NoorQureshi

@noorqureshi source repo

160 skills
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6 hours ago last updated

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Tradecraft Bugbounty Platforms · noorqureshi
Understand how the major bug-bounty platforms differ — scope rules, disclosure, triage, and reputation — so you play each correctly. Load when working a program on HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack, or Immunefi, on "platform rules", "safe harbor", "VDP vs paid", or before submitting. Signals: a program URL on one of these platforms, a policy/scope page.

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Tradecraft Complex Engagements · noorqureshi
Structure and discipline for complex, multi-stage targets — where the path is a chain of several bugs across multiple hosts, needs source review / custom exploit work, and spans sessions. Load when a foothold needs chaining, work spans multiple hosts, you're deep in dead-ends, or "stuck", "chain", "multi-host", "hard target".

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Tradecraft Duplicate Avoidance · noorqureshi
Avoid burning time on bugs that will be closed as duplicates. Load during bug-bounty work when deciding what to report or where to dig, on "will this be a dup", "is this already known", maximizing unique findings. Signals: a mature/popular program, a common vuln on an obvious asset, a recently expanded scope.

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Reverse Eng Binary Triage · noorqureshi
Triage a native binary you can run or read — find the vulnerable logic, the dangerous sinks, and the input path — with static + dynamic analysis. Load when handed an ELF/PE/Mach-O, a thick client, a standalone or obfuscated binary, or a service whose source you don't have. Signals: a compiled executable in scope, "reverse this binary", a crash/segfault to understand, custom protocol, strings that hint at auth/secrets, a setuid binary during privesc.

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Reverse Eng Deobfuscation · noorqureshi
Peel obfuscation off code until it's readable or callable — packed native binaries, minified/ obfuscated JavaScript, WebAssembly, and JS-VM-protected (JSVMP) bundles. Load when analysis is blocked by protection layers. Signals: high-entropy sections, a tiny import table, UPX headers, string-array/control-flow-flattened JS, `_0x` variable names, a .wasm module, an interpreter loop over a bytecode array, anti-debugger `debugger;` traps.

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Ad Adcs · noorqureshi
Attack Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) — ESC1–ESC8 template/CA misconfigurations to escalate to Domain Admin. Load with a domain foothold/creds where ADCS is present, on "certipy", "ESC1", "certificate template", or a CA server. Signals: Cert Publishers, pKIEnrollmentService, ports 443/135 on a CA, certipy find output.

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Web Xss · noorqureshi
Find and prove Cross-Site Scripting (reflected, stored, DOM). Load when input is echoed into HTML/JS/attributes, a search/comment/profile field renders your text, a URL param appears in the response, or a sink like innerHTML/document.write is in client JS. Signals: "search=", reflected values, error pages echoing input, Angular/React dangerouslySetInnerHTML.

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Web Xxe · noorqureshi bundle
XML External Entity injection → file read, SSRF, sometimes RCE. Load when the app parses XML you supply: SOAP, SAML, XML APIs, SVG/DOCX/XLSX upload, RSS import, `Content-Type: application/xml`. Signals: XML request bodies, "<?xml", SAML responses, file parsers.

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API Bola · noorqureshi
Broken Object/Function Level Authorization in REST/JSON APIs (the #1 API risk). Load on any REST API with object ids in paths/bodies (/api/v1/users/123, /orders/{id}), Bearer auth, mobile-app backends, or admin vs user function separation. Signals: predictable ids, verbs that skip re-authorization, "role" enforced only in the UI.

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API Grpc · noorqureshi
Test gRPC / Protocol Buffers APIs — reflection, method enumeration, authz, and injection. Load on gRPC services (HTTP/2, content-type application/grpc, .proto files, ports like 50051), grpc-web, or "protobuf". Signals: grpc, protobuf, reflection service, ServerReflection.

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Web Cors · noorqureshi
Exploit CORS misconfiguration to read cross-origin responses (data theft). Load when an API reflects Origin into Access-Control-Allow-Origin, allows credentials cross-origin, or trusts null/subdomains. Signals: ACAO reflects your Origin, ACAC: true, `Origin`-dependent responses.

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Web Csrf · noorqureshi
Cross-Site Request Forgery — force a victim's browser to perform state-changing actions. Load on state-changing requests (POST/PUT/DELETE) that rely only on cookies, missing/weak CSRF tokens, `SameSite=None`, or forms/JSON without anti-CSRF. Signals: cookie-only auth, no token, token not validated.

