Windows Security-Boundary Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill. Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the experiments below. This revision restores the upstream's Windows-boundary craft as scoped experiments: it names the boundaries and their servicing status, proving one crossing against a planted object in an owned lab rather than escalating on a live host.
Scope and prerequisites
Windows enforces several boundaries (integrity levels, tokens, sessions, object DACLs). Crucially, not all are servicing (defended) boundaries — Microsoft treats UAC and some others as convenience, not security boundaries. Work on an owned Windows lab with planted objects/accounts; prove a crossing against the planted target. Know, per boundary, whether Microsoft defends it before calling a crossing a vulnerability.
Declare the Windows build, the boundary under test, attempt budget, stop condition. Config-only review yields a hypothesis marked NOT TESTED.
Boundary classes (and servicing status)
- Integrity levels / UAC — Low/Medium/High/System. UAC elevation is NOT a defended security boundary per Microsoft; a Medium-to-High bypass is usually not serviced as a vuln.
- Token privileges / impersonation — SeImpersonate/SeDebug/SeBackup etc.; impersonation to SYSTEM from a service account is a classic (often by-design-for-service) path.
- Session / desktop isolation — Session 0 isolation; cross-session is a defended boundary.
- Object DACLs — securable-object permissions; a weak DACL on a privileged object is a real misconfiguration.
- Named pipe / service — pipe impersonation, weak service permissions (reconfigure/binpath).
Mechanism and observation
Pick one boundary; trace the capability that crosses it against a planted object.
Firstness: Record the crossing achieved against the planted target (impersonated a planted SYSTEM token, wrote via a weak DACL, reconfigured a planted service). Secondness: State whether the boundary is a defended servicing boundary and the deviation. Thirdness: Infer a finding only after the crossing is exercised under control AND the boundary is one Microsoft defends (otherwise it is a hardening/misconfig note, not a vuln).
Abduction and refutation
Hypothesis: A specific primitive crosses a defended Windows boundary (token/DACL/session) granting authority it should not.
Competing benign explanation: The crossing is over a non-servicing boundary (UAC) — expected, not a vuln; the token privilege is by design for that service account; the DACL is correctly restrictive; Session 0 isolation holds; the service cannot actually be reconfigured by the principal.
Deduction and controls
A principal within its rights succeeds (positive control); the crossing must fail (or be a non-boundary) otherwise. A confirmed finding crosses a defended boundary against a planted object where a hardened config refuses. Predeclare the capability and the boundary's servicing status. Restrictive DACL / removed dangerous privilege / Session 0 isolation are PASS controls; a UAC "bypass" is noted as non-servicing.
Induction: bounded laboratory procedure
Owned Windows lab; planted objects.
- Enumerate. Current integrity level, token privileges, session, and the DACLs/services in scope.
- Classify the boundary. Is the target crossing over a defended servicing boundary or a convenience one (UAC)?
- Exercise one crossing (planted target). e.g. SeImpersonate → impersonate a planted SYSTEM token; or reconfigure a planted weak-DACL service; or write a planted privileged object.
- Prove capability, stop. Demonstrate once against the planted object.
- Controls. Harden the DACL/privilege/service and confirm the crossing fails.
- Servicing note. State whether Microsoft would service this as a vuln.
Record results including refutations. Keep finding status separate from control status and from servicing status.
Craft notes (leads)
The "Potato" family (SeImpersonate → SYSTEM) is often by-design for service accounts, not a vuln per se — the finding is the over-granted privilege, not the technique. UAC bypasses are abundant but not serviced. The real, serviced findings are weak DACLs on privileged objects/services, cross-session isolation breaks, and token-privilege over-grants to low-trust principals. Always pair the technique with the servicing status.
Domain-specific failure modes
Reporting a UAC bypass as a vulnerability is the classic over-call — it is not a defended boundary. A by-design service privilege (SeImpersonate) is a configuration note unless the principal should not hold it. Crossing a boundary on a live host instead of a planted object is out of scope. Classify the boundary before scoring.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the boundary, its servicing status, the crossing against the planted object, the capability gained, and the hardened-config control result. Keep to the owned lab. Attach minimal replay, expected/observed, rival explanation (non-boundary/by-design), falsifier, boundaries not assessed.
Versions and tool limitations
Pin the Windows build — boundary behavior and servicing stance change across versions. No Windows behavior was verified by this content; confirm on the lab first.
Remediation and detection
Least-privilege tokens (remove SeImpersonate/SeDebug from low-trust accounts), restrictive DACLs on privileged objects and services, enforce Session 0 isolation, and treat UAC as convenience (do not rely on it as a boundary). Detect token impersonation to SYSTEM, service reconfiguration, and privileged-object DACL changes. Add a regression that the crossing fails under hardening.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | A crossing over a defended boundary (weak DACL/over-granted token/cross-session) is exercised against a planted object where hardening refuses: CONFIRMED; FAIL. |
| Benign refutation | The crossing is over a non-servicing boundary (UAC) or a by-design service privilege: REFUTED as a vuln (note as hardening/misconfig); PASS for defended-boundary controls. |
| Insufficient evidence | A crossing attempted but capability not confirmed: CANDIDATE; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/infrastructure/offensive-windows-boundaries/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's Windows-boundary craft and pairs each with its Microsoft servicing status, re-expressed as owned-lab experiments against planted objects with hardened controls, replacing live escalation with bounded, servicing-aware crossing proof. Composes with rt-windows-privesc, rt-windows-mitigations, rt-active-directory.