Phishing Simulation Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill. Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the simulation below. This revision restores the upstream's phishing craft as a sanctioned, consented simulation: it designs lures and landing pages to measure susceptibility and mail-security coverage with benign tracked artifacts, not a real credential-harvesting campaign.
Scope and prerequisites
A phishing assessment measures two things: whether mail security delivers the lure, and whether recipients click/submit/report. Run only as an authorized simulation with the client's sign-off and a defined recipient set (or an approved opt-out process). Use benign, clearly-tracked artifacts — a simulation landing page that records a click/submission without capturing real credentials or delivering real malware.
Declare the recipient scope, the mail-security stack, the simulation infrastructure, attempt budget, stop condition. Design-only review yields a hypothesis marked NOT TESTED.
Attack surface and measurement targets
- Delivery / mail security — does SPF/DKIM/DMARC, the secure email gateway, and sandboxing block or deliver the lure?
- Lure/pretext — theme plausibility (compose with
social-engineering-plausibility), sender spoofing/lookalike domain, urgency. - Landing page — benign credential-capture simulation (records the submission event, not the password) or a benign "payload" that reports execution.
- Human response — click rate, submission rate, and crucially the report rate (did users report it?).
Mechanism and observation
Send the simulated lure; measure delivery, click/submit, and report.
Firstness: Record delivery (reached the inbox?), the click/submission events (benign tracking), and reports to the security team. Secondness: State the expected controls (mail security blocks spoofed/lookalike lures; users report) and the deviation. Thirdness: Infer a susceptibility/control gap only after the measured rates are in.
Abduction and refutation
Hypothesis: The organization is susceptible — mail security delivers the lure and/or users click/submit without reporting.
Competing benign explanation: DMARC/gateway blocks the spoofed sender; sandboxing detonates the link; users report at a high rate; the clicks came from security tooling scanning the link, not humans; the lure was unrealistic.
Deduction and controls
A legitimate email is delivered and acted on normally (baseline). A confirmed gap shows the lure delivered and clicked/submitted with low reporting, where mail security or trained users would stop it. Predeclare delivery and the click/submit/report metrics; exclude automated link-scanner clicks. Mail-security blocking / high report rate are PASS controls.
Induction: bounded simulation procedure
Consented recipients; benign tracked artifacts.
- Design. Build a plausible, authorized lure and a benign landing page (records events, no real credential storage). Use a controlled sender/domain.
- Deliver. Send to the scoped recipients; record which reached inboxes vs were blocked/quarantined.
- Measure. Click rate, submission rate (benign), report rate; filter out security-scanner clicks (user-agent/timing).
- Mail-security coverage. Note which controls (SPF/DKIM/DMARC, gateway, sandbox) blocked or passed the lure.
- Debrief. Deliver awareness feedback; do not shame individuals.
Record results including refutations. Keep the susceptibility finding separate from the mail-security control score. No real credentials captured.
Craft notes (leads)
The report rate is as important as the click rate — a workforce that clicks but reports fast is resilient. Mail-security evasion here is measured (does the gateway catch the lookalike/spoof?), not optimized to harm. Lookalike domains, display-name spoofing, and urgency are standard lure levers; realism must be plausible (see social-engineering-plausibility). Automated link scanners inflate click counts — filter them.
Domain-specific failure modes
Scanner-generated clicks inflate the rate — filter by user-agent/timing. DMARC/gateway blocking the lure is a PASS, not a failed test. A high report rate is resilience even with some clicks. An unrealistic lure under-measures susceptibility. Capturing real credentials or delivering real malware is never appropriate — benign simulation only. Individual shaming is counterproductive and out of scope.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the lure, delivery results (per mail-security control), click/submit/report rates (scanner-filtered), and the awareness/remediation recommendations. No real credentials. Attach the recipient scope, consent basis, expected/observed, rival explanation (scanner clicks), falsifier, controls not exercised.
Versions and tool limitations
Pin the mail-security stack and simulation platform. Delivery behavior is configuration-specific. No control behavior was verified by this content; run the sanctioned simulation to measure.
Remediation and detection
Deploy SPF, DKIM and a DMARC policy appropriate to the organization's domain-authentication goals; DMARC alignment helps handle spoofing of the protected domain but does not identify lookalike domains. Use gateway/sandbox controls and separate lookalike-domain detection. Provide ongoing awareness training and an easy reporting path. Measure delivery, scanner-filtered opens/clicks/submissions and reports as separate outcomes; a high report rate does not refute a mail-control weakness by itself. Add a recurring, consented simulation cadence.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | The lure is delivered and clicked/submitted with low reporting where mail security or trained users would stop it: CONFIRMED susceptibility/control gap; FAIL (report rates). |
| Benign refutation | The applicable domain-authentication or gateway control blocks the tested lure, or the apparent interaction is attributable to scanners: REFUTED only for that claim. Report lookalike detection and human reporting outcomes separately. |
| Insufficient evidence | Clicks unfiltered for scanners, or an unrealistic lure: CANDIDATE; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/social-engineering/offensive-phishing/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's lure/delivery/landing-page craft as a sanctioned, consented simulation measuring susceptibility and mail-security coverage with benign tracked artifacts and report-rate metrics, replacing real credential harvesting with bounded, ethical measurement. Composes with social-engineering-plausibility, rt-social-engineering, rt-initial-access.