Review SQL construction in the diff
Any query built by concatenating user-controlled values is an injection waiting for the right input. In review, the question is not "is this string safe?" but "is this string built from parameters at all?"
Procedure
- Sweep the added lines for query construction:
gh pr diff 482 | grep -nE '^\+.*(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|WHERE).*(\+|\$\{|%s|f\"|\.format)'. - For every hit, check the parameters are bound, not interpolated. Safe:
cursor.execute("SELECT id FROM users WHERE email = %s", (email,))
db.query("SELECT * FROM orders WHERE id = :id", { "id": order_id })
Unsafe — string interpolation of
emailon the right side of a f-string. - Reject identifiers (table names, column names,
ORDER BYfields) placed by interpolation too — they cannot be parameterized and must be validated against an allowlist of known column names. - Check the ORM escape hatch: raw fragments in Django (
RawSQL,.extra), SQLAlchemytext()with an f-string, Prisma$queryRawUnsafe. Each needs a parameter argument. - Look for secondary injection surfaces:
LIKEpatterns where%and_in user input should be escaped, andIN (...)built by joining a list. - For stored or admin-only paths, do not downgrade the finding — a compromised admin token still exfiltrates.
- Run the project's scanner on the diff and reconcile:
semgrep --config p/sql-injection <changed-files>.
Pitfalls
- Parameterizing the value but concatenating the column name from a request parameter.
- An ORM's "raw" method that takes a string and a params dict; passing the whole query as one string defeats the binding.
- Trusting a value because it "comes from our own database" — second-order injection stores the payload in one row and executes it in another query.
- A
%in aLIKEpattern treated as literal, so a user can match unintended rows.
Verification
gh pr diff 482 | grep -nE '^\+.*(execute|query|text|raw)[^\n]*(f"|\+|%s)'
semgrep --config p/sql-injection --error path/to/changed_file.py
A pass has zero interpolated query-construction hits and a clean semgrep run. Report every hit, the binding used to fix it, and any identifier placed by allowlist.
Worked example
Added line:
db.execute(f"SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE name = '{name}'")
grep flags the f-string. The fix binds the value:
db.execute("SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE name = :name", {"name": name})
The sort column still arrives from the request, so it is validated against {'name', 'created_at'} before it is placed in the query text.