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Web Idor · noorqureshi
Insecure Direct Object Reference / broken access control on web objects. Load when a request references an object by id you can change: /account/1234, ?invoice=987, UUIDs in URLs/bodies, "download", "view", "edit" endpoints, numeric or guessable identifiers, or multi-tenant apps. Signals: sequential IDs, object refs in JSON, role/owner not re-checked.

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Web Saml · noorqureshi
Attack SAML SSO — signature exclusion/wrapping (XSW), unsigned assertions, and comment/XXE tricks to forge authentication. Load on SAML SSO (SAMLResponse, ACS URL, IdP/SP), enterprise login, or "SAML". Signals: SAMLResponse base64 in POST, /saml/acs, <saml:Assertion>, Shibboleth/ADFS/Okta SSO.

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Web Sqli · noorqureshi bundle
Detect and exploit SQL injection (error-based, UNION, boolean/time blind, stacked). Load when a param feeds a query, you see DB errors, numeric/string params change result sets, login forms, search, sort/order-by, or ORM raw queries. Signals: "id=", 500 on a quote, "You have an error in your SQL syntax", MySQL/Postgres/MSSQL/Oracle banners.

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Web Ssrf · noorqureshi
Discover and escalate Server-Side Request Forgery. Load when the app fetches a URL you influence: webhooks, "import from URL", link/image preview, PDF/HTML render, avatar-by-URL, URL health-checks, XML/SVG parsers. Signals: params like url=, uri=, dest=, callback=, image=, feed=, or a request that reaches out on your behalf.

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Web Ssti · noorqureshi bundle
Server-Side Template Injection → RCE. Load when user input is rendered by a template engine: profile names in emails, custom reports, "hello {{name}}", error pages echoing math, Jinja2/Twig/Freemarker/Velocity/ERB/Handlebars. Signals: {{7*7}} returns 49, ${...} or #{...} evaluated, framework stack traces mentioning a templating engine.

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Web OAUTH · noorqureshi
Attack OAuth 2.0 / OIDC / SSO flows for account takeover. Load on "Login with Google/GitHub", /authorize, /callback, redirect_uri, state, code/token params, SAML/OIDC SSO. Signals: OAuth endpoints, redirect_uri handling, missing state, implicit flow, pre-account-linking.

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API Fuzzing · noorqureshi
Discover and fuzz API endpoints, methods, params, and versions systematically. Load when you have an API base but not its full surface, an OpenAPI/Swagger/Postman spec, or "map/fuzz the API". Signals: /api, /v1, swagger.json, GraphQL, mobile backend, undocumented routes.

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API GRAPHQL · noorqureshi
Attack GraphQL APIs. Load on /graphql, /graphiql, /v1/graphql, a POST with {"query":"..."}, Apollo/Hasura/graphene stacks, or "query/mutation" language. Signals: introspection enabled, batched queries, deeply nested fields, __schema, aliases.

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Cloud GCP · noorqureshi
Attack Google Cloud Platform — metadata/SA token theft, IAM privilege escalation, and storage/ function misconfig. Load when the target runs on GCP, you hold a GCP SA key/token, or see gcp/gcloud/GCE/GKE/appspot. Signals: metadata.google.internal, service-account.json, storage.googleapis.com, cloudfunctions, gcloud.

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Web Arsenal · noorqureshi
One line: web enumeration + exploitation tool arsenal for authorized engagements. Trigger signals: port 80/443/8080/8443 open, "web", a URL to a lab target, an HTTP service surfaced by recon. Authorized, in-scope targets only.

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Ad Dacl Abuse · noorqureshi
Abuse Active Directory object ACLs/DACLs for lateral movement and escalation — GenericAll, WriteDACL, GenericWrite, WriteOwner, AddMember, ForceChangePassword, and DCSync rights. Load with domain creds + BloodHound showing an ACL edge, on "GenericAll", "WriteDACL", "DCSync", "abuse this edge".

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AI LLM Dos · noorqureshi
Unbounded-consumption / denial-of-wallet attacks on LLM apps — force runaway tokens, cost, or latency. Load when testing an LLM product's limits/billing, on "LLM DoS", cost amplification, or resource exhaustion. Signals: user-controlled prompts/max_tokens, agent loops, no rate/'cost caps'.

