Insecure Deserialization Boundary Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill. Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the domain experiments below. This revision restores the upstream's deserialization craft as scoped experiments: it names the formats, sinks and gadget families, and proves reachability with detection-only gadgets (a DNS lookup to an owned collector) rather than shipping RCE gadget chains against a target.
Scope and prerequisites
Find every sink that deserializes untrusted bytes: cookies, POST bodies, hidden fields, caches (Redis/Memcached), queues (Celery/RabbitMQ), session stores, ViewState, JMX/RMI. Use an owned instance with the same library versions; confirm reachability with a safe gadget that only makes an owned DNS/HTTP callback (e.g. URLDNS-style), never an RCE chain.
Declare target, language/library and exact versions (gadget availability is version- and classpath-bound), attempt budget, stop condition. Source-only authorization yields a hypothesis marked NOT TESTED. RCE via gadget chain is an impact class to demonstrate on an owned lab, bounded, not run live.
Attack surface and recognition signatures
Recognize the format first (leads):
- Java
ObjectInputStream: hexac ed 00 05, Base64rO0AB. XMLDecoder:<java>/<object class=. - PHP serialize:
O:<len>:"Class":/a:<count>:{, often Base64 in cookies. phar: polyglot disguised as an image. - .NET BinaryFormatter: Base64
AAEAAAD/////; Json.NET:"$type":; ViewState blobs. - Python pickle: opcodes
\x80\x04\x95(v4+) /(dp0; found in Redis, Celery, ML pipelines. - Ruby Marshal:
\x04\x08. Jackson polymorphic:["class.name", {.
Mechanism and observation
Trace untrusted bytes to the deserializer and its type controls (filters, allowlists, enableDefaultTyping).
Firstness: Record whether a detection gadget triggered (owned DNS/HTTP callback) and the deserializer's errors. Secondness: State the secure baseline (type-restricted or signed/opaque data only) and the deviation. Thirdness: Infer the defect class only after a controlled gadget resolves.
Abduction and refutation
Mechanism hypothesis: The sink reconstructs attacker-chosen types from untrusted bytes with no type restriction, so a gadget present on the classpath executes during deserialization.
Competing benign explanation: The blob is HMAC-signed and tampering is rejected before deserialization; an ObjectInputFilter/allowlist blocks the type; the required gadget is not on the classpath; the data is opaque/encrypted; the value is parsed by a safe format, not deserialized.
Deduction and controls
A valid signed/typed object deserializes (positive control); an attacker-typed object must be rejected if controls hold. A confirmed finding fires the owned callback via a detection gadget where the control object does not. Predeclare the callback. A signature check or type filter rejecting the object is a PASS control.
Induction: bounded laboratory procedure
Owned instance, version-matched; detection-only gadgets.
- Baseline. Capture a legitimate serialized object; confirm the sink deserializes it and note any signature/MAC.
- Signature check. Flip a byte; if it is rejected intact, a MAC likely gates the sink — record as a control.
- Detection gadget (owned). Submit a gadget that only performs a DNS/HTTP lookup to your collector (Java URLDNS, equivalent benign chains elsewhere). A callback proves the bytes were deserialized into attacker-chosen behavior — without RCE.
- Classpath/type mapping. From source or errors, enumerate available gadget libraries (Commons-Collections, Spring, Hibernate, BeanUtils; phpggc chains; ysoserial.net families) — knowledge, not execution.
- Impact bound (owned lab). If demonstrating RCE reachability is in scope, do it once on the owned lab with a benign marker, then stop.
- Control. Confirm the signed/typed control path rejects the attacker object.
Record results including refutations. Keep finding and control status separate.
Gadget-family craft (leads; impact classes to bound)
- Java — ysoserial families (CommonsCollections 1-7 by JDK/version, Spring, Hibernate, BeanUtils), JRMPClient/JNDI redirect, Jackson polymorphic + JNDI, XMLDecoder. Use URLDNS for safe confirmation first.
- PHP — phpggc (Laravel, Symfony, Monolog, Guzzle, WordPress), phar:// triggering via file-ops functions.
- .NET — ysoserial.net (TypeConfuseDelegate, WindowsIdentity, TextFormattingRunProperties, PSObject), ViewState when machine key is disclosed, Json.NET
TypeNameHandling. - Python — pickle
__reduce__, unsafeyaml.load. - Node —
node-serializeIIFE,funcster. Ruby — Marshal gadget chains.
Domain-specific failure modes
A signed blob makes the sink unexploitable without the key — report that as a control, not a bypass. Gadget availability is classpath- and version-specific; absence of a chain is not absence of the flaw (and vice versa). A callback proves deserialization reachability; RCE still depends on an available gadget. Modern filters (ObjectInputFilter, TypeNameHandling=None) change the verdict — verify them.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the sink, the format signature, the detection-gadget callback record, the library/versions and classpath evidence, and any signature/type control. Keep host output out of portable reports. Attach minimal replay, expected/observed, rival explanation, falsifier, uncovered sinks.
Versions and tool limitations
Pin library and runtime versions and the classpath — gadget chains are version-bound. ysoserial/phpggc/ysoserial.net default to RCE payloads; use detection-only gadgets for confirmation and bound any RCE demo to an owned lab. No chain was verified by this content; confirm versions first.
Remediation and detection
Do not deserialize untrusted data; prefer data-only formats (JSON without polymorphic typing); if unavoidable, HMAC-sign blobs, apply strict type allowlists (ObjectInputFilter, TypeNameHandling=None), and isolate the process. Add a regression asserting the detection gadget is rejected. Detect unexpected class loads and outbound callbacks during deserialization correlated to the request ID.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | A detection gadget fires the owned callback where the control object is rejected: CONFIRMED for deserialization reachability; FAIL (RCE only if an available gadget is shown). |
| Benign refutation | A signature check or type filter rejects the attacker object: REFUTED for the tested sink; PASS for the control. |
| Insufficient evidence | Format recognized but no callback and no type-control visibility: CANDIDATE; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/web/offensive-deserialization/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's format-recognition signatures and cross-language gadget-family knowledge, re-expressed as owned-fixture experiments using detection-only gadgets and signature/type controls, replacing RCE gadget chains with bounded reachability proof.