NoorQureshi
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- 6 days ago last updated
- ▌ Defense Threat Modeling · noorqureshiThreat-model a system or feature (STRIDE + attack trees) to find design-level risk before code. Load on "threat model", a new design/architecture review, security design questions, or planning controls. Signals: architecture diagram, data-flow, "what could go wrong", pre-build security.
- ▌ Tradecraft Scope Roe · noorqureshiEstablish and enforce the authorization envelope before any testing — the scope rule that governs everything. Load FIRST on every engagement, on "start", a new target, a program handle, or any ambiguity about what is allowed. Signals: a domain/IP to test, a bug-bounty program handle, a pentest statement of work, a scope list.
- ▌ Tradecraft Attack Scenarios · noorqureshiTurn a goal + a scope into a concrete, ordered attack scenario across multiple skills — not one technique in isolation. Load at the START of an engagement, on "where do I even begin", when a target has many surfaces, or to plan an objective-driven path (e.g. "reach domain admin", "prove data exfil"). This is how an agent decides what to try, in what order, and why.
- ▌ Reverse Eng Dotnet · noorqureshi bundleReverse a .NET / C# assembly — decompile, deobfuscate, debug, and IL-patch managed binaries. Load when the target is a managed PE (.exe/.dll with a CLR header), a Sharp* red-team tool (Rubeus, SharpHound, Seatbelt), a ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly/Babel/.NET-Reactor-obfuscated sample, or a .NET loader/stealer. Signals: "mscoree" / "_CorExeMain" / "mscorlib" strings, garbled Unicode class names in a decompiler, "deobfuscate this .NET", "patch/keygen a C# binary".
- ▌ Reverse Eng Ghidra · noorqureshiReverse engineer with Ghidra (GUI, headless, or ghidra-mcp) — decompile, cross-references, scripting — when there's no IDA license, for batch/CI decompilation, or as a free second opinion. Load for "decompile without IDA", bulk analysis of many samples, analyzeHeadless, Ghidra scripts (Jython/PyGhidra), or patch diffing with ghidriff. Signals: an ELF/PE needing a decompiler, "use Ghidra", headless automation, no commercial RE license.
- ▌ Reverse Eng Go Rust · noorqureshiReverse stripped Go and Rust binaries — recover symbols from pclntab/moduledata and panic metadata, then navigate language-specific idioms. Load when a stripped ELF/PE/Mach-O shows Go or Rust runtime residue. Signals: "go.buildid", "runtime.main" / "main.main", "panic:" or "rust_begin_unwind" strings, /rustc/ or src/*.rs paths, huge static binary with no symbols, Go malware, a Rust release build.
- ▌ Reverse Eng Malware · noorqureshi bundleFully analyze a malware sample — static, dynamic, and behavioral — including unpacking and IAT rebuild, import-table triage, anti-analysis detection and defeat, IOC extraction, and YARA/Sigma rule writing. Load when handed a suspicious PE/ELF/Mach-O/script sample to reverse beyond quick triage: packed binaries, "analyze this malware", a sandbox run that shows no behavior, or a need for durable detection. Signals: a dropped sample, a VirusTotal/MalwareBazaar hash, C2 strings, anti-VM/anti-debug checks, "write a YARA rule for this family".
- ▌ Reverse Eng Radare2 · noorqureshi bundleCommand-line binary analysis with radare2/r2 — recon, disassembly, strings/imports, cross-references, patching, diffing, and scripting, no GUI needed. Load for exe/dll/so/elf/dex/wasm CLI analysis, quick triage before committing to IDA/Ghidra, r2 batch commands (-c/-A), r2pipe scripts, or help with rabin2/rasm2/radiff2/rahash2/rax2. Signals: "use radare2/r2", terminal-only environment, radiff2 diffing, fast recon on a new sample.
- ▌ Reverse Eng Protocol · noorqureshi bundleReverse a custom network protocol from captured traffic or the client binary: recover the frame layout, message-type dictionary, field meanings, and state machine. Load for custom TCP/UDP binary protocols, Protobuf/gRPC without reflection, FlatBuffers/MessagePack, WebSocket/MQTT/private RPC framing, PCAP-driven format recovery, length-prefixed or TLV frames, magic bytes, CRC/checksum fields, or encrypted frame headers.
- ▌ Reverse Eng Patch Diff · noorqureshi bundleTurn a vendor security patch into a working N-day: diff the patched and unpatched binaries, read the newly added safety checks back to a bug class, then write a PoC that crashes the unpatched build. Load for a CVE with a patch but no public PoC, Patch Tuesday triage (ntoskrnl / win32k / afd.sys / clfs.sys), Linux LTS backport analysis, bindiff / ghidriff / Diaphora workflows, patch diff, binary diffing to find what a patch fixed.
- ▌ Reverse Eng Binary Ninja · noorqureshiReverse engineer in Binary Ninja — HLIL/MLIL/LLIL inspection, strings/imports/exports, cross-references, types, patching, Python API automation, and the optional MCP/HTTP bridge. Load when the user picks Binary Ninja, when its IL levels materially help data-flow analysis, or when IDA/Ghidra/radare2 results need an independent cross-check. Signals: "binaryninja", HLIL/MLIL, BinaryView scripting, Vector 35, localhost:9009 bridge.
