802.11 WLAN Posture Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill. Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the assessment below. This revision restores the upstream's Wi-Fi material as an umbrella posture assessment over the specific wireless skills, bounded by authorization and spectrum law, testing an owned WLAN rather than third-party networks.
Scope and prerequisites
A WLAN posture assessment covers discovery, availability (deauth/PMF), rogue-AP susceptibility, and the authentication/cipher layer. Test only owned/in-scope networks in a controlled RF setting with synthetic credentials; respect spectrum/monitoring law. Prove each weakness against the owned WLAN with a negative control.
Declare the scoped SSIDs, the RF environment, attempt budget, stop condition. Config-only review yields a hypothesis marked NOT TESTED.
Assessment areas (route to the specific skill)
- Recon — AP/client/cipher map →
rt-wifi-recon. - Availability / management frames — deauth/disassoc, PMF/802.11w →
rt-deauth-disassoc. - Rogue AP / credential capture →
rt-evil-twin,rt-wpa-enterprise. - WPA2-PSK — handshake/PMKID, provisioning policy →
rt-wpa2-psk. - WPA3-SAE — Dragonblood-class, transition-mode downgrade →
rt-wpa3-sae. - WPA-Enterprise/EAP — RADIUS/evil-twin, weak EAP →
rt-wpa-enterprise. - WPS — PIN/Pixie-Dust →
rt-wps. - Protocol flaws — KRACK/FragAttacks →
rt-krack-fragattacks.
Mechanism and observation
Assess each area against the owned WLAN's intended posture.
Firstness: Record the per-area observation (cipher, PMF state, WPS state, handshake/SAE behavior) from the specific skill. Secondness: State the target posture (WPA3 or WPA2 with PMF, no WPS, strong PSK/EAP) and the deviation. Thirdness: Infer a posture finding only after the specific skill confirms it under control.
Abduction and refutation
Hypothesis: The WLAN has a posture weakness (weak cipher, no PMF, WPS on, weak PSK/EAP, downgrade-able transition mode).
Competing benign explanation: WPA3 with PMF is enforced; WPS is disabled; the PSK is high-entropy; EAP uses strong methods with proper server-cert validation; the guest/IoT SSID's weaker posture is intentional and segmented.
Deduction and controls
The target WLAN meets its intended posture (positive control). A finding is a per-area deviation confirmed by the specific skill where the hardened posture would not allow it. The hardened posture (WPA3/PMF/no-WPS/strong-PSK-EAP) is the PASS control.
Induction: bounded procedure
Owned WLAN; synthetic credentials.
- Map with
rt-wifi-recon. - Route each weakness area to its skill and run its bounded experiment (owned network, synthetic creds, negative control).
- Aggregate the per-area results into a posture scorecard (PASS/WARN/FAIL per area).
- Control. Confirm the hardened posture resists each tested area.
Record results including refutations. Keep per-area findings and control scores separate.
Domain-specific failure modes
Testing a third-party network is out of scope and often illegal. An intentionally weaker segmented guest/IoT SSID is not a finding. A single area's weakness does not condemn the whole WLAN — score per area. Each area's depth and caveats live in its specific skill; this umbrella does not restate them.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the posture scorecard: per-area result, the specific-skill evidence, and the hardened-posture control. Keep to owned networks and synthetic credentials. Attach scope, expected/observed, rival explanation, falsifier, areas not assessed.
Versions and tool limitations
Pin AP/supplicant firmware and adapter capabilities. Posture and attacks are version/hardware-specific. No WLAN behavior was verified by this content; test the owned WLAN to confirm.
Remediation and detection
WPA3 (or WPA2 with mandatory PMF), disable WPS, high-entropy PSK or strong EAP with server-cert validation, avoid downgrade-able transition mode where feasible, segment guest/IoT, and deploy a WIDS. Add regressions per area. Detect deauth floods, rogue APs, and EAP downgrade.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | A per-area weakness is confirmed by its skill on the owned WLAN where the hardened posture would not allow it: CONFIRMED; FAIL for that area. |
| Benign refutation | The hardened posture holds, or weaker guest/IoT posture is intentional/segmented: REFUTED; PASS. |
| Insufficient evidence | A suspected weakness not confirmed by the specific skill: CANDIDATE; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/wireless/offensive-wifi/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's Wi-Fi material as a scoped posture umbrella routing to the specific wireless skills, replacing third-party attacks with a bounded, owned-WLAN scorecard. Composes with rt-wifi-recon, rt-deauth-disassoc, rt-evil-twin, rt-wpa2-psk, rt-wpa3-sae, rt-wpa-enterprise, rt-wps, rt-krack-fragattacks.