
Competing benign explanation: Sensitive characteristics require authenticated/encrypted access; pairing uses Passkey/Numeric-Comparison with LE Secure Connections; commands carry anti-replay (nonce/counter); the device is not actually the target (another owned device).
Deduction and controls
An unauthenticated client cannot read/write sensitive characteristics or replay commands on a hardened device (positive control). A confirmed finding reads/writes a sensitive characteristic without auth, or replays a command, on the owned device where authenticated access/anti-replay would prevent it. Predeclare the characteristic/command. Authenticated pairing / access control / anti-replay are PASS controls.
Induction: bounded procedure
Controlled RF; owned device.
- Enumerate. Scan and connect (bluetoothctl/gatttool/nRF tools); map services and characteristics and their permissions.
- Unauthenticated access. Attempt to read/write sensitive characteristics without pairing.
- Pairing. Observe the negotiated pairing method; test whether Just-Works is accepted.
- Replay. Capture an owned command and replay it; check for anti-replay.
- Control. Confirm that authenticated pairing / access control / anti-replay refuse the above.
Record results including refutations. Keep finding and control status separate. Owned device only.
Craft notes (leads)
GATT characteristics often lack per-characteristic authentication, exposing control/sensitive data to any connected client — the most common BLE finding. Just-Works pairing provides no MITM protection. Legacy pairing (pre-4.2) is weak; LE Secure Connections (ECDH) is the control. Many IoT BLE commands lack anti-replay. Sniffing needs the device to transmit unencrypted (or a captured pairing).
Domain-specific failure modes
A characteristic that requires authenticated/encrypted access is not an unauthenticated finding. Just-Works may be acceptable for non-sensitive devices — scope the impact. Anti-replay (counter/nonce) defeats replay. Interacting with others' BLE devices is out of scope. Sniffing encrypted LE SC traffic yields nothing.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the GATT map, the unauthenticated read/write (if any), the pairing method, the replay result, and the control outcome. Keep to the owned device. Attach expected/observed, rival explanation, falsifier, characteristics/commands not tested.
Versions and tool limitations
Pin the BLE version (4.x/5.x), pairing mode, and the sniffer/adapter. Capabilities are version/hardware-specific. No device behavior was verified by this content; test the owned device to confirm.
Remediation and detection
Require authenticated, encrypted access for sensitive characteristics, use LE Secure Connections with Passkey/Numeric-Comparison (avoid Just-Works for sensitive functions), add anti-replay (counter/nonce) to commands, and minimize exposed characteristics. Add a regression that unauthenticated access and replay are refused.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | A sensitive characteristic is read/written without auth, or a command replays, on the owned device where hardening refuses: CONFIRMED; FAIL. |
| Benign refutation | Authenticated access / LE SC pairing / anti-replay refuses it: REFUTED; PASS for the control. |
| Insufficient evidence | A readable characteristic of unclear sensitivity, or Just-Works on a non-sensitive device: CANDIDATE; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/wireless/offensive-bluetooth-ble/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's GATT/pairing/sniffing/replay craft as a scoped experiment against an owned BLE device with authenticated-access and anti-replay controls, replacing attacks on others' devices with bounded boundary proof. Composes with rt-bluetooth-classic, rt-iot, rt-crypto-attacks.