- ▌ Reverse Eng Edr Analysis · noorqureshi bundleReverse engineer the EDR/AV on an authorized target host, then evade it — fingerprint the product, dump its userland hook table, and assemble a matching bypass stack: ntdll unhooking, direct/indirect syscalls (Hell's/Halo's/Tartarus Gate), ETW and AMSI patching, hardware-breakpoint Blindside, call-stack spoofing, PPID spoof, sleep masks. Load for "bypass EDR", implant OPSEC against CrowdStrike/Defender/SentinelOne, or when telemetry keeps killing your payload. Signals: unhook, direct syscall, ETW patch, AMSI patch, ETW-TI, Sysmon evasion, MITRE T1562. Pentest only.
- ▌ Reverse Eng Thick Client · noorqureshiSecurity-test a desktop thick client end to end: map its trust boundaries, then work the local attack surface (config files, credential storage, IPC, update channel) and the network surface (proxying, certificate pinning, hidden APIs). Load for a C/S desktop app in scope — Electron, Qt, .NET WinForms/WPF, or native — an installer to audit, local config/credential storage to assess, named pipes or loopback IPC, an auto-update channel, or a client that hides admin-only API calls.
- ▌ Mobile Apk Reverse · noorqureshi bundleReverse an Android APK end-to-end — jadx/apktool unpacking, manifest and smali analysis, rebuild-sign-install patching, and Frida runtime hooks. Load when handed an .apk to understand, modify, or instrument: login/signing/risk-control logic, root or SSL-pinning checks, cert validation, embedded .so/JNI code. Signals: an APK in scope, "decompile/patch this app", smali, AndroidManifest.xml, jadx/apktool/frida/adb, System.loadLibrary, OkHttp/Retrofit.
- ▌ Web Extension Reverse · noorqureshiReverse engineer browser extensions (Chrome/Edge MV2/MV3, Firefox) for an authorized review: unpack .crx/.xpi, assess the permission surface, trace background/service-worker and content-script logic, and recover credential, signing, or traffic-handling behavior. Load on "analyze this extension", extension supply-chain or malicious-extension investigation, or keys hidden in chrome.storage. Signals: .crx, .xpi, manifest.json, chrome-extension://, <all_urls>, webRequestBlocking, declarativeNetRequest, externally_connectable, nativeMessaging.
- ▌ Hardware Security · noorqureshiDiscover and triage hardware debug interfaces (UART, JTAG, SWD) on an authorized embedded device — read boot logs, land a root console, interrupt the bootloader, and extract flash for offline analysis. Load when handed a physical device, PCB, or IoT/embedded target in scope, exposed test points or header pins, a serial console, U-Boot prompt, or a flash chip to dump. Signals: TX/RX/GND pads, silkscreen labels, baud-rate guessing, IDCODE enumeration.
- ▌ Hardware Radio Sdr · noorqureshiAuthorized RF/SDR security research on non-Wi-Fi radio signals — identify a signal's frequency and modulation receive-only, demodulate and reverse the protocol, and assess replay feasibility in a shielded lab. Load for wireless remotes, key fobs, sensors, telemetry, ISM-band devices, ADS-B, or any sub-GHz/RF protocol outside classic Wi-Fi. Signals: unknown RF device in scope, 315/433/868/915 MHz, OOK/ASK/FSK captures, RTL-SDR/HackRF work.
- ▌ Defense Threat Intel · noorqureshi bundleEnrich IOCs, campaigns, impersonation, and scam narratives from public sources — bounded public X/Twitter collection via Xquik plus independent corroboration — and hand off a reviewable intelligence package. Load for "enrich this IOC", "is this domain in recent phishing disclosures", tracking threat-actor aliases or lookalike accounts, or prepping an intel package for threat hunting, malware triage, or IR. Signals: IOC lists (domain/IP/URL/hash/email/wallet), campaign names, phishing disclosures, impersonation reports, X/Twitter leads, Xquik.
- ▌ Automation Browser · noorqureshi bundleDrive a real browser against an in-scope web app with Playwright / agent-browser: automated login, form and payload submission through the UI, scraping JS-rendered pages, request/response interception, and evidence screenshots. Load on "browser automation", "fill this form", "submit payload", "screenshot this page", automated login, headless crawling, or UI-driven XSS testing. Signals: Playwright, agent-browser, headless, @e1 element refs, networkidle, DOM interaction.
- ▌ Exploit Pwn Chain · noorqureshi bundleEngineer a reliable exploit from a known memory-corruption bug — stack, heap, or kernel — taking a local crash to a stable remote exploit: ret2libc/ret2csu/one_gadget, tcache/fastbin/unsorted-bin techniques matched to the glibc version, kernel pwn against SMEP/SMAP/KASLR/KPTI, and remote stabilization (libc fingerprinting, stack alignment, recvuntil anchoring, spray sizing). Load when you have binary + bug + target environment and "local works, remote crashes". Signals: pwn, ROP, ret2libc, one_gadget, tcache, heap spray, kROP, modprobe_path, pwntools, checksec output.
- ▌ AI System Prompt Leakage · noorqureshiExtract an LLM app's system prompt / hidden developer instructions — the attack map that reveals guardrails, tool definitions, internal endpoints, and planted secrets. Load when the target is a chatbot/assistant/agent with hidden instructions, refuses with policy-sounding language, names tools or functions in errors, or does RAG. Signals: "repeat your instructions", canned refusals, verbose tool-call errors, "you are a helpful assistant for <company>".
