Vulnerability Class Taxonomy
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill. Apply its evidence labels and scope contract when classifying. This revision restores the upstream's vuln-class material as a classification reference: each class names the invariant it violates, how to recognize it, where it tends to be exploitable, and how to detect it — a lookup aid for triage, not a set of weaponized payloads.
Scope and use
Use this to assign a defensible class to a bug found by fuzzing, review or crash triage, and to reason about where to hunt its siblings. Classification is an inference from evidence (rt-bug-identification), and exploitability per class is a tendency, not a verdict (rt-crash-analysis).
The classes
Each entry: the violated invariant → recognition signature → typical sink → exploitability tendency → detector.
- Out-of-bounds read — access past a buffer's bounds. Signature: read of adjacent/unmapped memory; info leak. Sink: array/pointer arithmetic, length miscompute. Tendency: info leak (ASLR defeat) more than control. Detector: ASan, bounds checks.
- Out-of-bounds write — write past bounds. Signature: corrupted adjacent data/metadata. Sink: unchecked copy/index. Tendency: high (overwrite pointers/metadata). Detector: ASan, canaries.
- Use-after-free — use of freed memory. Signature: access to a dangling pointer; reallocation controls contents. Sink: lifetime/ownership error. Tendency: high (type confusion, control). Detector: ASan, MTE.
- Double-free — freeing twice. Signature: allocator abort/corruption. Sink: duplicate ownership. Tendency: medium-high (allocator exploitation). Detector: ASan, hardened allocator.
- Type confusion — treating an object as the wrong type. Signature: field misinterpretation, bad vtable. Sink: unchecked downcast, union misuse, deserialization. Tendency: high. Detector: UBSan (vptr), CFI.
- Integer overflow/underflow — arithmetic wraps past the type's range. Signature: undersized allocation, bypassed bounds check. Sink: size/length math. Tendency: medium (gateway to OOB). Detector: UBSan.
- Uninitialized memory — reading before writing. Signature: nondeterministic values, leaks. Sink: missing init path. Tendency: info leak. Detector: MSan.
- NULL/near-NULL deref — dereferencing NULL. Signature: fault at low address, no attacker control. Tendency: usually DoS only. Detector: crash triage.
- Format string — user input as a format. Signature:
%n/%xeffects. Sink:printf(user). Tendency: read/write primitive. Detector: compiler format warnings. - Race / TOCTOU — check and use not atomic over shared state. Signature: behavior depends on timing. Sink: check-then-act (see
rt-toctou,rt-race-condition). Tendency: varies. Detector: TSan, invariant tests.
Mechanism and observation
Classify by the broken invariant, not the crash site.
Firstness: Record the first wrong operation and the data it corrupted/leaked. Secondness: State the memory-safety invariant the class violates (bounds, lifetime, type, initialization, arithmetic range, atomicity). Thirdness: Assign the class only after the root cause (not the fault site) matches the invariant.
Classification discipline
- One bug can present as several classes (an integer overflow causing an OOB write) — name the root class and the downstream effect separately.
- A crash site rarely equals the bug class — root-cause first.
- Exploitability tendency is a prior, not a verdict — confirm with
rt-crash-analysis. - Memory-safe languages eliminate most of these by construction; note when the class is impossible in the target language.
Domain-specific failure modes
Classifying by the faulting frame instead of the root cause mislabels the bug. Collapsing an integer-overflow-to-OOB into just "OOB" loses the fix site. Treating a class's exploitability tendency as a verdict overclaims. A NULL deref labeled "high" is the common over-call.
Deliverable
For each bug: the assigned root class, the violated invariant, the downstream effect class (if any), the detector that would catch it, and a pointer to its exploitability triage. Keep the classification evidence-based and language-aware.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/fuzzing/offensive-vuln-classes/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's vulnerability-class material as an invariant-based classification reference with detectors and exploitability tendencies, replacing a payload collection with a triage lookup aid. Composes with rt-bug-identification, rt-crash-analysis, rt-toctou, invariant-hunting.