Malicious file upload
When it applies
The app accepts a file and later stores, serves, parses, or converts it. Impact depends on what happens to the file after upload — served from webroot? passed to a parser? rendered?
Why it works
Validation is usually on the wrong signal (extension or Content-Type, both attacker-set)
while the dangerous behaviour is downstream: the web server executes .php in the uploads
dir, a parser follows external entities, or the file is served with an HTML content-type.
Method
Payloads & full variation set:
cheatsheet.mdnext to this file — work the set, not the first line.
- Find the after-upload behaviour: where is it stored, what URL serves it, what parses it?
- RCE via executable extension when uploads are under a script-executing webroot:
upload
shell.php; if blocked, try.phtml .php5 .phar, double extshell.php.jpg, null byteshell.php%00.jpg, case.pHp, trailing dot/space, or a polyglot (valid JPEG + PHP in a comment) with a.phpname. - Content-Type / magic-byte bypass: keep a real image header (
GIF89a;) then payload; change the multipartContent-Typetoimage/pngwhile the name stays.php. - Parser-based: SVG upload → XSS/SSRF/XXE (SVG is XML+script); office/PDF → SSRF/XXE via external resources; image libraries (ImageMagick) → command exec via crafted files.
- Path traversal in filename:
../../var/www/html/shell.phpto escape the uploads dir.
Gotchas
- Upload succeeds but stored outside webroot / served as
text/plain→ no RCE; pivot to XSS/SSRF instead. - Random server-side filenames defeat direct access — look for a predictable/leaked path.
- WAF strips
<?php→ use<?=or<script language="php">.
Verify success
Browse to the uploaded script and get command output, or the SVG/XML fires in a victim context / triggers an OOB callback.
References
PortSwigger file-upload labs; OWASP Unrestricted File Upload.