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Web Auth JWT · noorqureshi bundle
Attack JWT/session authentication. Load when auth uses a JWT (three base64url parts, header.payload.signature), Authorization: Bearer, or you see alg/kid/jku fields. Signals: eyJ... tokens, "alg":"none"/"HS256"/"RS256", kid header, JWKS endpoints, role/admin claims.

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Cloud Azure · noorqureshi
Attack Azure / Entra ID — managed-identity token theft, Entra (Azure AD) role abuse, and app/ storage misconfig. Load when the target is on Azure, you hold Azure creds/a token, or see Entra/AAD/azurewebsites/blob.core.windows.net. Signals: 169.254.169.254 IMDS, Managed Identity, az cli, Entra roles, service principals.

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Recon Osint · noorqureshi
Passive OSINT to expand attack surface without touching the target: dorks, code/secret leaks, Shodan/Censys, cloud assets, employees. Load at recon start, on "OSINT", "google/github dorks", "shodan", or gathering intel on an org. Signals: org name, root domain, "find leaks/exposed".

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Web Websocket · noorqureshi
Attack WebSocket endpoints — CSWSH (cross-site hijacking), message tampering, and auth gaps. Load on ws:// or wss:// connections, Socket.IO, real-time chat/notifications/trading, or "websocket". Signals: Upgrade: websocket, ws handshake, JSON messages over a socket, token in the handshake.

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AI Jailbreak · noorqureshi
Bypass an LLM's safety/guardrails to make it produce restricted output or ignore its policy. Load when testing an AI product's content controls, "jailbreak", "guardrail bypass", refusal testing, or safety evals. Signals: a chatbot/assistant with a usage policy, refusals to test, content filters.

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API Versioning · noorqureshi
Find and attack old/shadow API versions that missed a fix — improper inventory management. Load when the API is versioned (/v1, /v2, /api/2021-01), on "old API", or after mapping the surface. Signals: version in path/header/subdomain, deprecated docs, mobile app using an older version.

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Web Csp Bypass · noorqureshi
Get script to run despite a Content-Security-Policy — the step after finding an injection that CSP is blocking. Load when you have HTML/JS injection but the payload won't execute, on "CSP is blocking my XSS", or when auditing a CSP for weakness. Signals: a Content-Security-Policy header, a blocked-script console error, a reflected injection with no popup.

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Web Mfa Bypass · noorqureshi
Defeat a second authentication factor — OTP/TOTP, SMS, push, or backup codes. Load when login has a 2FA/MFA step and you want to reach the account without the factor, on "2FA bypass", "OTP brute", "MFA", or during account-takeover work. Signals: an OTP/verification screen after password, a "verify your device" step, `/verify`, `/2fa`, `otp`/`code` parameters.

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Ad Kerberoasting · noorqureshi
Kerberoasting & AS-REP roasting — request/crack Kerberos tickets to recover service/user passwords offline. Load with any domain foothold or valid domain creds, on "kerberoast", "AS-REP", SPNs, service accounts, ports 88/389. Signals: domain creds in hand, SPNs set, accounts with pre-auth disabled.

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Ad Pivot Arsenal · noorqureshi
One line: Active Directory, pivoting/tunneling, and password-cracking arsenal for authorized engagements. Trigger signals: "Active Directory", "domain", "kerberos", "kerberoast", "AS-REP", "BloodHound", "DCSync", "AD/.local domain", holding domain creds or a foothold. Authorized, in-scope targets only.

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Recon Arsenal · noorqureshi
One line: port/host/service discovery tool arsenal for authorized engagements. Pack in trigger signals so it auto-loads: "new target", "enumerate", "scan", an in-scope target, open-port lists needing deeper enum. Authorized, in-scope targets only.

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Web File Upload · noorqureshi bundle
Turn a file upload into RCE or stored XSS/SSRF. Load on any upload: avatars, attachments, import CSV/XML, profile images, document processors, "upload your resume". Signals: multipart/form-data, filename in response, an uploads/ path, image thumbnailing, PDF/office parsing.

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Web Host Header · noorqureshi
Host header injection — abuse a trusted Host/X-Forwarded-Host to poison password-reset links, routing, and caches. Load when the app builds absolute URLs from the request host, on password-reset flows, or behind a proxy/CDN. Signals: reset emails with links, X-Forwarded-Host reflected, virtual hosting, cache in front.

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Web Postmessage · noorqureshi
Exploit insecure cross-window messaging (`window.postMessage`) — handlers that trust `event.data` without checking `event.origin`, leading to XSS, token theft, or state change. Load when the app uses iframes/popups/SSO widgets, on "postMessage", or when JS registers a `message` listener. Signals: `addEventListener("message", ...)`, embedded third-party frames, SSO/login popups.

