HTTP Request Smuggling Boundary Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill. Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the domain experiments below. This revision restores the upstream's desync craft as scoped experiments against an owned front-end/back-end lab: it names the desync variants and their discriminators while keeping confirmation to timing/self-observed effects rather than poisoning other users' responses.
Scope and prerequisites
Smuggling is a parser differential (compose with parser-differential-hunting): the front-end and back-end disagree on where one request ends. Reproduce the real two-tier topology (proxy/CDN/load-balancer in front of an origin) in an owned lab. Confirm with timing and self-targeted effects; do not poison a shared queue or capture other users' requests on a live system.
Declare target topology, attempt budget and a stop on first confirmation. Source-only / single-tier setups yield a hypothesis marked NOT TESTED.
Attack surface and classes
- CL.TE — front-end uses
Content-Length, back-end usesTransfer-Encoding. - TE.CL — the reverse.
- TE.TE — both support TE but one is tricked by an obfuscated header into ignoring it.
- HTTP/2 desync — H2 downgraded to H1 at the back-end with mismatched length semantics; H2.CL / H2.TE.
- Client-side desync (CSD), pause-based, CONNECT tunneling, WebSocket desync, header oversizing — modern variants.
Mechanism and observation
Trace how each tier computes message length (CL vs TE vs H2 frame).
Firstness: Record the timing/response anomaly (a delayed response indicating a back-end wait for bytes that never come, or a smuggled prefix affecting your own next request). Secondness: State the correct behavior (both tiers agree on message boundaries) and the deviation. Thirdness: Infer a desync only after a controlled, self-observed effect reproduces.
Abduction and refutation
Mechanism hypothesis: Front-end and back-end parse length differently, so a crafted request leaves a prefix in the back-end's buffer that prepends to the next request on that connection.
Competing benign explanation: Both tiers normalize headers identically (no differential); the delay is network jitter; the connection is not reused between requests (no shared buffer); the front-end rejects ambiguous CL+TE outright.
Deduction and controls
A well-formed request pair behaves normally (positive control). A true desync produces the time-based signature (the back-end stalls waiting for the declared body) and then a self-observed prefix effect on your own follow-up request. Predeclare the exact timing threshold and the self-targeted marker. A front-end that rejects ambiguous length framing is a PASS control.
Induction: bounded laboratory procedure
Owned two-tier lab; self-targeted confirmation; single-packet where applicable.
- Baseline. Send normal requests; confirm connection reuse and capture normal timing.
- Time-based probe. Send a CL.TE / TE.CL probe whose framing makes the back-end wait for more bytes; a reproducible delay (vs the baseline, repeated) indicates a differential. This is the safe first discriminator.
- Confirm self-effect. Smuggle a prefix that affects only your own next request (e.g. changes your own response), proving the buffer carried over — without targeting another user.
- TE.TE obfuscation. Test header obfuscations (spacing, casing, duplicate TE, line folding) to see which tier is fooled.
- HTTP/2 downgrade. If the front-end speaks H2 to an H1 back-end, test H2.CL/H2.TE and CRLF-in-H2-header injection.
- Control. Confirm the well-formed pair stays in sync.
Record results including refutations. Keep finding and control status separate. Stop at the self-observed confirmation; do not escalate to live victim capture.
Craft notes (leads)
Classic obfuscations: Transfer-Encoding: chunked with trailing space/tab, duplicate TE headers, Transfer-Encoding:\nchunked, Content-Length + Transfer-Encoding together. H2 desync exploits the length ambiguity introduced at downgrade; check Alt-Svc/H2/H3 support. Pause-based desync sends headers slowly then a smuggled request. Impact classes to bound: security-control bypass, cache/response-queue poisoning, request capture — demonstrate the mechanism, not the live population.
Domain-specific failure modes
A single slow response is jitter until repeated. No connection reuse means no shared buffer, so no classic smuggling. A front-end that fully normalizes removes the differential even if the back-end is lenient. Timing signatures prove a differential but not yet a usable prefix — show the self-effect to confirm.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the topology, the framing probe, the reproducible timing delta, the self-observed prefix effect, and which tier was fooled. Keep any captured data to your own requests. Attach minimal replay, expected/observed, rival explanation (jitter/no-reuse), falsifier, uncovered variants.
Versions and tool limitations
Pin front-end and back-end server/versions — desync is implementation- and version-specific (track real CVEs). Burp's HTTP Request Smuggler and the single-packet attack are the standard tools; keep probes self-targeted. No topology behavior was verified by this content; reproduce the live stack first.
Remediation and detection
Make both tiers agree: reject ambiguous CL+TE, normalize/strip TE before the back-end, prefer HTTP/2 end-to-end without downgrade, disable connection reuse to untrusted back-ends, and cap header sizes. Add a regression asserting ambiguous framing is rejected. Detect anomalous response/queue behavior and malformed length headers at the front-end.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | A reproducible timing signature plus a self-observed smuggled prefix on an owned two-tier lab: CONFIRMED; FAIL. |
| Benign refutation | Both tiers normalize identically / no connection reuse / front-end rejects ambiguity: REFUTED; PASS for the control. |
| Insufficient evidence | A single unrepeated delay, no self-effect: CANDIDATE; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/web/offensive-request-smuggling/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's CL.TE/TE.CL/TE.TE and modern H2/CSD/pause-based desync craft, re-expressed as owned two-tier lab experiments with timing and self-observed discriminators, replacing live queue/response poisoning with bounded mechanism proof.