HTTP Parameter Pollution Boundary Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill. Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the domain experiments below. This revision restores the upstream's HPP craft as scoped experiments: it names the pollution forms and the precedence differentials to test, confirming which component honors which duplicate value against owned fixtures.
Scope and prerequisites
HPP is a precedence differential (compose with parser-differential-hunting): two components disagree on which occurrence of a repeated parameter wins. Identify where a value passes through more than one parser/tier (gateway→backend, WAF→app, framework array parsing). Use owned accounts and fixtures.
Declare target stack, attempt budget, stop condition. Source-only authorization yields a hypothesis marked NOT TESTED.
Attack surface and classes
- Duplicate parameters —
?id=1&id=2across URL, form body, JSON, GraphQL variables/aliases, WebSocket messages. - Array-notation confusion — PHP brackets, Express/
qsbracket-optional, Rails numeric indices, mixed notation. - Parameter cloaking — encoding variants, double/triple encoding, Unicode normalization, legacy null-byte.
Mechanism and observation
Trace a repeated/ambiguous parameter through each tier to see which value each one reads.
Firstness: Record which value each observable component acted on (the response, the authorization decision, the logged value). Secondness: State the intended single interpretation and the deviation between tiers. Thirdness: Infer the defect class only after a controlled pollution makes two tiers act on different values.
Abduction and refutation
Mechanism hypothesis: One tier authenticates/authorizes/validates using the first occurrence while another processes the last (or vice versa, or an array-notation difference), so a security decision and the effect use different values.
Competing benign explanation: Both tiers pick the same occurrence (no differential); the framework rejects duplicates; the second value is ignored entirely; the observed difference is unrelated to the duplicate.
Deduction and controls
A single, unambiguous parameter behaves consistently (positive control). A confirmed HPP shows the authorization/validation tier reading one value while the effecting tier reads another, against owned fixtures. Predeclare which value each tier should read. Consistent interpretation across tiers is a PASS control.
Induction: bounded laboratory procedure
Owned accounts/fixtures.
- Baseline. Send the single-parameter request; capture which value the app uses and logs.
- Duplicate. Send two occurrences with distinct owned values; observe which the response/authorization reflects.
- Cross-tier. If a gateway/WAF precedes the app, craft the duplicate so the front tier plausibly reads one value and the backend the other; confirm with owned IDs (e.g. front authorizes
id=own, backend servesid=own2). - Array notation. Test bracket/index notations the framework parses differently.
- Cloaking. Test encoding/Unicode variants that one parser decodes and another does not.
- Control. Confirm the single-parameter request is consistent.
Record results including refutations. Keep finding and control status separate.
Craft notes (leads)
Occurrence precedence differs by stack: typically PHP/$_GET last, ASP first, Node/Express array, JSP first, Rails last — verify, do not assume. GraphQL alias/variable pollution can bypass per-operation rate limits. API-gateway-vs-backend precedence is the high-value variant (gateway picks first id, backend picks last → IDOR/access-control bypass). HPP can also smuggle XML/filter-evading content past a WAF checking a different occurrence.
Domain-specific failure modes
If both tiers agree, there is no finding. A reflected second value is not an effect unless a security decision diverges from it. Framework rejection of duplicates is a refutation. The impact is entirely about the differential: name the two tiers and the two values.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the parameter, the two values, which tier honored which, the resulting security effect (auth/AC/WAF bypass, IDOR), and the single-parameter control. Use owned IDs only. Attach minimal replay, expected/observed, rival explanation, falsifier, uncovered parameters.
Versions and tool limitations
Pin each tier's server/framework and version — precedence is implementation-specific. No parsing behavior was verified by this content; confirm each tier's live behavior first.
Remediation and detection
Reject duplicate parameters (or canonicalize to one occurrence) consistently across all tiers, enforce a single array notation, and make the authorization tier and the effecting tier read the same canonical value. Add a regression asserting duplicates are handled identically end-to-end. Detect repeated parameters diverging between gateway and backend logs.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | The authorization tier reads one value while the effecting tier reads another (owned IDs), producing a bypass/IDOR: CONFIRMED; FAIL. |
| Benign refutation | Both tiers read the same occurrence / duplicates rejected: REFUTED; PASS for the control. |
| Insufficient evidence | A second value is reflected but no cross-tier divergence is shown: CANDIDATE; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/web/offensive-parameter-pollution/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's pollution forms, framework precedence knowledge and gateway-vs-backend high-impact variant, re-expressed as owned-fixture cross-tier experiments with consistency controls, replacing speculative impact with a demonstrated precedence differential.