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API Auth Attacks · noorqureshi
Break API authentication: token handling, key leakage, weak session/JWT, and no-auth endpoints. Load on REST/GraphQL APIs using API keys, Bearer tokens, HMAC signing, or basic auth. Signals: `Authorization` headers, api_key params, tokens in URLs, /v1 vs /v2 auth drift.

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Web Clickjacking · noorqureshi
Clickjacking / UI redress — frame a target so a victim's clicks hit hidden actions. Load when a page allows framing (no X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors), on state-changing one-click actions, or "clickjacking". Signals: missing framebusting headers, sensitive buttons, OAuth consent, account settings.

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Web Jdbc Attacks · noorqureshi
Turn an attacker-controllable database connection string / JDBC URL into RCE via the driver itself. Load when an app lets you set a DB host/URL/driver: a "test connection" form, a data-source config, an ETL/reporting/integration tool, or a processor that takes a JDBC URL. Signals: a jdbc: URL field, H2/MySQL/Postgres connection settings, Apache NiFi/Mirth/Metabase/DBeaver-style data-source config, "connection string", driver properties you can edit.

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AI MCP Security · noorqureshi
Assess Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and agent tool integrations — tool poisoning, prompt injection via tool descriptions/results, over-broad scopes, and unauth tool exposure. Load when the target uses MCP servers, agent tool/function integrations, or connectors. Signals: mcp.json, MCP server, tool schemas, connector marketplace, agent with external tools.

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AI Supply Chain · noorqureshi
Attack the ML/LLM supply chain — poisoned models, datasets, plugins, and unsafe model deserialization. Load when an app loads third-party models/weights (HuggingFace, .pt/.pkl/.h5), installs ML deps, uses plugins/extensions, or fine-tunes on external data. Signals: torch.load, pickle model files, model hub downloads, plugin marketplace, RAG over external corpora.

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Cloud Imds Ssrf · noorqureshi
Escalate SSRF to cloud credential theft via the instance metadata service (IMDS). Load when SSRF is confirmed AND the target runs on AWS/GCP/Azure. Signals: 169.254.169.254 reachable, cloud-hosted app, SSRF that can set arbitrary Host/headers, "metadata".

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Mobile Webview · noorqureshi
Exploit insecure mobile WebViews — JS-bridge abuse, file access, and XSS→native. Load when an app renders web content in a WebView/WKWebView, exposes a JS bridge, or loads attacker-influenced URLs. Signals: addJavascriptInterface, WKScriptMessageHandler, loadUrl, file:// access, deep-link → WebView.

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Web Open Redirect · noorqureshi
Open redirect — abuse a redirect param to send users to attacker sites, and chain it (OAuth token theft, SSRF filter bypass, phishing). Load on params like redirect=, next=, url=, return=, callback=, dest=, or a 30x Location built from input. Signals: `?returnUrl=`, login redirects, OAuth `redirect_uri`.

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Ad Delegation Abuse · noorqureshi
Abuse Kerberos delegation to impersonate users and take over hosts — unconstrained, constrained (S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy), and resource-based (RBCD), including the coercion → NTLM-relay-to-LDAP → RBCD chain. Load in an AD environment when BloodHound/enum shows delegation rights, a machine account you control, GenericWrite/GenericAll over a computer, or coercion is possible. Signals: msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION, msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo, PetitPotam.

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AI RAG Poisoning · noorqureshi
Poison a RAG/knowledge-base pipeline so retrieved content hijacks the model (indirect prompt injection at scale) or exfiltrates data. Load when the app does retrieval over documents/URLs/ tickets/emails the attacker can influence, "RAG", vector DB, "knowledge base", agent that reads content. Signals: upload-to-KB, "chat with your docs", crawled sources.

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Cloud Kubernetes · noorqureshi
Attack exposed Kubernetes: API server, kubelet, etcd, dashboards, and RBAC. Load on k8s signals — ports 6443/10250/2379/8443, /api/v1, kube-dns, a pod foothold, or "kubernetes/k8s". Signals: kubectl, service-account tokens, exposed dashboard, container in a cluster.

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Web Business Logic · noorqureshi
Find business-logic flaws — abusing intended functionality in unintended ways. Load on workflows with money/quantity/state/limits: checkout, coupons, refunds, transfers, quotas, multi-step flows, role/tenant boundaries. Signals: price/qty params, discount codes, step skipping, negative/overflow values.