- ▌ Network Email Security · noorqureshiEmail security review: dissect phishing samples (headers, URLs, attachments), assess a domain's spoofability via SPF/DKIM/DMARC alignment, recognize BEC patterns, and audit tenant anti-phishing controls incl. OAuth consent abuse. Load on phishing email analysis, .eml header review, "can this domain be spoofed", DMARC/SPF checks, or BEC investigation. Signals: Received chain, Authentication-Results, dmarc p=none, ~all vs -all, reply-to mismatch, lookalike domains.
- ▌ Network Database Security · noorqureshiAssess reachable database services — PostgreSQL/MySQL/MSSQL/MongoDB/Redis — for unauthenticated access, weak/default accounts, over-broad grants, and dangerous features (xp_cmdshell, COPY FROM PROGRAM, UDF, Redis file write) that turn a DB login into OS code execution. Load when recon shows 3306/5432/1433/6379/27017, leaked app config yields DB creds, or a database review is in scope. Signals: 0.0.0.0 bind, unauth Redis PONG, mysql.user host '%', FILE priv, secure_file_priv empty, xp_cmdshell.
- ▌ AI Sensitive Data Disclosure · noorqureshiMake an LLM app disclose sensitive data it should never reveal: training-data memorization, secrets/PII in RAG context, cross-tenant leakage, conversation logs. Load when the target LLM has RAG/document access, is multi-tenant (per-user/per-org assistants), was fine-tuned on private data, or logs conversations. Signals: "ask your documents", per-org chatbots, upload a file and query it, admin/debug endpoints, conversation history in analytics.
- ▌ Reverse Eng JS · noorqureshi bundleReverse front-end JavaScript end to end: trace which script fires a given request, capture a signing/encryption function's real inputs at runtime, then rebuild the algorithm locally in Node.js with evidence-driven environment shims until it reproduces the target parameter. Load when you need the *mechanism* behind client-computed params (sign, signature, _signature, X-Sign, token, encrypted bodies, anti-bot / risk-control fields), when webpack-minified or obfuscated JS hides the logic, or when you must trace an XHR/fetch/WebSocket trigger point.
- ▌ Tradecraft Attack Chain · noorqureshi bundleOrchestrate a full multi-stage kill chain — recon → initial access → privilege escalation → lateral movement → objective — with phase gates, per-phase playbooks, and operating discipline. Load on pentest tasks that span stages: "get from external to domain admin", "full internal pentest", "I have a webshell, route me to the objective", red-team exercise planning. Single-stage tasks go straight to their domain skill; bug bounty never uses this.
- ▌ Reporting Evidence Review · noorqureshiPre-handoff audit of an engagement package — scope confirmed, every finding traceable to reproducible evidence, activity-log leads closed with rationale, artifact hashes intact. Load before writing the final report or handing a case to a teammate/client, on "is this ready to report", "review my engagement notes", QA of findings/ + notes.md. Signals: findings folder full, handoff, report QA, evidence chain, chain of custody.
- ▌ Reverse Eng Ida · noorqureshi bundleDeep reverse engineering in IDA Pro — Hex-Rays decompile, cross-references, types, patching — via the GUI or the ida-pro-mcp bridge for agent-driven analysis. Load when a PE/ELF/Mach-O/DLL/SYS needs pseudocode-grade analysis: license/serial checks, crypto or protocol recovery, a sink found during triage, malware capability mapping. Signals: "decompile this exe/dll", IDA, Hex-Rays, idapro_* tools, port 13337, .i64/.idb database, idalib.
- ▌ Reverse Eng Macos · noorqureshiReverse macOS Mach-O binaries and .app bundles — codesign/notarization state, entitlements, Objective-C/Swift symbol recovery, and lldb/Frida dynamic analysis. Load when the target is a Mach-O executable/dylib/framework, an .app bundle, a LaunchAgent/Daemon plist, or Apple-platform malware. Signals: "Mach-O 64-bit executable", codesign/spctl output, hardened runtime, objc_msgSend, mangled _ZN/_$s symbols, XPC service names, TCC prompts.
- ▌ Ctf Rev · noorqureshiCTF reversing speed-run — crack flag-check binaries fast: locate the check via strings/xrefs, bypass anti-debug and obfuscation, and solve constraint-checkers with z3 instead of manual algebra. Load when the handout is an ELF/PE/exe that asks for input or a key. Signals: "rev" category, "Enter the flag/key/password", correct/wrong messages, crackme, packed binary, anti-debug (ptrace, IsDebuggerPresent), keygen challenge.
- ▌ Ctf Web · noorqureshiCTF web challenge playbook — the recurring shapes jeopardy web challenges take: source disclosure (.git, backups, flask debug), SSTI/SSRF in their CTF forms, PHP quirks (type juggling, wrappers, filters), cookie/JWT games, and chained primitives to read /flag. Load on any CTF challenge whose handout is a URL. Signals: "web" category, flask/werkzeug or PHP banner, /flag or flag.txt on the box, robots.txt, provided app.py/index.php source, JWT or flask session cookie.
- ▌ Ctf Crypto · noorqureshiCTF crypto challenge playbook — read the provided encryption script like a spec, attack RSA parameter weaknesses, XOR/multi-time-pad oracles, and homemade ciphers with math tooling (z3, sympy, sage). Load when the handout is .py/.sage math, n/e/c values, or an "encryption service" on nc. Signals: "crypto" category, chall.py with Crypto.Util.number, e=3 or e=65537, "encrypted_flag", XOR with a key, nc service that encrypts your input.
