LoRaWAN / Sub-GHz Boundary Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill. Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the experiment below. This revision restores the LoRaWAN/sub-GHz craft as a scoped experiment in an isolated RF lab against owned devices: it tests provisioning, join/replay, and generic sub-GHz control-link security with synthetic keys, with hardened provisioning as the control, rather than attacking others' networks.
Scope and prerequisites
LoRaWAN security rests on key management (OTAA root/session keys vs ABP static keys) and join/replay handling; generic sub-GHz devices (remotes, sensors on OOK/FSK) often have unauthenticated, replayable links. Work on owned devices/gateway with synthetic keys in an isolated/attenuated RF lab; respect spectrum/duty-cycle law. Recover/inject only synthetic material.
Declare the owned devices, the provisioning mode, the RF isolation, attempt budget, stop condition. Config-only review yields a hypothesis marked NOT TESTED.
Attack surface and classes
- Provisioning — ABP static session keys (no rotation) vs OTAA; AppKey storage/exposure; reused keys across devices.
- Join procedure — DevNonce/JoinNonce replay handling (LoRaWAN 1.0 vs 1.1), join-accept replay.
- Session security — frame-counter anti-replay; MIC validation.
- Generic sub-GHz — OOK/FSK remotes/sensors with no authentication (capture-and-replay) or static codes.
Mechanism and observation
Observe join/uplink traffic or a generic sub-GHz control signal on the owned setup; test key exposure and replay.
Firstness: Record the provisioning mode, whether a synthetic key is exposed/reused, whether a join or uplink replays (counter handling), and whether a generic sub-GHz command replays. Secondness: State the secure baseline (OTAA with unique keys, nonce/counter anti-replay, authenticated sub-GHz with rolling codes) and the deviation. Thirdness: Infer a weakness only after a controlled test confirms it on the owned setup.
Abduction and refutation
Hypothesis: The device uses static/reused keys (ABP), mishandles join/frame nonces (replayable), or a generic sub-GHz link is unauthenticated and replayable.
Competing benign explanation: OTAA with unique per-device keys and proper nonce handling (1.1) prevents replay; frame counters enforce anti-replay; the sub-GHz link uses rolling codes/authentication; keys are stored in a secure element; another owned device was observed.
Deduction and controls
A hardened setup resists key exposure and replay (positive control). A confirmed finding exposes a synthetic key, replays a join/uplink, or replays a generic sub-GHz command on the owned setup where OTAA/anti-replay/rolling-codes do not. Predeclare the signal. OTAA + unique keys / nonce + frame-counter anti-replay / rolling codes are PASS controls.
Induction: bounded procedure
Isolated RF lab; owned devices; synthetic keys.
- Capture. Record a join and some uplinks (LoRaWAN) or a generic sub-GHz control transmission (SDR).
- Provisioning. Determine OTAA vs ABP; check for reused/static synthetic keys and AppKey exposure.
- Replay. Replay a captured join/uplink and observe nonce/frame-counter handling; for generic sub-GHz, replay the captured command to the owned receiver.
- Session integrity. Confirm MIC/frame-counter behavior.
- Control. Confirm OTAA + anti-replay (or rolling codes) refuse the above.
Record results including refutations. Keep finding and control status separate. Synthetic keys only; respect duty-cycle/spectrum limits.
Craft notes (leads)
ABP's static session keys (no rotation) and reused AppKeys are the core LoRaWAN provisioning findings; OTAA with unique keys and 1.1 nonce handling is the control. Join/frame-counter replay depends on version and implementation. Generic sub-GHz (garage/remote/sensor) devices frequently use static codes with no authentication — a capture-and-replay class defeated by rolling codes. SDR (e.g. with a LoRa/sub-GHz front-end) is needed.
Domain-specific failure modes
OTAA with unique keys and proper nonce handling defeats key-exposure/replay — the primary refutation. Rolling codes defeat generic sub-GHz replay. Frame counters enforce anti-replay. Reused keys across devices turn one exposure into many. Interacting with others' networks/devices is out of scope; respect duty-cycle law.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the provisioning mode, the synthetic-key exposure/reuse (if any), the join/uplink or sub-GHz replay result, and the hardened-provisioning control. Keep to owned devices. Attach expected/observed, rival explanation (OTAA/rolling-code), falsifier, cases not tested.
Versions and tool limitations
Pin the LoRaWAN version (1.0.x vs 1.1) and the device/gateway firmware and SDR front-end — replay and nonce behavior are version-specific. No device behavior was verified by this content; test the owned setup to confirm.
Remediation and detection
Use OTAA with unique per-device root keys (not ABP), store keys in a secure element, enforce nonce and frame-counter anti-replay (prefer 1.1), and use authenticated/rolling-code links for generic sub-GHz. Add a regression that join/command replay is refused. Monitor for counter resets and duplicate joins.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | A synthetic key is exposed/reused, or a join/uplink/sub-GHz command replays, on the owned setup where OTAA/anti-replay/rolling-codes do not: CONFIRMED; FAIL. |
| Benign refutation | OTAA + unique keys / anti-replay / rolling codes refuses it: REFUTED; PASS for the control. |
| Insufficient evidence | A capture that could not be decoded, or unclear provisioning: CANDIDATE; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/wireless/offensive-lorawan-sub-ghz/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's OTAA/ABP, join-replay and generic-sub-GHz craft as a scoped experiment against owned devices with synthetic keys and a hardened-provisioning control, replacing attacks on others' networks with bounded key-exposure and replay proof. Composes with rt-z-wave, rt-zigbee-thread-matter, rt-iot.