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Web Dom Clobbering · noorqureshi
Overwrite a page's JavaScript variables using only injected HTML — no script needed. Load when a sanitizer allows tags/attributes but strips script, and the app reads config/state from the DOM or globals. Signals: HTML injection behind DOMPurify/an allowlist, client code using `window.X`, `document.getElementById(...)`, or `config.*` that could come from named elements.

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API Mass Assignment · noorqureshi
Mass assignment / auto-binding privilege escalation. Load when an API binds JSON directly to a model (Rails, Spring, Django REST, Node/Mongoose), on signup/profile-update/create endpoints, or when responses expose fields you didn't send (role, isAdmin, balance, verified). Signals: ORM object binding, extra fields accepted silently.

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Cloud Iam Privesc · noorqureshi
Escalate privileges in cloud IAM (AWS/GCP/Azure) from a low-priv set of credentials. Load when you hold cloud creds/keys/a role and want higher privilege or new resources. Signals: leaked AWS keys, an assumed role, a service-account token, "escalate in AWS/GCP/Azure", enumerated permissions.

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Cloud S3 Exposure · noorqureshi
Find and prove misconfigured cloud object storage (S3/GCS/Azure Blob). Load when assets load from *.s3.amazonaws.com, storage.googleapis.com, *.blob.core.windows.net, bucket-looking hostnames, or "bucket". Signals: public-read/list, unauthenticated writes, predictable bucket names.

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Privesc Arsenal · noorqureshi
One line: Linux + Windows local privilege-escalation tool arsenal for authorized engagements. Trigger signals: "privesc", "got a shell", "escalate", "root", "SYSTEM", initial access gained but not root. Authorized, in-scope targets only.

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Recon JS Analysis · noorqureshi
Mine JavaScript for endpoints, params, secrets, and hidden functionality. Load on SPAs, heavy JS apps, after crawling, or "analyze the JS". Signals: bundled JS (webpack/main.*.js), API calls in JS, source maps, /static/js, front-end frameworks.

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Web Cache Deception · noorqureshi
Trick a CDN/cache into storing a victim's authenticated response at a public URL, then read it. Load on "web cache deception", when a CDN/cache sits in front of an app that serves per-user content, or to test whether private pages can be cached. Signals: `X-Cache`/`CF-Cache-Status` headers, caching by file extension, static-looking suffixes on dynamic endpoints.

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Web Cache Poisoning · noorqureshi
Web cache poisoning & deception — get a shared cache to serve attacker content to other users, or trick it into caching victims' private pages. Load behind a CDN/cache (Cloudflare, Varnish, Fastly, Akamai), on unkeyed headers, `X-Forwarded-Host`, cache headers, or static-looking URLs. Signals: `Age`/`X-Cache` headers, CDN, reflected headers.

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Web Deserialization · noorqureshi bundle
Insecure deserialization → RCE via gadget chains. Load when the app deserializes attacker data: Java (rO0/AC ED base64), PHP `unserialize` (O:), Python pickle, .NET BinaryFormatter/ViewState, Ruby Marshal/YAML. Signals: serialized blobs in cookies/params, `__VIEWSTATE`, `rO0AB`, `O:8:`.

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Web Race Conditions · noorqureshi
Exploit race conditions / TOCTOU — fire concurrent requests to break single-use limits. Load on "limit-once" actions: coupon/gift-card redemption, withdrawals, votes, invites, MFA/OTP attempts, balance changes. Signals: check-then-act on shared state, per-user quotas, "already used".

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Recon Cloud Assets · noorqureshi
Discover an organization's cloud footprint — buckets, blobs, apps, IP ranges, and services across AWS/GCP/Azure. Load during recon on a company target, on "cloud recon", finding storage/assets, or before cloud testing. Signals: an org name/domain in scope, assets on cloud CDNs, wildcard program.

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Recon Dns Analysis · noorqureshi
Deep DNS analysis for attack surface — record mining, zone transfers, DNSSEC/NSEC walking, and dangling records. Load during recon, on "DNS", a domain in scope, or hunting takeovers/origin IPs. Signals: a root domain, CNAMEs, MX/TXT/SPF, NS servers, subdomains to resolve.

