Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) Boundary Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill. Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the experiment below. This revision restores the Bluetooth-Classic craft as a scoped experiment against an owned BR/EDR device: it enumerates services, tests pairing/authentication strength, and verifies patch status for known protocol flaws, with a hardened control, rather than attacking others' devices.
Scope and prerequisites
BR/EDR security spans discovery, pairing/authentication, exposed profiles, and known CVE-class flaws (KNOB key-entropy downgrade, BIAS impersonation). Work on an owned device in a controlled RF setting; interact only with the owned device; respect spectrum law.
Declare the owned device, the RF environment, attempt budget, stop condition. Config-only review yields a hypothesis marked NOT TESTED.
Attack surface and classes
- Discovery — SDP service enumeration, device class, discoverability.
- Pairing/auth — legacy pairing vs Secure Simple Pairing/Secure Connections; Just-Works; PIN strength.
- Profile exposure — RFCOMM/serial, OBEX push/ftp, HFP/HSP, and app-specific services reachable without auth.
- Protocol flaws — KNOB (negotiated key entropy downgrade), BIAS (authentication impersonation) — patch-status questions.
Mechanism and observation
Enumerate services and test pairing/auth and patch status against the owned device.
Firstness: Record discoverable services, the pairing/auth negotiated (and the key entropy), unauthenticated profile access, and KNOB/BIAS test results. Secondness: State the expected protection (Secure Connections, adequate key entropy, authenticated profiles, patched stack) and the deviation. Thirdness: Infer a weakness only after a controlled test confirms it on the owned device.
Abduction and refutation
Hypothesis: The device uses weak pairing/low key entropy, exposes a profile without authentication, or is unpatched for KNOB/BIAS.
Competing benign explanation: Secure Connections with adequate key entropy is enforced (KNOB mitigated); profiles require authentication; the stack is patched (BIAS mitigated); the device is non-discoverable/requires user confirmation; another owned device was observed.
Deduction and controls
A hardened device enforces strong pairing/auth and patched behavior (positive control). A confirmed finding downgrades key entropy, accesses a profile without auth, or reproduces KNOB/BIAS on the owned device where a hardened/patched config does not. Predeclare the signal. Secure Connections / min-key-entropy / authenticated profiles / patched stack are PASS controls.
Induction: bounded procedure
Controlled RF; owned device.
- Discover & enumerate. SDP scan; map services/profiles and discoverability.
- Pairing/auth. Observe the pairing method and negotiated key entropy; test legacy/Just-Works acceptance.
- Profile access. Attempt unauthenticated access to exposed profiles (RFCOMM/OBEX) on the owned device.
- KNOB/BIAS. Use the published tests to check key-entropy downgrade and impersonation on the owned device.
- Control. Confirm Secure Connections / min-entropy / authenticated profiles / patched stack refuse the above.
Record results including refutations. Keep finding and control status separate. Owned device only.
Craft notes (leads)
KNOB downgrades the negotiated encryption-key entropy (to as low as 1 byte on unpatched stacks); the fix is a minimum-entropy floor. BIAS impersonates a previously-paired device on stacks that mishandle authentication; the fix is a patched stack + Secure Connections. OBEX push and open RFCOMM serial are classic unauthenticated-profile findings. Legacy pairing and short PINs are weak.
Domain-specific failure modes
A patched stack with Secure Connections and an entropy floor defeats KNOB/BIAS — the primary refutations. An authenticated profile is not an unauthenticated finding. A non-discoverable device that requires user confirmation raises the bar. Interacting with others' devices is out of scope.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the service map, the pairing/auth and key entropy, unauthenticated profile access (if any), the KNOB/BIAS results, and the hardened-config control. Keep to the owned device. Attach expected/observed, rival explanation (patched/authenticated), falsifier, cases not tested.
Versions and tool limitations
Pin the Bluetooth stack/version and controller — KNOB/BIAS exposure is patch-status-dependent. No device behavior was verified by this content; test the owned device to confirm.
Remediation and detection
Enforce Secure Connections with a minimum key-entropy floor, patch the stack (BIAS), require authentication for sensitive profiles, disable unused profiles/discoverability, and use strong pairing. Add a regression that KNOB/BIAS tests report not-vulnerable and profiles require auth.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | Key-entropy downgrade / unauthenticated profile access / KNOB or BIAS reproduces on the owned device where hardening/patching does not: CONFIRMED; FAIL. |
| Benign refutation | Secure Connections / entropy floor / authenticated profiles / patched stack refuses it: REFUTED; PASS for the control. |
| Insufficient evidence | An exposed profile of unclear sensitivity or a version-only KNOB/BIAS inference: CANDIDATE/NOT TESTED; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/wireless/offensive-bluetooth-classic/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's SDP/pairing/profile/KNOB/BIAS craft as a scoped experiment against an owned device with hardened/patched controls, replacing attacks on others' devices with bounded boundary and patch-status proof. Composes with rt-bluetooth-ble, rt-iot.