Software Supply-Chain Boundary Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill. Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the domain experiments below. This revision restores the upstream's supply-chain craft as scoped experiments with canary-only PoC packages and a staged risk ladder: it names the vectors and proves reach with a DNS callback, never distributing a functional payload, and mandates cleanup.
Scope and prerequisites
Supply-chain attacks place attacker-controlled code into a target's build/install. The engagement must authorize public-registry actions; every PoC is a payload-free DNS-canary package, removed at the end. Prefer owned-build verification before any public registration.
Declare the ecosystems and whether public registration is authorized, attempt budget, stop condition. Config-only authorization yields a hypothesis marked NOT TESTED.
Attack surface and classes
- Dependency confusion (see
rt-dependency-confusion) — npm/PyPI/NuGet name claiming. - Typosquatting — near-miss names of popular packages.
- Build-system install hooks — npm lifecycle scripts (
preinstall/postinstall), Pythonsetup.py/pyprojectbuild hooks, Makefile default-target injection — code that runs at install/build time.
Mechanism and observation
Trace how a dependency's install/build step executes code on the consumer.
Firstness: Record the canary callback firing during the target's install/build (or an owned-build trace resolving the PoC). Secondness: State the intended behavior (dependencies install data/code without arbitrary execution; resolution pinned to private sources) and the deviation. Thirdness: Infer the class only after a controlled install/build triggers the canary.
Abduction and refutation
Mechanism hypothesis: The build resolves or executes attacker-controllable package code (confusion, typosquat, or an install hook) during install/build.
Competing benign explanation: Resolution is pinned to private sources (confusion closed); lockfile integrity hashes reject substitution; install scripts are disabled (--ignore-scripts); the typosquat name is not actually referenced; the org defensively owns the name.
Deduction and controls
A correctly-configured install resolves and builds only trusted code with no arbitrary execution (positive control). A confirmed finding fires the canary during install/build via the vector where the pinned/hardened config would not. Predeclare the callback. Pinned resolution / integrity hashes / disabled scripts / defensive ownership are PASS controls.
Induction: bounded procedure with a staged risk ladder
Owned build first; canary-only PoC if public registration is authorized. Follow the ladder and stop at confirmation:
- Recon (low risk). Extract internal/dependency names from lock files; find typosquat candidates; identify unclaimed names.
- Config review (low). Check resolution pinning, lockfile integrity, and whether install scripts run.
- Owned-build trace (low). Resolve/install a local canary with an install hook in an owned build; confirm the hook runs and where resolution points.
- Staged PoC registration (medium, if authorized). Register a DNS-canary package (confusion or typosquat) with an install-time callback only; a callback confirms reach.
- Validate & document (low). Confirm the callback, scope the impact.
- Cleanup (mandatory). Remove PoC packages from public registries.
- Control. Apply pinning/integrity/
--ignore-scriptsand confirm the vector closes.
Record results including refutations. Keep finding and control status separate. PoC packages are payload-free DNS canaries only.
Craft notes (leads)
confused scans lock files for confusable names. Install hooks are the execution primitive: npm lifecycle scripts, Python setup.py cmdclass/entry hooks, Makefile targets that run before the default build. Typosquats rely on human/CI typos. The highest-impact variant is a transitive dependency's install hook, because it runs silently across many consumers.
Domain-specific failure modes
Pinned resolution closes confusion. --ignore-scripts/no-install-scripts defeats hook execution. Integrity-hash lockfiles reject substitution of locked deps. A typosquat no one references is not reachable. Owned-build trace resolving trusted is a refutation. A functional payload is never appropriate — canary only, and clean up.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the vector, the recon source, the canary callback or owned-build trace, the control result, and confirmation of cleanup. Attach minimal replay, expected/observed, rival explanation, falsifier, ecosystems not covered.
Versions and tool limitations
Pin package-manager versions — lifecycle-script and resolution behavior changes. Public registration has real side effects; keep PoCs payload-free and remove them. No build behavior was verified by this content; prefer an owned-build trace first.
Remediation and detection
Pin resolution to private sources, enforce lockfile integrity, disable install scripts by default (--ignore-scripts, vet exceptions), defensively register internal names, use allowlists/SBOM and signed provenance (SLSA), and review new/transitive dependencies. Add a regression asserting the vector closes. Detect install-time network callbacks and new transitive deps with install hooks.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | A canary fires during install/build via confusion/typosquat/hook where the pinned/hardened config would not: CONFIRMED; FAIL. |
| Benign refutation | Pinned resolution / integrity / --ignore-scripts / defensive ownership closes the vector: REFUTED; PASS for the control. |
| Insufficient evidence | An unclaimed/typosquat name without a confirmed install/build callback: CANDIDATE; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/supply-chain/offensive-supply-chain/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's confusion/typosquat/install-hook craft and staged risk ladder, re-expressed as owned-build/canary experiments with pinning and script controls and mandatory cleanup, replacing live malicious distribution with payload-free reach proof. Composes with rt-dependency-confusion, dependency-provenance, pipeline-boundary-assessment.