Cryptographic-Implementation Boundary Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill.
Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the domain experiments below.
This revision restores the upstream's crypto-attack craft as scoped experiments against an owned oracle with synthetic keys: it names the attack classes and their discriminators, proving a weakness on a disposable fixture rather than decrypting production data. Compose with crypto-misuse-reasoning.
Scope and prerequisites
These attacks exploit implementation choices (mode, padding, nonce, key generation, timing), not broken primitives. Use an owned endpoint/oracle with synthetic keys and planted ciphertexts. Recover only planted plaintext; never target production secrets.
Declare target, construction, attempt budget, stop condition. Source-only authorization yields a hypothesis marked NOT TESTED.
Attack surface and classes
- CBC padding oracle — distinguishable padding-error responses → decrypt/forge.
- ECB — equal, block-aligned plaintext blocks under the same key encrypt to equal ciphertext blocks. This reveals structure; it does not by itself establish an exploitable cut-and-paste impact.
- Hash length extension —
H(secret||msg)MACs with a Merkle-Damgard hash → append. - RSA — small
e(Hastad broadcast), shared prime across keys (common-factor GCD), partial-key-exposure (Coppersmith), textbook RSA. - Weak PRNG — predictable tokens (e.g. Mersenne-Twister state recovery from 624 outputs).
- AES-GCM nonce reuse — repeated nonce under the same key violates GCM's IV-uniqueness requirement, compromises confidentiality, and can enable authentication-key recovery or forgery under applicable message/tag conditions. Repetition alone confirms nonce misuse, not successful key recovery or forgery.
- Timing side channels — comparison/HMAC timing leaking position.
Mechanism and observation
Trace a ciphertext/token through the construction and the observable the implementation leaks. Record library/build, construction, a non-secret key-generation identifier, nonce allocator and authentication order. Distinguish independent cryptographic operations from duplicate log records with operation IDs; never export keys or connect this fixture to production secrets.
Firstness: Record the distinguishing signal (padding-error vs valid response; repeated ciphertext blocks; timing delta; recovered planted plaintext). Secondness: State the secure baseline (constant-time, authenticated encryption, unique nonce, CSPRNG) and the deviation. Thirdness: Infer the class only after the oracle yields a controlled result on a fixture.
Abduction and refutation
Mechanism hypothesis: The implementation leaks a distinguishable response (padding, timing) or reuses state (nonce, PRNG, prime) that collapses the security of a sound primitive.
Competing benign explanation: Errors are uniform and constant-time (no oracle); the mode is authenticated (AEAD) so tampering is rejected; nonces are unique; the RNG is a CSPRNG; the timing difference is noise, not key-dependent.
Deduction and controls
A valid ciphertext/token behaves normally (positive control). A confirmed fixture result must name the proposition established: e.g. the fixture exposes a distinguishable oracle, recovers a planted plaintext, permits a forgery, or reuses an IV under one key. These are separate outcomes; do not infer recovery or forgery from nonce repetition alone. Predeclare the artifact or statistical decision rule. Record finding status separately from control status.
Induction: bounded laboratory procedure
Owned oracle; synthetic keys; planted ciphertexts.
- Baseline. Submit a valid ciphertext/token; capture the normal response and timing distribution.
- Oracle probe. CBC: flip the last byte, check for a distinguishable padding error. ECB: send repeated identical blocks, check for repeated output blocks.
- Decrypt/forge a planted value (padbuster-class) against the oracle; stop at the planted plaintext.
- Length extension. Confirm the hash is Merkle-Damgard; try key lengths (e.g. 8-32) with hashpumpy to forge an extended planted MAC.
- RSA/PRNG/GCM. Extract
n,e; evaluate each RSA attack only after checking its prerequisites (for example, Håstad broadcast requires compatible unpadded instances of the same message for enough recipients with pairwise-coprime moduli). Check shared factors only across scoped keys; use Coppersmith only with a stated partial-information model. For GCM, group records by key identity and test IV uniqueness; report nonce misuse separately from any demonstrated plaintext recovery or forgery. Treat a CSPRNG as a design claim to verify in implementation and use, not as proof by label. - Timing. Predeclare the secret-dependent contrast, randomized/interleaved sampling plan, sample size or stopping rule, noise controls, effect estimate and uncertainty. Percentiles may describe distributions but do not alone establish secret-dependent leakage.
- Control. Confirm a hardened construction does not leak.
Record results including refutations. Keep finding and control status separate.
Craft notes (leads)
The upstream attack catalog includes CBC padding-oracle, hash length-extension, RSA, weak-PRNG and GCM-nonce classes. Treat tools as leads and only use synthetic fixture data. GCM nonce reuse under one key is a serious confidentiality/authenticity failure; recovery of the GHASH subkey or a successful forgery depends on available messages, lengths and tag conditions and must be demonstrated separately. Shared-prime GCD requires an appropriately scoped corpus. Timing claims need a predeclared statistical design.
Domain-specific failure modes
A single timing sample is noise — require statistics. Uniform error text alone does not rule out an oracle: compare externally observable behavior, including timing, status, response size, connection handling and downstream effects. A genuinely indistinguishable externally observable behavior can remove this oracle. AEAD verification before plaintext is trusted prevents unauthenticated modification, assuming correct use and key/nonce discipline. A correctly implemented and used CSPRNG is designed to resist relevant state-recovery attacks; the label alone is not evidence. Recover only planted values; recovering production secrets is out of scope. "The library could be misused" is not a finding without a demonstrated oracle.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the construction, the oracle/leak, the recovered/forged planted value (or timing statistics), and the control result. Keep real keys/plaintext out of portable reports. Attach minimal replay, expected/observed, rival explanation, falsifier, untested constructions.
Versions and tool limitations
Pin the crypto library and mode/version. Tools perform real recovery; use synthetic keys and planted data. No construction behavior was verified by this content; confirm the live construction first.
Remediation and detection
Use authenticated encryption with correct nonce management, authenticate before releasing or acting on plaintext, use HMAC rather than a secret-prefix hash construction, and use a correctly implemented CSPRNG. For RSA encryption, use a vetted scheme such as OAEP with appropriate key-generation parameters; a large public exponent alone is not a general remedy for RSA misuse. Add regressions for the specific oracle and lifecycle invariants. Detect externally distinguishable invalid-input behavior and same-key nonce reuse without logging secrets.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | State exactly what the experiment confirmed on which system: fixture-oracle behavior, planted plaintext recovery, forgery, or same-key IV reuse. Do not promote one result to another: CONFIRMED for that scoped proposition; report control status separately. |
| Benign refutation | Uniform errors / AEAD / unique nonce / CSPRNG prevents the attack: REFUTED; PASS for the control. |
| Insufficient evidence | A timing hint without statistical separation: CANDIDATE; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/crypto/offensive-crypto-attacks/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's padding-oracle, ECB, length-extension, RSA, PRNG, GCM-nonce and timing craft, re-expressed as owned-oracle experiments with synthetic keys and hardened controls, replacing production decryption with bounded fixture recovery. Composes with crypto-misuse-reasoning, rt-tls-attacks.