- ▌ Tools Curl · noorqureshiUse curl as the ground-truth HTTP client during recon and verification — browser-impersonation headers for CDN/WAF 403s, --globoff for bracket params, Windows curl.exe quirks, SPA false-200 traps. Load when bare tooling gets 403/blocked at a CDN edge, an API needs precise hand-crafted requests, or scanner output needs a clean manual repro. Signals: curl, 403 access-policy, CF-RAY, Cf-Mitigated, "bad range in position", --globoff, data-center UA blocked.
- ▌ Tools Ffuf · noorqureshiFuzz web targets with ffuf for content, parameter, and vhost discovery — FUZZ keyword placement in paths, query strings, POST bodies and Host headers, matcher/filter calibration (-mc/-fs/-ac), recursion, and when to switch to feroxbuster/gobuster/dirsearch. Load when a web target needs hidden paths, files, parameters, or virtual hosts enumerated. Signals: ffuf -w FUZZ, directory brute force, gobuster dir, feroxbuster, dirsearch, raft-medium-directories, burp-parameter-names, 404 filtering.
- ▌ Tools Nmap · noorqureshiOperate nmap and masscan for port/service scanning of in-scope hosts — scan-type selection (SYN/connect/UDP), version and OS detection, NSE vuln scripts, output formats, and the masscan-wide-then-nmap-deep pattern. Load when recon surfaces hosts/IPs and you need open ports, service versions, or OS fingerprints. Signals: nmap, masscan, -sV -sC -O, --script vuln, -p1-65535, --rate, "dnet: Failed to open device", top-ports, -oX.
- ▌ Ctf Forensics · noorqureshiCTF forensics playbook — quick wins on pcaps, memory dumps, disk images, and stego files: binwalk carving, Wireshark object export, Volatility's five commands that solve most memory challenges, steghide/zsteg/exiftool stego battery. Load when the handout is a capture, image, or dump file. Signals: "forensics"/"stego" category, .pcap/.pcapng, .mem/.raw/.vmem, .dd/.img/.E01, a lone .png/.jpg/.wav, "incident", "suspicious traffic".
- ▌ Tools Hydra · noorqureshiRun online password attacks against live services with hydra and its alternatives (medusa, ncrack, patator, crowbar) — service modules, http-post-form failure strings, thread tuning, resume, and lockout avoidance. Load when scope allows credential guessing against SSH/FTP/RDP/MySQL/web login forms and offline cracking is not an option. Signals: hydra -l -P, http-post-form, ^USER^ ^PASS^, ssh:// rdp:// mysql:// targets, medusa -M, ncrack, patator, login brute force.
- ▌ Tools Nuclei · noorqureshiOperate nuclei for template-based vulnerability scanning at scale — severity/tag selection, bulk targets, rate limiting, proxying, JSON output, and safe custom templates. Load when you have live hosts from recon and need known-CVE/misconfig/exposure sweeps, or when scanner hits need validation. Signals: nuclei, -severity critical,high, nuclei-templates, -tags cve, "9000+ templates", httpx | nuclei pipelines.
- ▌ Tools Sqlmap · noorqureshiOperate sqlmap to confirm and exploit SQL injection — target selection from Burp requests, level/risk tuning, tamper scripts for WAF evasion, DB enumeration, and safe dump discipline. Load after a manual SQLi probe shows promise, or when automating confirmation across parameters. Signals: sqlmap, --batch --dbs, --tamper, --os-shell, "parameter is vulnerable", time-based blind, SLEEP(5), sqlmap resume.
- ▌ Ctf Methodology · noorqureshiCTF challenge triage and time management — identify the category and intended technique from the handout artifacts in the first 10 minutes, budget points vs. time, and know when to park a challenge. Load at the start of any CTF/jeopardy challenge, when handed an unknown file, URL, or "nc host port" with no context. Signals: flag{...} / CTF{...} format, challenge tarball, pwn/ web/crypto/rev/forensics/misc categories, "nc ", Docker handout, points value.
- ▌ Tools Arsenal · noorqureshiCross-domain pentest tool selection — which tool for which job, and which Security Skills skill to load for it. Load at engagement start or whenever a new surface appears and you need the right scanner/framework/wordlist. Signals: "which tool for", tool selection, arsenal, SecLists, PayloadsAllTheThings, searchsploit, "what do I scan this with".
- ▌ Tools Hashcat · noorqureshiCrack password hashes offline with hashcat (GPU) and John the Ripper (CPU) — hash-mode selection, attack modes (straight/mask/combinator/rules), the -m type table, *2john extractors, and potfile discipline. Load when loot includes hashes: NTLM/NetNTLMv2 dumps, Kerberos TGS (kerberoast), JWT secrets, /etc/shadow, zip/rar/ssh key passwords. Signals: hashcat -m, rockyou, best64.rule, $6$ hashes, unshadow, john --show, mask ?a?a?a.
- ▌ Tools Burp Suite · noorqureshi bundleDrive Burp Suite for web/API testing — proxy history triage, Repeater, Intruder enumeration, Collaborator OOB, active scanning — manually or agent-driven through a Burp MCP extension on 127.0.0.1:9876. Load for any HTTP-target deep testing: "burp", proxy history analysis, repeater replay, intruder brute/enum, collaborator payloads, DAST scan, CSRF PoC generation, token randomness analysis. Signals: port 8080 proxy, port 9876 MCP, burpsuite, BApp MCP Server.
