OSINT Reconnaissance Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill.
Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the collection below.
This revision restores the upstream's OSINT craft as scoped, passive-first collection: it names the sources that build an organizational attack-surface map with provenance, bounded by authorization and privacy, rather than intrusive scanning or profiling individuals. Compose with attack-surface-triage and intel-source-evaluation.
Scope and prerequisites
Reconnaissance maps the authorized target's external footprint before any active testing. Collect from public sources on the organization and its infrastructure within scope. Keep it passive-first (no active scanning unless authorized), and avoid collecting personal data about individuals beyond what the engagement requires. Record the provenance of each datum.
Declare the target org/domains in scope, which sources are authorized, and the passive/active boundary. Active scanning without authorization is out of scope.
Collection surface
- DNS & domains — subdomain enumeration (passive: CT logs, passive DNS; active only if authorized), zone data, related domains.
- Certificate transparency — hostnames and infrastructure from issued certs.
- Exposed services — internet-wide scan data (Shodan/Censys-class) for the org's ranges — read, not scan, unless authorized.
- Public code & leaks — org repos, leaked credentials/keys in public commits, paste sites, exposed buckets.
- Cloud assets — enumerable buckets/endpoints tied to the org.
- Organizational metadata — tech stack, email format, public staff roles relevant to the engagement (minimized).
Mechanism and observation
Build the surface map from corroborated sources.
Firstness: Record each asset/datum and its source (which CT log, which scan dataset, which repo). Secondness: State what is in-scope and expected vs what is unexpectedly exposed. Thirdness: Infer an exposure (e.g. a forgotten subdomain, a leaked key) only after corroboration, not from a single stale source.
Source discipline (compose with intel-source-evaluation)
- Corroborate across independent sources; a single dataset can be stale or wrong.
- Record provenance and timestamp for every datum — recon data ages.
- Distinguish confirmed-live from historical (passive DNS/CT may list decommissioned hosts).
- Minimize personal data; collect only what the authorized engagement needs.
Abduction and refutation
Hypothesis: The org has an externally-observable exposure (forgotten host, leaked secret, misconfigured bucket) worth testing.
Competing benign explanation: The host is decommissioned (stale CT/passive-DNS record); the "leaked key" is revoked or a public/test key; the bucket is intentionally public; the asset belongs to a different org sharing infrastructure.
Deduction and controls
A known in-scope asset is confirmable live (positive control). A real exposure is one corroborated as live and unexpected. Predeclare what "live and in-scope" means. A stale or revoked datum is a refutation, not a finding.
Induction: bounded collection procedure
Authorized sources; passive-first.
- Seed. Start from the authorized domains/org.
- Expand passively. CT logs, passive DNS, scan datasets, public code/leak search, bucket enumeration — recording provenance.
- Corroborate & age-check. Confirm each asset is live and current (active confirmation only if authorized).
- Scope. Drop out-of-scope or other-org assets; minimize personal data.
- Map. Produce the attack-surface map with provenance, feeding
attack-surface-triage.
Record results including refutations (stale/other-org assets). Keep confirmed-live separate from historical.
Domain-specific failure modes
Stale CT/passive-DNS records list dead hosts — age-check. Shared infrastructure attributes another org's assets to the target — verify ownership. A "leaked" key may be revoked/public. Active scanning without authorization crosses from recon into unauthorized testing. Over-collecting personal data is both out of scope and an ethics/privacy problem.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the attack-surface map: each asset, its source/provenance, live-vs-historical status, and scope/ownership confirmation. Minimize personal data. Attach the source list, collection date, passive/active boundary honored, and assets excluded as out-of-scope.
Versions and tool limitations
Datasets (CT, passive DNS, scan data) have coverage and freshness limits — state them. No asset was actively confirmed by this content unless authorized and done; mark confirmation status.
Remediation and detection
Reduce external footprint: retire forgotten hosts/subdomains, rotate leaked secrets, lock down public buckets, minimize metadata leakage, and monitor CT logs and public code for org assets/secrets. Detect recon-driven scanning against confirmed assets.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | A corroborated, live, in-scope exposure (forgotten host / active leaked secret / public bucket) with provenance: CONFIRMED exposure. |
| Benign refutation | The asset is stale/decommissioned, revoked, intentionally public, or another org's: REFUTED. |
| Insufficient evidence | A single stale-source datum not corroborated or age-checked: CANDIDATE; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/recon/offensive-osint/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's DNS/CT/scan/leak/cloud collection craft, re-expressed as scoped, passive-first, privacy-respecting collection with provenance and corroboration, replacing intrusive scanning and personal profiling with a bounded attack-surface map. Composes with rt-osint-methodology, attack-surface-triage, intel-source-evaluation.