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Web Account Takeover · noorqureshi
Systematic account-takeover hunting — password reset, email change, session, and linking flaws that seize another user's account. Load on "ATO", password-reset/forgot flows, email-change, OTP/2FA, "login as", session handling. Signals: reset tokens, email-change without re-auth, OTP, magic links.

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Web Cypher Injection · noorqureshi
Inject into Neo4j Cypher queries to bypass auth, exfiltrate graph data, and reach SSRF/RCE. Load when user input reaches a Cypher query (Neo4j-backed app, GraphQL/REST over a graph DB) — a login, search, or filter that builds `MATCH (n {prop:'<input>'})`. Signals: Neo4j/Bolt (7687), `MATCH`/ `RETURN` in errors, `neo4j` cookies/stack traces, apoc procedures, a graph-backed search field.

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AI Agent Tool Abuse · noorqureshi
Abuse an LLM agent's tools/functions — coerce it to call tools with attacker-chosen args for SSRF, RCE, data exfil, or privilege abuse. Load when the target is an agent with tools/ function-calling/plugins, MCP servers, code interpreters, or "the assistant can do X". Signals: function-calling, tool schemas, browse/email/query/exec tools, autonomous agents.

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AI Model Extraction · noorqureshi
Extract or steal an ML/LLM model's parameters, training data, or system prompt via query access — model stealing, membership inference, training-data extraction. Load when testing an ML API/endpoint, "model extraction/inversion", data-leakage or IP-theft concerns, exposed inference endpoints. Signals: a predict/inference API, embeddings endpoint, fine-tuned model.

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AI Prompt Injection · noorqureshi
Test LLM-backed apps for prompt injection (direct + indirect) and its consequences: data exfil, tool/function abuse, guardrail bypass. Load when the target is a chatbot/assistant/ agent, summarizes untrusted content, has tools/functions, or does RAG. Signals: "ask AI", system prompts, function-calling, "summarize this URL/file", agentic actions.

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API Testing Checklist · noorqureshi
A fast, ordered methodology for assessing an API end to end — REST/GraphQL/gRPC/SOAP — so nothing gets skipped. Load when the target is an API (or recon found one), on "test this API", "checklist", methodology triage, or to confirm coverage before reporting. Signals: /api, swagger/openapi.json, GraphQL /graphql, gRPC, JSON/XML endpoints, a mobile/SPA backend.

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Web Command Injection · noorqureshi bundle
Turn user input that reaches a shell into arbitrary OS command execution. Load when a parameter feeds a system call — ping/nslookup/host tools, file conversion (ImageMagick, ffmpeg), archive/ export, PDF/thumbnail generation, filename handling, or any "network tools" feature. Signals: output that looks like command output, a value echoed into a system utility, blind time/OOB behaviour.

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Web Rate Limit Bypass · noorqureshi
Bypass rate limits and anti-automation to enable brute force, OTP guessing, coupon abuse, and enumeration. Load when an endpoint is throttled (429/"too many attempts"), on login/OTP/reset, or "rate limit". Signals: 429 responses, lockout messages, per-account throttling, OTP/2FA.

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Web Request Smuggling · noorqureshi
HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE/TE.CL/TE.TE/CL.0) — desync front-end and back-end to poison other users' requests. Load behind a proxy/CDN/load-balancer, on "smuggling/desync", or when Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding handling differs. Signals: front-end + back-end chain, timing anomalies, HTTP/1.1 keep-alive.

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Web Testing Checklist · noorqureshi
A fast, ordered checklist for testing a web application end to end — so nothing gets skipped. Load when starting on a web target, "checklist", "what should I test", methodology triage, or to confirm coverage before reporting. Signals: a new web app in scope, "am I missing anything".

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Code Review Go · noorqureshi
Security review of Go code — dangerous sinks and web-framework pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Go codebase/PR, on .go source in scope, or "review this Go". Signals: go.mod, net/http, os/exec, text/template, database/sql, gin/echo/fiber.

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Defense Ad Defense · noorqureshi
Detect and harden against Active Directory attacks — Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, DCSync, ADCS abuse, and delegation/relay. Load for "detect kerberoasting", "harden AD", "AD monitoring", "did someone DCSync us", or defending a domain. The defensive counterpart to the ad-* offensive skills.

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Network Ntlm Relay · noorqureshi
Coerce and relay NTLM authentication for lateral movement and privilege escalation (relay to SMB, LDAP, ADCS). Load in an AD network with a foothold, on "NTLM relay", "responder", "coerce", no/absent SMB signing, or PetitPotam/PrinterBug. Signals: LLMNR/NBT-NS traffic, SMB signing off, MS-RPRN/EFSRPC.

