Management-Frame Protection (Deauth/Disassoc) Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill. Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the experiment below. This revision restores the upstream's deauth craft as a scoped PMF-effectiveness experiment in an isolated RF lab: it measures whether management frames are protected (802.11w), against an owned AP/client, with DoS scope handled explicitly, rather than disrupting live networks.
Scope and prerequisites
Deauth/disassoc is fundamentally a DoS/availability technique — if the engagement excludes DoS, the deliverable is the PMF posture, not an executed flood. Run only in an isolated/shielded RF lab against an owned AP and client; never transmit deauth against third-party networks (illegal and disruptive). Respect spectrum law.
Declare the owned AP/client, the RF isolation, the DoS scope, attempt budget, stop condition. Config-only review yields a hypothesis marked NOT TESTED.
Mechanism and observation
Certain robust management frames can be spoofed when unprotected. Negotiated 802.11w PMF protects specified robust management frames within the applicable secured association; do not generalize that protection to every management frame or pre-association state.
Firstness: Record association state, negotiated PMF policy and whether the bounded spoofed robust deauth disconnected the owned client or was ignored. Secondness: Compare only frames covered by the negotiated PMF protection. Thirdness: Infer missing protection for that frame/state only after the controlled result; do not generalize to all management traffic.
Abduction and refutation
Hypothesis: The AP/client accept spoofed deauth/disassoc, allowing targeted disconnection (and a precursor to evil-twin/handshake capture).
Competing benign explanation: PMF/802.11w is enabled and the spoofed frame is ignored; the disconnect was unrelated RF interference; the client roamed; management-frame protection is mandatory on this AP.
Deduction and controls
With PMF disabled, the lab may accept the tested spoofed deauth; with PMF negotiated and applicable to that association/frame, the protected frame should be rejected. A confirmed finding is limited to that frame type, association state and implementation. Predeclare the disconnect signal and report PMF control status separately.
Induction: bounded procedure
Isolated RF lab; owned AP/client.
- Baseline. Associate the owned client; confirm a stable connection and the AP's PMF setting.
- PMF-off case. With PMF disabled on the lab AP, send a bounded spoofed deauth to the owned client; observe disconnection. If DoS is out of scope, confirm the PMF setting from configuration instead of flooding.
- PMF-on control. Enable PMF/802.11w; repeat; confirm the client is not disconnected.
- Stop. Demonstrate the single targeted disconnect (or the config posture); do not flood or sustain.
Record results including refutations. Keep the finding (frames unprotected) separate from the control (PMF). Respect DoS scope throughout.
Craft notes (leads)
aireplay-ng/mdk4 send deauth; the finding is really "PMF not enforced". Deauth is a precursor: it forces a reconnect to capture a WPA2 handshake (rt-wpa2-psk) or to push a client to an evil twin (rt-evil-twin). WPA3 mandates PMF; WPA2 can enable it as required/optional. A targeted single deauth proves the posture without a sustained DoS.
Domain-specific failure modes
PMF enabled defeats the attack — a PASS, and the primary refutation. A disconnect from interference/roaming is not a deauth finding. Flooding a live network is illegal and out of scope. If DoS is excluded, report the PMF posture from configuration rather than executing disruption.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the PMF posture, the targeted-disconnect result (PMF-off lab) vs the PMF-on control, and the DoS-scope handling. Keep to the isolated lab. Attach expected/observed, rival explanation (interference/roaming), falsifier, and whether a flood was deliberately not run.
Versions and tool limitations
Pin AP/client firmware and PMF capability — 802.11w support varies. No network behavior was verified by this content; test the owned lab to confirm.
Remediation and detection
Enforce PMF/802.11w (required), prefer WPA3, and deploy a WIDS to detect deauth floods and spoofed management frames. Add a regression that a spoofed deauth is ignored. Alert on management-frame anomalies and mass disconnects.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | A spoofed deauth disconnects the owned client (PMF-off lab) where PMF-on ignores it: CONFIRMED management-frames-unprotected; FAIL (availability impact scoped). |
| Benign refutation | PMF/802.11w ignores the frame: REFUTED; PASS for the control. |
| Insufficient evidence | A disconnect attributable to interference/roaming, or DoS out of scope with only config posture: CANDIDATE/NOT TESTED; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/wireless/offensive-deauth-disassoc/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's deauth craft as a scoped PMF-effectiveness experiment in an isolated lab with explicit DoS-scope handling, replacing live-network disruption with bounded posture proof. Composes with rt-wpa2-psk, rt-evil-twin, rt-wifi.