- ▌ Tools Metasploit · noorqureshiDrive Metasploit (msfconsole/msfrpcd) for the exploitation phase without hanging the toolchain — one-shot -x invocations, RPC daemon mode for persistent sessions, batch auxiliary runs. Load when a confirmed vuln maps to a public MSF module, you need exploit/multi/handler for a reverse shell, or meterpreter sessions must survive across steps. Signals: msfconsole, msf, meterpreter, LHOST/LPORT, "module for this CVE", exploit/multi/handler, session opened.
- ▌ Tools MCP Bridges · noorqureshiExpose CLI security tools to an AI agent through MCP servers — mcp-kali-server generic terminal bridge, MetasploitMCP, pentestMCP Docker bundle, mcp-security-hub, single-tool nmap/nuclei servers. Load when setting up agent-driven tooling on Kali or wiring a new tool into MCP. Signals: mcpServers config, kali-server-mcp, metasploitmcp, pentestmcp, "MCP server for nmap", stdio transport, port 5000/8080/8085.
- ▌ Web Open Graph Ssrf · noorqureshiSSRF through link-preview / URL-unfurl / oEmbed features. Load when the app generates a preview card for a user-supplied URL: chat/forum/comment link unfurling, "add a link" in posts or profiles, oEmbed endpoints, rich-text editors that auto-embed, bookmark/save-for-later tools, or any UI that shows an Open Graph title/image/description for a pasted link. Signals: params like url=, link=, embed=, preview=; a "fetching preview" spinner; response JSON with og:title / og:image fields; User-Agents like *bot, *crawler, Slackbot, Discordbot, or a fetch from a different egress IP than the app.
- ▌ Hardware Ot Ics · noorqureshiAssess OT/ICS environments — PLC, SCADA, DCS, HMI — safely and passive-first: Purdue-model zoning, industrial protocol discovery (Modbus, S7, DNP3, EtherNet/IP), mirrored-traffic analysis, and read-only verification. Load for an authorized engagement touching industrial control networks, engineering workstations, historians, or IT/OT boundaries. Signals: ports 502, 102, 44818, 20000; Modbus/S7comm banners; PLC/RTU inventory requests.
- ▌ Defense Forensics · noorqureshiDeep forensic artifact analysis after triage — memory dumps (Volatility 3), disk and super-timelines (Plaso), PCAP (tshark), and Windows host artifacts (Zimmerman toolset) — with hashing and chain of custody. Load when an incident moves past first response into "prove what the attacker did on this image": a memory dump to analyze, an E01/disk image, a captured pcap, or Prefetch/Shimcache/Amcache deep-dives. Signals: .dmp/.raw memory image, E01, pcap/pcapng, "analyze this dump", timeline reconstruction, evidence preservation.
- ▌ Ctf Pwn · noorqureshiCTF pwn challenge playbook — fast pwntools workflow against "nc host port" services: reproduce the remote environment locally with the provided libc/ld (patchelf, Docker), exploit format-string bugs (the CTF staple) for leaks and writes, and iterate a script from crash to flag. Load when the handout is a binary plus connection info. Signals: "pwn" category, nc host port, checksec output, provided libc.so.6/ld-linux, Dockerfile, "%p" reflections, menu-driven heap note apps.
- ▌ Tradecraft Bugbounty Platforms · noorqureshiUnderstand how the major bug-bounty platforms differ — scope rules, disclosure, triage, and reputation — so you play each correctly. Load when working a program on HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack, or Immunefi, on "platform rules", "safe harbor", "VDP vs paid", or before submitting. Signals: a program URL on one of these platforms, a policy/scope page.
- ▌ Tradecraft Complex Engagements · noorqureshiStructure and discipline for complex, multi-stage targets — where the path is a chain of several bugs across multiple hosts, needs source review / custom exploit work, and spans sessions. Load when a foothold needs chaining, work spans multiple hosts, you're deep in dead-ends, or "stuck", "chain", "multi-host", "hard target".
- ▌ Tradecraft Duplicate Avoidance · noorqureshiAvoid burning time on bugs that will be closed as duplicates. Load during bug-bounty work when deciding what to report or where to dig, on "will this be a dup", "is this already known", maximizing unique findings. Signals: a mature/popular program, a common vuln on an obvious asset, a recently expanded scope.
- ▌ Reverse Eng Binary Triage · noorqureshiTriage a native binary you can run or read — find the vulnerable logic, the dangerous sinks, and the input path — with static + dynamic analysis. Load when handed an ELF/PE/Mach-O, a thick client, a standalone or obfuscated binary, or a service whose source you don't have. Signals: a compiled executable in scope, "reverse this binary", a crash/segfault to understand, custom protocol, strings that hint at auth/secrets, a setuid binary during privesc.
- ▌ Reverse Eng Deobfuscation · noorqureshiPeel obfuscation off code until it's readable or callable — packed native binaries, minified/ obfuscated JavaScript, WebAssembly, and JS-VM-protected (JSVMP) bundles. Load when analysis is blocked by protection layers. Signals: high-entropy sections, a tiny import table, UPX headers, string-array/control-flow-flattened JS, `_0x` variable names, a .wasm module, an interpreter loop over a bytecode array, anti-debugger `debugger;` traps.