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Recon Subdomain Enum · noorqureshi
Enumerate subdomains and live hosts to build the attack surface for a bug-bounty program or external assessment. Load at engagement start, on "recon", a root domain in scope, "find subdomains", or before content discovery. Signals: wildcard scope (*.target.com), a program scope list, a new external target.

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Web Lfi Path Traversal · noorqureshi
Local File Inclusion / path traversal → read files, sometimes RCE. Load when a param names a file/path/template/page: ?file=, ?page=, ?template=, ?download=, ?lang=, or path segments. Signals: filenames in params, "include", download endpoints, `../` filtered, `.php?page=`.

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Web Subdomain Takeover · noorqureshi
Claim a dangling DNS record pointing to a deprovisioned service (subdomain takeover). Load after subdomain enum, on CNAMEs to cloud services, "NoSuchBucket"/"404 there isn't a GitHub Pages site here", or dangling A/CNAME. Signals: CNAME → S3/GitHub/Heroku/Azure/Fastly with a fingerprint error page.

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Cloud Docker Registry · noorqureshi
Find and loot exposed container registries — image pull/push, secrets baked in layers, and registry misconfig. Load on exposed Docker registry (port 5000, /v2/), a registry URL, harbor/ECR/ GCR/ACR references, or "container registry". Signals: /v2/_catalog, registry:2, unauth pull/push.

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Code Review Cpp · noorqureshi
Security review of C / C++ code — memory-safety and the classic unsafe-API sinks. Load when reviewing C/C++ source/PR, on .c/.cc/.cpp/.h in scope, or "review this C code". Signals: Makefile/CMakeLists, strcpy/sprintf/memcpy, malloc/free, raw pointers, format strings, parsers.

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Code Review Iac · noorqureshi
Security review of infrastructure-as-code — Terraform, CloudFormation, Ansible, Kubernetes/Helm manifests. Load when reviewing IaC in a repo/PR, on .tf/.yaml/.yml infra files, or "review our Terraform". Signals: *.tf, cloudformation/*.yaml, playbooks, k8s manifests, Helm charts, module registries.

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Code Review PHP · noorqureshi
Security review of PHP code — dangerous sinks and framework pitfalls (Laravel/Symfony/WordPress). Load when reviewing a PHP codebase/PR, on .php source in scope, or "review this PHP". Signals: composer.json, index.php, Laravel/Symfony/WP, unserialize, include/require with variables, mysqli/PDO.

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Defense Dfir Triage · noorqureshi
First-response DFIR triage: scope an incident, collect volatile evidence, and find attacker activity on Linux/Windows. Load on "incident", "we got breached", "investigate this host", "IOCs", suspected compromise, or forensic triage. Signals: alert to investigate, suspicious host, "what happened".

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Defense Purple Team · noorqureshi
Run a purple-team exercise — emulate specific attacker techniques and validate detection/response end to end. Load for "purple team", detection validation, ATT&CK coverage testing, "can we detect X", or turning red-team findings into blue-team improvements. Signals: detection gaps, ATT&CK mapping, control testing.

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Privesc Enumeration · noorqureshi
Systematic post-foothold host enumeration and credential/loot hunting on Linux and Windows — build situational awareness and find the lead that escalates or moves laterally. Load the moment you land a shell and think "now what?". Signals: fresh foothold, low-priv user, "enumerate the box", "situational awareness", hunting configs/history/creds, before running exploit tooling.

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Web Prototype Pollution · noorqureshi
JavaScript prototype pollution (client & server) → XSS, auth bypass, RCE via gadgets. Load on Node.js/JS apps that merge user objects: query/JSON parsing, `Object.assign`/deep-merge, lodash/jQuery.extend, config merges. Signals: __proto__, constructor.prototype in params, Node backend, client-side sinks.

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Wireless Evil Twin · noorqureshi
Stand up a rogue/evil-twin access point to harvest credentials — WPA2-Enterprise PEAP-MSCHAPv2 challenge/response and captive-portal capture. Load on an authorized wireless engagement targeting WPA-Enterprise (802.1X) or a portal-based network. Signals: PEAP/EAP/802.1X, RADIUS, "enterprise Wi-Fi", eaphammer/hostapd-wpe in play, a captive portal, corporate SSID with per-user logins.

