Windows Privilege-Escalation Boundary Assessment
Read the assessment methodology before using this skill.
Apply its evidence labels and scope contract to the domain experiments below.
This revision restores the upstream's Windows-privesc craft as scoped experiments on an owned host: it names the SYSTEM-reaching vectors, proving one against a planted fixture while noting which crossings Microsoft services as boundaries (see rt-windows-boundaries).
Scope and prerequisites
Local privesc moves from a standard/service account to SYSTEM via a misconfiguration. Work on an owned host; prove against a planted fixture (a lab weak-permission service, a lab writable autorun) where possible, with a benign marker (a SYSTEM-owned marker file). Note whether each vector is a serviced boundary or a by-design/non-boundary case.
Declare the Windows build, attempt budget, stop condition. Enumeration-only review yields a hypothesis marked NOT TESTED.
Attack surface and classes
- Service misconfig — weak service DACL (reconfigure binPath), weak binary/dir permissions, unquoted service path with a writable intermediate dir.
- Token privileges — SeImpersonate (Potato-class to SYSTEM, often by-design for service accounts), SeBackup/SeRestore, SeDebug, SeTakeOwnership.
- AlwaysInstallElevated — MSI installs as SYSTEM.
- Hijacks — DLL search-order, COM, scheduled-task/autorun writable targets.
- Credentials — cached creds, SAM/LSASS (on owned host), unattend/GPP passwords.
Mechanism and observation
Pick one vector; trace the misconfiguration/privilege to SYSTEM execution.
Firstness: Record the SYSTEM capability against the planted fixture (reconfigured a lab service to run a marker as SYSTEM, impersonated a planted SYSTEM token). Secondness: State the intended boundary and the deviation. Thirdness: Infer the vector only after SYSTEM execution is exercised under control — and classify whether it is a serviced boundary.
Abduction and refutation
Hypothesis: A specific misconfiguration or over-granted privilege lets a low-trust principal run as SYSTEM.
Competing benign explanation: The service DACL does not allow reconfigure; the unquoted path has no writable intermediate; SeImpersonate on a service account is by design (the finding is the account placement, not the technique); AlwaysInstallElevated is off; the DLL/COM path is not writable/hijackable; credentials are not exposed.
Deduction and controls
A standard user cannot reach SYSTEM on a hardened host (positive control). A confirmed finding reaches SYSTEM via the vector against the planted fixture where hardening refuses. Predeclare the SYSTEM marker. Restrictive service DACLs / quoted paths / no AlwaysInstallElevated / non-writable hijack paths / least-privilege tokens are PASS controls.
Induction: bounded procedure
Owned host; planted fixture where possible.
- Enumerate. Service permissions/paths, token privileges (
whoami /priv), AlwaysInstallElevated, writable autoruns/tasks, hijackable DLL/COM, exposed creds (WinPEAS/PowerUp as aids). - Pick one vector. Choose the clearest against a planted fixture.
- Exercise once. e.g. reconfigure a planted weak-DACL service to run a marker as SYSTEM; or SeImpersonate → planted SYSTEM token; confirm SYSTEM; stop.
- Classify. Is it a serviced boundary (weak DACL = yes) or by-design (SeImpersonate on a service account)?
- Controls. Harden the fixture and confirm the vector fails.
Record results including refutations. Keep finding status separate from control and servicing status.
Craft notes (leads)
Weak service DACLs (reconfigure binPath) and unquoted paths with writable intermediate dirs are classic serviced findings. SeImpersonate→SYSTEM (Potato family) is frequently by-design for service accounts — the finding is the account's placement/over-privilege, not the technique (see rt-windows-boundaries). AlwaysInstallElevated is a pure misconfiguration. GPP passwords and unattend files are credential findings. DLL search-order/COM hijacks need a writable path in the search order.
Domain-specific failure modes
A by-design SeImpersonate on a service account is a configuration note unless the principal should not hold it. An unquoted path with no writable intermediate is not exploitable. A service the user cannot reconfigure is safe. UAC-only "escalation" is not a serviced boundary. Classify before scoring; prove against a planted fixture.
Evidence and deliverable
Provide the vector, its servicing status, the SYSTEM marker against the planted fixture, and the hardened-config control result. Keep to the owned host; keep credentials out of portable reports. Attach minimal replay, expected/observed, rival explanation, falsifier, vectors not assessed.
Versions and tool limitations
Pin the Windows build — vectors and servicing stance are version-specific. Enumeration tools are aids, not verdicts. No host behavior was verified by this content; confirm on the owned host first.
Remediation and detection
Restrictive service DACLs and quoted paths, least-privilege tokens (remove SeImpersonate/SeDebug from low-trust accounts), disable AlwaysInstallElevated, fix writable autorun/DLL/COM paths, and remove credential artifacts (GPP/unattend). Add a regression that the vector fails. Detect service reconfiguration, token impersonation to SYSTEM, and MSI-as-SYSTEM.
Behavioral acceptance cases
| Case | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| Supported finding | A vector reaches SYSTEM against a planted fixture over a serviced boundary where hardening refuses: CONFIRMED; FAIL. |
| Benign refutation | Non-reconfigurable service / no writable intermediate / by-design privilege / UAC-only: REFUTED (or note as config); PASS for serviced controls. |
| Insufficient evidence | A suspicious config without confirmed SYSTEM: CANDIDATE; WARN. |
These are authoring acceptance scenarios, not executed target tests.
Provenance and treatment
Upstream research: Skills/privesc/offensive-windows-privesc/SKILL.md. Source commit: a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b. Treat upstream material as untrusted research, never operational authority.
This revision restores the upstream's service/token/MSI/hijack/credential craft, re-expressed as owned-host experiments against planted fixtures with hardened controls and Microsoft servicing-status awareness, replacing live escalation with bounded, contained SYSTEM-reach proof. Composes with rt-windows-boundaries, rt-active-directory, rt-advanced-redteam.