- ▌ Ad Adcs · noorqureshiAttack Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) — ESC1–ESC8 template/CA misconfigurations to escalate to Domain Admin. Load with a domain foothold/creds where ADCS is present, on "certipy", "ESC1", "certificate template", or a CA server. Signals: Cert Publishers, pKIEnrollmentService, ports 443/135 on a CA, certipy find output.
- ▌ Web Xss · noorqureshiFind and prove Cross-Site Scripting (reflected, stored, DOM). Load when input is echoed into HTML/JS/attributes, a search/comment/profile field renders your text, a URL param appears in the response, or a sink like innerHTML/document.write is in client JS. Signals: "search=", reflected values, error pages echoing input, Angular/React dangerouslySetInnerHTML.
- ▌ Web Xxe · noorqureshi bundleXML External Entity injection → file read, SSRF, sometimes RCE. Load when the app parses XML you supply: SOAP, SAML, XML APIs, SVG/DOCX/XLSX upload, RSS import, `Content-Type: application/xml`. Signals: XML request bodies, "<?xml", SAML responses, file parsers.
- ▌ API Bola · noorqureshiBroken Object/Function Level Authorization in REST/JSON APIs (the #1 API risk). Load on any REST API with object ids in paths/bodies (/api/v1/users/123, /orders/{id}), Bearer auth, mobile-app backends, or admin vs user function separation. Signals: predictable ids, verbs that skip re-authorization, "role" enforced only in the UI.
- ▌ API Grpc · noorqureshiTest gRPC / Protocol Buffers APIs — reflection, method enumeration, authz, and injection. Load on gRPC services (HTTP/2, content-type application/grpc, .proto files, ports like 50051), grpc-web, or "protobuf". Signals: grpc, protobuf, reflection service, ServerReflection.
- ▌ Web Cors · noorqureshiExploit CORS misconfiguration to read cross-origin responses (data theft). Load when an API reflects Origin into Access-Control-Allow-Origin, allows credentials cross-origin, or trusts null/subdomains. Signals: ACAO reflects your Origin, ACAC: true, `Origin`-dependent responses.
- ▌ Web Csrf · noorqureshiCross-Site Request Forgery — force a victim's browser to perform state-changing actions. Load on state-changing requests (POST/PUT/DELETE) that rely only on cookies, missing/weak CSRF tokens, `SameSite=None`, or forms/JSON without anti-CSRF. Signals: cookie-only auth, no token, token not validated.
- ▌ Web Idor · noorqureshiInsecure Direct Object Reference / broken access control on web objects. Load when a request references an object by id you can change: /account/1234, ?invoice=987, UUIDs in URLs/bodies, "download", "view", "edit" endpoints, numeric or guessable identifiers, or multi-tenant apps. Signals: sequential IDs, object refs in JSON, role/owner not re-checked.
- ▌ Web Saml · noorqureshiAttack SAML SSO — signature exclusion/wrapping (XSW), unsigned assertions, and comment/XXE tricks to forge authentication. Load on SAML SSO (SAMLResponse, ACS URL, IdP/SP), enterprise login, or "SAML". Signals: SAMLResponse base64 in POST, /saml/acs, <saml:Assertion>, Shibboleth/ADFS/Okta SSO.
- ▌ Web Sqli · noorqureshi bundleDetect and exploit SQL injection (error-based, UNION, boolean/time blind, stacked). Load when a param feeds a query, you see DB errors, numeric/string params change result sets, login forms, search, sort/order-by, or ORM raw queries. Signals: "id=", 500 on a quote, "You have an error in your SQL syntax", MySQL/Postgres/MSSQL/Oracle banners.
- ▌ Web Ssrf · noorqureshiDiscover and escalate Server-Side Request Forgery. Load when the app fetches a URL you influence: webhooks, "import from URL", link/image preview, PDF/HTML render, avatar-by-URL, URL health-checks, XML/SVG parsers. Signals: params like url=, uri=, dest=, callback=, image=, feed=, or a request that reaches out on your behalf.
- ▌ Web Ssti · noorqureshi bundleServer-Side Template Injection → RCE. Load when user input is rendered by a template engine: profile names in emails, custom reports, "hello {{name}}", error pages echoing math, Jinja2/Twig/Freemarker/Velocity/ERB/Handlebars. Signals: {{7*7}} returns 49, ${...} or #{...} evaluated, framework stack traces mentioning a templating engine.
- ▌ Web OAUTH · noorqureshiAttack OAuth 2.0 / OIDC / SSO flows for account takeover. Load on "Login with Google/GitHub", /authorize, /callback, redirect_uri, state, code/token params, SAML/OIDC SSO. Signals: OAuth endpoints, redirect_uri handling, missing state, implicit flow, pre-account-linking.
- ▌ API Fuzzing · noorqureshiDiscover and fuzz API endpoints, methods, params, and versions systematically. Load when you have an API base but not its full surface, an OpenAPI/Swagger/Postman spec, or "map/fuzz the API". Signals: /api, /v1, swagger.json, GraphQL, mobile backend, undocumented routes.
- ▌ API GRAPHQL · noorqureshiAttack GraphQL APIs. Load on /graphql, /graphiql, /v1/graphql, a POST with {"query":"..."}, Apollo/Hasura/graphene stacks, or "query/mutation" language. Signals: introspection enabled, batched queries, deeply nested fields, __schema, aliases.
- ▌ Cloud GCP · noorqureshiAttack Google Cloud Platform — metadata/SA token theft, IAM privilege escalation, and storage/ function misconfig. Load when the target runs on GCP, you hold a GCP SA key/token, or see gcp/gcloud/GCE/GKE/appspot. Signals: metadata.google.internal, service-account.json, storage.googleapis.com, cloudfunctions, gcloud.