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Cloud Container Escape · noorqureshi
Break out of a container to the host. Load when you have a shell in a container/pod and want the node: privileged container, mounted docker.sock, dangerous capabilities, hostPath, or "escape the container". Signals: /.dockerenv, cgroup shows docker/k8s, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, mounted socket.

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Cloud Docker API Abuse · noorqureshi
Turn an exposed container daemon or an over-privileged container into host compromise — a Docker API on 2375/2376, a mounted docker.sock, or a privileged/`-v /:/host` container. Load when you find an open Docker/containerd socket, port 2375/2376, a container you can run images in, or you landed inside a container and want the host. Signals: 2375/tcp open, /var/run/docker.sock reachable, `docker` group membership, privileged container, host paths mounted in.

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Code Review Cicd · noorqureshi
Review CI/CD pipelines for security flaws — poisoned workflows, secret leakage, and injection. Load on GitHub Actions / GitLab CI / Jenkins config, ".github/workflows", pull_request_target, self-hosted runners, or "pipeline security". Signals: workflow YAML, secrets in CI, third-party actions.

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Code Review Java · noorqureshi
Security review of Java code — dangerous sinks and Spring pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Java/ Spring codebase/PR, on .java source in scope, or "review this Java". Signals: pom.xml/build.gradle, Spring/Spring Boot, ObjectInputStream, XML parsers, Runtime.exec, JNDI/lookups.

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Code Review Ruby · noorqureshi
Security review of Ruby code — dangerous sinks and Rails pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Ruby/Rails codebase/PR, on .rb source in scope, or "review this Rails app". Signals: Gemfile, config/routes.rb, ActiveRecord, ERB, YAML.load, send/constantize.

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Code Review Rust · noorqureshi
Security review of Rust code — where a memory-safe language still has real bugs: `unsafe`, FFI, panics, and the usual injection/logic sinks. Load when reviewing Rust source/PR, on .rs / Cargo.toml in scope, or "review this Rust". Signals: Cargo.toml, unsafe blocks, extern "C", unwrap/expect, actix/axum/rocket handlers.

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Defense Log Analysis · noorqureshi
Hunt for attacker activity in logs — auth, web, cloud, endpoint — with concrete queries and what to look for. Load for blue-team log/SIEM hunting, "analyze these logs", "find the attack", triage of auth/web/cloud logs, or building hunts. Signals: log files/SIEM, "what happened", IOC hunting.

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Exploit Chaining · noorqureshi
Combine low/medium findings into one high-impact exploit chain, and amplify demonstrated impact. Load when you have several small bugs, a "so what?" finding, on "chain", "escalate impact", or building the narrative for a report. Signals: self-XSS + CSRF, open-redirect + OAuth, IDOR + info-leak, SSRF + metadata.

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Mobile Deeplink Abuse · noorqureshi
Abuse deep links / custom URL schemes / intents for redirect, token theft, and reaching internal screens. Load on custom schemes (myapp://), App Links/Universal Links, exported activities, or "open in app". Signals: intent-filters in the manifest, WebView loading deep-link params, OAuth redirect via a custom scheme.

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Mobile IOS Assessment · noorqureshi
Assess an iOS app (static + dynamic). Load when the target is an IPA / iOS app, an iOS bug-bounty scope, or "test the iOS app". Signals: .ipa, Info.plist, Swift/Obj-C, Keychain, URL schemes, ATS exceptions, Frida/objection on a jailbroken device.

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Payloads Waf Bypass · noorqureshi bundle
Bypass WAFs/filters blocking your payloads. Load when a payload that should work is blocked, you see 403/406/429 or "request blocked", Cloudflare/Akamai/Imperva/AWS-WAF/ModSecurity, or a filter strips keywords. Signals: works locally but blocked on target, generic block pages.

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Web Dependency Confusion · noorqureshi
Dependency confusion / substitution — publish a malicious public package matching an internal name so build systems pull yours. Load on leaked internal package names (npm/PyPI/RubyGems/Maven), package.json/requirements with unknown deps, or private-registry setups. Signals: @scope/internal packages, non-public dep names in manifests, .npmrc/registry config leaks.

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Recon Content Discovery · noorqureshi
Discover hidden paths, endpoints, params, and JS-exposed routes on a web target. Load after a live host is found, on "dirbust/content discovery/fuzzing", or when mapping an app's real surface. Signals: a single web host to deep-map, SPA with API calls, /api, JS bundles.

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160 published skills · page 1 of 2