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NoorQureshi (@noorqureshi) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Cloud Azure by noorqureshi — Agent Skill

Name: Cloud Azure
Author: NoorQureshi

Cloud Azure

Attack Azure / Entra ID — managed-identity token theft, Entra (Azure AD) role abuse, and app/ storage misconfig. Load when the target is on Azure, you hold Azure creds/a token, or see Entra/AAD/azurewebsites/blob.core.windows.net. Signals: 169.254.169.254 IMDS, Managed Identity, az cli, Entra roles, service principals.

NoorQureshi 98febb7 2.6 KB Updated Sep 17, 2026

File contents

Azure / Entra ID attacks

When it applies

Target on Azure and you have some access — SSRF into a VM/App Service with a Managed Identity, a leaked service-principal secret/cert, or a foothold. Goal: steal tokens, abuse Entra roles, reach resources.

Why it works

Azure resources authenticate via Managed Identities and service principals; the IMDS hands out OAuth tokens for them. Entra (Azure AD) roles and app permissions are widely over-assigned, and several (adding credentials to a service principal, role assignment, Owner on a subscription) escalate to control.

Method

Managed Identity → token (via SSRF, or on the host): GET http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/ oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/ with header Metadata: true (→ cloud-imds-ssrf). Also request tokens for Graph, Key Vault, Storage.
Authenticate & enumerate: az login with the SP or token; enumerate roles/resources; map Entra with AzureHound (BloodHound for Azure); ScoutSuite/MicroBurst for misconfig.
Entra / IAM privesc: add credentials to a service principal you can manage → auth as it; abusive Entra roles (Application/Cloud App Admin, Privileged Role Admin); role assignment (Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write) → grant yourself Owner; consent grants.
Resources & secrets: Key Vault (token for vault.azure.net), Storage blobs (→ storage misconfig), Automation Accounts / runbooks (RCE as their identity), App Service.
Prove impact read-only as the escalated principal; avoid persistent role changes.

Gotchas

Two planes: ARM (resources) and Microsoft Graph / Entra (identity) — get tokens for the right resource/audience.
Managed-identity SSRF needs the Metadata: true header — header-less SSRF won't work (that's the mitigation).
AzureHound reveals Entra attack paths you'd miss manually — run it early.

Verify success

Escalated access proven — a token/role letting you act beyond your start (Key Vault secret read, subscription role you granted, resource action as a managed identity).

References

Azure IMDS & Managed Identity docs; AzureHound/BloodHound; MicroBurst; Entra privesc research.

---name: cloud-azuredescription: Attack Azure / Entra ID — managed-identity token theft, Entra (Azure AD) role abuse, and app/ storage misconfig. Load when the target is on Azure, you hold Azure creds/a token, or see Entra/AAD/azurewebsites/blob.core.windows.net. Signals: 169.254.169.254 IMDS, Managed Identity, az cli, Entra roles, service principals.---# Azure / Entra ID attacks## When it appliesTarget on Azure and you have some access — SSRF into a VM/App Service with a **Managed Identity**,a leaked service-principal secret/cert, or a foothold. Goal: steal tokens, abuse Entra roles, reach resources.## Why it worksAzure resources authenticate via **Managed Identities** and **service principals**; the IMDS handsout OAuth tokens for them. Entra (Azure AD) roles and app permissions are widely over-assigned, andseveral (adding credentials to a service principal, role assignment, Owner on a subscription) escalate to control.## Method1. **Managed Identity → token** (via SSRF, or on the host): `GET http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/ oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/` with header `Metadata: true` (→ `cloud-imds-ssrf`). Also request tokens for Graph, Key Vault, Storage.2. **Authenticate & enumerate**: `az login` with the SP or token; enumerate roles/resources; map Entra with **AzureHound** (BloodHound for Azure); ScoutSuite/MicroBurst for misconfig.3. **Entra / IAM privesc**: add credentials to a service principal you can manage → auth as it; abusive Entra roles (Application/Cloud App Admin, Privileged Role Admin); role assignment (`Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write`) → grant yourself Owner; consent grants.4. **Resources & secrets**: Key Vault (token for `vault.azure.net`), Storage blobs (→ storage misconfig), Automation Accounts / runbooks (RCE as their identity), App Service.5. **Prove impact** read-only as the escalated principal; avoid persistent role changes.## Gotchas- Two planes: **ARM** (resources) and **Microsoft Graph / Entra** (identity) — get tokens for the right `resource`/audience.- Managed-identity SSRF needs the `Metadata: true` header — header-less SSRF won't work (that's the mitigation).- AzureHound reveals Entra attack paths you'd miss manually — run it early.## Verify successEscalated access proven — a token/role letting you act beyond your start (Key Vault secret read,subscription role you granted, resource action as a managed identity).## ReferencesAzure IMDS & Managed Identity docs; AzureHound/BloodHound; MicroBurst; Entra privesc research.

Frequently asked questions