- ▌ Web Arsenal · noorqureshiOne line: web enumeration + exploitation tool arsenal for authorized engagements. Trigger signals: port 80/443/8080/8443 open, "web", a URL to a lab target, an HTTP service surfaced by recon. Authorized, in-scope targets only.
- ▌ Ad Dacl Abuse · noorqureshiAbuse Active Directory object ACLs/DACLs for lateral movement and escalation — GenericAll, WriteDACL, GenericWrite, WriteOwner, AddMember, ForceChangePassword, and DCSync rights. Load with domain creds + BloodHound showing an ACL edge, on "GenericAll", "WriteDACL", "DCSync", "abuse this edge".
- ▌ AI LLM Dos · noorqureshiUnbounded-consumption / denial-of-wallet attacks on LLM apps — force runaway tokens, cost, or latency. Load when testing an LLM product's limits/billing, on "LLM DoS", cost amplification, or resource exhaustion. Signals: user-controlled prompts/max_tokens, agent loops, no rate/'cost caps'.
- ▌ Web Auth JWT · noorqureshi bundleAttack JWT/session authentication. Load when auth uses a JWT (three base64url parts, header.payload.signature), Authorization: Bearer, or you see alg/kid/jku fields. Signals: eyJ... tokens, "alg":"none"/"HS256"/"RS256", kid header, JWKS endpoints, role/admin claims.
- ▌ Cloud Azure · noorqureshiAttack Azure / Entra ID — managed-identity token theft, Entra (Azure AD) role abuse, and app/ storage misconfig. Load when the target is on Azure, you hold Azure creds/a token, or see Entra/AAD/azurewebsites/blob.core.windows.net. Signals: 169.254.169.254 IMDS, Managed Identity, az cli, Entra roles, service principals.
- ▌ Recon Osint · noorqureshiPassive OSINT to expand attack surface without touching the target: dorks, code/secret leaks, Shodan/Censys, cloud assets, employees. Load at recon start, on "OSINT", "google/github dorks", "shodan", or gathering intel on an org. Signals: org name, root domain, "find leaks/exposed".
- ▌ Web Websocket · noorqureshiAttack WebSocket endpoints — CSWSH (cross-site hijacking), message tampering, and auth gaps. Load on ws:// or wss:// connections, Socket.IO, real-time chat/notifications/trading, or "websocket". Signals: Upgrade: websocket, ws handshake, JSON messages over a socket, token in the handshake.
- ▌ AI Jailbreak · noorqureshiBypass an LLM's safety/guardrails to make it produce restricted output or ignore its policy. Load when testing an AI product's content controls, "jailbreak", "guardrail bypass", refusal testing, or safety evals. Signals: a chatbot/assistant with a usage policy, refusals to test, content filters.
- ▌ API Versioning · noorqureshiFind and attack old/shadow API versions that missed a fix — improper inventory management. Load when the API is versioned (/v1, /v2, /api/2021-01), on "old API", or after mapping the surface. Signals: version in path/header/subdomain, deprecated docs, mobile app using an older version.
- ▌ Web Csp Bypass · noorqureshiGet script to run despite a Content-Security-Policy — the step after finding an injection that CSP is blocking. Load when you have HTML/JS injection but the payload won't execute, on "CSP is blocking my XSS", or when auditing a CSP for weakness. Signals: a Content-Security-Policy header, a blocked-script console error, a reflected injection with no popup.
- ▌ Web Mfa Bypass · noorqureshiDefeat a second authentication factor — OTP/TOTP, SMS, push, or backup codes. Load when login has a 2FA/MFA step and you want to reach the account without the factor, on "2FA bypass", "OTP brute", "MFA", or during account-takeover work. Signals: an OTP/verification screen after password, a "verify your device" step, `/verify`, `/2fa`, `otp`/`code` parameters.
- ▌ Ad Kerberoasting · noorqureshiKerberoasting & AS-REP roasting — request/crack Kerberos tickets to recover service/user passwords offline. Load with any domain foothold or valid domain creds, on "kerberoast", "AS-REP", SPNs, service accounts, ports 88/389. Signals: domain creds in hand, SPNs set, accounts with pre-auth disabled.
- ▌ Ad Pivot Arsenal · noorqureshiOne line: Active Directory, pivoting/tunneling, and password-cracking arsenal for authorized engagements. Trigger signals: "Active Directory", "domain", "kerberos", "kerberoast", "AS-REP", "BloodHound", "DCSync", "AD/.local domain", holding domain creds or a foothold. Authorized, in-scope targets only.
- ▌ Recon Arsenal · noorqureshiOne line: port/host/service discovery tool arsenal for authorized engagements. Pack in trigger signals so it auto-loads: "new target", "enumerate", "scan", an in-scope target, open-port lists needing deeper enum. Authorized, in-scope targets only.
- ▌ Web File Upload · noorqureshi bundleTurn a file upload into RCE or stored XSS/SSRF. Load on any upload: avatars, attachments, import CSV/XML, profile images, document processors, "upload your resume". Signals: multipart/form-data, filename in response, an uploads/ path, image thumbnailing, PDF/office parsing.
- ▌ Web Host Header · noorqureshiHost header injection — abuse a trusted Host/X-Forwarded-Host to poison password-reset links, routing, and caches. Load when the app builds absolute URLs from the request host, on password-reset flows, or behind a proxy/CDN. Signals: reset emails with links, X-Forwarded-Host reflected, virtual hosting, cache in front.
- ▌ Web Postmessage · noorqureshiExploit insecure cross-window messaging (`window.postMessage`) — handlers that trust `event.data` without checking `event.origin`, leading to XSS, token theft, or state change. Load when the app uses iframes/popups/SSO widgets, on "postMessage", or when JS registers a `message` listener. Signals: `addEventListener("message", ...)`, embedded third-party frames, SSO/login popups.
- ▌ API Auth Attacks · noorqureshiBreak API authentication: token handling, key leakage, weak session/JWT, and no-auth endpoints. Load on REST/GraphQL APIs using API keys, Bearer tokens, HMAC signing, or basic auth. Signals: `Authorization` headers, api_key params, tokens in URLs, /v1 vs /v2 auth drift.
- ▌ Web Clickjacking · noorqureshiClickjacking / UI redress — frame a target so a victim's clicks hit hidden actions. Load when a page allows framing (no X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors), on state-changing one-click actions, or "clickjacking". Signals: missing framebusting headers, sensitive buttons, OAuth consent, account settings.
- ▌ Web Jdbc Attacks · noorqureshiTurn an attacker-controllable database connection string / JDBC URL into RCE via the driver itself. Load when an app lets you set a DB host/URL/driver: a "test connection" form, a data-source config, an ETL/reporting/integration tool, or a processor that takes a JDBC URL. Signals: a jdbc: URL field, H2/MySQL/Postgres connection settings, Apache NiFi/Mirth/Metabase/DBeaver-style data-source config, "connection string", driver properties you can edit.
- ▌ AI MCP Security · noorqureshiAssess Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and agent tool integrations — tool poisoning, prompt injection via tool descriptions/results, over-broad scopes, and unauth tool exposure. Load when the target uses MCP servers, agent tool/function integrations, or connectors. Signals: mcp.json, MCP server, tool schemas, connector marketplace, agent with external tools.
- ▌ AI Supply Chain · noorqureshiAttack the ML/LLM supply chain — poisoned models, datasets, plugins, and unsafe model deserialization. Load when an app loads third-party models/weights (HuggingFace, .pt/.pkl/.h5), installs ML deps, uses plugins/extensions, or fine-tunes on external data. Signals: torch.load, pickle model files, model hub downloads, plugin marketplace, RAG over external corpora.
- ▌ Cloud Imds Ssrf · noorqureshiEscalate SSRF to cloud credential theft via the instance metadata service (IMDS). Load when SSRF is confirmed AND the target runs on AWS/GCP/Azure. Signals: 169.254.169.254 reachable, cloud-hosted app, SSRF that can set arbitrary Host/headers, "metadata".
- ▌ Mobile Webview · noorqureshiExploit insecure mobile WebViews — JS-bridge abuse, file access, and XSS→native. Load when an app renders web content in a WebView/WKWebView, exposes a JS bridge, or loads attacker-influenced URLs. Signals: addJavascriptInterface, WKScriptMessageHandler, loadUrl, file:// access, deep-link → WebView.
- ▌ Web Open Redirect · noorqureshiOpen redirect — abuse a redirect param to send users to attacker sites, and chain it (OAuth token theft, SSRF filter bypass, phishing). Load on params like redirect=, next=, url=, return=, callback=, dest=, or a 30x Location built from input. Signals: `?returnUrl=`, login redirects, OAuth `redirect_uri`.
- ▌ Ad Delegation Abuse · noorqureshiAbuse Kerberos delegation to impersonate users and take over hosts — unconstrained, constrained (S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy), and resource-based (RBCD), including the coercion → NTLM-relay-to-LDAP → RBCD chain. Load in an AD environment when BloodHound/enum shows delegation rights, a machine account you control, GenericWrite/GenericAll over a computer, or coercion is possible. Signals: msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION, msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo, PetitPotam.
- ▌ AI RAG Poisoning · noorqureshiPoison a RAG/knowledge-base pipeline so retrieved content hijacks the model (indirect prompt injection at scale) or exfiltrates data. Load when the app does retrieval over documents/URLs/ tickets/emails the attacker can influence, "RAG", vector DB, "knowledge base", agent that reads content. Signals: upload-to-KB, "chat with your docs", crawled sources.
- ▌ Cloud Kubernetes · noorqureshiAttack exposed Kubernetes: API server, kubelet, etcd, dashboards, and RBAC. Load on k8s signals — ports 6443/10250/2379/8443, /api/v1, kube-dns, a pod foothold, or "kubernetes/k8s". Signals: kubectl, service-account tokens, exposed dashboard, container in a cluster.
- ▌ Web Business Logic · noorqureshiFind business-logic flaws — abusing intended functionality in unintended ways. Load on workflows with money/quantity/state/limits: checkout, coupons, refunds, transfers, quotas, multi-step flows, role/tenant boundaries. Signals: price/qty params, discount codes, step skipping, negative/overflow values.
- ▌ Web Dom Clobbering · noorqureshiOverwrite a page's JavaScript variables using only injected HTML — no script needed. Load when a sanitizer allows tags/attributes but strips script, and the app reads config/state from the DOM or globals. Signals: HTML injection behind DOMPurify/an allowlist, client code using `window.X`, `document.getElementById(...)`, or `config.*` that could come from named elements.